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THEMES AND VARIATIONS: THE CONVERGENCE OF




The generally accepted definition of the phrase "corporate governance"
comes from the seminal report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Cor-
porate Governance, which was chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury.' The Cadbury Re-
port defines corporate governance as "the system by which companies are directed
and controlled.",2 It has been defined by others as "a system of checks and bal-
ances between the board, management and investors to produce an efficiently func
tioning corporation, ideally geared to produce long-term value."3 At its most basic,
corporate governance deals with the relationships among various stakeholders with
respect to the control of corporations. Above all, corporate governance addresses
the relationship between the owners of a company - the shareholders who are the
principals-and those who manage the company's operations - the executives
hired to run the company as agents of the principals. 4 Corporate governance en-
compasses the weight given to various factors in connection with the process for
making strategic decisions, the adequacy and transparency of disclosures, the reli-
ability of financial reporting, and compliance with laws and regulations.5
Over the past several years, scholars have written extensively about the con-
Vice President, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. L.L.M., Georgetown University (1992); J.D., University of
Tulsa (1987). Ms. Garrett also serves on the national board of directors of the American Society of
Corporate Secretaries, the nation's top corporate governance organization. The views presented in this
article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., its
officers, directors, subsidiaries or affiliates.
1. Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Dec. I, 1992),
available at www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/privatesector /cg/docs/cadbury.pdf (last visited Feb. I, 2004)
[hereinafter Cadbury Report].
2. Id. at § 2.5.
3. Governance and Executive Compensation: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Finance,
107th Cong. 2 (2002) (testimony of Dr. Carolyn Kay Brancato, Director, Global Corporate Governance
Research Center, The Conference Board, before the Senate Finance Committee on April 18, 2002, at 2),
available at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/041802cbtest.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
4. Cadbury Report, supra note 2, at § 2.5.
5. See id.
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vergence of corporate governance practices around the world.6 In the post-Enron
era and with the passing of the first anniversary of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 7 we
can clearly see that the pace of change has hastened; in some markets where corpo-
rate governance was nascent, it has advanced considerably in a short period of time
as regulators around the world are united by a desire to restore the confidence of
investors in the world's securities markets. Despite the swift change, the conver-
gence of governance practices will never be complete for many reasons, although
certain core principles will be recognized in virtually every country as fundamental
to a market economy
This article reviews some of the factors affecting this convergence process
and also looks at the status of convergence between the United States' governance
laws and practices and those of certain other major markets. Specifically, the arti-
cle briefly reviews recent corporate governance changes in Canada, Germany Ja-
pan, Mexico and the United Kingdom from the perspective of a practitioner who
has been involved in various governance issues in subsidiaries and acquisitions in
these markets. In each of these countries, one constant is that the corporate gov-
ernance principles to which companies are subject are imposed through several
sources. In the United States, for example, principles of corporate governance ap-
plicable to a public company created under the laws of Delaware are derived from
the Delaware General Corporation Law,8 state and federal securities laws, and the
listing standards of any stock exchanges upon which that company's stock is
listed. 9
FACTORS AFFECTING CONVERGENCE
Internal and external factors influence companies to establish good govern-
ance practices. While certain factors that influence companies in the area of corpo-
rate governance are specific to the country, or even the state or province in which a
company is domiciled, many of these factors transcend geographic borders. Many
different factors, such as the philosophical approach, market forces, political forces
6. See generally Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of 'Global' Convergence in
Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 321 (2001); William W Bratton & Joseph A. McCa-
hery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross
Reference, 38 COLUM. J TRANSNAT'L L. 213 (1999); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The
Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV.
641 (1999); Gustavo Visentini, Compatibility and Competition Between European and American Cor-
porate Governance: Which Model of Capitalism? 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 833 (1998); Edward B. Rock.
America Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate Governance, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 367
(1996).
7 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.
(2002).
8. 8 Del. Code §§101 et seq. (2003).
9. See generally Hillary A. Sale, Delaware Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004);
Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law, And Federal
Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961 (2003); and William B. Chandler, III & Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two
Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 953 (2003).
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and the cooperation of various global entities, have played a role in the progress
toward convergence.'0
THE PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH TO GOVERNANCE
One impediment to complete convergence is the varying philosophical ap-
proach to governance regulations. Some countries approach corporate governance
in a manner that differs substantially from the approach adopted in the United
States. With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the adoption by the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission of various enhanced corporate governance stan-
dards, the United States has progressed even further into a law-based, or rules-
based, approach to governance." The legislation, regulations, and stock exchange
listing requirements relating to governance are extremely detailed. Failure to com-
ply with these highly specific rules may result in penalties.
Conversely, in some of the world's other markets, the approach is a princi-
ples-based approach. 12 In those countries favoring a principles-based approach to
the regulation of corporate governance, the government may adopt - or even allow
self-regulatory organizations such as the stock exchanges to adopt - general prin-
ciples of corporate governance. 3 A simple explanation of the difference between
the two approaches is illustrated by the different concepts conveyed by the terms
"law" and "guideline."'i 4 The result is a different mindset with respect to corporate
governance in the United States, which applies a rule- or law-based approach,
where what is not prohibited is permitted, compared to a principles-based approach
where greater discretion is vested in a company's management to make decisions
regarding governance activities.
A principles-based approach to governance is one in which guidelines are
clear, but compliance with them is voluntary Some countries have adopted a
"comply or disclose" approach to corporate governance, which requires corpora-
tions to disclose whether they comply with governance guidelines. I5 Other coun-
tries have adopted a "comply or explain" approach, which requires corporations
not only to disclose whether they comply with governance guidelines, but also re-
quire the explanation of any reasons for non-compliance. 16 Typically, the compli-
ance or non-compliance disclosure is made in a filing with either the stock ex-
10. See generally Alex Y Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT'L
L. J. 429 (1997).
I1. See e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Princi-
ples Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV 1023 (2003).
12. See id. at 1037
13. See generally Bratton, supra note 11.
14. See PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (Wait Disney Pictures
2003), where the pirate captain, Barbossa, tells Elizabeth, "First, your return to shore was not part of
our negotiations nor our agreement, so I must do nothin' And secondly, you must be a pirate for the
Pirate's Code to apply, and you're not. And thirdly, the Code is more what you'd call 'guidelines' than
actual rules.
15. See generally Bratton, supra note II.
16. See generally id.
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change or a government agency 17
THE EFFECT OF MARKET FACTORS ON GOVERNANCE
Good corporate governance is of utmost importance in today's economic en-
vironment because it affects investors, capital markets and the companies them-
selves. In a recent study sixty-three percent of investors said that they would
avoid investing in certain companies if those companies had poor corporate gov-
ernance practices.18 Fifty-seven percent of investors said they would change their
holdings in companies based on the corporate governance practices of those com-
panies. 19 In the alternative, investors in many countries are willing to pay substan-
tial premiums to invest in well-governed companies. In Africa and Eastern
Europe, the premiums can be as high as thirty percent, while in Western Europe
20and North America, the premiums are in the low teens.
These same investors indicated that corporate governance can have a pro-
found effect on the capital market of particular countries. 21 Thirty-one percent of
investors said they would avoid holdings in certain countries based on the general
governance practices in those countries. 22 Companies from around the word com-
pete against each other for capital in the global markets.23 The need to go outside
the country for capital may be due to the lack of depth of the capital markets in a
company's home country, or the possibility of obtaining lower rates abroad.24
Companies from those countries viewed as having lax laws governing transparency
and disclosure will have a competitive disadvantage as the rates they pay for capi-
tal in the global markets will be higher.25
Rating agencies such as Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch now evaluate,
in addition to the financial ratios they have always reviewed, governance issues in
17. See generally id.
18. McKINSEY & COMPANY, GLOBAL INVESTOR OPINION SURVEY: KEY FINDiNGS, (2002), avail-
able at http://www.mckinsey.com/practices/corporategovemance/PDF/GloballnvestorOpinionSur-





23. See generally Christopher J. Mailander, Financial Innovation, Domestic Regulation and the
International Marketplace: Lessons on Meeting Globalization Challenge Drawn from the Interna-
tional Bond Market, 31 G. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 341 (1998).
24. See James A. Fanto & Roberta S. Karmel, A Report on the Attitudes of Foreign Companies
Regarding a U.S. Listing, 3 STANFORD J. OF L. Bus. & FIN. 51 (1997).
25. In meeting of the World Economic Forum in Mexico in 2001, Frederic Sicre, Managing Di-
rector of the Centre for Regional Strategies at the World Economic Forum noted that "Management
should not consider corporate governance as a straightjacket, but rather as a means to lower its cost of
capital. World Economic Forum, Mexico Meeting 2001 Report: Managing New Expectations and
Old Challenges at 34, available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Mexico/Mexico-report_2001 .pdf (last
visited Feb. 2, 2004).
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assigning a debt rating to companies. 26 In a competitive marketplace, the rate at
which a company can finance debt is directly related to the company's credit rat-
ing. 27 Where a company's risk of default is determined to be high by the ratings
agencies, the company must pay a higher rate to raise capital, possibly issuing junk
bonds which require high interest rates to compensate investors for the high risk of
default, than a company which can issue investment grade bonds.
For the companies themselves, governance can have a great impact. Poor
governance, as seen in the media over the past two years, can lead to the implosion
of respected and successful companies. 28  Poor governance can also affect stock
prices, as investors sell stock in companies that have a reputation for poor govern-
ance practices. 29 Not only can poor governance affect companies' stock prices, it
may also affect courtroom outcomes. A recent study found that seventy-three per-
cent of jurors believe auditors will lie for their clients, while seventy-eight percent
believe companies destroy documents. Particularly in the United States, this mis-
trust of corporations may lead to larger jury verdicts in the future for corporations
that have a reputation for poor governance and, perhaps, for all corporations.
26. S&P Moody's, and Fitch have been designated by the SEC as Nationally Recognized Statisti-
cal Rating Organizations. See Written Statement of Rating and Investment Information, Inc.. Submitted
to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission In Connection with the November 15 and 21, 2002
Hearings on Credit Rating Agencies at 2 (Nov. 14, 2002), available at
www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/ratingsinvest.htm (last visited Feb. i, 2004). Like corporate Amer-
ica, these groups face increased regulations as a result of recent corporate scandals; they did not down-
grade WorldCom or Enron until bankruptcy was inevitable. This was the impetus for these organiza-
tions to begin scrutinizing governance at the companies they review. See e.g., Claire A. Hill, Ratings
Agencies Behaving Badly: The Case of Enron, 35 CoNN. L. REV. 1145 (2003).
27. For a discussion of the credit rating agencies and their impact on a corporation's cost of capi-
tal, see generally Frank Partnoy, The Siskel & Eberts of Financial Markets? Two Thumbs Down for the
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. UNiV. L. Q. 619 (1999).
28. See 2002 Report on the Corporate Performance Project, Conformance & Performance-
Corporate Governance: As Conformance Duty-An Assessment of Progress as Performance Opportu-
nity-Is There Real Potential, World Economic Forum in Partnership with Deloitte Touche Tomatsu,
available at www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/WEFreport 2002(2).pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
29. The Brunswick Group, Opinion Research Corporation Study of U.S. Attitudes Toward Com-
panies Facing Litigation, Litigation: the Bottom Line, available at www.brunswickgroup.com
/indexflash.htm (last visited March 29, 2004). The study showed that in 2003 over sixty percent of
investors considered selling stock in companies accused of wrongdoing in lawsuit, compared to just
over 50% in 2001.
30. Minority Corporate Counsel Association, DecisionQuest/MCCA Juror Perception Survey
Warns of Intense Corporate Distrust by America' Juries (October 16, 2002), available at
http://mcca.com/site/data/researchprograms/surveys/dq_mcca-survey 2002.htm (last visited March 29,
2004).
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THE EFFECT OF CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND OWNERSHIP DISPERSION ON
GOVERNANCE
The type of corporate structure common in some countries can lead to differ-
ent results in the corporate governance arena. In Germany, for example, there is a
two-tiered board structure consisting of a management board called the Vorstand
and a supervisory board of outside directors called the Aufstchtsrat.3i Members of
the Vorstand cannot, at the same time, be members of the A ufstchtsrat.32 The exis-
tence, at the highest level in the corporation, of a board of independent, outside di-
rectors, arguably abrogates the need m Germany for some of the corporate govern-
ance principles gaining traction in the United States, such as requiring independent
audit or compensation committees.
Ownership dispersion also differs from country to country, creating different
governance concerns in some other countries than those that exist in the United
States. In the United States and United Kingdom, ownership dispersion is high,
while in France, Canada and Germany ownership dispersion is low. 33 The com-
monplace family or bank ownership structures in Canada, Germany, Japan and
Mexico may make investors in those cultures more comfortable with control of the
corporation resting in a limited number of individuals having a high percentage of
ownership. Differences in the number of individual investors in comparison to in-
stitutional investors may also lead to apposite results in various countries. Institu-
tional investors can be expected actively to monitor firm performance because of
the expertise they possess.34 Further, their large ownership stakes motivate them to
engage in active monitoring.
In Japan and the United Kingdom, for example, companies may have com-
mercial dealings with many banks, but rely heavily on one main bank as their pri-
mary source of funds.35 These banks may exercise very little control during period
of smooth sailing. Until the company faces a crisis, the banks are likely to eschew
intervention. When a crisis occurs, the banks become more active, exercising their
rights as lenders and at times, substantial shareholders, to guide the company
through the crisis or oversee reorganization by replacing management, restructur-
ing debt and trimming expenses.
During the past two decades, institutional investors such as mutual funds and
31. DR. THOMAS KUSTOR, DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY IN AUSTRIA at lb, 2 (Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer, July 2002), available at http://www.aiu.com/aiu/PDF/Austria.pdf [last visited
March 29, 2004] (discussing the Limited Liability Company Act (GmbH-Gesetz), and The Stock Cor-
poration Act (Aktiengesetz)).
32. Id. at 2.
33. Eric R. Gedajlovic & Daniel M. Shapiro, Management and Ownershp Effects: Evidences
from Five Countries, 19 STRATEGIC MGM'T J. 533, 536 (1998).
34. See e.g., David Bank, CALPERS Won't Back 5 Directors of H-P in Protest ofAuditing, WALL
STREET JOURNAL, March 11, 2004 and Tim Burt & Christopher Parks, The Walt Disney Crisis: A 'Re-
sounding Victory for Shareholders, FINANCIAL TIMES, March 5, 2004.
35. For discussion of the Japanese Banking System, see generally THE JAPANESE MAIN
BANK SYSTEM: ITS RELEVANCE FOR DEVELOPING AND TRANSFORMING ECONOMIES
(Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds., 1994).
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pension funds have played an increasingly important role in corporate governance
on both a domestic and international level. To some degree, this is the natural ef-
fect of the premium investors will pay for well-governed companies in markets
recognized as leaders in the areas of transparency and adequate disclosure. In-
creasingly, however, these institutional investors act as internal insurgents proac
tively attempting to influence corporations by issuing corporate governance state-
ments36 and filing shareholder proposals.
The institutional investors will also vote against certain management propos-
als viewed by the investors as lacking the hallmarks of good corporate governance.
For example, most institutional investors will vote against any proposed stock op-
tion plan that does not explicitly prohibit the repricing of options. 7 Institutional
investments originating in the United States dominate those from other countries.
Thus, the type of activism that institutional holders here exert will likely become
more prevalent abroad over time. Another effect is that there is pressure exerted
by these investors to bnng disclosure in other markets up to the levels of disclosure
United States investors have learned to expect. The activism of institutional hold-
ers helps to shape the goals set by companies with respect to governance.38 It also
helps determine the speed at which various governance issues are addressed by
both companies and governments and how issues are pnontized.
This institutional investor activism, which has been prevalent for years in the
United States, is being actively exported in the post-Enron era. The California
Public Employees Retirement System (CaIPERS), for example, has identified sev-
eral "Global Corporate Governance Principles" that are, in its view, minimum
standards of corporate governance. 39 CalPERS takes the position that in all mar-
kets, companies should adhere to these standards to attract investment from institu-
tional holders. 40 In April of 2003, CaIPERS issued a press release in which it an-
nounced a $200 million investment in The Taiyo Fund.4i The fund, based in
Japan, will function within Japan as an activist investor much as CalPERS has in
the United States.42 The Taiyo Fund, to avoid dissipating its influence, will make
significant investments in a relatively small number of companies to effect change
in the area of corporate governance in Japan.43
36. See e.g., California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), Global Corporate Gov-
ernance Principles at 3, available at http://www.calpers-govemance.org/principles/international
/global/pageOl .asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2004) [hereinafter CaIPERS Global Corporate Governance
Principles].
37. See generally Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Vot-
ing on Stock Option Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31 (2000).
38. See generally Klaus Eppler & Paul A. Kemnitzer, Corporate Governance Activities of Institu-
tional Investors and Other Activists, 1353 PLI/Corp I1 (2003).
39. CaIPERS Global Corporate Governance Principles, supra note 36, at 5.
40. Id
41. Press Release, CalPERS, CalPERS Invests $200 Million in Japan Corporate Governance





DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
THE EFFECT OF COMPENSATION PRACTICES ON GOVERNANCE
Compensation practices in various countries also play a role in the develop-
ment of governance practices. Boards of directors use base salaries, bonuses and
equity awards, such as stock options or restricted stock, to compensate a corpora-
tion's senior management. Certain types of compensation more closely align the
interests of the company's management with the interests of the company's own-
ers. For example, long-term incentive plans and stock options will in theory en-
courage company managers to act in harmony with the long-term good of the
company rather than making rash, short-term decisions. Institutional investors pay
close attention to compensation practices because compensation that is too gener-
ous can dilute their ownership over time. Many institutional holders make it a
practice to vote against certain types of compensation plans based on corporate
governance concerns. For example, Institutional Shareholder Services recom-
mends that institutional holders routinely vote against any stock option plan that
does not explicitly prohibit the repncing of options. Institutional holders also
pushed companies to expense stock options out of a sense that certain companies,
had they expensed options all along, would not have shown a profit.
44
Some institutional investors view executive pay issues as a touchstone for
whether the board properly oversees the management of the company After all,
the board of directors has been elected by the company's owners - the sharehold-
ers - to, among other things, hire the executives to run the company on their be-
half. Those executives report to the board of directors. If the executives' pay is
too high, it results from a board that may be too easily swayed by a powerful per-
sonality or by the cache or remuneration of board service.45
THE EFFECT OF THE MARKET FOR CONTROL ON CONVERGENCE
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions may also affect corporate governance
views and practices. As a company in the acquisition mode examines various tar-
get companies in a particular market, it will pay a premium for the well-governed
target company. The due diligence process that occurs in connection with an ac
44. See generally Stephen Taub, Coke to Treat Options as the Real Thing, CFO.com, available at
http://www.cfo.com/article/1,5309,7452,00.html?f=related (last visited March 29,2004).
45. D. Quinn Mills, Paradigm Lost: The Imperial CEO, 4 DIRECTORS & BOARDS 27 41 (Summer
2003). Professor Mills makes the observation that:
Initial efforts to retrain strong CEOs have not been promising. Boards have begun to cut
back the severance packages of retired or resigned CEOs, especially those under investi-
gation for fraud. Some boards are said to be getting less generous with pay packages.
But salary and perks are not the key to the imperial CEO power is. Excessive pay is
but a reflection of the dominant position that most CEOs have in their companies.
Unless the disproportionate power of the dominant CEO is addressed, it will soon pro-
vide him or her a way to again push compensation up dramatically and again afford the
independence from checks and balances that enables investors to be defrauded.
Id. at42.
Mills also observes that board rooms often have "club-like atmosphere" because many directors are
themselves CEOs or former CEOs. Id.
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quisition involves, among other things, examining the governance of the target
company, the independence of its directors, the quality of the company's financial
reporting and disclosure and the existence of related party transactions between the
company and its officers or directors. Similarly, a corporation "window dressing"
itself to be an attractive target may implement widely-recognized touchstones of
good governance to increase its price.
Even if a company is not a takeover target, as companies from other countries
enter into strategic alliances, joint ventures and other similar arrangements, these
partnerships will hasten the convergence of governance principles. A United
States company entering into a joint venture with an established company in a par-
ticular market will expect of that company a certain level of governance discipline.
Further, the agreements documenting the relationship between the two companies
may put into place governance mechanisms over the business that are designed to
provide the American company a level of comfort in the governance of the jointly-
run business.
Even within the country, underperforming firms will be purchased by rival
firms that are more competitive. In theory, these more competitive firms are so, in
part, because strategic decisions are made within a governance structure that al-
lows the best decisions to be made. Decisions that focus on the long-term health of
the company rather than ones that serve no purpose other than to entrench man-
agement in the company are made.
THE EFFECT OF LISTING STANDARDS ON CONVERGENCE
One factor playing an increasingly important role in the global convergence
of corporate governance principles is the listing of certain global companies with
the stock exchanges of multiple countries. Each major stock exchange requires
that the companies whose stock is traded on the exchange comply with certain list-
ing requirements, many of which directly address issues of corporate governance.
46
There are, for example, approximately 200 interlisted Canadian companies 47 which
must comply with not only the Toronto Stock Exchange listing requirements but
also the listing requirements of the United States exchange upon which they are
listed.48 Foreign companies have been encouraged to access capital through par-
ticipation in the United States capital markets. 49 American companies are also ac
46. See e.g., THE TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL, available at www.tse.com/
en/productsAndServices/listings/tse/resources/resourceManual.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2004); THE
LISTED COMPANY MANUAL OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, available at
www.nyse.com/listed/p1020656067970.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2004); LISTING STANDARDS OF THE
BOLSA MEXICANA DE VALORES, available at www.bmv.com.mx; ADMISSION AND DISCLOSURE
STANDARDS OF THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, available at www.londonstockexchange.com
/about/pdfs/admiss standards_2002.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
47. Keeping Up, CORP SECRETARY 22 (Aug.-Sept. 2003).
48. The Ontario Securities Commission has been lobbying the Secunties and Exchange Commis-
sion to allow Canadian inter-listed companies to comply only with the Canadian regulations and not
United States rules. CORP SECRETARY 10 (Feb./March 2003).
49. Roel C. Campos, Embracing International Business in the Post-Enron Era, Remarks at the
2004
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tively courted by foreign stock exchanges.50 As companies seek to comply with
multiple listing standards in various countries, those companies may influence
global corporate governance in much the same way that global accounting stan-
dards have been influenced by multinationals.
Related to the issue of listing standards is the desire of stock exchanges of
other countries to give American investors access to the markets in those countries
through the use of trading screens in the United States. Several European Union
exchanges, in particular, have sought this access. 51 Under the Secuinties and Ex-
change Commission's rules, stock exchanges must register with the Commission to
offer and sell securities to the public.52 Further, the securities listed on those ex-
changes must be registered with the SEC. These exchanges oppose the idea of reg-
istration with the SEC and argue that governance by their home country is suffi-
cient. They are also limited because the exchanges could not, through the mere act
of registering, force all of the companies listed upon them to register with the SEC.
The SEC, above all, is in business to protect investors. The Commission remains
concerned that granting other exchanges access to investors on terms different than
the terms with which exchanges here must comply creates a competitive advantage
for the foreign exchanges. The depth of this country's capital markets is a testa-
ment to the SEC's long-standing successes in protecting investors; opening the
door to foreign exchanges here without appropriate controls could limit the SEC's
ability to exercise the same control in the future.
Centre for European Policy Studies (June 11, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/news
/speech/spch06]lO3rcc.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2004). The Commissioner stated:
.1 wish to reaffirm a simple message: European and other non-U.S. market players are
welcome and encouraged to participate in the U.S markets. The SEC has facilitated for-
eign participation in the past and will continue to do so, all within the framework of pro-
tecting investors through our existing secunties regulation. With this philosophy in
mind, over the past 70 years of the SEC's existence, we have afforded equal treatment to
all market participants. Few distinctions have been made based on the domicile of the is-
suer or service provider. After all, US investors are entitled to the same protections re-
gardless of whether an issuer is foreign or domestic. In addition, placing US market par-
ticipants at competitive disadvantage negatively affects the vibrancy of US markets
and, ultimately, would hurt US investors. Shielding US firms from foreign competition,
however, would deprive US investors of the benefits derived from the services and prod-
ucts offered by non-US competitors.
Id.
50. OTC CONSULTING & FINANCIAL SERVICES, DUAL LISTING IN GERMANY, at
http://www.duallisting.com/index.php (last visited Feb. 1, 2004). This is reference to the DAX mar-
keting materials inviting American companies to consider dual listing on the DAX as well as United
States exchanges. Interestingly, blue chip companies' stock is often listed on those exchanges anyway,
through programs similar to the unsponsored American Depository Receipt programs initiated by major
banks in the United States to "list" the stocks of prominent foreign firms.
51. See ICGN, JCGN History, at www.icgn.org/history.html (last visited March 29, 2004), and
ICGN, ICGN Statement on Global Corporate Governance Principles (July 9, 1999), at
http://www.icgn.org/documents/globalcorpgov.htm (last visited March 29,2004).
52. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE LAWS THAT GOVERN THE SECURITIES
INDUSTRY, available at www.sec.gov/about/laws.stml (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
VOL. 32:2
CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES
THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON CONVERGENCE
Global organizations are significantly impacting the convergence of core gov-
ernance principles. Among these organizations are the International Corporate
Governance Network, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), the United Nations, the Export Import Bank, the International Or-
ganization of Securities Commissions, the American Society of Corporate Secre-
taries in cooperation with its sister organizations in other countries, the
International Accounting Standards Board, the Institute of Internal Auditors, the
Asia-Pacific Economic Forum, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Corporation.
Seminars, conventions, publications, and meetings by and among these groups and
their members have led to certain principles of corporate governance being gener-
ally identified as core principles that must guide the behavior of corporations in a
market economy
There are several examples of international cooperation among various gov-
ernment agencies and membership organizations working toward corporate gov-
ernance convergence. As a case in point, in 1999 the OECD adopted Principles of
Corporate Governance.53 These principles do not suggest that any one structure
for companies' boards of directors is appropriate; different structures are appropri-
ate in different circumstances for many of the reasons discussed in this section on
factors affecting convergence. Similarly, in 1995, the International Corporate
Governance Network was formed by a group of institutional investors, such as
pension funds and financial institutions, to provide a forum for exchange on inter-
national corporate governance information.54 It published guidelines in 1999 that
have been relied on by many institutional investors in forming their own interna-
tional corporate governance principles. 55 The International Organization of Securi-
ties Commissions has also released recent pronouncements on transparency and
disclosure, auditor independence and the board's role in the oversight of outside
auditors.56 The International Accounting Standards Board and the United States
Financial Accounting Standards Board are at work on global accounting standards;
the accounting rulemaking bodies of other countries are also focused on imple-
menting changes that would harmonize standards m their countries with accepted
norms of international accounting.
57
53. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Ad-Hoc Task Force on
Corporate Governance, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/50/4347646.pdf (last visited March 29, 2004).
54. See International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), JCGN History, at http:
//www.icgn.org/history.html and ICGN, ICGN Statement on Global Corporate Governance Principles
(July 9, 1999), at http://www.icgn.org/documents/globalcorpgov.htm, (last visited March 29, 2004).
55. See International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), ICGN Statement on Global Corpo-
rate Governance Principles (July 9, 1999), at http://www.icgn.org/documents/globalcorpgov.htm (last
visited March 29, 2004).
56. See International Organization of Secunties Commissions, Objectives and Principles of Secu-
rities Regulation, (May 2003), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf
(last visited March 29, 2004).
57. See Campos, supra note 49. In his speech Embracing International Business in the Post-Enron
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THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL FACTORS ON CONVERGENCE
The stability of a country's government may also play a role in the develop-
ment of corporate governance practices in particular countres. Where the gov-
ernment is relatively stable, the government may be able to legislate regarding is-
sues in the corporate governance arena, whereas a less stable government's focus
may simply be entrenchment.
Beyond the borders of a single country, the creation of certain international
bodies such as the European Union (EU) is leading to convergence in the area of
corporate governance practices, as well as in the area of commercial law. The EU
has adopted a Financial Services Action Plan that addresses issues relating to cor-
porate law, accounting and auditing, as well as access to the capital markets. 5 A
focus on corporate governance principles is a very important part of the EU's goal
Era, the SEC Commissioner stated:
European officials and issuers for years have urged the SEC to accept financial state
ments prepared under 1AS without requiring reconciliation to US GAAP as required at
present. SEC staff has noted two important considerations in assessing this requirement:
progress in converging IAS and US GAAP and the development of an effective global
financial reporting infrastructure for the consistent application, auditing and enforcement
of IAS. Because investor protection is the fundamental mission of the SEC, we will look
at the quality of the information received by US investors. The standards themselves are
very important. No less critical is how standards are interpreted and applied in practice.
With respect to convergence of IAS and US GAAP it is widely agreed that similar,
high-quality answers to important accounting issues will benefit cross-border investors.
Convergence of accounting standards should translate into greater transparency. This ul-
timately will increase the comparability of financial statements for investors and lower
costs for cross-border issuers. As I mentioned earlier, the FASB and IASB entered into a
memorandum of understanding to work together toward the important goal of conver-
gence between US GAAP and lAS. The SEC has fully supported this project.
While the FASB and IASB convergence project is still in its early stages, and involves
many complicated issues, I continue to be encouraged by the progress being made. SEC
staff is working closely with these organizations to support an agenda that prioritizes
consistency among critical accounting standards.
In addition to our work with the IASB and the FASB to encourage short-term conver-
gence, we are working with regulators in other countries and with the accounting and
auditing profession on ways to encourage the development of an effective global infra-
structure for interpretation, auditing and enforcement of ]AS. Such an infrastructure is as
important as the accounting standards themselves. It is meant to ensure consistency and
accountability. Without such mechanism, a "single" set of standards quickly could de-
volve, for practical purposes, into multiple standards. In this context, we are encouraged
by the EU's work through CESR to develop a supporting infrastructure for IAS within
the EU. We continue to see 2005 as an interesting possible target date for evaluating
IAS.
Id.
58. See EUROPA, COMPANY LAW & CORPORATE GOVERNMENT, available at http://europa.eu.int
/comm/intemal market/company/index en.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
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to create a single market for financial services in the EU.59
THE EFFECT OF THE MEDIA ON CONVERGENCE
Pressure from the fourth estate is another factor leading to changes in the cor-
porate governance arena. This pressure typically comes from a variety of media
sources. There is a tremendous amount of business media coverage in today's cli-
mate. Talk show hosts interview executives, regulators and business commenta-
tors and articles are written about various companies and industries nearly every
day. As a result of Enron, Worldcom and other high-profile frauds, much of the
coverage has centered on issues of governance and the independence of directors.
The media is now more attuned to issues of this ilk, and specific coverage of com-
panies is likely to include coverage regarding governance practices. The value of
the contribution of the media to the governance debate depends on the journalist's
background; journalists who cover particular industries or companies gain insights
and business acumen that a general journalist will not possess, making their cover-
age both more accurate and more insightful. Finally, there are a number of gov-
ernance organizations that use media effectively to orchestrate a "name and
shame" process. These organizations will publish "10 best" or "10 worst" lists in
an attempt to draw attention to the accomplishments or failings of companies in the
corporate governance arena.
60
THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS ON CONVERGENCE
To some degree, United States government regulations on the subject of cor-
porate governance have an extraterritorial effect, even where the effect was unin-
tended. For example, Regulation FD,6' which was passed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission in August of 2000, is intended to level the playing field be-
59. The EU has stated that:
Harmonisation of the rules relating to company law and corporate governance, as well as
to accounting and auditing, is essential for creating a Single Market for Financial Ser-
vices and products. In the fields of company law and corporate governance, objectives
include: providing equivalent protection for shareholders and other parties concerned
with companies; ensuring freedom of establishment for companies throughout the EU;
fostering efficiency and competitiveness of business; promoting cross-border co-
operation between companies in different Member States; and stimulating discussions
between Member States on the modemisation of company law and corporate govern-
ance.
See id.
60. E.g., Press Release, The Corporate Library, Citigroup has the Highest Risk Board in the US
According to the Corporate Library's New Rating of Corporate Directors, (June 9, 2003) (on file with
author), at http://www.thecorporatelibrary.net/products/ratings_press-release.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2004).
61. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, Release Nos. 33-7881, 34-43154, IC-24599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716 (Aug. 24, 2000), at
http:/www.sec.gov/ruleslfinal/33-7881 .htm (last visited March 29,2004).
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tween analysts, institutional investors and individual investors. The Commission
believed that companies provided more information or earlier information to ana-
lysts and institutional investors than to individual investors.62 Regulation FD re-
quires that companies communicate material information contemporaneously to
these groups. 63 As companies from other countries court American investors, they
must be aware of the requirements of Regulation FD. Similarly, as American
companies deal with investors abroad, those companies will act as they have been
trained to act by their United States-based attorneys.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act64 also has an extraterritorial effect. Section 906 of
the Act,65 which is the officer certification provision to which criminal penalties
attach, applies to periodic reports containing financial statements. This would
cover not only Forms 10-K and 10-Q filed by United States issuers, but also Forms
20-F 40-F66 and 6-K filed by foreign issuers.67
Ethiopis Tafara, the Director of the SEC's Office of International Affairs, ac
knowledged in a speech that SEC actions have caused concerns in the international
community.6 The concerns include: (i) the required registration and inspection of
foreign audit firms, which are covered by the Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Board's 69 (PCAOB) broad-ranging authority to regulate auditing firms; (ii)
the potential violation of privacy laws, which are extremely strict in the European
Union and require that companies transmitting personal data take a number of pre-
cautions; and (iii) whether the PCAOB's inspection rights, which would give it
broad powers to require that foreign audit firms produce work papers relating to
their audits, are too broad. 70 The PCAOB will work in a cooperative manner with
accounting regulators from other countries to reach a consensus on these matters. 7'
62. See Michael P Daly & Robert A. Del Giomo, The SEC's New Regulation FD: A Critical
Analysts, ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENTARY 461-462 (2002).
63. Id. at 463.
64. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.
(2002).
65. 18 U.S.C. §1350(c) (2002).
66. This form is specific to Canadian issuers. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), Securities and Exchange Commission Forms List, at http:/Iwww.sec.gov/about/forms/
secforms.htm.
67 The SEC amended Forms 20-F and 40-F to include certifications by the officers. See SEC,
Final Rule: Certication of Disclosure in Companies Quarterly and Annual Reports, Release Nos. 33-
8124, 34-49427 IC-25722 (Aug. 29, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/ruleslfinal33-8124.htm (last visited
March 29, 2004).
68. Ethiopis Tafara, U.S. Perspective on Accountancy Regulation and Reforms, Remarks at the
Annual Conference of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales, (July 8, 2003), at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch070803et.htm (last visited March 29, 2004) [hereinafter Tafara].
69. See generally Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, at http://www.pcaobus.org/ (last
visited February 28, 2004).
70. See Tafara, supra note 68.
71. "Although the PCAOB's final rules call for registration of non-US firms by April 2004, the
PCAOB hopes, before that time, to be able to make substantial progress with its foreign colleagues in
developing harmonized registration and oversight models. Id. See also Campos, supra note 49 (not-
ing that the SEC and the PCAOB have made a number of accommodations to foreign firms, including:
not requinng foreign audit firms to provide registration information to the PCAOB if it would violate
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Fortunately, the SEC has a long history of cooperation with regulators in
other countries. Over the years, many different mechanisms have developed to al-
low for the regulators of various nations to work together on matters affecting their
countries. These include memoranda of understanding between the SEC and its
counterparts, as well as arrangements for the sharing of information among regula-
tors and law enforcement agencies around the world.
GOVERNANCE CHANGES IN PARTICULAR MARKETS
All of the factors discussed above have had an effect on the convergence -
and speed of convergence - of core corporate governance principles. The section
which follows provides an overview of the status of governance in Canada, Ger-
many, Japan, Mexico and the United Kingdom, the similarities to governance laws
in the United States, and any recent changes in governance in that market.
CANADA
According to an assistant secretary with a Canadian oil company, in Canada
"the bad news is that everything is changing. On the other hand, the good news is
that everything is changing. 72 The changes in corporate governance in the United
States have had a profound effect in Canada as well. Canada's primary securities
regulator is moving to a United States-style, rules-based corporate governance re-
gime.
One factor that significantly impacts securities regulation in Canada is the
lack of a single, national agency regulating securities. Instead, there are thirteen
provincial and territorial agencies responsible for the regulation of securities in
Canada.73 The Ontario Securities Commission, because the Toronto Stock Ex-
change is located within its jurisdiction, wields more power than the other regula-
tors in Canada.
Corporate governance issues are complicated in Canada by the lack of har-
monization among the various provinces, and by bickering amongst the various
provincial securities regulators. In British Columbia and Alberta, for example,
regulators favor a principles-based regulatory scheme, while in Ontario, regulators
favor a rules-based scheme patterned after new United States laws, such as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
It has been nine years since the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) first intro-
duced corporate governance disclosure regulations in response to the Dey report.74
the laws of their home country, granting foreign audit firms an additional six months during which to
register; and limiting the registration only to those who provide more than ten hours of work on the au-
dit).
72. Sylvia Groves, Assistant Corporate Secretary with Nexen, (quoted in Keeping Up, CORP
SECRETARY 22 (Aug.-Sept. 2003).
73. See Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA/ACVM), About the CSA (June 2001), at
http://www.csa-acvm.ca/htmiCSA/about who are csa.htm (last visited March 29, 2004).
74. The report is so named because Peter Dey chaired The Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on
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The TSX listing standards that were passed in 1994: (i) clearly identified the role
of directors as stewards of the corporation; (ii) required that the board have a ma-
jority of "unrelated directors; ' ' 75 (iii) noted that the board should review the ade-
quacy and form of compensation of directors; (iv) required that certain board
committees be compnsed of outside directors, a majority of whom are unrelated
directors; (v) required the audit committee to be comprised solely of outside direc
tors; and (vi) required that each company disclose on an annual basis its govern-
ance process with respect to the guidelines.
In 2002, the TSX proposed new governance standards.76 These new standards
require, for example, that boards oversee the company's strategic planning process;
that all members of the audit committee be financially literate,77 with at least one
member having "accounting or related financial expertise,, 78 and that the audit
committee have a charter 79 The new changes would also slightly tweak the defini-
tion of "independent directors, defining these individuals as directors "free from
any other relationship which could reasonably be perceived to materially interfere
with the director's ability to act with a view to the best interests of the issuer."
80
The TSX also went on record as supporting stricter standards such as CEO and
CFO certification of the financial statement, but is deferng to legislators on this
issue.81 Following the TSX's guidance, Canadian securities regulators are propos-
ing certification rules similar to the requirements under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Corporate Governance which released its report, "Where Were the Directors?" in December of 1994.
See Guidelines for Improved Corporate Governance, at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/coun-
try documents/canada/dey.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2004).
75. An "unrelated director" was defined by the TSE as one who is independent of management
and free from any interest and any business or other relationship which could materially interfere with
the director's ability to act with a view to the best interests of the corporation. See David Armstrong,
Corporate Governance in Canada (October 25, 2002), at http://www.ffhsj.com/SymposiumMaterial/
GC fall 02/corpgov canada.pdf (last visited March 29, 2004) [hereinafter Armstrong].
76. See id See also Toronto Stock Exchange, Corporate Governance Policy-Proposed New Dis-
closure Requirement and Amended Guidelines (March 26, 2002), at http://www.ecgi.org/
codes/country documents/canada/policydraft_26mar2002.pdf [hereinafter TSX Corporate Governance
Policy] (last visited March 29, 2004).
77 Financially literate was defined by the TSE as the ability to read and understand financial
statements of complexity and scope similar to the issuer's financial statements. See Armstrong, supra
note 75, at 7.
78. Financial expertise is the ability to understand the issuer's financial statements and the gener-
ally accepted accounting principles used to prepare those statements; an ability to asses the application
of GAAP with respect to accruals, reserves and estimates; experience, either directly or through super-
vising others, in preparing or auditing financials in situation that would raise issues similar to the is-
sues the issuer faces; an understanding of internal controls; and knowledge of the audit committee's
role.
As in the United States, there is concern that the person designated as the financial expert on the
audit committee could be held to higher standard of care than other directors or face liabilities that
exceed those of other directors. The CSA did not include a specific safe harbor for the person desig-
nated as the "financial expert. Rather, the CSA has stated that the designation will not increase that
directors' personal liability. Id
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that chief executive officers and chief financial officers certify the accuracy of
their company's financial reporting.
82
The Chairman of the Ontario Securities Commission asked that the Canadian
Institute of Chartered Accountants address issues of auditor independence, rotation
of engagement partners, and possibly rotation of the firm. 3 The Chairman also
asked that the Law Society of Upper Canada consider whether to implement Sar-
banes-Oxley type rules governing professional conduct before the Ontario Securi-
ties Commission and whistle-blowing by outside counselYu On June 27 2003, the
Canadian Securities Administrators released proposed rules on governance issues
for public comment. 85 The rules cover audit committees,86 officer certifications
and auditor independence.8 7  The Proposed Rules follow the U.S. initiative of a
rules-based approach to corporate governance as opposed to the traditional Cana-
dian principles-based approach. Subsequently, the efforts of the Canadian Securi-
82. 18 U.S.C. 1350 (a), (b). (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act required the SEC to adopt rules requiring certification of the quarterly and annual periodic reports
filed with it. The SEC adopted Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14 under the Exchange Act. The chief executive
officer and chief financial officer must now certify that they have reviewed the report, that to their
knowledge the report contains no false or misleading statements and does not omit any material facts,
the financial statements fairly present in all material respects the company's results of operations and
cash flows for the reporting period, that the signing officers are responsible for internal controls of the
issuer and have evaluated those controls within the prior ninety days, that they have disclosed to the
audit committee and outside auditors any significant deficiencies in controls and any fraud involving
management or employees having significant role in internal controls, and whether any factors could
significantly affect internal controls after the evaluation date. The format for this report is prescribed in
the SEC's release, and may not be altered.
A similar certification provision is contained in Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This pro-
vision, which has criminal implications, requires that the chief executive officer and chief financial of-
ficer certify that the periodic report fully complies with the requirements of the Exchange Act. Section
906(a) and (b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. 1350(a), (b). False certifications can result in pen-
alties of up to a $1 million fine, imprisonment for up to ten years, or both, for non-willful violations and
a $5 million fine, imprisonment for up to twenty years, or both, for willful violations. H.R. 3763, 107th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2002).
83. Presently under Canadian corporate law, the shareholders select the auditors annually and set
the auditors' compensation. Canada Business Corporations Act, § 162. The approach suggested would
differ significantly from the existing approach. See Armstrong, supra note 75, at 8.
84. See Armstrong, supra note 75, at 8.
85. See OSC, Notice of Request for Comments (June 27, 2003), at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en
/Regulation/Rulemaking/Rules/rule_52-108_20030627_c Inotice-roc.pdf (last visited March 29, 2004).
86. With respect to audit committees, the proposed rules are in many ways similar to the audit
committee requirements under the NYSE Listing Standards. For example, the audit committee must
have written charter. It must recommend the outside auditors and their fees to the full board, oversee
the work of the outside auditors, pre-approve non-audit services above a de nmmis threshold, review
filings and press releases, review hiring of external auditors or former external auditors as employees,
oversee the issuer's disclosure processes, and establish complaint procedures. See OSCB, Multilateral
Instrument 52-108, Auditor Oversight, at http://www.conferenceboard.ca/GCSR/links/pdfs
/OSCAuditorOversightJunO3.pdf, OSCB, Multilateral Instrument 52-109, Certification of Disclo-
sure in Companies Annual and Interim Filings, at http://www.conferenceboard.ca/GCSR/
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ties Administrators to lead governance reform in Canada have slowed as regulators
from the various jurisdictions have differing views about approaches to reform 88
If adopted "as is" the rules will become effective next year.
Ontario's government passed several new laws in late 2002 that strengthen
governance in Canada.8 9  These include increasing fines from $1 million (Cana-
dian) to $5 million (Canadian), 90 increasing prison terms from two years to one day
less than five years,9 1 increasing fines for insider trading to the greater of $5 mil-
lion (Canadian) or triple the profit made,92 strengthening the laws prohibiting mar-
ket manipulation and fraud,93 and giving the Ontario Securities Commission new
rulemaking authority. 94 This new rulemaking authority empowered the Ontario
Securities Commission to require that CEOs and CFOs certify that the financial
statements fairly present the issuer's financial condition. Further, certifications re-
garding internal controls and procedures will be required on filings made after
January 1, 2004.9'
The most recent change is the Ontario Securities Commission's release for
comment of a Proposed Policy regarding corporate governance practices. 96 The
proposals are being considered by the securities regulators of each province other
than British Columbia and Quebec. 97 The OSC requested that comments be pro-
vided by April 15, 2004.98 Among the governance proposals recommended by the
OSC are that a majority of board members should be independent and that those
directors should meet regularly The chair should be an independent director or a
88. See Karen Howlett, BCSC Head Accuses OSC Boss of Raising Fears Over Reform (Aug. 27
2003), at http://regulators.itgo.com/PI369.htm (last visited March 29, 2004). The article states that
"British Columbia Securities Commission chairman Douglas Hyndman has accused his counterpart in
Ontario of raising false alarms about his proposed securities reforms, marking the latest volley in an
escalating war of words between the two provincial watchdogs. Id. The article further notes that, due
to the "widening rift, Hyndman has stepped down from his position as head of the Canadian Secunties
Administrators, hamstringing the efforts of a group that should play a leading role in governance re-
forms in Canada. Id.






95. See OSCB, Multilateral Instrument 52-109, Certification of Disclosure in Companies Annual
and Interim Filings, at http://www.conferenceboard.ca/GCSR/inks/pdfs/OSCCertificationJunO3.pdf
96. Ontario Securities Commission, News Release, "Regulators Propose Corporate Governance
Reforms for issuers, (January 16, 2004), at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca.en/About/News/NewsRe-
leases/2004/nr_20040116_osc-corporate.htm> (last visited April, 29, 2004); and Ontario Securities
Commission, Proposed and Final Rules, "Request for Comment: Notice on Proposed Multilateral
Policy 58-201 Effective Corporate Governance, and Proposed Multilateral Instrument 58-101
Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices, Form 58-IOIFI and 101F2 (January 16, 2004), at
http://osc.gov.on.ca/en/Rulemaking/Policies/pol_20040116_58-201_roc.htm.
97. See http://library.lsuc.on.ca/Gl/stayinformed-corporate.htm. Both the British Columbia and
Quebec Securities Commissioners plan to publish their own corporate governance guidelines in the near
future.
98. See TSX Guidelines for Improved Corporate Governance, supra note 76.
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lead director who is independent should be appointed. A written corporate gov-
ernance policy should be adoped by the board and this policy should describe the
positions of the directors and CEO. Training and director education opportunities
should be provided to the board members. A code of ethics should be adopted.
The board should create a compensation committee and also a nominating commit-
tee that will adopt policies regarding the criteria for selection of new directors.
The board will develop assessment tools to review the performance of the entire
board, as well as the performance of individual directors. Each of the proposals is
written in precatory language, giving issuers the ability to exercise a substantial
amount of discretion in deciding how best to apply the practices to its own busi-
ness.
Once adopted, the TSX's new corporate governance standards would be re-
voked to the extent they are inconsistent with, or create duplication or regulatory
overlap with, the OSC corporate governance standards. 99 These suggested changes
by the OSC would bring Canada's listed companies more in line with the govern-
ance expected of public companies in the United States. Many of the suggested
changes, such as the creation of nominating and compensation committees, are
changes that the NYSE already requires of listed companies. Similarly, the direc
tor education and assessment tools are similar to recent changes in the United
States.
GERMANY
As noted previously, boards of directors of public companies in Germany
have two levels - the Vorstand, which is a management board, and the Auf-
sichtsrat, which is a supervisory board comprised of outside directors.1°° These
are separate groups of people, such that members of the Vorstand who serve as
members of the company's executive committee are not members of the Auf-
sichtsrat. Further, the Aufstchtsrat cannot exercise managerial powers to avoid
circumvention of the required two-tier structure.
In the United States, there is a definite trend toward the appointment of a ma-
jority of outside directors; in Germany however, the two-tiered structure has for
years required independent, outside directors at the highest level. These directors
represent both capital and labor. They are appointed by the shareholders at the an-
nual meeting and also by the trade unions; employees appoint directors to the
board in furtherance of the system of labor co-determination in Germany 10'
99. See generally http://library.isuc.on.ca/GL/staymformed-corporate.htm.
100. See Thomas Marx, Doing Business in Germany (August 2001), at http://www.legamedia.net/
legapractice/marxthomas/2001/01-08/0108marx thomasbusiness-germany 01 .php (last visited
March 29 2004),
101. Section 102(l) AktG. Different compositions of the board are required under German law,
depending on the number of employees a company has. Under the German Shop Constitution Act, a
company with more than 500 but less than 2,000 employees must have one-third of the Aufsichtsrat
members represent employees. If the company has more employees, the German Co-Determination Act
requires that one-half of the Aufsichtsrat members represent employees. See Dr. Theodor Baums, Cor-
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This two-tiered structure has received criticism over the years. Some say that
the major banks in Germany exercise too much power and that just a few banks
may have seats on the boards of several major companies, leading to interlocking
directorates. °2 A conflict of interest could arise from service on the boards of
competing companies, but this is addressed through the disclosure of the board
members' other positions. Another concern is that the appointment of a labor rep-
resentative to the board could lead to a fragmented board, with labor and manage-
ment factions meeting separately with the chairman and meetings being little more
than perfunctory gatherings aimed at avoiding unpleasant discussions. The two-
tiered structure may also have an unintended effect of limiting the amount of in-
formation provided to the board. Attempts to avoid providing certain information
to the labor representative on the board may mean that the board would not receive
information that, in the United States, a board of directors would receive. One fi-
nal criticism that has been leveled against the two-tiered board structure is that the
structure breeds inefficiencies. While this may be true to some degree, in many
respects the Vorstand is essentially the same as a United States company's execu-
tive committee.
Like Canada's corporate governance code, Germany has a "comply or dis-
close" corporate governance regime. In July of 2002, Germany enacted the Trans-
parency and Publicity Act ("TransPuG"), 0 3 an act based on recommendations
made by the German Corporate Governance Commission, whose Corporate Gov-
ernance Code was first published in February of 2002.'04 TransPuG became effec
tive on January 1, 2003. The Act covers disclosure, transparency and accounting
issues. i5 Because TransPuG is so new, German courts have not yet addressed the
question of whether violation of the Corporate Governance Code creates any liabil-
ity for the company, but the courts may see compliance with the Code as creating a
safe harbor for corporations, 06
On an annual basis, the Vorstand must now file a Compliance and Disclosure
Statement with the Handelsregister or Commercial Register. 10 7 That Compliance
and Disclosure Statement is a representation both as to compliance during the year
and compliance at the time of filing with the principles in the Corporate Govern-
porate Governance Systems in Europe - Differences and Tendencies of Convergence, Crafoord Lecture,
at http://wwwjura.uos.de/institut/hwr/PDF/a0896.pdf (last visited March 29,2004).
102. See Richard Deeg, German Banks and Industrial Finance in the 1990' (October 1996), at
http://skylla.wz-berlin.de/pdf/1996/i96-323.pdf (last visited March 29,2004).
103. See Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code, Transparency and Disclosure
Law Now in Force (July 30, 2002), available at http://www.corporate-govemance
code. de/eng/news/transparenzgesetz2002O8Oi.html (last visited March 29, 2004) [hereinafter Trans-
parency and Disclosure].
104. See Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code, German Corporate Govern-
ance Code, available at http://www.corporate-governance-code.delindex-e.htm (last visited Feb. 4,
2004).
105. Id
106. Hassan Sohbi, TransPuG. The Impact of Comply and Explain Regulation, Speech at 2nd An-
nual German Investor Relations Conference (Dec. 5, 2002), available at
http://www.osborneclarke.com/publications/pdf/transpug.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
107 See Transparency and Disclosure, supra note 103.
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ance Code. 08 If the company has failed to comply with certain provisions of the
German Corporate Governance Code, the company must specifically disclose
those provisions with which it failed to comply '09 Certain provisions of the Cor-
porate Governance Code restate mandatory provisions from German corporate law,
while other provisions are precatory and simply give guidance as to best prac
tices. O Among the precatory provisions are that no more than two members of
the Aufsichtsrat may be former Vorstand members, Aufsichtsrat members may not
serve on competitors' boards, conflicts of interest must be disclosed, committees
shall be formed to perform certain tasks, and audit committee members must be
independent."'
JAPAN
Commodore Perry's black ship has become a metaphor in Japan for that coun-
try's westernization.'2 Recent changes in the corporate governance arena in Japan
are further evidence of the country's continuing westernization.' 1 3 Despite the at-
tempts to change, Japan is still viewed as lacking in the transparency and disclo-
sure rules necessary to provide a high level of investor confidence. I4 Japan started
to transform governance practices slowly- in 2000, the Tokyo Stock Exchange
wrote to all companies listed upon it and requested that they revise their corporate
governance practices to take into account shareholder interests to a greater de-
gree." 5 The Tokyo Stock Exchange also established a permanent corporate gov-
ernance committee to advise the Exchange and listed companies.l 6 Today, how-
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Government Commission, German Corporate Governance Code (May 21, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/download/DCG_K-E200305.pdf (last visited
March 29, 2004).
I1. Id.
112. See Naval Historical Center, Commodore Perry and the Opening of Japan: Background.
(Nov. 25 2002), available at http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/teach/ends/opening.htm [last visited
March 29, 2004].
113. The United States has been charged with exporting poor corporate governance practices. See
generally LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY' AMERICA'S NEWEST EXPORT
(Yale University Press 2001). Recent changes in governance in Japan, as discussed in this section,
make it clear that current thinking in Japan with respect to governance is tracking more closely than
ever the United States' approach to governance.
114. See Standard & Poor's, Japan Corporate Governance in Transition: Weaknesses Remain and
Challenges Continue (2002) and An Overview of Corporate Governance in Japan (2002). See also Mi-
chael Solomon Associates, Inc., Interview with Ted White, Director of Corporate Governance.
CalPERS, 4 Japan Corporate Governance Report, 2 (Jan. 2003), available at
http://www.msapr.con/pdf/JCGReport Jan03_English.pdf (last visited March 29, 2004), in which he
states, Japan needs to strengthen the independence of their boards, improve their disclosure and
transparency, pay particular attention to the independence of company auditors, and increase their
communication with shareholders.
115. Michael Solomon Associates, Inc., Interview with Takusk Shimoda, Managing Director of
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, 5 Japan Corporate Governance Report 2 (March/April 2003), available at
http://www.msapr.com/pdf/JCGReportApr03_English.pdf (last visited March 29, 2004).
116. Id.
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ever, less than thirty percent of companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
have independent directors.' 17
There may well be cultural reasons for the slow pace of change in the corpo-
rate governance area. Corporations in Japan focus on the importance of consensus
in decision making. Further, the concept of "family" is extremely important in the
Japanese capital market. Due to cross shareholdings, there are interrelationships
among many companies in Japan. These ketretsus are tied together through a
common ownership structure which may, in many instances, involve the primary
bank for one or more of the related companies. This ownership structure results in
shareholders - even large shareholders - being fairly stable and passive. Despite a
substantial shareholding, these shareholders may not exert control in the same
ways as might major shareholders in the United States. Another unusual factor in
Japan that affects the area of corporate governance has been the lack of hostile
takeovers. Unlike other markets where there may be bidding wars or hostile take-
overs, the Japanese focus on consensus will not motivate companies to "window
dress" for a potential bidding war. Finally, the Japanese government plays a strong
role in corporate governance, as the government has shown willingness to inter-
vene to assist troubled companies.
On May 22, 2002, the Diet passed revisions to Japan's Commercial Code.i"'
The revisions, effective April 1, 2003, included a number of changes affecting the
operation of boards of directors in Japan. The boards of large companies, those
most likely to be recipients of foreign investment, are now allowed to either oper-
ate using a single tier structure like boards of directors in the United States or
maintain their traditional Japanese style structure."19 Those opting for the new sys-
tem must establish three committees of the board of directors: a nomination com-
mittee, an audit committee and a compensation committee. 20 A majority of the
members of each of the three committees must be an outside director. The role of
each committee is similar to the role that committee would serve in a United States
company. Since the passage by the Diet of the laws allowing creation of Ameri-
can-style board committees, several companies in Japan have announced, or are
considering announcing, plans to reorganize their boards of directors.1
2 1
In addition to the recent revisions to the Commercial Code allowing Japanese
companies to operate using American-style boards of directors, Japan is also foi-
1 17 Id. Not only do few companies in Japan have independent directors, others simply do not see
the need for independent directors. For example, Toyota restructured its board in early 2003 to reduce
the number of directors from fifty-eight to twenty-seven. It did not before the restructuring, and still
does not, have any independent directors on the board. Id. at 4.
i 18. Ryoko Ueda, Corporate Governance and Reform of Japan Commercial Code, 2 J-IRIS Re-
search Newsletter I (Oct. 2002), available at http://www.j-iris.com/newsletter/n]02.pdf (last visited
March 29, 2004).
119 Id. at 2.
120. Id
121. These include Sony, Onx, Hitachi, Toshiba, Minolta, Konica, and the Aeon Group, among
others. JETRO, Focus: Economic Revitalization-Corporations and Investors Position Themselves to
Compete in the New Japan, (Mar. 19, 2003), at http://www.jetro.go.jp/usa/newyork/focusnewsleter
/focus2 I.htmI (last visited March 29, 2004).
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lowing the lead of the United States in crafting reforms in the accounting and au-
diting areas. Japan's Financial Services Agency's Subcommittee on Certified Pub-
lic Accountant Regulation has recommended taking steps to enhance auditor inde
pendence, such as limiting non-audit services and rotating audit staff, as well as
working to increase the number of accountants in Japan. 12 2 Stronger government
of the accounting industry is also among the proposed reforms.1
23
MEXICO
The tenor of the corporate governance debate in Mexico. is very different than
in the United States. In the United States, the debate deals mainly with creation of
the proper balance between the shareholders and the management of companies.
In Mexico, the debate-while not overlooking the former issue - deals more with
the relationship between majority and minority shareholders. 124 In both versions of
the debate on governance, the ovemding issue is one of balancing competing in-
terests.
Although there are several different forms of commercial entities in Mexico,
all companies listed on the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores are organized as limited
liability stock corporations having the soctedad anonima designation. The general
law of corporations is the Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles,125 while the Ley
del Mercado de Valores, or Securities Act, is that country's securities law. 126 As
provided in these laws, companies are overseen by the board of directors, but in
122. Michael Solomon Associates, Inc., Regulatory Watch: A Blueprint for Accounting Reform in
Japan: Blue-Ribbon Panel Releases Its Recommendations to the Financial Services Agency, 4 Japan
Corporate Governance Report 3 (January 2003), at http://www.msapr.com/pdf/JCGRe-
portJan03_English.pdf (last visited March 29, 2004). There are 14,000 CPAs in Japan currently; the
report targets having 50,000 CPAs in Japan by the year 2018. Id.
123. Id.
124. New rules to protect the interests of minonty shareholders are contained in the Securities
Act, Article 14 Bis 3, sections III and IV The new rules were enacted on June i, 2001, but became
effective the following year in conjunction with the date of the annual meeting for companies affected
by the rules. The rules provide, among other things, that:
1. Minority shareholders have the right to appoint at least one member of the board of di-
rectors for each ten percent of stock ownership;
2. Minority shareholders who hold at least ten percent of the shares have the right to ap-
point one comisano, or statutory auditor;
3. Minority shareholders who hold at least ten percent of the shares have the right to cause
a shareholders meeting to be postponed for at least three days if they have not received
sufficient information about the matters to be voted upon;
4. Minority shareholders who hold at least ten percent of the shares have the right to re-
quest that a shareholders meeting be called;
5. Minority shareholders who hold at least fifteen percent of the shares have right to file
a civil action against the board of directors; and
6. Minority shareholders who hold at least twenty percent of the shares have the right to
oppose shareholder resolutions that have been passed.
125. Carlos Creel C & Alfonso Garcia-Mingo, Corporate Governance under Mexican Law, INT'L
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addition to the board of directors, the company must have a comisarto, or statutory
auditor who has an obligation to oversee operations of the company and deliver an
annual report. 127 Generally, these individuals are the partners of the company's
outside auditing firm.
On June 9 1999, a new Codigo de Mejores Pacticas Corporativas, or Best
Practices for Corporate Governance for Mexico, was introduced. 128 The Code had
been drafted through the cooperation of the Mexican Bankers' Association, the
Mexican Institute of Finance Executives, the Mexican Institute of Public Account-
ants, and the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, Mexico's stock exchange. 29 The Code
addresses governance issues relating to the structure and function of boards of di-
rectors, 30 auditing of the company and oversight of internal controls,' 3 ' and fi-
nance, planning, transparency and disclosure in the provision of relevant informa-
tion to shareholders.132  Compliance with the Code is voluntary- Mexico has
followed a prnciples-based rather than rules-based approach to governance. 
133
Companies must file a report annually with the Bolsa identifying any areas of the
Code with which they are non-compliant and explaining the reasons for the non-
compliance. 
34
Like the United States, Mexico has a single government agency responsible
for the oversight of the country's capital markets. The Comision Nactonal Ban-
caria y de Valores, or National Banking and Securities Commission, oversees the
127 Antonio Franck C, Rafael Robles Miaja, & Manuel Galicia R, Amendments to the Mexican
Securities Law, INT'L FIN. L. REV., in THE IFLR GUIDE TO MEXICO 83, 90 (Ben Maiden ed., 2001).
128. Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, Corporate Governance Code for Mexico 1, at
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/country_documents/mexico/mexico.code_en.pdf (Sep. 26, 2002) (last vis-
ited March 29, 2004) [hereinafter Mexico Code].
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2. Section I of the Code explains that day-to-day operations are the responsibility of
management, while the board of directors is to provide strategic oversight. Id. Section 1.2 deals with
the number of directors, discourages the use of alternate directors, requires that the board include out-
side directors, and suggests the information to be provided to shareholders to enable them to vote on the
slate of proposed directors. Id. Section 1.3 deals with the structure of the board and recommends the
use of audit, compensation and finance and planning committees. Id.
131. See Section 3.2 of the Corporate Governance Code for Mexico in Mexico Code, supra note
128, at 2.
132. See Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the Corporate Governance Code for Mexico, in Mexico Code,
supra note 128, at 2. Until recently, it was not the common practice in Mexico for companies to send
lengthy proxy statements containing information about the director nominees and other issues; rather,
the primary communication tool with shareholders was the company's annual report, which is required
by Article 14 of the Ley Del Mercado de Valores (the Securities Act of Mexico). There is still great
reluctance, due to security concerns, for companies in Mexico to provide the type of disclosure regard-
ing executive compensation that shareholders in the United States are accustomed to receiving. Rather,
if companies do make executive compensation disclosures, they do so by aggregating the compensation
information rather than by providing detailed information about specific executives. They may also
discuss the general compensation philosophy of the company in the disclosure materials.
133. Bryan W Husted & Carlos Serrano, Corporate Governance in Mexico 15-16, at
http://egade.sistema.itesm.mx/investigacion/documentos/documentos/9egade-husted.pdf (May 2001)
(last visited March 29, 2004).
134. Id at 15.
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registration of securities and regulates issuers.135  The Securities Act sets forth
general communications requirements, such as the requirement that a company
provide an annual report to shareholders. 36 The company's audit committee must,
at the annual shareholders meeting, give a report to shareholders. 37 The Act also
defines independent directors and requires that the chair and a majority of the
members of the audit committee be independent. 38  Most Mexican companies
have only recently begun to establish audit committees and draft charters for those
committees; in many instances, they follow the charters used by United States
companies as models.
UNITED KINGDOM
It is the United Kingdom which produced the Cadbury Report, one of the first
extensive reviews of governance practices.139 Over the years, a number of other
reports issued in the UK have provided further thought on governance practices.
These include the Greenbury Report, 40 which focused on disclosure of director
pay- the Hampel Report 14 issued in June of 1998, which became the Combined
Code and is discussed below; the Turnbull Report, 142 issued in September of 1999
which reviewed companies' approach to internal controls; and most recently the
135. Id.
136. Creel C & Garcia-Mingo, supra note 125, at 44.
137 Id. at 46. Securities Act, Section 14 Bis 3, subsections IV and V as amended.
138. Franck C, supra note 127, at 86.
Securities Act, Article 14, states that the following will not be deemed independent directors:
I. Employees or managers of the company, or persons employed by the company during
the prior year;
2. Significant shareholders who, although they are not employed by the company. wield
management power;
3. Affiliates of groups providing consulting services to the issuer if the transaction with
the issuer represents ten percent or more of that firm's revenues;
4. Customers, suppliers, debtors, creditors, partners, directors or employees of other enti-
ties having an important relationship with the issuer;
5. Employees of charitable institutions that receive significant contributions from the is-
suer, defined as more than fifteen percent of the grants received by the institution;
6. Senior executives of other companies, where senior executive of the issuer serves on
the other company's board; and
7. Spouses and other close relatives of those listed above.
139. The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance & Gee and Co. Ltd, Re-
port of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Gee 1992), at
http://www.eegi.org/codes/countrydocuments/uk/cadbury.pdf (last visited March 29, 2004).
140. See Greenbury Recommendations, at http://www.blindtiger.co.uk/llA/uploads/2c9l03-
ea9f7e9fbe-7e22/Greenburyreport.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
141. See G. P Stapledon, The Hampel Report on Corporate Governance, 16 COMPANY AND
SECURITIES L. J. 408, 408-413 (1998), available at http://www.corpgov.com/publications
/fulltext/hampelreport.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
142. See THE INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENGLAND & WALES, INTERNAL
CONTROL. GUIDANCE FOR DIRECTORS ON THE COMBINED CODE (Accountancy Books
1999), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/countrydocuments/uk/tumbul.pdf (last visited March
29, 2004).
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Higgs Report, 143 issued in January of 2003.
The issuance of the Higgs Report, commissioned by the Department of Trade
and Industry, builds upon the corporate governance foundation laid in the Cadbury
report. Some criticized the report, however, as an attempt to go too far in regulat-
ing corporations. 144 The concern appears to be that the UK, if not cautious in
adopting governance reforms, will be carried along with the reforms in the United
States and other countries in adopting a rules-based approach rather than the prin-
ciples-based approach, which has been the hallmark of governance in the UK.
Primary laws governing UK corporations are the Companies Act of 1985,145
the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers,I6 the rules applicable to mergers
adopted by the Takeover Panel, 14 7 and the Financial Services Authority's Code of
Market Conduct. 148 In addition, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance, as
supplemented by the Turnbull Report, applies to all listed companies in the UK,
including those listed on the London Stock Exchange. 14 9 As in Mexico, compli-
ance with the Code is voluntary '5o If companies choose not to comply with the
Code, they must disclose the non-compliance in their annual report and state the
reasons for the non-compliance. 151
The Combined Code requires that non-executive directors comprise at least
one half of the directors. 152 A majority of these non-executive directors should
also be free from any relationship with the company or management that would
143. DEREK HIGGS, REVIEW OF THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
(Jan. 2003), available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/nonexecreview/pdfs/higgsreport.pdf (last visited
March 29, 2004).
144. See Alexandra Johnson, Kelley Rejects Higgs Criticism as 'Disturbing Complacency
ACCOUNTANCYAGE.COM, (March 12, 2003), at http://www.accountancyage.com/News/i 132858 (last
visited March 29, 2004). The article refers to a speech given by Ruth Kelly, financial secretary to
Treasury, in which she defends the Higgs Report. The Higgs Report had been criticized in the UK as
rule-book and a step too far toward the US-style rules-based approach to corporate governance. Id See
also David Rae, Former Dixons Chairman Slams Higgs, ACCOUNTANCYAGE.COM, (March 5, 2003), at
http://www.accountancyage.com/News/ 132772 (last visited March 29,2004).
145. HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 88, (Andrew Davies, Gilian Bailey, &
Eric Roydhouse, eds., Butterworths (1999)).
146. The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, which was last revised and reissued in July 2000,
is similar to the Williams Act of 1968, which amended the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The
City Code provides for equal treatment of shareholders, disclosure to shareholders, and good faith con-
sideration by the board of offers and prevents market manipulation.
147 CHARLES M. NATHAN & MICHAEL R. FISCHER, AN OVERVIEW OF TAKEOVER REGIMES IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE AND GERMANY, (Latham & Watkins, 2003), at
http://www.lw.com/resource/publications/-pdf/pub485.pdf (last visited March 29, 2004).
148. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE CODE OF MARKET CONDUCT (FSA Handbook, Re-
lease 026 2003), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/handbooklBL2MARpp/Mar/Chapter I.pdf (last
visited March 29, 2004).
149. FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(2003), at http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pdf/combinedcodefinal.pdf [hereinafler COMBINED CODE]
(last visited March 29, 2004).
150. Id at I.
151. Id.
152. Id at 7
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interfere with the exercise of their independent professional judgment.i53
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) recently acted to require that stock-
based compensation plans be approved by the shareholders. Although a version of
this rule existed previously, the new rule is more restrictive. Like this provision of
the NYSE's listing standards, the Combined Code requires shareholder approval of
any new long-term incentive plans. 154 Further, beginning this year, shareholders
are required to approve the compensation report to shareholders.
155
Institutional investors have great influence in the UK, just as they do in the
United States. Pension funds, in particular, may hold a large percentage of the
stock of a company Many institutional investors in the UK have issued their own
corporate governance guidelines, and will vote the stock they hold in accordance
with the governance principles set forth in those guidelines. The role of institu-
tional investors in the UK will evolve in coming years from simply voting the
shares they hold to engaging management in dialogue regarding significant gov-
ernance issues.
Although many countries are following the lead of the United States with re-
spect to governance practices, the United States has begun to follow the lead of the
United Kingdom in at least one respect. 156 In the United Kingdom, the roles of the
chairman and the chief executive officer have been separate for many years.
57
Only recently has this become more commonplace in the United States.
Further governance reforms appear to be needed in the UK. The Institute of
Internal Auditors for the UK and Ireland is firmly of the opinion that additional
work is needed in the governance area to reach the point at which investors can
have a higher level of confidence in the governance practices of UK companies. 158
Specifically that organization has concluded that the UK should migrate from the
comply and explain approach to more of a rules-based approach that enforces
compliance with governance principles.
5 9
153. Id.
154. COMBINED CODE, supra note 149, at 14.
155. Disapproval would have no legal effect, but would be an indicator to the full board of the
shareholders' dissatisfaction with its actions in the area of compensation.
156. US Heading for UK-style Governance, CORP SECRETARY 7 (Feb./March 2003).
157. AccountancyAge.com, FTSE-lO0 Fails to Deliver on Higgs, (Feb. 7, 2003), at
http://www.accoutancyage.com/News/l 132457 (last visited March 29, 2004). Despite the separation of
roles which has been the clear best practice for many years in the UK, five percent of companies there
still combine the roles. There are no legal prohibitions against combining these roles. Id.
159. INSTITUTE OF INTERNAL AUDITORS - UK AND IRELAND, A NEW AGE FOR CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REFORM 3 (2002), at http://www.blindtiger.co.uklIlA/uploads/-38c9a362-ed7 Ice5fa5--
72ff/CorporateGovemanceReformiJuly2002.pdf (last visited March 29,2004).
160. Id. at 6. Among other changes recommended by the Institute are that public companies
should be required to assess the effectiveness of their internal controls and make disclosures with re-
spect to the effectiveness. This is similar to the requirement set forth in Section 404 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.
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CONCLUSION
Over the next few years, whether current efforts to reform corporate govern-
ance practices around the world are successful will be seen through the eyes of in-
vestors. If the world's capital markets perform well, this will be an indication that
the degradation of investor confidence in recent years has been arrested and, per-
haps, reversed. International organizations will continue to play a key role in for-
mulating governance principles that have international currency Regulators must
continue to work together very closely to assure that laws and regulations passed
by various countries allow for the free flow of capital into and out of the global
capital markets. Finally we are likely to see a continued migration away from
principles-based governance to the rules-based governance of the United States.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: SARBANES-OXLEY ACT,
RELATED LEGAL ISSUES, AND GLOBAL COMPARISONS
JOHN M. HOLCOMB
"I don't sense an enthusiastic pursuit of the fundamental principles of corporate
governance even today. I see a reluctant minimalist approach, staying one
step ahead of the regulators more than anything else. I am trying to find my
own way in getting a stronger board and stronger shareholder involvement on the
issues. If you re not utterly insensitive to matters, you have to a ree that
shareholders are getting more active and restless. 
They want more say.
When even a leading corporate CEO such as Andrew Grove is skeptical of the
system of corporate governance in place today at most corporations, there is a real
problem. Many of the corporate scandals of the past two years come back to the
deficiencies in corporate governance. At Enron and other companies, the focus
was on the failure of the audit committee of the board of directors. At Tyco and
WorldCom, the focus was on the willingness of the board to approve lavish loans
and compensation for the CEO and other top officers. At other companies, the
focus has been on both the structure and composition of the board, and particularly
on its lack of independence. We should remember, however, that in terms of
independence, some consider the Enron board to have been a model board of
directors.
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
Reform of corporate governance is not a new issue. It is now simply a more
compelling and urgent issue, perhaps because adequate responses were not
forthcoming earlier. Ever since the 1970s, there has been a concern about the
John M. Holcomb is Associate Professor, Department of Business Ethics & Legal Studies, Daniels
College of Business, University of Denver. He teaches courses in International Law, Law & Ethics,
and Public Policy. He has J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center and M.A. in Political
Science from Vanderbilt University. He is former Director of the Foundation for Public Affairs in
Washington, DC, and is currently a Member of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline. His
writing and research interests focus on corporate political activities, political interest groups, and legal
aspects of business. He gratefully acknowledges the Center for Corporate Change for supporting his
research for this article.
1. Patrick McGeehan, Can Annual Meetings Restore Trust? N.Y TIMES, May 11, 2003, at 3.1
(quoting Andrew S. Grove, Chairman of Intel).
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independence of the board. Irving Shapiro, then CEO of DuPont, was one of the
leading spokespersons for greater board independence and for an infusion of
independent outside directors. Diversity on the board became an issue as well in
the 1970s, partially in response to the civil rights era and to issues of minority and
women's rights. These were modest suggestions at the time, in contrast to Ralph
Nader's more aggressive call for federal chartenng of corporations. In the 1976
book Taming the Giant Corporation, he and Joel Seligman criticized the lenient
governance standards imposed on corporations through the state chartering
mechanism, especially for those major companies chartered in the state of
Delaware.2 They proposed instead that corporations be chartered by the federal
government and that every corporation with over $700 million in assets have a
board of nine members, representing various corporate constituents, including
workers, consumers, suppliers, environmental advocates, and community
members.3
That proposal strikes at the heart of the ongoing debate over corporate
governance - to whom should corporations be ultimately accountable, shareholders
or stakeholders? The classical corporate model or ownership model would answer
"shareholders." 4 The more modern theory would answer "stakeholders." 5 Some
claim that is more consistent with the managerial model of most large
corporations, though others claim the managerial model has degenerated into a
form that elevates managerial self-interest and executive ego over the interests of
any stakeholders.6 The separation of ownership and management characteristic of
the large modern enterprise analyzed by Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means in the
classic work The American Corporation and a large body of literature on the issue,
has spawned a governance trap.7 With no real consensus on the accountability
2. See RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976).
3. Id., See also Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J.
574 (1984) (containing a sympathetic discussion of this proposal).
4. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, in ETHICAL
THEORY AND BUSINESS (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 6th ed. 2001).
5. R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation, in ETHICAL THEORY
AND BUSINESS (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 6th ed. 2001) (leading work on
stakeholder theory or the stakeholder approach); see also MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND
CONTROL. RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995) (setting
forth an approach that blends accountability to stakeholders with the fiduciary duty to shareholders);
See also J.A. CONGER, ET AL, CORPORATE BOARDS: NEW STRATEGIES FOR ADDING VALUE AT THE TOP
CH. 9 (2001); STEVEN WALKER & JEFFERY MARR. STAKEHOLDER POWER: A WINNING PLAN FOR
BUILDING STAKEHOLDER COMMITMENT AND DRIVING CORPORATE GROWTH 2001 (an example of
modem executives have also largely embraced the stakeholder approach).
6. See generally KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY 317-46 (2002) (detailing a
historical and political perspective on executive abuses). See also Jack Bogle, What Went Wrong in
Corporate America, Community Forum Distinguished Speaker Series (February 25, 2003), transcript
available at http:www.vanguard.com/bogle site/sp20030224.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2004) (Jack
Bogle, founder of the Vanguard Group, and Peter Peterson, former Secretary of Commerce and co-chair
of the Commission on Public Trust of the Conference Board, have spoken widely before many pubic
forums and in congressional testimony about executive greed and abuses.). For historical and political
perspective on executive abuses, see KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY- A POLITICAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN RICH, CH. 8 2002.
7 ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
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model of the corporation, there is much confusion and disagreement over just how
it should be governed.
The need for a committee structure on the board became a prominent issue in
the 1970s as well.8 With the scandal over inappropriate payments to foreign
government officials in the early 1970s and the subsequent passage of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act in 1977 the requirement that corporate boards have an audit
committee became a legal requirement. 9 Corporate public policy or public
responsibility committees became more common among Fortune 500 companies at
the time as well.' 0 In response to a shareholder resolution that Ralph Nader filed
against General Motors as part of his Campaign GM, requesting that the company
form such committee, the company did so." A few years thereafter, a survey by
the Conference Board found that over a hundred companies had formed such board
committees.12
Beyond audit and public policy committees, the gradual formation of
nominating and compensation committees also followed over time. Nominating
committees were a response to the need to both diversify boards and to identify
outside directors not beholden to CEOs. 13 Compensation committees were a
response to the need for a check and independent voice on decisions over
executive compensation, and they have assumed an even larger significance with
the rising controversy over CEO compensation. 14 The latter issue is examined in
another section of this article, but it is inextricably tied to the issue of corporate
governance. In fact, some see it as the major unresolved issue of corporate
accountability and credibility, even with the Sarbanes-Oxley law and other recent
reforms.' 5 In terms of public perception and corporate image, it leaves a more
indelible impression on the public than any other issue. It also goes beyond
corporate accountability and is symbolic of the issue of social justice that heavily
PROPERTY 4 (1932).
8. Michael L. Lovdal, Making the Audit Committee Work, HARv. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1977, at
108, 108-9. (There has been growing recognition of the importance of board committees for large
corporations over time.). See also The Business Roundtable, Principles of Corporate Governance, May
2002, at 14, available at http://www.businessroundtable.org/pdf/704.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2004)
(The Business Roundtable has stated that it believes that the functions generally performed by the
audit, compensation and corporate governance committees are central to effective corporate
governance.").
9. RICHARD SCHAFFER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 503
(2002).
10. Michael L. Lovdal et al., Public Responsibility Committees of the Board, HARV Bus. REV
May-June 1977, at 40, 40-41.
11. JOHN H. JACKSON, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY' MANAGING SOCIAL ISSUES 370 (1997).
12. PHYLLIS MCGRATH, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: THE PUBLIC POLICY
COMMITTEE. RESEARCH REPORT NO. 775 (1980).
13. Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Great Boards Great, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept. 2002, at
106, 113.
14. Id. at 109 (citing a 2001 study from the National Association of Corporate Directors and
Institutional Shareholder Services of 5,000 public company boards showing that 99 percent have audit
committees and 91 percent have compensation committees).
15. Treasury Snow Says Corporate Reform Includes Executives Pay, Oct. 16, 2003, at 2, at
http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2004/Jan/O6-631299.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2004).
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resonates with a large portion of the public.
Duties of Directors
Beyond the structure and composition of the board, the legal duties of the
directors have also become more stringent over time. Historically good-faith
errors in judgment by board members enjoyed the defense of the business
judgment rule, a rather permissive rule that prompted a court to defer to business
judgment rather than substitute its own. The Delaware Chancery Court issued
many decisions providing for a wide expanse of managerial prerogative. 16 Over
time, however, even the Delaware courts have begun to demand more in the way
of due care and diligence, informed decision-making, and independent judgment
by corporate directors, through such decisions as Smith v. Van Gorkum.1
7
Regarding board member independence, there is one major point of legal
vulnerability for many current board members and that is potential conflicts of
interest they might have as insiders or quasi-insiders.
Board-Management Relations
In the midst of rising concerns over CEO compensation and with the greater
role now being played by outside directors, evidence exists that boards are being
tougher m holding CEOs accountable. 18 In their annual survey of CEO turnover,
Booz Allen Hamilton experts have found that performance-related turnover
reached a record high in 2 0 0 2 .19 It constituted 39 percent of all CEO successions,
including those who voluntarily retired and merger-related turnovers. 20 The
highest rates of performance-related turnover were in the information technology
telecommunications services, and consumer discretionary industries. 21 The most
impressive finding is that the "return gap" - the difference in the total shareholder
return between a company's return and the total market return for voluntarily
retired and fired CEOs - declined to 6.2 in 2002 from 13.5 in 2000 and 11.9 in
2001.22 This demonstrates that boards are now judging CEOs more harshly and
that forced dismissals took place for underperformance that earlier would have
been tolerated.
Despite the renewed assertiveness of some boards, the examples of recent
board failures are many Most often, those failures have been due to inattention
16. This phenomenon is what. many critics have labeled the "race to the bottom" in terms of
attracting corporations and generating chartenng fees by conditions friendly to management; a race that
Delaware seems to have won.
17 Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73, 893 (1985).
18. Patrick McGeehan, Study Finds Number of Chiefs Forced to Leave Jobs Is Up, N.Y TiMES,
May 12, 2003, at C2.
19 Chuck Lucier, et aL., CEO Succession 2002: Deliver or Depart, STRATEGY + BUSINESS,
Summer 2003, at 1-2, available at http://www.strategy-business.com/press/artcle/21700?pg=O (last
visited Feb. 28, 2004).
20. Id. at 4.
21. Id. at 8-11.
22. Id. at 8.
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rather than lack of independence, although there is sometimes a mixture of the two.
The Freddie Mac case is an instructive one.23 A series of interviews related to the
Freddie Mac accounting issues "shows a board whose members struggled, and
sometimes hesitated, to take tough action against top executives they had known
and respected for years."24 The board's audit committee finally hired former SEC
General Counsel James Doty to conduct an investigation, later broadening that
investigation and requesting a report to the full board. 25  The firm's auditor,
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), refused to accept representations from Freddie
Mac's president and chief operating officer, and Doty found pages deleted from
the COO's diary that may have shown his direct involvement in the accounting
problems related to over one trillion dollars of denvatives and an effort to hide
fluctuating earnings and create an impression of smooth earnings growth over
time.26 The board, initially wanting the COO to resign, only then decided it must
fire him, and forced out the CEO and chief financial officer as well. While
Doty's report "largely absolves the board, saying that management withheld key
information from the board, other finance experts believe the report is too soft on
the board, that the board "should have been more aggressive, asked more questions
and relied less on what officials were telling them." 2 The Economist found the
following as key features of the Freddie Mac crisis: "missing documents; lavish
executive pay- uncooperative directors; and indications that Freddie Mac's
reported figures are wrong, and its internal controls are in chaos. 29
Subsequent to forcing out the three top officers, the board then promoted the
chief investment officer to be president and CEO.30 However, the Doty report
directly implicates him as well in circumventing new denvatives accounting rules
and even in dividing the denvatives transactions so they would not have to be
disclosed to the board. One business reporter therefore concludes, "Restonng
Freddie's credibility ought to mean getting nd of everybody involved - up to and
including the board of directors,' 31 The Doty report found that the tone of the
organization and goal of attaining smooth reporting earnings for "steady Freddie"
was set at the top.32 Another report concludes:
The convoluted strategies Freddie Mac employed ultimately failed, contributing to
as much as $4.5 billion in accounting errors [and] provide some of the most
vivid illustrations since the collapse of Enron Corporation of the lengths to which
corporations have gone to circumvent accounting rules and manipulate the





27. Id., Kathleen Day, Freddie Mac Told to Remove CEO, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2003, at El.
28. Kathleen Day, Report Faults Freddie Mac Officials, WASH. POST, July 24, 2003, at El.
29. Trouble at Home, ECONOMIST, June 14, 2003, at 70.
30. Day, supra note 28.
31. Jerry Knight, At Freddie Mac, It's Hard to Lay Claim to Innocence, WASH. POST, July 28,
2003, at El.
32. See Day, supra note 28.
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numbers they disclose to the investing public.
33
Outside or Independent Directors
The debate over corporate governance has emphasized, and some would
argue has overemphasized, the importance of companies having outside or
independent directors on the board. That was emphasized by early reformers and
is a key component of the Sarbanes-Oxley provisions and the NYSE standards,
requiring that key board committees be composed entirely of outsiders.34
Outsiders, and especially genuinely independent directors, are ostensibly less
prone to defer to the CEO and may bring broader perspectives to board
deliberations. Anecdotal evidence suggests that outside directors are also
becoming more actively engaged in corporate decision-making." One study found
that when such outsiders serve on a network of multiple boards, they may diffuse
positive standards of CEO compensation and of useful strategic lessons among
several firms.3 6
Beyond the legal duties of directors, the powers of the board include those of
both monitoring the behavior of management and more actively contributing to
strategic policy-making. Both require a certain detachment from management and
independence from management influence. 37 Hence, a great debate has ensued
over the need to have more outside or independent directors on the board. If a
director has business or personal ties to corporate management, he or she might too
easily be influenced into rubber-stamping management decisions. The control
exerted by management over directors and the "cozy" relationship between the two
is the most common criticism of corporate governance. The criteria for
determining a genuinely "independent" director is of course subject to debate, and
to be independent does not guarantee a board member will be actively engaged in
his or her board responsibilities.
Both the regulators and the academic literature favor independent rather than
inside directors. The academic literature does so because it is based on agency
theory, which sees the key role of boards as being the control or monitoring
function.38 It is reasonable that independent directors, less related and beholden to
the CEO, would be more effective monitors. However, a competing theory, that of
33. David S. Hilzenrath, Strategy Aimed to Circumvent New Rule, WASH. POST, July 28, 2003, at
El.
34. Lovdal, supra note 8, at 108-9.
35. Carrie Johnson, Corporate Audit Panels to Gain Power, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2003, at E2
(citing Charles M. Elson, director of the Center for Corporate Governance at the University of
Delaware, who has noticed audit committees are meeting more often and seeking more outside advice
since the collapse of Enron).
36. James D. Westphal, et al., Second-order Imitation: Uncovering Latent Effects of Board
Network Ties, ADMIN. Sci. Q., Dec. 2001, at 717
37. See CONGER, supra note 5, ch. 2; Sonnenfeld, supra note 13, at i II (stressing that a culture of
open dissent within the board is even more important than dominance by outside directors).
38. Amy J. Hillman & Thomas Dalziel, Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Integrating
Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 383, 383-84 (2003).
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resource dependency, suggests that the board provides much more than a control
function and that it also provides a wide range of resources or capital to the
corporation beneficial to business and strategic decisions. 39 Based on this theory
dependent directors from the firm's customers, suppliers, consultants, or bankers
might actually have a greater incentive to supply "board capital" since they would
stand to gain more from the contribution than would completely detached
outsiders.40  Based on this analysis, the firm would gain more from a board
composed of both dependent and independent directors, rather than one dominated
by independent directors. However, the dependent directors need not be corporate
insiders in the strictest sense of that term, i.e., employees of the firm. It is not
necessary that they actually be on the board for the directors to gain from their
insights and input. Outside directors should be able to question key insiders at
anytime for relevant information and some companies are even structuring such
interaction to ensure that directors are informed of new developments within the
firm.
41
This may also explain why a meta-analysis of all studies on the link between
board composition and financial performance4 2 found there is no positive
correlation between firm financial performance and a large proportion of outsiders
on a corporate board.43 Further, both Enron and Tyco had boards with a heavy
presence of outside directors and might be considered model boards, yet they
failed in dramatic fashion. 44 Hence, the culture of firm and the board, along with
other best board practices, may be more important than the presence of outsiders
on the board, as required or promoted by Sarbanes-Oxley and the standards of the
stock exchanges.45
The life cycle and tenure of the CEO, and even of the firm, may further
complicate the value of dependent and independent directors at any given point in
time. One study argues that early in a CEO's tenure, especially one hired from
outside the firm, the board must play a greater role in leadership development than
in monitoring opportunistic behavior.46 Cultivating leadership might call for a
combination of backgrounds and skills from both independent and dependent
directors.
Separation of Chairman and CEO
The separation of the positions of chairman and CEO is seen by some experts
39. Id. at 385-388.
40. Id. at 391.
41. Saul Gellerman, Why Corporations Can't Control Chicanery, 46 Bus. HORIZONS 3, 17-24
(2003).
42. Dan R. Dalton, et al., Meta-Analytic Reviews of Board Composition, Leadership Structure,
and Financial Performance, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 269, 269-70 (1998).
43. Id. at 280.
44. Sonnenfeld, supra note 13, at 108.
45. /d. atl 109-113.
46. Wei Shen, The Dynamics of the CEO-Board Relationship: An Evolutionary Perspective, 28
ACAD. MGMT. REV 466,466-67 (2003).
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as even more important than dominance by independent directors on the board, but
it is an area where little progress has been made by U.S. corporations. According
to a study by The Corporate Library, only fifteen of S&P 500 corporations have an
47independent director as chairman. More common has been a compromise
measure of selecting a lead outside director to preside over board meetings even
when the CEO is chairman.48
Best Board Practices
Along with new actors and new aspects of shareholder activism, there is also
an evolving discussion and study of "best practices" in corporate governance. That
list has expanded from the traditional list of director independence and committee
49structures. Various advocates are now emphasizing such new board practices as:
Separation of Chairman and CEO Positions;
Lead Director Position;
Totality of Independent Directors (as at Amencan Standard, Baxter
Healthcare, and Fortune Brands);
Limits on Number of Multiple Directors (numbers of board seats held);
Downsizing of Boards (Crandall, former CEO of AMR recommends six
to eight members and no committees);
Board Meetings without Management
More Frequent Meetings and Staff Support;
Frequent and Complete Disclosure of Information to the Board;
Stock Ownership by Board Members, but no options;
Evaluations of Corporate Governance Process;
Board Committee on Corporate Governance; and,
Limit CEOs and Directors on Each Other's Boards
50
Whatever measures are taken voluntarily or mandated by the SEC, some
advocates contend that they all fall short. Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Associate Dean of
the Yale School of Organization and Management, claims it all comes down to
corporate culture. 5' There must be a culture of independence on the board, in
substance and not just in form. Independent directors must be inquisitive and
challenging, and dissent must be respected and encouraged by senior management
for genuine checks and balances to exist. Independent directors of stature,
47 Ben White, Save the Chairfor the Chief? WASH. POST., Feb. 7, 2003, at El; see also The
Corporate Library, Exclusive Special Report on CEO/Chairman Splits in the S&P 500: How Many and
How Independent? Feb. 2003, at http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/study/spotlight.asp (last visited
Feb. 29, 2004) (containing multiple corporate studies).
48. Paul Kocourek, et. ai., Corporate Governance: Hard Facts About Soft Behaviors, STRATEGY +
BUsiNESS, Spring 2003, at I, available at http://www.strategy-business.com/press/article/8322?pg=0
(last visited Jan. 30, 2004); Mary Williams Walsh & David Leonhardt, To Rein in Abuses, Executives
Get Watchdogs, N.Y TiMES, July 5, 2002, at CI.
49. See Sonnenfeld, supra note 13, at 106-109 (detailing traditional board structures); Nell
Minnow, Stockholders Would Benefit From More Board Flexibility, USA TODAY, Sept. 16, 2002, at
13A (detailing emerging board best practices).
50. Sonnenfeld, supra note 13, at 112-13; Minnow, supra note 49.
51. Sonnenfeld, supra note 13, at 109.
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expertise, and standing must be appointed.52
In keeping with Sonnenfeld's views, others have also suggested that
qualitative reforms going well beyond the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley may do
much more to improve corporate governance.53 Kocourek, Burger, and Birchard
emphasize the following key ingredients: (1) Select the right directors: one study
by Korn/Ferry found that current directors rate "willingness to challenge
management" as the number one criteria for a good director;54 (2) Training of
directors: a major failing of most corporations, but Pfizer is an example of a
company that does an excellent job; (3) Inform and empower directors: they need a
constant flow of information, ready access to key managers, and both financial and
nonfinancial measures of company progress; (4) Counterbalance the CEO:
separating the positions of chairman and CEO is necessary and far better than just
having a lead director, and the board nominating committee must have more power
than the CEO in selecting future directors; (5) Nurture a culture of collegial
questioning: while being a partner with the CEO, strong-willed directors must also
challenge and disagree; (6) Devote an adequate amount of time: directors must
devote 100-200 hours a year to a board, and perhaps 300 hours for audit committee
members; 55 (7) Measure board performance: studies show a small percentage of
boards face up to this need, but surveyed directors recognize its value.
56
Continuing with the emphasis on director diligence, as opposed to
independence, another author suggests ways of increasing the time invested by
directors and expanding their control. One argues in favor of full-time directors,
who view that job as their primary responsibility and serve on only one corporate
board.57 Such directors would also be given "the authonty of a military inspector-
general, with the right to question anyone within the company and impose
sanctions on them.
58
Finally, for corporate governance to really work, cooperation must exist
between the corporate community and business policy organizations on the one
hand and self-regulatory bodies and government regulators on the other. Each
must respect the professionalism of the other. The adversary spirit long dominant
between business and regulators will impede progress on the road to reform. All
must march together in the same direction.
Shareholder Rights
In the 1970s, much of the incipient changes in corporate governance related to
the structure and composition of the corporate board.59 However, there also was
52. Id. at 113
53. Kocourek, supra note 48, at 12.
54. Id. at 5.
55. Id. at 11.
56. Id. at 4-5.
57 Gellerman, supra note 41.
58. Id.
59. Lovdal, supra note 8, at 108-10; JACKSON, supra note II, at 367-370.
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movement in the area of shareholder rights and powers as well. Shareholders have
historically enjoyed and used the following legal powers:
Voting - to vote for or against directors, usually a management slate of
directors, as well as to vote on proxy resolutions. There has also been a
modest campaign for the system of cumulative voting, which would give
dissident directors more concentrated power in electing some
representatives to the board.
Inspecting the Books - beyond having access to the 10-K report and other
corporate disclosures, shareholders sometimes legally demand and receive
access to more detailed financial information, under special circumstances
and when it is in their material interests.
Lawsuits - shareholders can bring individual, class action, or denvate
suits against management when they have been injured by management
mistakes.
Wall Street Rule - the final power by shareholders has been that of
exiting or selling their shares when they disagree with the direction of the
company and decisions of management.
Shareholder Resolutions - they can file a resolution on a corporate policy
with which they disagree, to be voted upon by all shareholders, when they
own $2,000 worth of stock.60
It is the final power of introducing shareholder resolutions that has become
ever more prominent since the 1970s. The SEC has periodically ruled on the
criteria that such resolutions should meet, which can be disqualified by
management, and the votes required for resubmission of such resolutions.6i
Organized shareholders, though, have been the driving force behind what has
really become a movement of shareholder resolutions. The radical organizer Saul
Alinsky used resolutions as an organizing strategy in the 1950s;62 Nader later used
them for a time in the late 1960s;63 and the National Council of Churches really
promoted their widespread use since that time. 64 Its Interfaith Center on Corporate
Responsibility annually sponsors hundreds of shareholder resolutions.65 Other
religious and labor organizations now sponsor resolutions as well.
66
As an indication of their growing impact, the Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC) formed in 1973 to monitor shareholder resolutions and to
advise institutional investors on how to vote their shares.67 Most of the resolutions
60. ARTHUR LEviTT, TAKE ON THE STREET 211-212 (2002).
61. Security Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a)(8), 17 CFR 1.
62. SANDOR D. HORwITT, LET THEM CALL ME REBEL. SAUL ALINSKY, His LIFE AND LEGACY
(1989).
63. JACKSON, supra note 11, at 370.
64. Id.
65. Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Companies, Resolutions and Status: 2002-2003
Season, at http://www.iccr.org/shareholder/proxybook03/03statuschart.php (last visited Feb. 14, 2004)
(listing continual update on these resolutions); The Corporate Library, News Briefs, at
http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/news/default.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2004) (featuring articles on
shareholder activism).
66. The Corporate Library, News Briefs, supra note 65.
67 The Investor Responsibility Research Center Library, at
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of the 1970s and 1980s related to the social impact of corporate policies, such as
disclosure of EEO data, investment in South Africa, development of nuclear
power, or animal testing.6s Reflecting current times, shareholder resolutions more
commonly focus today on mainstream corporate governance issues, such as the
separation of the office of CEO and chairman of the board, the demand for more
independent directors, or reform of CEO compensation.69
NEW ELEMENTS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
In terms of what is new in shareholder activism, the upsurge in activism by
mainstream shareholders on mainstream issues tells the tale. No longer are liberal
church groups and other cause organizations the only ones sponsoring resolutions
on largely social issues. Even before the wave of corporate scandals, corporate
governance had become a growing concern among institutional investors. Beyond
the formation of the IRRC in 1973, other organizations formed to assist
institutional investors in the 1980s, including Institutional Shareholder Services,
Inc.7° James E. Heard, an organizer of IRRC, is now a principal in this firm.7' In
fact, boards and senior management might have seen the earlier activism on
corporate governance as an early-warning signal to its importance as an issue.
Regulators might likewise have paid closer attention.
Now, in the wake of the scandals over management and board misconduct,
other organized interests have entered the arena. The Council of Institutional
Investors, along with state pension funds, is playing a greater role in pressunng
management and boards on corporate governance and executive pay issues.7 2 The
rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor's and Moody's, are now involved in
evaluating the governance mechanisms and systems of the companies they
http://www.irrc.org/resources/iibrary.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004) (providing some of IRRC's
research which is known as fair and objective).
68. See DAVID VOGEL, LOBBYING THE CORPORATION: CITIZEN CHALLENGES TO BUSINESS
AUTHORITY 69-125 (1978); see also PATRICIA O'TOOLE, MONEY & MORALS IN AMERICA 300-27
(1998).
69. Robert D. Hershey, Investor Angst Prompts Funds to Speak Up, N.Y TIMES, July 7 2002, at
3.5; see also The Corporate Library, Shareholder Proposals, at http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/
shareholder-action/shareprops/default.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2004) (containing submitted shareholder
proposals); CaIPERS, Shareholder Action, at http://www.calpers-govemance.org/alert/default.asp (last
visited Feb. 14, 2004) (detailing CaPERS' policies on exercising its voting rights); TIAA-CREF
TIAA-CREF Publications, at https://www5.tiaa-cref.org/bookstore/list.do?cat-6 (last visited Feb. 14,
2004) (containing TIAA-CREF's investment philosophies); AFL-CIO, Executive PayWatch, at
http://www.aflcio.org/paywatch (last visited Feb. 14, 2004) (covering executive compensation trends,
issues, and resolutions).
70. Institutional Shareholder Services, Company Profile (2004), at
http://www.issproxy.comlabout/index.asp (last visited Jan. 27, 2004) (Institutional Shareholder Services
(ISS), Inc. is a for-profit proxy monitoring service.). For a critique of ISS's potential conflicts of
interest, see Adam Lishinsky, ISS Wants Business Both Ways, FORTUNE, June 16, 2003, at 24.
71. Institutional Shareholder Services, Company Profile, supra note 70 (information about staff
and operations).
72. See Council of Institutional Investors, What We Do, at http://www.cii.org/dcwascii/web.nsf/
doc/whatindex.cm (last visited Feb. 29, 2004) (information on its corporate governance activities).
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evaluate.73 Finally, there are new companies that have been recently formed to sell
services on corporate governance evaluation, such as Governance Metrics
International.74 Investors are beginning to focus much more on governance
evaluation, partially because studies increasingly show a positive relationship
between "good governance" and financial performance.75 That field of study will
likely grow even more as the corporate governance issue remains high on the
agenda.
Organized political interests have also taken positions on corporate
governance. The Business Roundtable has promoted the need for more
independent boards, even while it takes a cautious stance on the expensing of stock
options.76 The Conference Board formed a Commission on Public Trust and
Private Enterprise, co-chaired by former Commerce Secretary Peter Peterson and
John Biggs of TIAA-CREF 77 and it has stressed the need for more scrutiny and
independence on corporate boards, as well as the expensing of stock options.78
John Bogle, a member of the Commission and founder of the Vanguard
Group, has emerged as a leading activist in favor of corporate governance
reform. 79  He has been a critic of both the gatekeepers and monitors, such as
corporate boards, regulators, and legislators, as well as of investors themselves.
He believes the mutual funds must step to the plate in monitoring the governance
of companies in which they invest. As he puts it:
Even after the bear market that devastated the value of our clients' equity
holdings, the only response we've heard from the mutual fund industry is the
sound of silence. We need to return to behaving as owners rather than traders,
to return to pnnciples of prudence and trusteeship rather than of speculation and
salesmanship, and to return to acting as good stewards of the assets entrusted to
80our care.
73. See Standard & Poor's, Governance Services, at http://www.standardandpoors.com (last
visited Jan. 26, 2004).
74. See Governance Metrics International, About Us: Overview, at http://www.gmiratings.com
(last visited Feb. 29, 2004).
75. See Jeanne Patterson, The Patterson Report: Corporate Governance and Corporate
Performance Research (2003), available at http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/Govemance-
Research/patterson-report/patterson.asp (last visited Mar. I1, 2004). See also The Corporate Library,
Governance Research (2004) (containing multiple studies), at
http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/Govemance-Research/default.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
76. The Business Roundtable, Principles of Corporate Governance, (May, 2002) at http:/www.
businessroundtable.org/pdf/704.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2004).
77 The Commission on Public Trust and Enterprise, (2004), at http://www.conference
board.org/knowledge/govemCommission.cfm (last visited Mar. 2, 2004) (Co-chair Biggs was an
erstwhile candidate to head the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, established by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, while Harvey Pitt was still Chairman of the SEC, but his candidacy met with
substantial business opposition.).
78. The Commission Board, Commission on Public Trust & Private Enterprise: Findings &
Recommendations, Jan. 9. 2003, at 38-39, at http://www.conference-board.org/pdf free/758.pdf (last
visited Mar. 2, 2004).




One other major issue is of renewed concern for shareholders, that of
transparency Disclosures of all sorts of corporate practices related to the
governance system, to accounting, and to the means of evaluating executive
performance and compensation are being promoted by shareholders. The SEC has
unanimously proposed a rule requiring greater disclosure on how corporate
directors are selected, including policies on how directors are nominated, the
minimum qualifications to serve on the board and how candidates came to the
attention of the board.8
Shareholder Nomination of Directors
Historically, shareholders have had limited powers in nominating directors
due to management's control of the proxy machinery Shareholders' ability to
nominate directors and participate in board elections has been undermined by the
huge financial barriers of financing a campaign for their own nominees.
Corporations enjoy the power to finance campaigns and proxy materials for only
those candidates nominated by the corporate board. Shareholders therefore face a
slate of choices selected by the company Outside candidates must present
shareholders with an alternative ballot at their own expense. As one business
writers concludes, "Most significant [even after Sarbanes-Oxley], the very heart of
corporate governance, the election of directors, is still a sham. The shareholder
ballots you receive with your proxy materials are just like those Stalin used to
distribute. For every position there is exactly one candidate. Please mark your
choice."82
However, the SEC is now considenng a rule which would allow significant
and long-time shareholders, those with more than 3 to 5 percent of corporate
ownership, to nominate their own directors.8 3 Shareholder activist Evelyn Y Davis
and corporate governance expert Charles Elson are concerned that such a high
threshold might set a precedent for elevating the share holding requirement to
sponsor shareholder resolutions from the current level of one percent or $2,000 of
shares, but the SEC has defeated such moves in the past.84 The rule may allow
shareholder nominations when certain triggering events occur, such as a
company's failure to implement the terms of shareholder resolutions enjoying wide
support that call for changes in corporate governance, or when shareholders have
expressed widespread dissatisfaction in the current board.85 Some experts fear that
if support for shareholder resolutions becomes a triggering event, then corporations
will fight earlier and harder to heavily defeat such resolutions.
86
Another rule proposed by the SEC would require disclosure of nominating or
governance committee actions on shareholder candidates. The board would have
8i. Came Johnson, SEC Votes to Propose Director Rules, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2003, at E3.
82. Geoffrey Colvin, Shareholders are No Fools Anymore, FORTUNE, July 7, 2003, at 42.
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to explain why it found unacceptable a board candidate nominated by shareholders
who owned more than 3 percent ownership stake for the past year.
87
Some corporate governance reformers, such as Nell Minow and the AFL
CIO, see shareholder empowerment as bringing more fundamental change in
corporate governance than does the Sarbanes Oxley Act, through the presence of
more "outside directors" chosen by the board itself.8 8 Opponents, such as Henry
Manne, notable expert in the law and economics movement, believe that
empowering shareholders in director elections will create mischief by creating too
much corporate democracy and paralyzing corporate decision-making with the
presence on the board of activist shareholder representatives.8 9 Even moderate
critics reject the "romantic notion that corporations should be laboratories of
democracy, and conclude that "running a corporation requires more stability and
internal harmony than the democratic model allows."' 9 For these reasons, leading
business lobbies like the Business Roundtable have opposed the new rule, saying it
would "turn every director election into a divisive proxy contest." 91 The American
Society of Corporate Secretaries and the New York City Bar Association also
oppose the rule, contending it would produce divided and unqualified boards.
92
However, to this fear of a balkanized board, other governance experts reply that,
"the ideal board candidate is someone with forceful opinions who isn't afraid to
share them and that the best boards aren't necessarily those that agree, but those
that argue. 93 Some companies, like Apria Healthcare Group and Hanover
Compressor, have already allowed shareholder access to the proxy machinery to
make director nominations.94
Shareholder Litigation
Beyond the promotion of these new concerns through shareholder resolutions,
there is also a renewed emphasis on shareholder litigation. Many of the scandal-
ridden corporations have been the targets of such litigation by pensioners and
institutional investors, such as the lawsuit brought against Enron and its creditors
by the University of California system.95 Beyond the suits brought by the leading
plaintiff lawyers, such as William Lerach, many established law firms are moving
into this line of business, joined by new firms that are carving it out as a niche
business.96 Hence, any corporations and management tinged with legal problems
87. Johnson, supra note 81.
88. Minow, supra note 49.
89. Henry Manne, Citizen Donaldson, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2003, at 10.
90. Steven Pearlstein, Corporate Reform Could Go Too Far WASH. POST, July 18, 2003, at EI.
91. Louis Lavelle, Shareholder Democracy Is No Demon, BUS. WK. ONLINE, July 2, 2003, at 1, at
http://businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/ju12003/nf2003072_0829db042.htm (last visited Mar. 3,
2004).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2.
94. Id.
95. Jerry Hirsch, UC Named Lead Plaintiff in Enron Class-Action Suit, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16,
2002.
96. In Praise of Trial Lawyers, ECONOMIST, July 12, 2003, at 60.
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can expect to confront such litigation. Just the investment banks involved in the
recent Wall Street settlement may face potential outside liability of up to $82
billion, prior to appeals and out-of-court settlements.97 Hence, the individual fines
and criminal actions, and the billions involved in the settlement, may be just the tip
of the iceberg.98
Given the requirement of the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,99
that the control of such shareholder suits would rest with that largest investor,
attorneys such as William Lerach are now forced to work more closely with
institutional investors, which have the largest stakes in the litigation. In
representing the University of California against such Enron creditors as Citigroup,
J.P Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, and Merrill Lynch,
Lerach's opening settlement proposal was for $15 billion.i0° He is also trying to
persuade the banks to drop their indemnification agreements, which would
increase his fees. °i As the Economist comments, "These indemnification
agreements throw liability for due-diligence failures back on the company issuing
the shares or bonds, making a nonsense of an underwriter's gatekeeping role." i02
The battle over final liability for the failures of directors and officers, and of
investment analysts in other cases, will be fought between the banks and insurance
companies. The banks will argue that D&O and E&O insurance policies should
cover their liability and even some of the money owed in the $1.4 billion
settlement orchestrated by New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer,10 3 while the
insurance companies will resist paying, arguing that their policies do not cover
fraud and deceit.i04 The contest relates to the larger argument over the
appropriateness of D&O indemnification policies. Some like Warren Buffet argue
that such policies create a moral hazard and encourage sloppy behavior by
directors, so Berkshire Hathaway does not even carry such policies.105 Xerox
Corporation, on the basis of its D&O policy, paid for the disgorgement of $6.4
million of gains due to fraud committed by former CEO Paul Allaire.'06 This is
but one example of what some consider the moral hazard created by such policies,
in arguing that directors and officers should, at a minimum, purchase their own
policies.' 07
Corporate Governance Ratings







103. Whose Skunk Is It? ECONOMIST, June 7, 2003, at 63-64.
i04. Id.
105. Id.
106. Carrie Johnson, Former Xerox Officials Settle Case, WASH. POST, June 6, 2003, at E2.
107. See Whose Skunk Is It? supra note 103.
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
nsmg interest in the investment community over good governance practices,
various organizations that serve business and institutional investors have launched
corporate governance ratings services. The two major organizations that advise
institutional investors on a wide array of issues - the Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC) and Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS) - have both
done so.' 0 8 The Corporate Library, a research organization and website directed by
Nell Minow, has also developed its own rating system, as has Governance Metrics
International, a firm developed specifically to rate corporate governance. 1' 9
Finally Standard & Poor's, a major ratings company has expanded its evaluation
of corporations and developed a Global Corporate Governance practice, headed by
George Dallas in its London office.' 10
One of the firms, ISS, has already been criticized for possible conflicts of
interest in its ratings practice."' It offers a service costing $15,000 to corporations
that helps them improve their governance ratings, while it also provides the
resulting metrics to its institutional investor clients. 12  ISS responds that it
maintains a wall of separation between its corporate and client services, but other
corporate watchdogs remain critical." 
3
While the major rating firms, such as Moody's and Standard & Poor's have
developed corporate governance ratings services, they have also been criticized for
failing to alert the investment public to the possibility of unfolding corporate
scandals, especially in the case of Enron.'i 4 A report to the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, Financial Oversight of Enron: The SEC and Private-Sector
Watchdogs criticized the rating companies for failing to probe deeply enough, for
focusing on largely short-term issues, and for failing to hold themselves
accountable for the accuracy of their reports.' 
5
Corporate Governance and Financial Performance
Many studies have examined the link between different changes in corporate
governance and financial performance, and the results have been mixed. Studies
show that the impact of more independent boards on financial performance has
been notably weak.' 16 That was the key finding of a recent study based on a large
sample of firms over an extended period of time.ii 7 Broadening the base from
independence on corporate boards to other criteria of corporate governance,
108. See Investor Responsibility Research Center Library, supra note 67" Institutional Shareholders
Services, supra note 70.
109. See Governance Metrics International, supra note 74.
110. See Standard & Poor's, supra note 73.
Ill. Adam Lashinsky, ISS Wants Business Both Ways, FORTUNE, June 16, 2003, at 24.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Claire Hill, Rating Agenctes Behaving Badly, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (2003).
115. Id. at 1148.
116. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and




however, reveals more positive results, especially in comparing the firms with the
best governance systems versus those with the worst. Corporate governance
experts Ira Millstein and Paul MacAvoy found that those companies rated A in
their governance by the California Public Employees Retirement System
outperformed those rated "F" by over 25 percent. is
Business and Federalism Issues
In the regulatory arena, there has been a lively debate over states' rights in the
courts, and especially in the U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist's
leadership. The tensions within our federal system of government have been
important ever since the nation's founding, have assumed even more significance
since the expansion of federal authority during the late New Deal years. '19 In the
past ten years, there has been a rollback in federal authority and a resurgence of
states' rights under the Rehnquist Court, also vigorously promoted by Justice
O'Connor. Decisions like US. v. Lopez, ruling unconstitutional the Gun-free
School Zones Act, 120 and US. v. Morrison, ruling unconstitutional the Violence
Against Women Act, 2' have marked a new watershed on federalism issues. While
the rollback in federal authority may please business in certain respects, the
resulting promotion of more state regulation and activism may not be so pleasing.
In fact, uniform regulation at the federal level, accompanied with a more rational
and professional approach to regulation might prove easier for business to
accommodate.
The rise in initiatives by state attorneys general and their aggressive pursuit of
investigations and litigation against certain industries became more prevalent
during the 1990s. The litigation by the states against the tobacco industry and
against Microsoft are but two examples. 122 Most prominent starting since the year
2002 has been the action by New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer versus the
financial industry, relying on state laws like the Martin Act to prosecute leading
investment banking firms. 123 Some conservatives and business interests have
complained that he has invaded the legitimate turf of the Justice Department and
SEC, 124 while Spitzer and his defenders respond that he was driven to act by the
passivity and failure of the SEC under Chairman Harvey Pitt to act in a timely
i 18. Ira Millstem, & Paul MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Improved Performance or
the Large Publicly Traded Corporation. 98 COLUM. L. REV 1283, 1300 (1998).
119. ROBERT NAGEL, IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 5 (2001).
120. See generally U.S.v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
121. See generally U.S. v. Momson, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
122. See CARRICK MOLLENKAMP, ET AL., THE PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO: HOW THE STATES TOOK
ON THE CIGARETTE GIANTS (1998); JOEL BRINKLEY & STEVE LOHR, U.S. V MICROSOFT: THE INSIDE
STORY OF THE LANDMARK CASE (2000); Carolyn Mayer, Attorneys General Crusade Against
Corporate Misdeeds, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2003, at E i.
123. Amy Borrus & Mike McNamee, States vs. the SEC. What' all the Shouting For? BUS. WK.,
July 28, 2003, at 39; Gary Weiss, Competing Watchdogs Are Good for the Street, BUS. WK., Sept. 1,
2003, at 86.
124. Brooke A. Masters, States Role in Doubt on Wall Street, WASH. POST, July 23, 2003, at E 1.
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manner. 1
25
Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court do have the ability to override state
initiatives through the doctrine of federal preemption.' 26 While the Court has not
always been sympathetic to claims of federal preemption, as in leading tobacco
cases and occupational safety cases, it will usually defer to explicit statutory
provisions of federal preemption. 2 7 This may provide an incentive for business to
lobby for more such provisions in the future. While it may seem strange for
business to advocate the expansion of federal power over the states, it may advance
efficiency concerns for business while also boosting its public reputation for
seeking constructive solutions. It may also curry favor with certain citizen groups
who would join a coalition promoting federal power and regulation against old-
guard conservative groups.
One major caveat is that the willingness of non-business interests to embrace
federal pre-emption really depends on the stringency of the uniform federal
standard to be applied. Bills proposed for uniform federal product liability
standards have floundered for the past two decades because consumer groups and
trial lawyers have objected to the more lenient standards of liability for business
embodied in these bills, whether the issue is caps on punitive damages or standards
for strict liability 128
In the summer of 2003, House capital markets subcommittee Chairman
Richard H. Baker (R-LA), proposed legislation to curb the power of state securities
regulators and attorneys general, 2 9 perhaps to clip the wings of NY state attorney
general Eliot Spitzer and his counterparts in other states. Baker and his supporters
believe that securities markets should have only one watchdog, the SEC, and that
states should not have the power to fashion remedies that change industry
practices, and certainly not enforce rules tougher than those of the SEC. SEC
Chairman William Donaldson and Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan also seem to
support that view. 131 Spitzer and his allies, however, aggressively lobbied against
the bill, and it died in committee. Given that Spitzer and the states have acted
more swiftly against industry misconduct than have the SEC and the federal
government, Wall Street firms supported Baker's initiative. 133 The criminal
charges brought by Oklahoma State Attorney General Edmondson against
125. E.J. Dionne, Defending States Rights Except on Wall Street, WASH. POST, July 22, 2003, at
AI7.
126. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (the Commerce Clause).
127. See generally U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504 (1992); Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
128. Lorraine Woeilert, Tort Reform: A Little Here, A Little There, Bus. WK., Jan. 20, 2003, at 60.
129. Masters, supra note 124.
130. Id.
131. Brooke Masters & Ben White, Donaldson Backs SEC Supremacy Bill, WASH. POST, July, 16,
2003, at E l.
132. Ben White & Brooke Masters, Bill to Limit State Probes of Wall St. Delayed, WASH. POST,
July 25, 2003, at El.
133. See Masters, supra note 124; Borrus & McNamee, supra note 123.
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WorldCom and four executives in August, 2003,134 when the U.S. Department of
Justice had thus far failed to act, again demonstrates the aggressive role the states
sometimes play in the face of federal delays. The tension between the states and
the federal government will certainly continue in the area of corporate financial
fraud, as in many other areas.
Given the popularity of Spitzer's actions, the rise of state activism, and the
tradition of state regulation of corporate governance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
breaks new ground by pre-empting state law on corporate governance and absent
the crisis of corporate scandals, surely would have generated much more
controversy and debate. Of course, the U.S. House of Representatives was more
resistant to the broad sweep of the law than was the Senate, 3 5 but on the heels of
the WorldCom scandal, even Republicans in the House joined the throng
supporting Sarbanes-Oxley. 36  The rather rapid passage of the law, however,
should not obscure its major departure from past regulatory approaches. As one
expert comments:
For over 200 years, corporate governance has been a matter for state law. Even
the vast expansion begun by the New Deal securities regulation laws left the
internal affairs and governance of corporations to the states. Taken
individually, each of Sarbanes-Oxley's provisions constitutes a significant
preemption of state corporate law. Taken together, they constitute the most
dramatic expansion of federal regulatory power over corporate governance since
the New Deal. 1
37
The law not only injects the SEC and the national listing exchanges into the
regulation of the structure, composition, and duties of the corporate board, but it
also regulates several aspects of executive compensation. Traditional federalism
analysts believe that the states, as "laboratories of democracy, might generate
better solutions through interstate competition, and that the one-size-fits-all
approach of Sarbanes-Oxley is particularly inappropriate when trying to design
governance models to fit different corporate cultures in vastly different
industries. 38 Since Congress has moved so far on federalizing corporate law, it is
perhaps less strange that even leading Republican legislators would now try to roll
back state securities regulations and the power of state attorneys general. Perhaps
those moves appease the efficiency interests of their business supporters, but they
also move counter to the trends of recent Republican administrations and to the
line of federalism decisions by the Rehnquist Court.
134. Christopher Stem, et al., Oklahoma Plans to Charge Ebbers, WorldCom, WASH. POST, Aug.
27, 2003, at El; Christopher Stem & Brooke Masters, WorldCom, Ex-Officers Charged in Oklahoma,
WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2003, at El; Bamaby Feder and Kurt Eichenwald, A State Pursues WorldCom
and May Hurt the U.S. Case, N.Y TIMES, Aug, 28, 2003, at C 1.
135. Jackie Spinner, Sarbanes Circulates Auditing Reform Bill, WASH. POST, May 9, 2003, at AI0.
136. Dana Milbank, Both Political Parties Say Enron Proves Their Point, WASH. POST, May 8,
2002, at AS.
137 Stephen Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, REGULATION, Spring
2003, at 26
138. Id. at 30-31.
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SARBANES-OXLEY ACT PROVISIONS
This section will first briefly state some of the leading provisions of the act
39
and then will elaborate on some contentious issues left open for regulation. The
act provides for:
I Public Accounting Oversight Board - with powers over the public
accounting profession and independent audit firms: only firms
registered with the board will be allowed to audit public companies;
accountants must disclose any civil or criminal proceedings against
them; the larges firms will be evaluated annually and smaller firms
once every three years; in case of deficiencies, audit firms can be
fined up to $15 million or barred entirely from public accounting.
40
2. Auditor Independence - prohibits the provision of specified non-
audit services, requires that permitted services be pre-approved by
the corporate board, and requires that the lead audit partner be
rotated every five years. 14l
3. Board of Directors Audit Committee - must be comprised only of
independent directors and is responsible for the appointment,
oversight, and compensation of company auditors. i42
4. Certification of Periodic Financial Reports - the CEO and CFO must
certify that financial statements fairly represent the issuer's financial
condition and results of operations. 1
43
5. Corporate Governance and Responsibility/Reimbursement of
CEO/CFO Compensation - in the event of misconduct and misstated
financial results, the CEO and CFO must repay any bonus, incentive
compensation, or profits resulting there from. 44
6. Insider Trades During Blackout Periods - directors and officers may
not trade during blackout periods, and any resulting profits must be
disgorged. 1
45
7 Loans to Officers and Directors - issuers may not make any new
loans or modify prior loans to their officers and directors.1
46
139. Rules of Professional Responsibility for Attorneys (Sarbanes-Oxley Act), 15 U.S.C.S. § 7201
(2003) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act].
140. Charles A. Bowsher, Statement before the Senate Banking Committee (Mar. 19, 2002)
(transcript available at http://www.publicoversightboard.org/news 03 19 02.htm (last visited Mar. 3,
2004) (Charles Bowsher, at the time of this statement, was the chairman of the Public Oversight
Board.); Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 139.
141. Robert Reilly, Summary of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Bankruptcy Appraisers, 2003 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 40, 1-8 (2003). See also Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 139.







8. Enhanced Financial Statement Disclosures - financial statements
must reflect all material correcting adjustments identified by the
company's auditors, and the SEC shall issue rules on the disclosure
of off-balance-sheet transactions and the disclosure of pro forma
financial results.
47
9 Issuer and Management Disclosure/Insider Transactions - insider
sales and purchases of stock must be reported within two days of the
transaction.
48
10. Other Issuer and Management Disclosures - the SEC must issue
rules on the disclosure of a company's internal controls and financial
reporting procedures, whether the company has a code of ethics and
any waivers it allows, and whether the audit committee includes a
financial expert.'
49
11 Fraud and Criminal Penalties - increases or adds criminal penalties
for a number of securities and corporate governance matters,
increases the statute of limitations, provides that debts arising from
securities fraud cannot be discharged in bankruptcy, and authorizes
the SEC to freeze any payments to officers and directors during
investigations. For "knowingly" signing off on inaccurate financial
statements, the penalty is up to ten years in jail and a $1 million fine,
while for "knowingly and willingly" signing off on such statements,
the penalty is up to tweny years in jail and a $5 million fine.
50
12. SEC Resources and Authority - requires the SEC to issue rules
regarding the minimum standards of professional conduct for
attorneys practicing before the SEC. 15i
13. Securities Analysts and Securities Research Reports - requires the
SEC to issue rules that address conflicts of interest of securities
analysts. 1
52
14. Regulatory Studies and Reports - authorizes the SEC, Comptroller
General, and GAO to issue reports on the need for further
legislation. 153
15. Fraud and Criminal Penalties/Whistleblower Protections - creates
protection for whistleblowers and employees when they act lawfully
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16. Corporate Fraud Accountability - authorizes the SEC to prohibit
"unfit" individuals from serving as officers or directors. 155
Auditor Conflicts of Interest
According to Sarbanes-Oxley provisions, auditors are discouraged from
providing a range of non-audit services to clients.' 56 Those that are prohibited
include human resources and technology services. 5 7  Tax projects must be
approved by the client corporation's board, and the SEC has released guidelines
stipulating that the approval must be for each project proposed and cannot be on a
blanket basis. 5  In order to avoid the paperwork and processing costs that each
pre-approval would entail, some firms may spread the work among various audit
firms instead. 159
Regulation of Attorneys
Since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC now requires attorneys to
report any client misconduct upward in the organization as far as the board of
directors, if necessary This is the so-called "reporting-up" or "laddering-up"
provision. More controversial has been its consideration of a "noisy
withdrawal" provision, requiring that a corporate attorney resign from representing
the firm and that the firm report any misconduct to the SEC.i6 1 In order to blunt
this possible regulation, the American Bar Association narrowly approved an
exception to the rule of attorney-client confidentiality which allows but does not
require an attorney to go to the public authorities when company officials are
violating the law in a way that harms the company 162 Attorneys are normally
required to report violations of a client only when those violations pose physical
harm to persons. The voluntary reporting standard follows the lead of forty-two
states that already allow it.163 In arguing in favor of the ABA's approach over that
of a more rigid SEC noisy-withdrawal requirement, Bart Schwartz, general counsel
to the Mony Group states, "The 'permissive reporting-out' rule approved by the
ABA leaves more discretion to corporate lawyers about when it is necessary to
divulge client confidences, and should give corporate clients more comfort that
their lawyers can continue to handle sensitive information without turning into
SEC informants.' ' |64
155. Id.
156. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 139.
157. Id.
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Prior to the ABA s action, the Washington state bar association was feuding
with the SEC over the issue. It argued that complying with the SEC mandate
would provide lawyers no protection from state bar sanctions for violating lawyer-
client confidentiality 165 Citing Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC argues to the contrary
that federal rules should prevail over state rules. 166 The ABA's action, however,
by making reporting outside the organization only voluntary, may have minimal
impact in the face of such state bar codes. In California, for example, the state's
Business and Professions Code provides for strict attorney-client confidentiality 167
On the other hand, if lawyers fail to exercise their option to report offenses to the
SEC, they may be subject to shareholder lawsuits by injured investors. i68
Expert assessments of the ABA's decision range from largely symbolic to
"modest, as Columbia Professor Jack Coffee says,' 69 to a "tectonic shift, as NYU
Professor Stephen Gillers states. 170 Gillers states that the ABA "to its credit
recognized that lawyers are in a public profession and have obligations to other
people. " 17 1 Coffee said the ABA amendments were "modest changes in the right
direction, under the shadow of far more sweeping change that the SEC is
considering this has real teeth, and the bar is scared to death about it.'
72
The ABA actually passed two amendments, one allowing lawyers to warn
potential victims of fraud perpetrated by their clients, and the other allowing them
to report the conduct. 173 In some states, codes of conduct already permit lawyers
to report criminal conduct, and in most states, attorneys may warn victims of fraud
if clients used the lawyers' legal work in conceiving the fraud.i74 The new ABA
amendments and SOX oblige lawyers to report fraud to the board of directors and
therefore go beyond the voluntary standard. The ABA standards go beyond
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in one respect. They cover attorney obligations to private
companies and nonprofit organizations such as unions, not just companies that
report to the SEC.1
75
Part of the pressure being exercised on law firms to help expose white-collar
crimes is also coming from the IRS. In its first action ever taken against a law
firm, the IRS is taking action in federal court to force Jenkens & Gilchrist, a Dallas
firm, to disclose details of a tax shelter plan the firm has allegedly marketed to a
165. Brooke A. Masters, New Rules Leave Lawyers In Bind on Whistle-Blowing, WASH. POST,
Aug. 6, 2003, at Ei.
166. Id.
167 California Business & Professions Code, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/.html/
bpc_tableof contents.html (last visited Mar. I, 2004).
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client. 7 6 Here again, the concern is violation of the attorney-client privilege.
Regarding the rights of investors to bring private lawsuits against law firms,
the SEC has banned them from doing so unless they can show the firms are
"primary actors" causing their losses.' 7 7 Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) and
others inserted that dubious provision as part of the Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995.178 Nonetheless, investors are trying to hold liable the firms of
Kirkland & Ellis and Milbank, Tweed, attorneys for various Enron entities and
investment bankers.
COMBINATION OF REGULATIONS AND SELF-REGULATION
There are several cases where agencies, both government and self-regulatory
bodies, have concurrent jurisdiction over an industry, sector, or issue. This is no
truer than in regulations of the financial sector. The Freddie Mac case is a good
example where different agencies have junsdiction and have taken action. In this
case, the SEC, Department of Justice, and the Office of Housing Enterprise
Oversight, the agency established to specifically regulate Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, have all been involved. 79 Freddie Mac is being investigated for violating
SFAS 133, a rule passed in January 2001 to require companies to value at current
market prices its derivatives contracts. 8 Freddie Mac instead sought to actually
understate current earnings, in contrast to all the other earnings restatement cases,
in order to smooth out earnings projections over the long term and avoid the
appearance of volatility 181
In the aftermath of the WorldCom collapse, even more government agencies
and authorities have assumed important roles. The SEC investigated the
accounting fraud and came to a $500 million settlement with the company 182 The
Justice Department is prosecuting several former WorldCom executives for
criminal violations. 8 3 The Department of Justice and the Federal Communications
Commission are both investigating charges, including illegal rerouting of calls,
made by the firm's competitors. 8 4 The General Services Administration (GSA)
has ordered that WorldCom should not be able to compete for government
176. Albert B. Crenshaw, IRS Case Tests Attorney-Client Privilege, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2003, at
E3.
177 Steven Pearlsten, Not So Firm With Lawyers, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2003, at E l.
178. Id.
179. Kathleen Day & David S. Hilzenrath, Stock Sales Followed 'Smoothing Freddie Mac Chief
Cleared$17 Million, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2003, at A].
180. Id.
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182. Seth Schiesel, WorldCom Seems Close to Deal to Settle SEC's Fraud Case, N.Y TiMES, Nov.
5, 2002, at CI, See also Jerry Knight, WorldCom Stockholders Owe SEC Thanks for Almost Nothing,
WASH. POST, May 26, 2003, at El.
183. Christopher Stem, New Charges Brought Against CFO at WorldCom, WASH. POST, April 17,
2003, at Ei.
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contracts, but Congress can always make a different determination. 185 Politics
could make a big difference here for WorldCom since the Federal Government is a
major customer and depends heavily on the company WorldCom's major
competitors, especially Venzon and AT&T however, also have political clout in
Congress and have been generous campaign donors. 186 Finally, WorldCom is also
accountable to a bankruptcy court, which will take into account two investigations
of the firm's collapse, one report authorized by the board and the other by the court
itself.'87 That investigation, supervised by former Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh concluded, among other things, that "[i]t appears that the Company's
officers and Directors went along with Mr. Ebbers and Mr. Sullivan, even under
circumstances that suggested corporate actions were at best imprudent and at worst
inappropriate. ' 88  WorldCom had concocted an $11 billion accounting fraud,
involving the blatant violation of classifying operating expenses as capital costs, 
i89
which should have set off alarm bells for an engaged board and audit committee.
The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) will also sometimes
join regulatory bodies in bringing suit or other action against alleged violators. In
one celebrated case, the NASD has filed suit against Frank Quattrone, former
research director and investment banker for Credit Suisse First Boston for failing
to supervise stock analysts, for undermining their independence by tying their
bonuses to banking fees generated, and for spinning IPOs to investment banking
clients.' 9°  Subsequently, the Manhattan U.S. Attorney launched a criminal
investigation for obstruction of justice by Quattrone, for ordering employees to
purge emails after an investigation had been launched, and may prosecute
following an initial mistnal. The SEC is also involved in the investigation. 
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Multiple agencies and authorities have also been involved in the various
investigations and charges brought against Enron and its executives. The SEC and
federal prosecutors have brought various civil and criminal charges. 9
2  The
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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has investigated Enron's manipulation of
the California energy market. 93  Further, the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission has charged Enron and two executives with manipulating natural gas
and agricultural commodity prices.1
94
Exchange Rules. Beyond the combination of government rules and
regulations are the rules established by the NYSE and Nasdaq that must meet with
SEC approval. According to major legal expert Jack Coffee, it is the history and
effectiveness of the private self-regulatory organizations, not state intervention or
supervision that has built confidence in the integrity of the financial markets.1 95
The NYSE requires that all listed companies have a majority of outside directors
and that the audit and compensation committees be composed entirely of
independent directors. 196  The NYSE is also tightening its definition of
"independent, excluding those with a "material relationship" to the firm, and is
requiring non-management directors to meet in executive sessions. 197 The Nasdaq
offered parallel rules in advance of Sarbanes Oxley and also requires that an audit
committee of independent directors hire and fire the firm's auditor. While the
NYSE has never delisted a company for governance reasons, of the 670 companies
delisted by Nasdaq over 2001-02, 100 were delisted for reasons related to
corporate governance. 198
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The NYSE, along with the SEC, is also promoting the interests of disclosure
to investors. In one area, it has backed off due to First Amendment concerns. The
NYSE had considered prohibiting Wall Street analysts from speaking with media
outlets that failed to disclose any potential conflicts of interest for analysts being
interviewed. Though disclosure of such conflicts might be important information
for investors, it did not justify the prior restraint on analyst speech.199
REMEDIES
The complex area of legal remedies involves a large range of issues and
choices: litigation versus arbitration, government versus private action, civil versus
criminal sanctions, and personal versus corporate liability The issue is also
directly connected to that of legal jurisdiction, that of the specific agency or
agencies involved, and whether a case can be brought by state or federal
authorities, or both. The sanctions differ from one agency to another and from one
level of government to another. Among the most significant issues, and perhaps
the primary one, is whether the government ought to pursue individual violators or
entire firms, whether they be corporations or audit firms.
Individual versus Corporate Liability: There is less dispute over the wisdom
of criminally prosecuting individual wrongdoers than over prosecuting
corporations. The controversy surrounding the prosecution and demise of Arthur
Andersen is a leading example of that dispute. To convict an organization also still
requires that an individual perpetrator be identified, and then a jury can hold the
organization vicariously liable. Some of the legal controversy surrounding the
guilty verdict of Andersen was the judge's ruling that different jurors could find
different executives, rather than the same one, guilty in order to hold the firm
liable.2° ° The larger practical criticism is that entire firms, and many innocent
parties, are punished for the sins of perhaps just a few when firms are held
liable.20' However, others argue that it is entirely appropriate to prosecute a firm
when its culture is that of a repeat offender or chronic violator, even if the firm's
199. Alex Berenson, A US. Push on Accounting Fraud, N.Y TIMES, April 9, 2003, available at
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existence is placed in jeopardy 202
Though the tide may be turning more in favor of prosecuting organizations,
the SEC has focused to date mainly on individual auditors and accountants, and the
Andersen case was brought by the Department of Justice, not by the SEC.20 3
Further, among its legal actions, the SEC has focused almost entirely on small
accounting firms and brought charges in 2002 against only two auditors working
for then Big 5 firms, while bringing actions against auditors from 15 auditors from
smaller firms.20 4 The disciplinary actions brought against smaller firms are more
often for incompetence, while the actions brought against the large firms are for
lapses of integrity 205 In total, it brought 598 enforcement actions in 2002, up 24
percent from the previous year.
One example of the action taken by the SEC against individual auditors was a
case involving PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), once the lead auditor for
Microstrategy, a company whose "accounting mirage" and inflated earnings is
credited for bursting the tech bubble,20 7 even before subsequent scandals at Enron
and WorldCom surfaced. In this case, the individual auditor was barred from
auditing publicly traded companies for a two-year period and can then apply for
reinstatement with the SEC. The SEC took a similar approach in penalizing an
audit partner with PwC who was "reckless" in auditing Tyco and ignoring signs of
trouble.208 In neither case, though, did the SEC take any action against PwC as a
firm. PwC also paid $50 million to settle a lawsuit with Microstrategy investors
who charged the firm for defrauding them by approving the company's books.20 9
The shareholders' report also charged that PwC and Microstrategy had discussed
joint business deals, jeopardizing PwC's independence and creating a conflict of
interest.
2 10
In 2002, the SEC did bring administrative charges against Ernst & Young for
violating independence rules by a joint marketing arrangement with client
company PeopleSoft. 2 1 Words by Enforcement Director Stephen Cutler indicate
202. Id., see generally BARBARA L. TOFFLER & JENNIFER RENGOLD, FINAL ACCOUNTING:
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that the SEC may bring more actions against the audit firms in the future. He has
stated:
In short, absent egregious conduct, in which senior firm managers participated or
acquiesced, the commission typically has elected not to pursue a case against the
firm itself. It is time to adopt a new enforcement model a new paradigm: one
that holds an accounting firm responsible for the actions of its partners; one that
reverses the current presumption against suing firms for an audit failure.
212
In the wake of the criminal prosecution and subsequent demise of Arthur
Andersen, however, there is one major factor that inhibits the government from
bringing criminal charges against the organization. Should it do so and cause the
downfall of yet another major accounting firm, the industry becomes even more
concentrated. The "big five" that has dwindled to the "big four" risk becoming the
"big three." Given its criminal jurisdiction, the Justice Department is thwarted
more than the SEC by this factor. By shrinking the number of major firms, it also
would make even more difficult the rotation of audit firms, discussed later in this
article. Hence, the major accounting firms may be politically insulated from
further criminal prosecution and, in a sense, may have become too big to fail.
Businesses now audited by the big four accounting firms account for a huge 99
percent of all public company sales, about which SEC Chairman William
Donaldson says, "It's a national problem. We're concerned about the long-term
implications. 213 To combat such industry concentration, the government could
award more contracts to non-big-four firms and to foreign accounting firms.
When the government seeks to hold firms and organizations liable, there are
lessons that the Arthur Andersen case teaches, most importantly that such a firm
must cooperate fully with the government. Firms will be rewarded for cooperation
and punished dearly for resistance and confrontation. As one leading observer put
it, "[tlime and time again the firm made missteps that left prosecutors
questioning its desire to resolve the case. Its efforts at internal change went
nowhere, as the partnership spun into chaos. When its lawyers suggested that
Andersen consider pleading guilty the firm's management replaced them. 21 4
There have been stiffer organizational sanctions permitted under recent
changes to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, giving the prosecution more leverage
and making cooperation with the government more compelling.2i 5 This is further
related to the new regulations of attorney obligations under Sarbanes-Oxley Not
only are attorneys given a greater incentive to report management misconduct
upward, but the firms themselves are given incentive to waive any privilege, under
212. Id.
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11, 2004).
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Justice Department policies.216 The law thus encourages cooperation in various
ways, and individual employees must beware that their own personal interests that
weigh in the balance may be sacrificed by the firm. When the firm is rewarded for
cooperation, an employee can even be fired for asserting her legal freedom from
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. That has been one of the potential
consequences even as firms have sought to mitigate their sentences since the
organizational sentencing guidelines were passed in 1990.217
Civil versus Criminal Liability: While it has been less common for the
government to seek criminal penalties against auditors, aside from the obstruction
of justice prosecution of Arthur Andersen, it is becoming more common to seek
such penalties against executives in the scandal-ridden firms. Three former Tyco
executives, for example, have been charged with criminal offenses, and one of its
board members has pleaded guilty to securities fraud.2I8
The enhanced criminal penalties under Sarbanes-Oxley are also proving to be
an effective lever in building cases against violators at the top. The Justice
Department and SEC combine forces to investigate corporate fraud, and as at
companies like HealthSouth and Symbol Technologies, have pursued indictments
of mid-level and senior managers to gather evidence against those at the top.
219
With the tougher penalties, lower level managers have a greater incentive to
cooperate with the government to lighten their sentences. Still, some take a
different view. Some defense lawyers believe that the penalties are too harsh and
with more at stake, clients will actually be less willing to talk.220 Whatever
provided the incentive, nine HealthSouth executives, including three top finance
officers, have pleaded guilty to criminal charges in the case involving $2.5 billion
of overstated profits.22'
In the complex Enron case, federal prosecutors have indicted Andrew Fastow
on 78 counts and received a guilty plea from his deputy Michael Kopper.222 The
government has also brought criminal fraud charges against two other Enron
executives for trying to hide the Braveheart Internet video venture off the books
while it failed to meet the rule of having a minimum of 3 percent of its capital from
outside investors.223 The essence of the fraud is that "Enron sold its interest in
broadband to itself but pretended that there were outside investors with capital at
risk to make the transaction appear to be a true sale. 224
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Civil fines and remedies can result from either court proceedings or
administrative settlements. The SEC pursued administrative action against
Deutsche Bank AG for failing to disclose a conflict of interest in voting its shares
in favor of Hewlett Packard's (H-P) acquisition of Compaq Computer Corp.225
The Bank had business deals with H-P with more to follow were the acquisition
approved. 6 The forces supporting William Hewlett's opposition to the deal
accused H-P of buying the bank's vote. For its failure to disclose, the bank agreed
to pay $750,000, and the SEC also censured the firm and directed it to cease and
desist from further securities violations.22 7
The largest settlement ever was negotiated by the SEC with WorldCom, on
behalf of investors. WorldCom recently settled for $500 million with victimized
stock and bond holders, and fraud victims will also receive $250 million worth of
stock in the reorganized company, when it emerges from bankruptcy 228
Shareholders are normally last in line to be paid in bankruptcy proceedings, so
critics of the settlement observe that bondholders who normally receive higher
priority will be subsidizing shareholders through the settlement. 22 9 The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act at least has made possible the ability to pay victims. 230 Prior to the law,
settlement money would have been paid to the U.S. Treasury 231 The penalty is the
largest ever paid by a non-Wall Street firm but is slight compared to the $180
billion in damage done to investors.232 WorldCom has also taken some measures
of internal reform, having replaced its entire board of directors and removed more
than two dozen executives who were directly or indirectly involved in the
company's accounting problems. More on the WorldCom internal reforms is
discussed below. There is serious question whether WorldCom has been
sufficiently punished by its settlement with the SEC, and some argue it should be
liquidated rather than allowed to reorganize under bankruptcy 233 Given that
WorldCom's collapse wiped out around $180 billion in shareholder value,2 34 many
competitors and critics argue the settlement is totally inadequate, even though it is
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the largest ever negotiated by the SEC.235 Some suggest the government wanted
WorldCom to emerge from bankruptcy and to survive as it now has under the MCI
label, rather than face liquidation, for a number of reasons - to prevent any adverse
impact on its 55,000 employees and the economy, to maintain its vital supplies of
data equipment to the government and defense department, and to preserve
competition in the telecommunications industry to serve antitrust values.
236
The SEC has also settled its civil charges against J.P Morgan Chase and
,,237Citigroup for helping Enron "cook the books. In announcing the $300 million
settlement, enforcement director Stephen M. Cutler sent a message to all other
financial institutions that might have facilitated fraud at other firms under
investigation, such as Freddie Mac, WorldCom, and AOL Time Warner. Cutler
stated, "If you know or have reason to know that you are helping a company
mislead its investors, you are in violation of the federal securities laws.
' 238
Corporate critics see the settlement as much too insignificant in contrast to the
damage the banks facilitated at Enron. As William Greider states:
The $300 million Enron 'settlement' government regulators worked out with the
nation's two largest banks smells so bad that even The Wall Street Journal
editorial writers gagged on the rank odor. What Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase
did, remember, was to design the funny-money financial deals that directly
pumped up Enron's profits and stock price. When Enron's fraudulent scheme
unraveled and the stock collapsed, the nation's pension funds lost somewhere
between $25 to $50 billion. And these two famous banks each profited mightily
from their role as financial architects of the great swindle. The pay-up costs will
not even require an asterisk on their balance sheets.
239
Not just corporate critics like Greider weighed in against the settlement, but
so did Business Week magazine. While acknowledging the difficulty of
demonstrating willful fraud necessary to bnng criminal charges, the amount of
$300 million would be seen as merely a cost of doing business, since the fines
represent "roughly a week's profit to the banks., 240 Especially since Sarbanes-
Oxley allows some of the fines to be credited against liability under private
securities litigation, authority Jack Coffee concludes, "I don't think there was
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deterrence in these settlements. 24'
Fines versus Action Remedies: Even in civil cases, courts and especially
regulatory agencies have the option of imposing financial penalties or action-
forcing remedies, or both. The common complaint about fines or financial
settlements is that they are usually passed on to shareholders, or sometimes to
customers in the form of higher prices.242 The pain may not be borne by the actual
perpetrators, unless the penalties are so heavy that the firm or its board takes action
against the offending officers or employees. Action remedies, however, may
include pain directly inflicted on the individual offender. For instance, the SEC
may bar auditors from auditing publicly-traded companies and may even bar
executives from serving as officers or directors of a listed company 243 In the year
2000, the SEC barred thirty-eight executives from ever again serving as officers or
directors of public companies, and in the first two thirds of 2003, that number had
increased to 105, including two WorldCom financial executives. 244 The SEC has
brought legal charges against two former executives from Merrill Lynch for aiding
and abetting securities fraud at Enron for moving Nigerian ships off the books
245through a sham sale and for fraudulent energy trades. In addition to fines and
injunctions, the SEC is seeking a permanent ban to prevent the executives from
serving as officers or directors of any listed company 246 The SEC has targeted for
a similar fate executives with Qwest, HealthSouth, and Tyco.
247
Not only can the SEC bar executives from future corporate positions, but so
can the NASD. In the case against Frank Quattrone mentioned above, the NASD
is seeking to bar Quattrone from the securities industry for failing to cooperate
with the investigation. 248 The NASD also brought a different type of action-
forcing remedy against the brokerage firm Homblower & Weeks, suspending it
from publishing research for six months, since it had published "misleading and
exaggerated statements" about a stock.249 Other government agencies besides the
241. Id.
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SEC can at least remove executives from their present positions, or urge their
boards to do so. In the case of Freddie Mac, the OHEO agency ordered that two
executives, the president and general counsel, be removed from the company,
250
after the board had already terminated the previous CEO and two other officers
and restated earnings of $4.5 billion for the past three years.25'
When fines are the remedy, the question arises what level of fine is
appropriate and effective. Citigroup Global Markets, formerly Salomon Smith
Barney, was fined only $1 million by the NYSE for failing to give suitable advice
to WorldCom employees related to their pension holdings in company stock. 52
Salomon Smith Barney had advised the employees to borrow money to pay taxes
resulting from the exercise of stock options, rather than cash in the options. 53
That level of fine is less than a slap on the wrist.
Private Lawsuits: Perhaps the most expensive remedy for any offending firm
is that of private lawsuits brought by injured parties. In the many cases of
corporate scandals, those injured parties are usually employees, retirees, or
investors. The pension funds and institutional investors are often a greater threat
than regulatory agencies, regarding the amount of damages they can extract from
corporate offenders. The 1995 Securities Litigation Reform Act, meant to limit
liability to shareholders, also gave institutional investors higher priority as lead
plaintiffs in securities cases.254 The University of California system, with its $145
million in losses following the Enron debacle, is the lead plaintiff in a class-action
suit against Enron and all of its financial backers.255 The pension funds of Ohio
and California are suing AOL Time Warner for over $100 million in losses to their
state pension funds. 25 6  Ohio and West Virginia pension funds are also suing
Freddie Mac and three former executives for securities fraud, causing almost $30
million in stock losses to those states. 25 7 Ohio also has suits pending against
Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing. 258 The California Public Employees'
Retirement System (CALPERS) estimates it lost $565 million on its WorldCom
investments, while the New York State Common Retirement Fund lost about $300
million.259 Those pension funds are also bnnging suits against the company The
250. Jonathan D. Glater, Freddie Mac Board Forced to Remove Chief Executive, N.Y TIMES,
Aug. 23, 2003, at CI. See also Kathleen Day, Freddie Mac Board Told to Remove CEO; Regulators
Cite Parseghian Role in Improper Accounting; Directors Response is Unclear WASH. POST, Aug.
22, 2003, at E01.
25 1. See Carrie Johnson and Kathleen Day, Freddie Mac Ousts Three Top Executives; Shake-up at
Mortgage Giant Roils Markets, WASH. POST, June 10, 2003, at Ai (discussing the earlier action by
the Freddie Mac board and the actions by top officer that lead to the board's actions).
252. Christopher Stem, Citigroup Fined for WorldCom Advice: NYSE Says Workers Were not
Warned, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2003, at El.
253. Id.





259. Leslie Wayne, Turmoil at WorldCom: Retirement Money; Irate Over all the Scandals and Big
Losses, Pension Funds are Going to Court, N.Y TIMES, June 28, 2002, at CI.
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Wisconsin state pension fund lost $36.3 million through the WorldCom collapse,
the Michigan state employee fund lost $116 million, and the Iowa state pension
fund lost $33 million.26 Michael L. Fitzgerald, state treasurer of Iowa, said:
I'm outraged. We have invested in the American marketplace and we have lost
confidence. There is now no confidence in people who are running these
businesses. No trust in them at all. Institutional investors need to pick up the




The lawsuits by all concerned private parties against Enron and Andersen will
continue for sometime. Enron workers and investors are seeking $26 billion in a
class-action suit that also names Enron and Andersen executives and board
members.262 Pnvate suits brought by investors against outside directors of Enron
for fraud and insider trading were dismissed in March 2003, for failure to show
intent by the directors.263 Suits for negligence, however, might still be possible.2M
Given that most of these shareholder suits are settled for far lesser amounts
though, the question remains what effect they really have on corporate misconduct.
For firms like Enron and Andersen that no longer exist or exist in vastly
diminished scale, the lack of connection is obvious. Even for any living entities,
though, the effect is dubious. Former SEC Commissioner and Stanford Law
Professor Joseph Grundfest concludes:
I'm not suggesting that [the class-action system] has no deterrent effect. It's just
weak compared with the criminal and the SEC enforcement mechanisms. The
reason is that only 0.5 percent of the settlements in the fifteen largest settlements
came out of the pockets of the wrongdoer. The vast amount of the money that is
used to fund these settlements comes from the corporation, the defendant in the
action. And who owns the corporation? The shareholders. The shareholders are
also the plaintiffs who get the recovery. So there is no secunties fairy paying the
settlements. We're simply moving money from investors' right pocket to
investors' left pocket - and paying lawyers a lot for moving the money around.265
Arbitration versus Litigation: The choice between arbitration and litigation is
important for private plaintiffs bringing action against investment analysts and
brokers, as well as against their firms. There is also a regulatory component
provided by the $1.4 billion Wall Street settlement, as aggrieved investors who
were victimized by fraudulent stock ratings might claim relief from the restitution
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Five Ex-Andersen Execs Won't Face Enron Shareholder Suit: Judge Throws out Claims
Against Group Including In-house Lawyer Claims Against Others Proceed, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2003, at B7
263. Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Outside Directors Win Round in Court, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 14,
2003, at C6.
264. Id.
265. Joseph Grundfest & Nicholas Varchaver, Winona, Martha & the Securities Fairy, FORTUNE,
Aug. 11, 2003, at 50.
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fund established by the settlement. 266 Those bringing individual court cases are
having a difficult time recovering, however.
In the main, investors are left with the remedies provided by arbitration, since
a 1987 Supreme Court case held that securities firms may force their clients into
arbitration when provided by contract.267 Plaintiffs complain that arbitration tends
to favor the industry, and studies tend to bear that out.268 In the case of California,
however, the arbitration requirement may be eroded or bypassed due to a state
ethics law that requires arbitrators to disclose their financial dealings and any
conflicts of interest. The NASD, which hears 90 percent of all securities
arbitrations, has asked any claimants to waive the application of the new law, and
securities firms argue the law should be preempted by federal regulations.269 A
federal appellate court has just upheld the law in the face of those arguments.270
Some recovery may be easier in arbitration than in court, as arbitrators tend to
be more concerned about a fair result than about technical procedures and burdens
of proof. Nonetheless, even in arbitration, an investor or complainant must
demonstrate "specific reliance" on the advice of a broker or analyst in causing
his/her loss, 271 which is often difficult to show. Some state laws give investors
broader relief if they can show that an adviser failed to disclose pertinent facts,
such as an investment banking relationship with the covered company 272
Arbitration does not lend itself to a mass-tort class-action approach, but some
lawyers are trying it anyway in the research analyst cases. One team of lawyers
has signed up 9,000 potential plaintiffs through the website stockmarketfraud.com,
and a Florida law firm represents 6,000 more.273
266. Anitha Reddy, Investors Eligible for Restitution; Settlement will also Aid Class Actions,
WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2003, at El. See also Ben White and Kathleen Day, SEC Approves Wall Street
Settlement; Conflicts of Interest Targeted, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2003, at Al, Ben White, SEC
Pushes for Approval of Wall St. Deal, WASH. POST, June i 7, 2003, at E i; Amy Baldwin, Don't Count
on Restitution Money; Fund Investors Unlikely to get Piece of Wall Street' $387.5 Million Pie,
WASH. POST, May 1I, 2003, at F4.
267 Walter Hamilton, Californians May Win Right to Sue Brokerages: Appellate Ruling Could
Lead to Precedent Allowing Investors to Bypass Arbitration, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2 i, 2003, at B I.
268. Brooke A. Masters, Few Gains for Investors Suing Over Research; Arbitration Panels
Awarding Little if Anything in Cases Based on Stock Analysts Conflicts, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2003,
at El. See also Walter Hamilton, Aggrieved Investors Face the Big Fight; Contentious Brokerage
Arbitration Renews Debate on how it Works and Whether it's Fair L.A. TIMES, July 27, 2003, at
BI.
269. See Hamilton, supra note 268.
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271. Brooke A. Masters, Laying Claim to Arbitration; Law Firm Aims to Dominate Investor
Securities Cases, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2003, at El. See also Brooke A. Masters, Investors v.
Brokers; Meting out Quick Justice in Murky World ofArbitration, WASH. POST, July 15,2003, at El.
272. See Masters, supra note 268.
273. See Brooke A. Masters and Ben White, Wall St. Facing Legal Blitz: 'Global' Settlement
Prompts Investor to File Claims, WASH. POST, July 3, 2003, at El (for other figures on the expanding
number of arbitration cases); see also Ben White and Brooke A. Masters, Investor Suits Against Wall St.
Firms Rejected; Federal Judges Dismiss Class Action Blaming Research Reports for Technology-Stock
Losses, WASH. POST, July 2, 2003, at El (for an account of an important victory for Merrill Lynch &
Co. and the dismissal of class action suit by investors by Senior U.S. District Judge Milton Pollack).
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The individual arbitrations conducted thus far have not been successful for
injured investors. About a dozen cases, ranging all the way up to $30 million in
claimed damages have been decided, and only two plaintiffs have received any
awards.274 Still the cases have really only begun. The NASD has received around
300 filed cases, with thousands more expected, and the NYSE has received almost
100.275
IMPACT OF REGULATION
With the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the debate now ensues over its impact.
Will it deter fraud? Will the costs of compliance be excessive? Will it improve
boards of directors or make it more difficult to attract top candidates? Will it make
management too cautious and risk averse? Will it delay too many decisions and
drive them to the top9 Most important, will it restore investor confidence? The
answers vary from one expert to another. It may also take a long time to assess the
effectiveness of the act and new controls, since financial fraud is more typical at
the end of long bull runs on Wall Street.
Cost of Controls: Beyond the debate over the definition of proper "internal
controls, there is a deep concern over the cost of those controls. Some see
Sarbanes-Oxley as ironically a windfall for the accounting industry One business
journalist suggests it may raise audit fees by 30-100 percent.276 Colleen A.
Sayther, chief executive of Financial Executives International said, "With all due
respect to the accounting firms, there is a financial incentive for them to increase
their amount of testing., 277 Greg W Matz, director of internal audit at Agilent
Technologies, said, "[c]ontrols are not free. [Companies may] overspend without a
lot of benefit or safety for the investor., 27  Meanwhile, William J. McDonough,
chairman of the Public Accounting Oversight Board, maintains, in my view,
good internal controls are cost effective and once put in place more than justify the
expense involved. 279
Going Private: Considering these costs, some firms have decided to either
remain private or move from public back to private, partially in order to avoid the
demands of Sarbanes Oxley. 280 Hence, the law does nothing to improve their
corporate governance. In 2002, ninety-seven firms filed requests with the SEC to
274. See Masters, supra note 268.
275. Id.
276. Came Johnson, Stiffer Accounting Standards Debated: Tougher Review Rules Planned,
WASH. POST, Aug. 9,2003, at El.
277. Id.
278. Id., See also Julie Hirschfield Davis, For Sarbanes, the Grumbling was Expected, BALT.
SUN, July 29, 2003, at ID (for additional estimates of compliance costs. The article notes that the
Business Roundtable finds its member firms spending between $1 million and $10 million annually due
to the new Sarbanes-Oxley law. Further, business law and consulting firm Foley & Lardner found that
the cost of being a publicly traded firm has increased 100 percent due to new compliance
requirements.).
279. Id.
280. Murray Coleman, More Companies Exit Public Markets; New Accounting Rules Get the
Blame Burden for Small Companies, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY Aug. 26,2003, at Al.
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go private, and by July 31, 2003, sixty-seven firms had applied to go private.
2
81
Not only are the costs of compliance high for firms with little capital, but
premiums for director and officer insurance policies have increased 30-40 percent
since Sarbanes Oxley passed.28 2 Small firms thus have great difficulty attracting
willing outside directors. Given the Wall Street settlement with investment
banking firms, and their commensurate needs to downsize among their analyst
corps, some thinly traded small companies no longer enjoy analyst coverage at all.
Hence, the benefits of remaining public pale in contrast to the costs. As the CFO
of Tumbleweed, a small restaurant chain, put it, "We didn't see much value in
being public. It was costing us a lot of extra money. Then Sarbanes-Oxley came
along and that was the last straw. 283  Tom Taulli, a finance professor at the
University of Southern California concludes that, with the added costs and
restrictions of Sarbanes-Oxley, the tradeoffs are looking much better to go
private."2 4
Recruiting Board Members: Given the enhanced responsibilities of directors
and the stronger criminal penalties, some believe that many qualified candidates
will now find board positions far less attractive and that it will be difficult to build
strong boards. As defense attorney Ira Lee Sorkin states, "Why would someone
want to be a director and face all this potential exposure?
28 5
Executive Reactions: Not surprisingly, most senior executives have a dim
view of Sarbanes-Oxley as they might of most other regulation. A survey of 192
senior executives in the July 28, 2003 Financial Times found that 60 percent
believe that reform has gone too far.28 6 Further, a poll of CFOs and managing
directors found that only 30 percent have a good opinion of Sarbanes Oxley 287
When trying to gauge the effectiveness of new reforms, professional money
managers are skeptical of their likely effect. In a recent survey, just 23 percent
said recent antifraud measures had been effective, and 60 percent doubted even the
recent Wall Street settlement would improve the quality of brokerage research.2 88
Still, half of the respondents supported the efforts of local and state regulators. As
the chief coordinator of the study reported, "The support of these fund managers
for the state securities regulators suggests somewhat of a lack of confidence in the
ability of the S.E.C. to do its job. 2 9
Internal Investigations: Whatever actual change in corporate behavior is
281. Id.
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283. Murray Coleman, More Companies Exit Public Markets: New Accounting Rules Get the
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produced by new regulations, the scandals certainly have invited close scrutiny and
outside pressure brought by former top SEC officials and law enforcement officers.
Investigators have been installed by courts and boards of directors to supervise
internal investigations that have produced enlightening reports.290 Former SEC
general counsel William McLucas has supervised internal investigations at Enron,
WorldCom (at the invitation of the board), and Qwest Communications. 29' Former
Attorney General Richard Thornburgh supervised another investigation of
WorldCom for the bankruptcy court, and former SEC official Gregory S. Bruch
coordinated the internal investigation at Global Crossing.292  Attorney David
Boies, who litigated the monopoly case against Microsoft, supervised internal
investigations of Tyco,293 while former SEC counsel Richard Doty conducted an
internal investigation of Freddie Mac.294 The bankruptcy judge in the Enron case
appointed R. Neal Batson, an Atlanta attorney, who concluded creditors might be
entitled to recover $5 billion in assets improperly transferred to outside
partnerships and to $74 million in loans received by Chairman Kenneth Lay 295 He
also found that CFO Fastow received twice as much as reported, and that Enron
manipulated the tax laws to create "phantom" tax losses. 2%
Corporate Monitors: The government has also installed former SEC
Chairman Richard Breeden to monitor and approve of business decisions at
WorldCom, as Gregory Bruch is now doing for U.S. Technologies. 297  Such
officials provide a valuable service in discovenng all the elements of corporate
misconduct, in the case of investigations, and of setting the ship aright again, in the
case of corporate monitors.298
290. One example is the internal investigative report on Enron, known as the Powers Report. The
investigation was chaired by William C. Powers, Jr., an outside director on the Enron board and Dean
of the University of Texas Law School. See William C. Powers, Jr., Raymond S. Troubh, and Herbert
S. Winokur, Jr., Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of
Directors of Enron Corp., Feb. 1. 2002, available at
http://bodurtha'georgetown.edu/enron/Board -Special-Reporthtm (last visited Feb. 16, 2004).
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2003, at E4. See also Floyd Norris, Ebbers and Passive Directors Blamed for WorldCom Woes, N.Y
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UNFINISHED BUSINESS: PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND ALTERNATIVE REGULATIONS
Some see Sarbanes-Oxley as misdirected, that it really won't do much to cure
most of the corporate abuses and real problems of corporate governance. Some
say the real problem is not lack of director independence but directors simply not
working hard enough. 299 Separating auditing from non-audit services won't do
much, some say, because the auditor still has an interest in ingratiating the client in
order to retain its audit business.3°° As one analyst puts it," even if auditing
firms have to get out of the consulting business, the temptation for auditors to
please the people they are paid to police will still be there.",30 ' The better approach
is one of a genuine check and balance between two audit firms, through a forensic
audit or periodic rotation of audit firms.
Alternative Reforms: Before resigning as SEC Chairman and even before the
debate over Sarbanes-Oxley Harvey Pitt suggested that companies be subject
periodically to full-scale forensic audits by a different audit firm.30 2 Regular
auditors normally review just a sample of company records and take
management's words at face value. Forensic audits probe more deeply and would
more likely uncover any real problems.30 3 Other experts have suggested regular
rotation of the audit firm, not just of the auditors within a firm, going well beyond
the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley which only requires the two pnncipal partners
involved in the audit be rotated every five years. 304 Bypassing the normal biases
and relationships built up over time between a firm and its client is-the only path
that some see to true independence. Requiring forensic audits might create a lot of
new business for audit firms, so one might suspect they would lobby for such a
rule. More frequent rotation, however, might create disruption and transaction
costs and therefore stimulate political opposition by the auditors.
Only Auditing: If Sarbanes-Oxley has minimal impact, another option worth
considering is what Paul Volcker suggested as his condition of leading Arthur
Andersen - forego consulting altogether and stick to auditing.0 5 Despite the
financial and business sacrifices that would entail for the firm, perhaps a model
built for modest success and integrity of the business system overall is a better
alternative for the future. As Volcker said, "We've missed an opportunity of
having an accounting firm of some weight doing auditing the way it seems to me it
299. See Sonnenfeld, supra note 13.
300. Gellerman, supra note 41, at 23 n.3.
301. Id.
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should be done. Andersen is now a very lame horse, a lame horse that got shot in
the head." 3°6 Further, as the U.S. editor and a correspondent for the Economist
contend:
Enron is certainly an opportunity to instigate some long overdue corporate
reforms. It was always a recipe for disaster that accountants were allowed to do
consulting. It was always a scandal that chief executives were allowed to design
their own remuneration packages. Despite some screams from the business lobby,




Ban Tax Services: While Sarbanes-Oxley bans auditors from providing
certain kinds of consulting services - human resources and technology systems, it
has not banned tax services or consulting on tax shelters, leaving that up to
corporate audit committees to approve or not.30 8 In January 2003, the SEC voted to
allow tax services and consulting to continue, subject to approval by corporate
boards and under the supervision of audit committees.3 9
Abolish Banking/Brokerage Combination: As for the provision in the Wall
Street settlement requiring that analysts not be compensated for any investment
banking business brought to the firm nor go on "road shows" for clients with the
bankers, some maintain that is misdirected and insufficient as well. 310  Even
without direct contact with the bankers and incentive pay based on touting client
stocks, everyone in the firm knows that its overall success is inextricably tied to
that of its clients. Scott Cleland of the Precursor Group, an independent research
firm, observes that the entire model, based on research, trading, and banking is
inherently conflicted.31 1 That diagnosis leads to the conclusion that investment
banking and securities analysis/brokerage should not exist under the same roof.
They should be entirely separated, based on the model of the Precursor Group. For
investment banking firms to be required to supplement their own analysis with that
of truly independent firms, as stipulated by the Wall Street Settlement, might
insure some check and balance, but is a tacit admission that the investment
banking/analysis model has flaws.
Mutual Fund Industry Regulation: With the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the
attention is shifting from corporate fraud to abuses by the mutual fund industry
More aggressive than the SEC on this score is Rep. Richard Baker (R-LA), who
has proposed legislation requinng greater disclosure of fees paid by individual
investors, disclosure of the compensation structure for fund managers, and
regulation of "soft dollar" commissions, in which funds pay higher than normal
306. Id.
307. John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge, A Corporate Crisis? No, Just Business As Usual,
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309. Id.
310. Patrick McGeehan, For Financial Firms, Proposed New Rules on Analysts are the Least of
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commissions in return for research, with the costs passed on to fund investors.3t 2
The Baker bill also would increase the mandated percentage of independent
directors on fund boards from 40 percent to 67 percent.31 3
That legislation, the Mutual Fund Integrity and Fee Transparency Act of
2003, managed to get through the House Financial Services Committee, but is
likely to die on the House floor 314 Industry lobbyists succeeded in watenng down
the final reform bill, and reform advocate Jack Bogle concluded, "If a journey of a
thousand miles begins with a single step, I'd say this legislation still leaves us
many hundreds of miles to go.'315 Jack Bogle has roundly criticized the industry
he helped create and has been a crusader for reform.3i6 He charges most funds with
charging excessive fees, with insufficient disclosure of portfolio holdings, with
failing to provide an informed choice to investors, with failing to compensate fund
managers according to their performance, with excessively turning over stock
holdings, with failing to disclose its votes on shareholder resolutions, with
insufficiently holding management in invested firms accountable, and when all is
said and done, with underperforming the market.3i 7 Bogle and others believe the
governance and practices of this industry are the next best targets and candidates
for reform.
3t8
Governance of the Stock Exchanges: One matter not addressed by Sarbanes-
Oxley related to the integrity of the listing process itself concerns the governance
of the major stock exchanges, especially the NYSE. The controversy surrounding
Chairman Richard Grasso's $10 million salary in 2002, and his deferred
compensation package of $139 million, has brought more scrutiny to the NYSE's
integrity 319 That Grasso and the founder of Home Depot sat on each other's
320compensation committees also raised questions of NYSE's governance process.
While the self-regulatory organizations will require listed companies to have a
majority of independent directors by October 2004, they could set a better example
by themselves having more independence on their own boards. 321 Ten of the
twenty-seven board members of the NYSE were from either listed companies or
the securities industry prior to new NYSE Director John Reed downsizing the
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board, and that is also true of six of the twenty-one NASDAQ board members.
322
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer contends that, "Fixing self-regulation is
perhaps the most important policy issue facing the SEC. 323
MARKET REFORMS
As noted, there are compliance costs and administrative costs from Sarbanes-
Oxley that have met with criticism. Most of the costs are surely yet to be realized.
Further, there are questions whether the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are
misdirected and will markedly improve corporate governance. As The Economist
concludes, "[n]ew federal laws, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, have created a
dense thicket of rules prescribing good behaviour in the boardroom. But the
system's essential features - weak boards, muted shareholder participation and
sweeping power for the boss - so far remain intact."324 At the same time, the
corporate scandals have generated a spint of reform in the marketplace that has
produced other results. Whether the reforms voluntarily adopted by corporations
will turn out to be better than the widespread reforms forced by regulation remain
to be seen, but scandal-ridden companies like WorldCom are actually leading the
way toward the most ambitious reforms. MCI/WorldCom will be adopting many
of the seventy-eight reforms urged in the Breeden Report, "Restoring Trust.
' 325
Most of the reforms go well beyond the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley The
major reforms in corporate governance recommended include:
Outside director as chairman of board;
Full independence for all directors;
Ban CEO from serving on any other corporate boards;
CEO salary capped at $15 million without shareholder approval;
When board is divided on new candidates, contested elections must be
held;
Heavier director workload, salary increased to $150,000;
Explicit dividend policy, paying 25 percent of net profits;
Electronic "town hall" meetings on company website ideas with 20
percent support go to annual meeting; and,
Governance rules become part of articles of incorporation, not corporate
bylaws, and can be changed only with shareholder approval.326
In the case of WorldCom, of course, there are unique factors that may have
propelled the company to take more drastic steps in reforming itself. Those factors
include:
The extent of damage created to shareholders by the collapse of
WorldCom, to the tune of $180 billion in lost market capitalization;
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The fact that WorldCom's reorganization under the bankruptcy laws has
been roundly criticized by those who believe the company should instead
be liquidated;
The blatant nature of the company's accounting fraud and the fact that
four top executives have already pleaded guilty-
The criticism of the company's $750 million settlement with the SEC as
being totally insufficient;
The assault brought against MCI/WorldCom by its competitors (Verizon,
AT&T and SBC) and their political allies in Congress. AT&T has even
brought a suit under RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act) against MCI/WorldCom for its illegal routing of
phone calls;
The sweeping and harsh criticisms of the company's board and senior
management by the McLucas Report, requested by the company's board,
and by the Thornburgh Report, requested by the bankruptcy judge;
The company's favored position as a major government contractor, along
with the decision by the Government Services Administration (GSA) that
the company be suspended from bidding on any new government
contracts; and,
The criminal charges for securities fraud brought by the state attorney
general of Oklahoma against the company and its senior executives, likely
to be followed by similar charges by other states. 27
Given all of these political and legal pressures, the company perhaps felt it had to
take bold steps, in hopes of defusing some of those pressures. Other companies
not facing such a barrage of forces are unlikely to adopt such ambitious internal
reforms.
GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Changes in corporate governance are taking place in other political-economic
systems as well, though not always parallel to those changes in the U.S. There are
other pressing legal issues surrounding global corporate governance as well,
including the application of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to overseas auditors, the scope
and integrity of foreign regulatory bodies, and the evolution of global accounting
standards.
Corporate Governance Standards in other Countries: The roles of corporate
boards and shareholders are being debated in other countries, just as they are in the
U.S., but with some marked differences, depending on the country or region.328
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Wisely or not, attention has focused on the independence of boards and directors in
the U.S. That is somewhat true of other countries as well, but their requirements
and laws often have a different emphasis. For instance, following the publication
of the Cadbury Commission recommendations in 1992, corporations in the UK
have gone much further than American companies in separating the roles of
chairman and CEO.32 9 While in 1990, 90 percent of both U.S. and U.K. companies
combined the CEO and chairman positions, about 85 percent of FTSE 100
companies today separate those positions, while the situation is still the same in the
U.S.
33 0 The emphasis on empowering independent (or non-executive) directors
has occurred more recently in the U.K. and earlier in the U.S. The Higgs Report
includes two recommendations that most corporate chairmen find objectionable -
that a senior non-executive be designated on the board, opposed by 82 percent of
all chairmen; and a nomination committee be chaired by an independent non-
executive director, opposed by 87 percent of all chairmen.33 '
In France, independent directors are becoming somewhat more common.
There are no regulatory standards on independence, as in the U.S., but high-level
reports have recommended that the percentage of independent directors be
increased, the first report recommending a level of one third, and the second report
recommending one half. Genuine independence is more problematic, as most
corporate board members represent the French elite and are graduates of two
exclusive institutions of higher education.332 Some companies, especially those
with well publicized problems, have nonetheless moved in the direction of more
independent boards. Vivendi Universal, with the controversy surrounding its
accounting and CEO compensation, now has an audit committee completely filled
with independent directors.333 Moreover, the number of European boards having at
least one independent member, no great progress by U.S. standards, has
nonetheless risen from 53 percent in 2001 to 59 percent in 2002.334
In South Korea, with its history of poor corporate governance, family
dynasties called chaebol rule over large conglomerates, with opaque subcompanies
controlled through extensive networks of cross-shareholding. 335 While the boards
of such companies formerly had no outside directors, the situation is slowly
changing. At Samsung Electronics, half of its fourteen board members are now
outsiders, and its audit committee is totally composed of outsiders.336 KT
Corporation, the largest phone and broadband company in Korea, just recently
L. 341 (2002); Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of "Global" Convergence in
Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 321 (2001).
329. Paul F Kocourek, et al., Corporate Governance: Hard Facts about Soft Behaviors, 30
STRATEGY + BUSiNESs 58 (2003), available at http://www.strategy-business.comlpress/
articlel8322?pg=0 (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
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332. French Corporate Governance: Independent? Moi? ECONOMIST, Mar. 15, 2003, at 63.
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privatized, is one of few companies in Asia with an independent director as
chairman of the board.337
Beyond the issue of independent boards, not as big an issue in other countries
as in the U.S., there has been a movement in many global regions toward the
adoption of board committee structures. Companies in the U.K. and European
countries most often have compensation or remuneration committees, along with
audit committees. 338 Leading companies in Japan, like Sony and Hitachi, have also
put such committees in place.339 Corporate governance codes, while setting only
voluntary standards, are becoming more common throughout Europe. During
2002, Spain and Germany introduced governance codes for public companies,
while Italy and France updated their own codes.340 The German Stock Corporation
Act also requires companies to disclose how well they comply with the corporate
governance code.341 Over time, the European Commission also intends to
harmonize the over 40 European corporate governance codes.342
Boards all across the globe are now holding CEOs more accountable for their
failures to perform while in office. CEO turnover is up "192 percent in Europe and
140 percent in the Asia/Pacific region since 1995, and 45 percent of all CEO
replacements in the Asia/Pacific region in 2002 were related to corporate
performance. 343 The percentage of performance-related dismissals increased ten-
fold between 2001 and 2002.34 Japan also revised its commercial code in 2002 to
encourage companies to have outside directors.345
Despite increased accountability inattentive boards that fail to exercise
diligence are a common problem in other countries, just as they are in the U.S.
Boards dominated by strong-willed CEOs are also just as common in other
countries as in the U.S. For instance, Cees van der Hoeven, CEO of Ahold, was a
growth- and acquisition-focused executive and in many ways Europe's counterpart
to General Electric's Jack Welch.346 After the scandal surfaced, the company's
board rejected his offer to resign due to his personality and power of persuasion.347
In other words, the board may have been too intimidated to even allow the CEO to
fall on his own sword.
Shareholder Activism: Shareholder activism is much more prevalent in the
U.S. than in other countries, but the gap is narrowing in two ways. First, U.S.
337. Id.
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339. Ken Belson, At Meetings Abroad, Raucousness and Hoopla, N.Y TIMES, May I1, 2003, at
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21700?pg=all&tid=230 (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
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shareholder groups, whether church organizations like the Interfaith Center for
Corporate Responsibility or mainstream institutional shareholders, will
occasionally challenge the practices of firms in which they own shares that are
based in other countries. That trend moved forward in the 1990s. For instance, in
Europe, U.S. pension funds like TIAA-CREF which has an aggressive corporate
governance department, are joining forces with European funds to bring pressure
348on companies based in Europe. More recently, shareholders in other countries
have organized to pressure companies in their own homelands. As one scholar put
it, After years of relative isolation as pnmarily U.S. and British phenomenon,
shareholder activism has finally shown signs of going global. 34 9  For instance,
related to the Ahold scandal, a Dutch shareholder watchdog group called the
Foundation for Investigation of Business Information has applied pressure for the
CEO to return a large portion of his compensation. 350  There is also a Dutch
Association of Shareholders, a more traditional group.35 In France, since Alcatel
has sought investors in the U.S. capital market, it has faced pressure from U.S.
shareholder interests, while it has also had to face increasing pressure from French
shareholders.352 France now faces the question whether it is moving more in the
direction of the American "shareholder democracy" model and abandoning its
previous "stakeholder" model.3 53
Having acknowledged the growing activism of shareholders in the U.S., there
are still corporate governance experts who claim that shareholder powers pale in
contrast to those of directors, since the American model is much more director-
centric.354 In the U.S. and under the Delaware code, Bainbridge argues,
"Shareholder control nghts are so weak that they scarcely qualify as part of
corporate governance., 35 5 Even as to institutional investors, he states:
There is relatively little evidence that institutional investor activism has
mattered. Although about fifty percent of equity securities are owned by
institutions, large blocks held by a single investor are rare, and few U.S.
corporations have any institutional shareholders who own more than five-to-ten
percent of their stock. Even the most active institutional investors spend only
trifling amounts on corporate governance activism. Institutions devote little effort
to monitonng management; to the contrary, they typically disclaim the ability or
desire to decide company-specific policy questions. They rarely conduct proxy
348. Capell, supra note 333.
349. Perry E. Wallace, The Globalization of Corporate Governance: Shareholder Protection.
Hostile Takeovers and the Evolving Corporate Environment in France, 18 CONN. J. INT'L L. I (2002).
350. McCartney, supra note 346.
351. Id. (While this organization caters more to mainstream shareholders, the Foundation for
Investigation of Business Information is more akin to groups in the U.S. like the Interfaith Center for
Corporate Responsibility and is more prone to be aggressive and activist in its demands.).
352. Wallace, supra note 349, at 14.
353. Id. at 3.
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TRANSNAT'L LAW 45, 46 (2002).
355. Id. at 48.
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solicitations or put forward shareholder proposals.
356
That view of course conflicts with others discussed above. Meanwhile, even
though the U.K. shares a common law foundation with the U.S., as well as many
features of its corporate model, there the emphasis is much more on shareholder
rights and powers. Hence, while directors are held much more accountable for
executive salaries in the U.S., the U.K. has recently given shareholders the power
to approve of CEO pay packages.
Even though shareholder meetings of Japanese companies have been
historically friendly and quiet, they have also contended with professional
disrupters, known as sokaiya, who demand hush money from corporations
involved in scandal.357 Companies have largely succeeded in thwarting those
elements, but now legitimate shareholders have begun challenging management in
proxy votes.358
In South Korea, foreigners own more than a third of the shares of companies
listed on the Seoul stock exchange, and they are the primary forces promoting
corporate governance reform.359 Indigenous political forces also have the issue on
their agenda, especially since the stock manipulation scandal involving SK
Corporation, the country's third largest conglomerate.360 A group called People's
Solidarity for Participatory Democracy is seeking tighter restrictions on cross-
shareholding, more outside directors, the ability to bring class action suits, and
greater separation between banks and manufacturing companies.
36'
Organized shareholder groups are also forming in other countries,
counterparts to the shareholder activist groups in the U.S. Beyond the Dutch
groups mentioned above, South Korea has another group called the Center for
Good Corporate Governance, and in the region, there is an Asian Corporate
362Governance Association. In France, the major shareholder group is the
Association pour la Defense des Actionnaires Minoritaires (ADAM).
63
Pension funds have long been activist in the U.S., but mutual funds much less
so, and hence the encouragement of Jack Bogle, founder of the Vanguard Funds,
for mutual funds to exert much more pressure on corporate managements. 364 In
European countries, such as the United Kingdom, activism by both pension funds
and mutual funds has been at a much lower decibel, as only about 50 percent of all
shares are voted, whereas the figure is closer to 80 percent in the U.S. 365 However,
the volume is growing. Germany's second largest mutual fund is moving in an
356. Id at 50.
357. Belson, supra note 339.
358. Id.




363. French Corporate Governance: Independent? Moi? supra note 332, at 63.
364. Justin Fox, Saint Jack on the Attack, FORTUNE, Jan. 20,2003, at 112.
365. Will the Owners Please Stand Up? EcONOMIST, Nov. 2, 2002, at 72.
VOL. 32:2
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
activist direction, and the U.K.'s Institutional Shareholders Committee,
representing pension funds, insurers, and mutual funds has adopted an activist
code. Reflecting trends in the U.S., the U.K might also force funds to disclose how
they vote on proxy resolutions.' 66
Shareholder v. Stakeholder Models: Many countries are following the
Western model of corporate law and governance, including the wide dispersion of
ownership to shareholders, in order to be listed on one of the U.S. stock exchanges
and get access to greater capital in the U.S. Nevertheless, some experts believe it
is arrogant and imperialistic for the U.S. to believe this trend is inevitable and to
believe that its model of corporate governance is necessarily better.367 Other
models favor block ownership of shares, sometimes held by banks or families or
other constituents, and emphasize accountability to other stakeholders besides
shareholders. 368  One example is the European system of co-determination that
favors accountability to labor through two-tiered boards of directors. In the face of
other models, global convergence along the lines of the U.S. corporate governance
model will likely never occur. As one critic puts it:
The self-anointed corporate governance experts, elite as they may be in the United
States corporate law academy, are not cognizant of the real issues of the twenty
first century. Their advocacy of 'global' convergence, and that long the lines of
United States style corporate governance, is not based upon 'global'
developments, is culturally chauvinistic, and is anachronistic.
369
A rich body of literature exists on the variables that account for the
differences between shareholder and stakeholder accountability models. Why does
one country embrace the shareholder model while another country follows the
stakeholder model? One leading theory contends it is the quality of corporate law
(QCL) that accounts for the difference and that common law systems facilitate the
dispersion of shares and minority rights of shareholders, while civil law systems
more often promote concentrated ownership with accountability to stakeholders.37 °
This theory has generated a fair amount of criticism and counter-theories. John
Coffee argues that the existence of a common law or civil law system has very
little to do with the dispersion of ownership and shareholder power.371 Were that
the case, European civil law countries would not be able to move to a more
shareholder-centric system, as many are now doing, and transitional economies
with civil law systems would forever be trapped into a system of concentrated
ownership. The QCL theory also cannot explain the thriving securities market in
the Netherlands, a civil law country Coffee instead argues that the absence of
366. Id.
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state supervision is the critical factor leading to dispersion of ownership. 372 In
such environments, as in the U.S., the U.K., and Canada, vibrant stock exchanges
and self-regulatory systems emerge. They in turn give rise to accommodating
common law systems, rather than the other way around. Coffee believes the QCL
theorists have the causal chain backwards.3 73 It is liquidity and stock exchanges
that produce legal systems protective of shareholder rights.
To this debate, Mark Roe injects a political thesis. He argues that the type of
corporate governance followed by a given system is determined by the politics
underlying that system. 374 The legal system and type of state supervision are not
the critical variables but the nature of the overall political system.375 He maintains,
through an analysis of wide-ranging comparative examples, that social
democracies promote concentrated ownership and accountability to stakeholders,
while capitalist democracies promote dispersed ownership and shareholder
powers.3 76 It is social democracies that strengthen the claims of non-shareholders
such as labor. Peter Gourevitch offers a sympathetic critique of Roe's work,
believing it is essentially accurate, but still questions some of its elements.377 Roe
and Gourevitch are both political scientists, so it is not strange that they would
both stress the importance of the political system. Gourevitch argues that Roe
focuses too much on the overall political system and ignores such variables within
any given system as issues, interest groups, and institutions. 378 Any combination
of those forces, even in a social democracy, could serve to empower shareholders
and create dispersed ownership. Conversely, they might also lead to concentrated
ownership and stakeholder empowerment in a capitalist democracy. Even in the
U.S., there is an active debate within the academy and larger political society over
the relative power of shareholders and other stakeholders, over the ownership
structure of major corporations, and over the range of corporate accountability and
obligations.
Global Accounting Standards: The corporate scandals in the U.S., along with
the debate over conflicting standards of expensing stock options, have highlighted
the differences between U.S. and other country standards. The U.S. is no longer
viewed as the gold standard of either corporate governance or accounting
standards. The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has led the way
in the expensing of stock options, for example, with the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) about to follow Some Europeans view its standards
based on principles as more fair and less susceptible to abuse and corruption than
the U.S. rules-based standards based on rules.379 Ironically, the Roman law or code
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1878-1880.
378. Id. at 1878.
379. F Robert Buchanan, International Accounting Harmonization: Developing Single World
Standard, 46 BUS. HORiZONS 3, at 61-70.
VOL. 32:2
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
law countries of France and Germany have more general and flexible accounting
standards than do the common law countries of the U.S. and U.K.380
There are other differences as well. The common-law countries of the U.S.,
U.K., Canada, and Australia are more "shareholder-focused" in their governance
and accounting standards, while the code-law countries of Japan, Germany, and
France represent bank-dominated economies and are more "stakeholder
focused."3 81 They also tend to demand less transparency than their common-law
382counterparts. 2 Belying the accusation that U.S. standards tend to encourage more
reckless earnings management, one study found that:
[Aiccounting earnings in common law countries are more conservative than
reported earnings in code law countries, arising out of the arm's-length
relationship between contracting parties (managers and shareholders).
Reviewing the results of earnings suggests that bad news is incorporated more
slowly and good news more quickly in code law than in common law countries.
3 83
Indeed, when Daimler-Benz conformed its earnings statements to U.S.




With the differences in U.S. and global accounting standards, and the
criticisms of U.S. corporate scandals, there is a movement toward convergence of
standards. European companies that have used GAAP standards to date will be
moving toward international accounting standards. The goal of the FASB and
IASB is to have uniform standards created by 2005.385 Currently, the rules of the
two bodies cover the U.S. and almost fifty other countries.3s James Hamngton of
PricewaterhouseCoopers states, "[y]ou're looking at a whole paradigm of how the
rules are made. It's a momentous change. 38 7
Included among the advantages of convergence are lower compliance costs
for transnational enterprises and the stimulation of more global capital flows. 388
On the debit side, even with uniform and flexible standards, the implementation of
those standards will vary according to national and institutional cultures. 389 As to
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The Enron debacle, though having drawn great attention in the IFRS dialogue, is
not an indicator of any fundamental accounting or regulatory system failure.
Rather, it is a case of corrupt management that was seeking technicalities behind
which to perpetrate investor fraud. It appears that its primary infraction,
nondisclosure of off-balance sheet financing, might be more clearly prohibited
under IFRS. That, however, would not necessarily have precluded them from
fraudulent tactics under the international system, because the IFRS is generally
less structured than U.S. GAAP and more interpretive latitude is available to
corporate accountants.
390
Supporting the view that international accounting standards might create even
more chances for manipulation, an accounting expert stated, "[tihere's all this talk
about how international accounting standards are better. When I hear that it just
makes me sick to my stomach because I think it's so wrong. There's more
flexibility in the international standards. It makes it where it's easier to do the
kinds of things you want to do. .If they want to hide it, they're going to hide
it."9
39 1
Global Securities and Governance Standards: Beyond the effort to harmonize
accounting standards, international organizations are also attempting to harmonize
securities and corporate governance standards. The International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), formed in 1974, is composed of 161 securities
regulatory agencies from vanous parts of the world that agree: (1) to cooperate to
promote high standards of regulation; (2) to exchange information to promote the
development of securities markets; (3) to establish standards of effective
surveillance of international secunties transactions; and (4) to provide mutual
assistance to promote effective enforcement and the integrity of markets.392
Meanwhile, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) is attempting to promote and harmonize global corporate governance
standards.393 Examining its website one will see the areas of emphasis of its Ad
Hoc Task Force on Corporate Governance. 394 The five sections of its governance
principals cover the rights of shareholders, the equitable treatment of shareholders,
the role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency and the role of the board.3 95
Application of Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Foreign Firms: The Public Accounting
Oversight Board has recommended that auditors of foreign companies whose
shares are traded on U.S. exchanges must register with the SEC. 396  Such
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registration may also include annual inspections and the possibility of disciplinary
action being taken. Left undecided are whether the inspections might extend
overseas and whether overseas branches of Big Four American firms will be
treated differently from audit companies based abroad. Some legislators such as
Senators Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.) and Jon Corzme (D-N.J.) are concerned that
if foreign auditors are exempted from the law that there will be an incentive for
U.S. audit firms to move much of their operations abroad.397
In January 2003, the EU was initially pleased when the SEC announced
limited exemptions from new rules for accounting and corporate governance.
Included among the exemptions were (1) that foreign companies do not have to
disclose that a financial expert on the audit committee is independent of
management; (2) that non-management employees are allowed to serve on the
audit committee, a common practice in Germany- and (3) that foreign lawyers are
not required to report securities law violations within the firm, if they do not advise
management on issues of U.S. law. 398 However, by April 2003, the EU was less
pleased and was lobbying aggressively against any registration requrement. 39 9
Fritz Bolkenstem, the European commissioner in charge of market reform, wrote a
threatening letter to SEC Chairman William Donaldson, on behalf of the 15
member finance ministers, warning that such a requirement would undermine
confidence in financial markets and prompt reciprocal requirements for registration
of U.S. audit firms in each EU member country 400 The EU and European
governments are concerned that their audit firms not be subject to conflicting laws
and regulations and maintain that meeting U.S. disclosure requirements would
violate European data protection laws.4 0 ' They object to the law's coverage as
unfair, since European firms are already subject to a large number of U.S.
regulations. 4 2 The timing of the accounting fraud and restatement of over $800
million of earnings by Dutch food company Royal Ahold, however, stiffened the
resolve of the PAOB to cover the conduct of foreign auditors as well.
40 3
Jurisdiction over Overseas Firms and Auditors: When auditors working
abroad have evidence of accounting fraud, the question arises over U.S. access to
that information. When the Senate was investigating the BCCI (Bank of Credit
and Commerce International) scandal in 1991, Pncewaterhouse contended that
documents in its London office could not be subpoenaed, since the U.S.
headquarters had no control over its foreign branch offices. 404 The firm now says
it nevertheless regularly cooperates in supplying foreign work papers to the U.S.
2003 at E3.
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government.4 5 Foreign accounting firms must provide opinions and work papers,
upon which a registered public accounting firm relies when issuing an audit report
or anything that relates to its participation in an audit of a U.S. firm, though it does
not have to provide other unrelated documents.4 °6 The U.S. Customs Office will
also assist the SEC in tracking down documents by screening auditors when they
cross the border and denying them passage unless they turn over the documents.0
A KPMG auditor crossing the Mexican border turned over papers implicating
408Xerox Corporation in one such case, resulting in a $10 million settlement.
The SEC and federal prosecutors also have jurisdiction over overseas
companies based abroad that are listed on the New York Stock Exchange and may
have engaged in fraud that harmed U.S. investors. On that basis, the SEC has
brought administrative proceedings against the Cronos Group, a Luxembourg
company headquartered in England, and against its British accountants, for an
alleged fraud in connection with an initial public offering in 1995.410 The SEC has
also asserted jurisdiction over the Ahold accounting investigation, since the
company is listed in the U.S.
411
Regulatory Bodies in Foreign Countries: In the U.S., the Justice Department
and the SEC usually work together to examine accounting and securities fraud.4t 2
Most other countries lack the kind of serious regulatory framework and
enforcement agencies that exist in the U.S. In the case of Royal Ahold's
accounting fraud, it is being investigated by three entities in the Netherlands - the
public prosecutor's office, the Netherlands Authority for Financial Markets, and
Euronext Amsterdam NV the operator of the Dutch stock exchange.4i 3 However,
no Dutch regulatory authority enjoys the sweeping powers of the SEC, and
penalties for even such violations as insider trading are much milder than in the
U.S.
4 1 4
Having discussed both the voluntary changes in global corporate governance,
as well as some of the comparative regulations of corporate governance, the
following chart compares the ratings of corporate governance in leading European
countries.
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CONCLUSION
While U.S. Corporations have been under pressure to adopt more independent
boards since the 1970s, the corporate scandals and subsequent Sarbanes-Oxley Act
have added substantially to that pressure. Independence may be one factor among
several vital to reforming corporate governance, but it is certain that many
corporate boards are changing, especially in their scrutiny of CEOs and top
management. Business groups and leaders have criticized the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
for going too far and adding needless expenses to conducting business, especially
in the standards and documentation of internal controls, while making it more
difficult to attract talented directors to govern the corporation. Meanwhile,
business critics contend the law falls short even in the area of accounting reform,
where it is most directed, and ignores other important areas of corporate
governance. Still, most acknowledge it is the most important corporate reform
legislation since the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, and its impact is
bolstered by shareholder activism and litigation, by state and federal regulatory
authorities, by increased penalties and criminal prosecutions, and by more
aggressive stock exchanges.
The rise in concern over corporate governance is also occurring on a global
basis, taking on forms both similar to and different from those in the U.S. Some
countries take a stronger stakeholder approach than does the U.S., but shareholder
activism is becoming more common even in countries that do not share the
American history of capitalistic democracy. Further, in the U.K., governance
reform and shareholder empowerment has advanced in some ways even more than
it has in the U.S. Hopefully, this global movement will deter management
misconduct and elevate investor confidence in the future, thereby enhancing the
prospects for global economic expansion.
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THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT & DOE v UNOCAL. A
PAQUETE HABANA APPROACH TO THE RESCUE
JOHN HABERSTROH
The requirement that a rule command the general assent of civilized nations to
become binding upon them all is a stringent one. Were this not so, the courts of
one nation might feel free to impose idiosyncratic legal rules upon others, in the
name of applying international law.I
The exalted power of administering judicially the law of nations What a
beautiful and magnificent prospect of government is now opened The sluices




Twenty years ago Judge Edwards made his now well-known plea for the
Supreme Court to clarify the Alien Tort Claims Act" (ATCA) 3 and the law of
nations. 4 His plea echoes through a series of recent Ninth Circuit alien tort claim
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N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 60 (1999); See also William R. Casio, The Federal Courts Protective
Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV 467, 505
(1986).
3. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2004). ATCA is not an "Act" Alien Tort Statute is a more accurate
but less widely used designation. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law,
2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F 323, 342 (2001) (discussing the Alien Tort Statute). Others would prefer the
statute be called the Alien Tort Clause, since it was in fact a clause in Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of
1789. William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of The Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the
"Orignalists 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP L. REV. 221,222 n.6 (1996) [hereinafter Dodge I].
4. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring) ("This case deals with an area of the law that cnes out for clarification by the Supreme
Court. We confront at every turn broad and novel questions about the definition and application of the
'law of nations."'). Judge Robb disagreed in the same per curiam decision:
When case presents broad and novel questions of this sort, courts ought not to appeal
for guidance to the Supreme Court, but should instead look to Congress and the
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decisions here labeled Unocal I, II, and 111.5 The litigation concerns Unocal's
alleged complicity in Burmese security forces' use of forced labor to construct oil
and gas pipeline facilities. Unocal III is a vacated appellate court decision,
recently reheard en banc.6 A final Ninth Circuit decision was expected in the Fall
of 2003, but a decision had not yet been issued by the following spring.
7
A reheanng decision that largely affirms the appellate court may compel
Supreme Court review, and then we may have the long overdue update of judicial
rules for determining customary international law.8 This in turn would clarify
which international human rights violations, and which behavior in complicity
with those violations, fall within the scope of ATCA. 9
The Ninth Circuit en banc oral arguments took place on June 17 2003. As
expected, the judges' main interest was whether the appellate court was correct in
submitting Unocal's actions to an aiding-and-abetting standard derived from ad
President. Should these branches of the Government decide that questions of this sort
are proper subjects for judicial inquiry, they can then provide the courts with the
guidelines by which such inquiries should proceed.
Id. at 827 (Robb, J., concurring). The terms "customary international law" and "the law of nations" are
treated here as equivalent. See Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 1992)
("[Clustomary international law [is] the direct descendant of the law of nations."); Doe I v. Islamic
Salvation Front, 993 F Supp. 3, 7 (D. D.C. 1998) ("The law of nations [is] currently known as
international customary law.").
5. Doe v. Unocal Corp. 963 F Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) [hereinafter Unocal ]; Doe v. Unocal
Corp. I 10 F Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000) [hereinafter Unocal 11]; and Doe v. Unocal Corp, Nos. 00-
56603, 00-57197, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Unocal III].
6. Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716 (9th Cir. Feb.
14, 2003) (en banc hearing order). See also Jason Hoppin, 9th Circuit Wrestles With A TCA Standards,
THE RECORDER, June 18, 2003, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/newswire article.
jspid=1055463665626 (last visited Mar. 10, 2004). An unofficial transcript of the en banc hearing is
provided by one of the non-government organizations (NGOs) assisting the plaintiffs, Earthnghts
International. See http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/enbanctranscript.doc (last visited Mar. 10, 2004).
For further information on the NGOs assisting the plaintiffs, see infra note 22 and accompanying text.
7 See Harold H. Koh, Wrong on Rights, YALE GLOBAL ONLINE, July 18, 2003, at
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=2121 (last visited Mar. 10, 2004).
8. "Customary international law [is the law of the international community] that results from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987); cf.
Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art.
38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1031, 1060, 1945 U.S.T LEXIS 199, 63 (stating that the Court shall apply
"international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law").
9. For this reason, the now seven years of litigation have been closely watched by allies of
international corporations and human rights advocates. See Marcia Coyle, 9th Circuit Spurns U.S. Over
Alien Tort Claims, NAT'L L. J., June 10, 2003, available at http://www.law.com/serviet/ContentServer?
pagename--OpenMarket/XceleratefView&c=LawArticle&cid=I 052440857507&t=LawArticle (last
visited Mar. 10, 2004) (writing that Doe v. Unocal is "viewed as pivotal by human rights and corporate
defense lawyers in the fight over ATCA."); Jenna Greene, Gathering Storm, LEGAL TIMES, July 23,
2003, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/newswire-article.jsp?id=105841640691 1 (last visited Mar.
10, 2004) (Greene writes that the case is closely watched. Regarding ATCA, she states that "[blusiness
advocates nationwide are sounding the alarm about the once-obscure 1789 statute with "[giround
zero in the fight Doe v. Unocal." She adds that "[Ilabor and human rights activists, religious
groups, environmental organizations and plaintiffs' lawyers are mobilized to defend the statute ").
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hoc international criminal tribunal decisions.10 The judges indicated they were
considering the Unocal III concurrence, which had suggested instead applying a
federal civil common law standard to the aid-and-abet claims. 1
However, by presenting itself with only those two choices, the appellate court
displayed the unpalatable alternatives U.S. courts normally provide themselves
with in making customary international law determinations. A third and better
alternative is to institute a judicial practice - in a substantive international law
matter such as the applicable aiding-and-abetting standard - of freshly determining
such standards from the consensus among the world's domestic legal systems.
This might be called a "Paquete Habana" approach, though it is a natural
extension of Habana in line with the increased scope and domestic penetration of
international law. Critically such an approach would continue to recognize the
consensual nature of customary international law- that it must derive from settled
practice among the nations of the world. As applied to Unocal's aiding and
abetting conduct - which would not generate civil or criminal liability in the vast
majority of the world's legal systems - the approach would not find the
corporation's misbehavior a law of nations tort, and would compel dismissal of the
action because ATCA subsumes only torts in violation of customary international
law.
ATCA itself may receive a fresh review if the Supreme Court considers
Unocal III. Concerned by a statute unbound by a "new" customary international
law, the Court may seek to dim the statute's usefulness in international human
rights litigation. 12 The Court may even align itself with the scholarship of Judge
Robert Bork and others who have long advocated limiting ATCA to law of nations
torts actionable in the 1790s or to torts taking place in the United States.' 3 Instead,
10. Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716 (9th Cir. Feb.
14, 2003) (en bane hearing order).
11. Id.
12. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in the U.S. Courts - Before
and After Erie, 26 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 807, 822 (1997) (A critic of the new customary
international law, Bradley states that it "differs from traditional customary international law in several
fundamental ways: it can arise much more quickly; it is based less on actual state practice and more on
international pronouncements, such as UN General Assembly resolutions and multilateral treaties; and,
perhaps most importantly, it purports to regulate not the relations of states among themselves, but rather
a state's treatment of its own citizens."); see also J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary
International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449, 536 (2000) (concluding that customary international law
lacks the four indicators of legitimacy: determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and adherence to
hierarchy of secondary rules); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance
Between Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 666-68 (2000);
Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMp L. 31, 38 (1995-1996)
(arguing that binding international human rights norms can be discovered through examination of
liberal national constitutions, and are "not based on state practice at all").
13. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 810-16 (Bork, J., concurring); Alfred P Rubin, Professor
D'Amato Concept of American Jurisdiction is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 105, 105-06
(1985). The Doe v. Unocal defendants and the Department of Justice showed their sympathies in briefs
submitted to the en bane panel reviewing the case. Both featured as their main arguments Bork's
position that ATCA does not provide a cause of action. Supplemental Brief of Defendants-Appellees,
Doe v. Unocal, filed April 23, 2003, available at http://www.unocal.com/myanmar/enbancbrief (last
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with a modernized Paquete Habana, the Court should resist Bork's historically
inaccurate position but at the same time reject the new, non-consensual, non-
positivist customary international law
After briefly describing the human rights violations in Burma that gave rise to
litigation against Unocal, this paper begins to connect ATCA with those wrongs by
examining the early history of the alien tort statute, particularly its original
purpose. The paper finds that early history generally in harmony with the statute's
revival in modern international human rights litigation, which includes the Unocal
litigation. The paper begins discussion of the modem era with Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, an offspring of the birth of modem international human rights law in the
Nuremberg Tribunal. The discussion of ATCA concludes by reviewing the
controversy surrounding Judge Bork's opinion in the Tel-Oren decision, and finds
the Filartiga human rights litigation tradition more compatible with an originalist
understanding of ATCA than Judge Bork's ATCA scholarship.
Finally the paper examines the Unocal litigation, particularly the Unocal III
decision, which employed a notion of customary international law that appears to
escape the boundaries of the Filartiga tradition, deriving its legal standards
inappropriately from Nuremberg-style ad hoc criminal tribunals. Such a practice
inaccurately suggests that the tribunals have established a customary international
law independent of the practice of sovereign states and their legal systems. A
common-sense examination of choice of law principles suggests the Paquete
Habana methodology be applied not merely to primary violations of customary
international law, such as the forced labor allegations against the Myanmar
military government, but also to substantive legal issues ancillary to the primary
ones, in this instance the third-party complicity standard to be applied to Unocal's
behavior.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BURMA
The Unocal decisions concern a class action suit brought by farmers from the
Tenasserim region of Burma, also internationally recognized as Myanmar, against,
among others, Unocal Corp. ("Unocal"), Total S.A. ("Total"), and Burma's
visited Feb. 2, 2004); Brief for the United States of America As Amicus Curiae, May 8, 2003, available
at http://www.unocal.com/myanmar/doj/pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2004). The plaintiffs filed a response
to the Department of Justice brief. Plaintiffs-Appellants Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Amicus
Curiae Brief Filed by the United States, filed June 2, 2003, available at http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/legal/corporate-accountability/docs/OppositionBrieftoDOJ.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2004).
At the en banc hearing, Ninth Circuit judges showed little interest in the approach to ATCA taken by
Judge Bork. See Hoppin, supra note 6 ("Several times when [Unocal lawyer M. Randall Oppenheimer]
was asked about aiding and abetting standards, he responded with the caveat that he was only engaging
the question hypothetically, since he believes the case cannot be brought under the ATCA. The judges
seemed to pay little mind to his protestations."). See also Coyle, supra note 9 (noting that the en banc
9th Circuit - in its June, 2003 Alvarez-Macham v. U.S., No. 99-56772, and Alvarez-Macham v. Sosa,
No. 99-56880 decisions ignored the Justice Department's argument that ATCA does not create a
cause of action and therefore does not allow aliens to bring claims for conduct taking place in other
countries).
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military government. 4 The farmers alleged that the Burmese military had
committed international human rights violations through a state-owned oil and gas
company in furtherance of a Unocal, Total, and Burmese military joint venture, the
Yadana gas pipeline project.' 5 The Burmese military and security forces allegedly
used the farmers as slave labor for the pipeline project, and raped, tortured and
murdered those who refused to participate. 16 Plaintiffs alleged that Unocal and
Total, by using the services of the Burmese security forces with some awareness of
their practices, had used the Burmese farmers as slave labor for the pipeline
project.1 7 Successive Burma regimes have a "long and well-known history of
imposing forced labor on their citizens."' 8
The Unocal litigation originated with a Burmese trade union leader, U Maung
Maung, and his serendipitous contact with a Georgetown law school student,
Douglas Steele.i 9 U Maung Maung, an exile in Thailand, was dismayed by the
flood of refugees escaping from Burma who told him of forced labor and
associated rape, torture and murder on the Unocal-Total pipeline project. 20  He
wondered aloud to Steele whether any action could be brought against Unocal in
U.S. courts, and Steele investigated.2' Steele ultimately contacted the International
Labor Rights Fund in Washington, D.C.,22 which then filed a claim against Unocal
in September 1996.23 The claim was the first ATCA-based international human
rights action against a U.S. corporation.24
Ill. THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT, FROM INTENT TO REVIVAL
A. Original Intent and Early History
A legal understanding of the case brought against Unocal must begin with an
14. Burma's military government is called the State Law and Order Restoration Council. Unocal
I and Unocal If use the acronym SLORC. Unocal If, 110 F Supp. 2d at 1296; Unocal 1, 963 F Supp. at
883. Unocal III instead uses the term "the Myanmar military. Unocal I1, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
19263 at 3.
15. Unocal 1, 963 F Supp. at 883.
16. Id.
17 Id.
18. Unocal II1, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at4.
19. See Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement
Mechanisms, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183, 187 (2002).
20. Id. (U Maung Maung was General Secretary of the Federation of Trade Unions of Burma
(FTUB).).
21. Id. (Steele was working as a legal intern for an advisor to the FTUB.).
22. The International Labor Rights Fund website is www.laborrights.org. Two other NGOs
assisting the plaintiffs are EarthRights International of Washington, D.C. and Chiang Mai, Thailand,
whose Unocal webpage is at http://www.earthnghts.org/unocal/index.shtml, and New York's Center for
Constitutional Rights, whose Doe v. Unocal webpage is http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/
corporate accountability/corporateArticle.asp?ObjlD=lrRSFKnmmm&Content--45 (last visited Mar.
10, 2004).
23. See Collingsworth, supra note 19, at 187.
24. Id.
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understanding of ATCA, but based on more than the statute's reasonably clear
wording. ATCA, adopted in 1789 and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350, declares that
the federal district courts have "original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States. ' 2s The statute, from its wording, allows a civil action to be brought
in federal courts (1) by an alien (2) for a tort (3) committed in violation of
international law. Who can be sued is not limited, and therefore might include
26aliens as well as U.S. citizens.
However, the statute's rare use before its human rights litigation revival -
only twenty-one cases had invoked jurisdiction under ATCA before 198027 _ made
courts and scholars anxious that revived usage accord with the statute's original
meaning and purpose. 28 Thus, courts have strived to interpret ATCA in light of
Judge Learned Hand's counsel that "statutes always have some purpose or object
to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to
their meaning.,
29
Yet the statute was once famously declared "a kind of legal Lohengrin, 3 ° and
a complete account of its purpose and object may not be possible. For example,
there is no record of discussions in Congress leading up to ATCA s enactment.3
Nonetheless, many windows into Congressional thinking are available, and the
origins and general purposes of ATCA turn out to be reasonably clear. 2 First of
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
26. The class of defendants would, in time, be restricted to aliens alone, though neither the statute
nor the limited early case law implies such a restriction. See Dodge I, supra note 3, at 222 n.6.
27 See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries into
the Alien Tort Claims Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 4-5 n. 15 (1985).
28. See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789" A Badge of
Honor 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 463 (1989) ("The current debate over the meaning and scope of the
Statute is being waged on historical turf. An original intent argument may seem particularly
attractive because the Statute virtually lay fallow for 200 years.") (Anne-Marie Burley would later
change her name to Anne-Marie Slaughter). For thorough examinations of ATCA's background and
historical context, see the concumng opinions of Judge Bork and Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
29 Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945).
30. liT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that "although it has been with us
since the first Judiciary Act no one seems to know whence it came."). Lohengrm, legendary
figure depicted in the Wagner opera of the same name, was mysterious knight who refused to reveal
his full identity to his bride. See Courtney Shaw, Note, Uncertain Justice: Liability of Multinationals
under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 54 STAN. L. REV 1359, 1365 n.33 (2002).
31. See Ivan Poullaos, The Nature of the Beast: Using the Alien Tort Claims Act to Combat
International Human Rights Violations, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 329 (2002); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 812
(Bork, J., concurring) (citing I ANNALS OF CONG. 782-833 (J. Gales ed., 1789)) ("The debates over the
Judiciary Act in the House-the Senate debates were not recorded-nowhere mention the provision,
not even, so far as we are aware, indirectly.").
32. See Randall, supra note 27, at II ("True, no specific legislative history exists on the Judiciary
Act; but other historical and legislative sources, when pieced together, adequately indicate the statute's
origins and purposes."); William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some
Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687, 692 n.27 (2002) [hereinafter Dodge 11]
(declaring that, in the wake of considerable legal historical research, "it is fair to say that the Alien Tort
Statute is no longer 'legal Lohengrin' ").
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all, and broadly, it is evident the statute was a product of an effort by a militarily
weak nation reliant on international commerce to gain control over its voice in
foreign relations. 33 One element of that voice was treatment of tort actions by
foreigners for international law violations.34
Scholarly disagreement arises when discussion moves from general to more
specific purposes for the statute. Scholars pose two specific purposes (both will be
discussed in detail shortly). First, many see a "defensive" purpose: ATCA was
conceived as a defensive measure to remove a potential cause for international
conflict with the U.S. from the diplomatic arsenal of aggressive mercantile
powers. A second viewpoint is that the statute has an "assertive" purpose: ATCA
was a by-product and expression of a struggle by neutrals for "free trade" with
belligerent nations during an era of near constant war.36 The United States took up
this campaign alongside other militarily weak nations dependent on international
commerce, and the battle was waged by means of moral persuasion; there was little
else to work with against the mercantile world powers.37 The moral character of
the struggle made it both natural and strategic to remove resolution of international
law disputes, including alien tort suits, from the "interested" political branches to
the loftier realm of the judiciary 38 The judiciary's job, after all, was to detect,
define and interpret natural law and morality, and the federal judiciary could best
be expected to establish a uniform and prominent national position on the law of
nations in accord with and supportive of U.S. policy and commercial interests.39
Actually, there need be no real disagreement over ATCA's specific purposes:
the two objectives described are both compatible and supported by substantial
histoncal evidence. 40 Therefore, this paper will proceed under the well-supported
33. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964) (describing ATCA as
one of several provisions in the Judiciary Act "reflecting a concern for uniformity in this country's
dealings with foreign nations and indicating desire to give matters of international significance to the
jurisdiction of federal institutions"); see also Randall, supra note 27, at 72 ("[Tlhe federal government's
plenary authority over matters touching foreign relations motivated the statute's promulgation.").
34. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 812 (Bork, J., concumng) ("ITlhose who drafted the Constitution
and the Judiciary Act of 1789 wanted to open federal courts to aliens for the purpose of avoiding, not
provoking, conflicts with other nations."); Randall, supra note 27 at 72 ("[T]he statute's origin and
purpose are linked to the drafters' concern with extending federal authority over certain tort actions
brought by aliens where federal jurisdiction might otherwise have been unavailable "); see
generally Dodge I, supra note 3 (discussing the treatment of foreign tort actions for international law
violations).
35. See, e.g., Stewart Jay, The Status of the Lav of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 819, 840 (1989) ("At the practical level, the need to avoid violation that would give more
powerful country cause for war explained the insistence on following the law of nations."); Anthony
D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 62, 64
(1988).
36. See generally Sylvester, supra note 2. Sylvester's thesis will be more thoroughly explored




40. Sylvester, the scholar who makes the case for the assertive purpose, acknowledges that both
purposes exist: "Legal historians and scholars alike believe that the law of nations was used as a shield.
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supposition that ATCA had both defensive and assertive purposes. The
comparative priority Congress gave to those two goals remains uncertain, yet this
is not critical for a modem understanding of ATCA in the human rights litigation
context.
However, in order to gain the best possible understanding of Congressional
intent and how it might fit with use of the statute for redress of international human
rights violations, a more detailed grasp of the background and context of the statute
and its purposes is necessary Regarding the "defensive" purpose, in 1789 a
powerful enemy could interpret denial of an adequate judicial forum to an alien
tort claimant as official approval of the wrongful tort against the alien, and,
consequently as an affront to the foreigner's home country 41 Emmerich de Vattel,
the most influential international law scholar in the early days of the United States,
specifically stated that "denial of justice" to aliens abroad was one justification for
initiation of a war of reprisal by the foreign national's home country 42
Consequently, before ATCA, if a state court mishandled an alien tort claim - with
no federal influence over that forum and no judicial alternative provided for the
alien - the incident could readily be transformed into a transnational insult,
drawing the United States into a war or lesser international incident.43 Therefore, a
standard contention is that ATCA's primary attraction was its assurance against, or
at least maximization of federal control over, such a scenario. 44  As Alexander
Hamilton commented in the Federalist Papers, "[a]s the denial or perversion of
A proper understanding of the period demonstrates that it was used just as often as sword to achieve
specific policy goals of the young country. Id at 7 For further discussion of the defensive purpose,
see D'Amato, supra note 35, at 64.
41. Kathryn L. Pryor, Does the Torture Victim Protection Act Signal the Imminent Demise of the
Alien Tort Claims Act? 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 969, 971 (1989).
42. See D'Amato, supra note 35, at 64. The quotation is from 2 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW
OF NATIONs 230-31 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institute of Washington 1916) (1758).
Although on this matter he reflected a wide consensus, Vattel was less influential in France and Britain
than he was among the militarily weak trading nations. See generally Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William
Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 731
(1976) (discussing Blackstone's influence on the Founders.).
43. Pryor, supra note 41, at 972. See also Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 783 (Edwards, J., concurring):
Under the law of nations, states are obliged to make civil courts of justice accessible for
claims of foreign subjects against individuals within the state's territory If the
court's decision constitutes a denial of justice, or if it appears to condone the original
wrongful act, under the law of nations the United States would become responsible for
the failure of its courts A pnvate act, committed by an individual against an
individual, might thereby escalate into an international confrontation.
Id.
44. See D'Amato, supra note 35, at 63:
ATCA's original, overriding purpose was to maintain a rigorous neutrality in the face of
the warring European powers. The United States was still weak militarily, compared to
England, France and Spain. Many years would be needed before the new nation could
stand firm against any aggressive threat from abroad. During the formative years of
buildup, it was imperative that no excuse, no casus belli, be given to a foreign power.
Id, see also The Federalist No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) quoted in
Dodge I, supra note 3, at 236 [hereinafter The Federalist No. 801. The Federalist Papers were originally
published in 1787 and 1788.
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justice by the sentences of courts, as well as in any other manner, is with reason
classed among the just causes of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought
to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are
concerned., 45  Before long, ATCA would provide such federal cognizance over
torts in violation of international law.
One "defensive" concern vis-a-vis the Great Powers of the day involved state
courts' refusal to enforce treaties between the federal government and foreign
nations. 46  Of particular concern, the treaty ending the Revolutionary War
promised payment of debts to British creditors, but in fact state courts often
blocked Britain's efforts to collect the debts.47 As a result, Bntain repeatedly
threatened reprisals, which jeopardized U.S. security.48  ATCA could have
provided a means of redress, because treaty violation injuries were torts in
violation of the law of nations.
Further examples of the federal powerlessness the new Congress wanted to
alleviate with ATCA include two 1780s violations of diplomatic privileges. The
better-known "Marbois Affair" concerned a 1784 threat and assault upon French
Consul General Francis Barbe Marbois in Philadelphia. 49 An international clamor
ensued, the case was widely discussed among key federal figures, and Congress
stepped in to offer a reward for capture of the French assailant, Chevalier De
Longchamps.50
However, the federal government could do no more because it did not have
judicial jurisdiction over the crimes or torts in violation of international law This
inadequacy was of wide concern, and in 1785 the Continental Congress was forced
to explain to Marbois that federal powers were confined by "the nature of the
federal union in which each State retains a distinct and absolute sovereignty in all
matters not expressly delegated to Congress leaving them only that of advising in
many of those cases in which other governments decree.'
From the national perspective, Pennsylvania handled Longchamp's criminal
prosecution well: he was tried and convicted of violating the law of nations, which
was held to be part of Pennsylvania common law 52 A civil action was not
available to aliens under Pennsylvania law - the state had disregarded a 1781
Congressional resolution asking that such redress be made available by the states
53
45. The Federalist No. 80, supra note 44, at 476. Note that such purpose for ATCA indicates it
can be used against foreign as well as U.S. nationals when a "law of nations" tort is committed. See
Dodge I, supra note 3, at 222.
46. Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress Power To "Define and Punish
Offenses Against the Law of Nations 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 447, 466 (2000).
47 Id. at 466-67.
48. Id. at 467.
49. The details of the story are not in dispute. This summary is drawn from Dodge I, supra note 3,
at 229-30 and Dodge 11, supra note 32, at 693-95.
50. See Dodge 1, supra note 3, at 229-30; Stephens, supra note 46, at 466.
51. 27 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 314 (Library of Congress ed.,
1912), quoted in Dodge I, supra note 3, at 229-30.
52. Dodge I, supra note 3, at 230.
53. See Dodge II, supra note 32, at 692-93; Dodge I, supra note 3, at 229-30.
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- and no tort suit was filed in the affair. 54
The other display of federal inability to punish a violation of diplomatic
privileges occurred in 1788, when a New York City police officer entered Dutch
ambassador Van Berckel's residence and arrested one of his servants.55 Secretary
Jay complained that the federal government apparently was not vested "with any
judicial Powers competent to the Cognizance and Judgment of such Cases.
56
Fortunately for relations with Holland, a state court found the officer guilty of
violating international law and sentenced him to three months in jail.5 7
Fears in Congress that other states would not handle law of nations violations
as well as Pennsylvania had led to passage of a 1785 resolution asking Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, John Jay "to report the draft of an act to be recommended to the
legislatures of the respective states, for punishing the infractions of the laws of
nations, and more especially for securing the privileges and immunities of public
Ministers from foreign powers.' 'Si There is no record of Jay having prepared such
a draft.
Perhaps Jay was discouraged by the feeble response to the 1781
Congressional recommendation mentioned in reference to the Marbois affair. That
resolution had asked states to create criminal sanctions for certain international law
violations against aliens, and to authorize "(1) tort suits by the injured party against
the tortfeasor, and (2) suits by the United States against the tortfeasor to reimburse
the United States for compensation paid to the injured party "'9 While the text of
the resolution indicates the tortfeasor in the second case had to be a U.S. citizen, a
Connecticut bill in response to the Congressional resolution went further and
allowed such suits against "any Person or Persons whatsoever." 6  Unlike
Connecticut, however, it appears many states did not follow up on Congressional
urging that they provide for criminal sanctions and law suits against law of nations
violators.61
The figure of Oliver Ellsworth ties the Congressional recommendations with
the state and federal statutory acts. He was a member of the Continental Congress
that passed the 1781 resolution asking states to enact laws allowing damage suits
and establishing criminal sanctions for international law violations against aliens.62
54. See Dodge II, supra note 32, at 694-95.
55. See Dodge I, supra note 3, at 230.
56. See 34 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at I I1 (Library of Congress
ed., 1912), quoted in Dodge I, supra note 3, at 230.
57 See Dodge I, supra note 3, at 230.
58. 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 655 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912),
quoted in Dodge I, supra note 32, at 694 n.39.
59. See Dodge i, supra note 32, at 692-93.
60. See id. at 693 (quoting 4 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT FOR THE
YEAR 1782, at 157 (Leonard Woods Labaree ed., 1942)).
61. See Dodge I1, supra note 32, at 694-95.
62. See Dodge I, supra note 3, at 228-29. The recommendation asked states to enact laws that
would "authorise suits to be instituted for damages by the party injured, and for compensation to the
United States for damage sustained by them from an injury done to a foreign power by citizen.
Dodge I, supra note 32, at 692 (quoting 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at
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Ellsworth was also a member of the 1782 Connecticut General Assembly that
responded as described above to the 1781 Congressional recommendation.63
Finally, he was responsible for writing most of the Judiciary Act of 1789
including section 9 64 The ATCA sub-section of section 9 gave district courts
jurisdiction over suits brought by an injured alien against a tortfeasor for law of
nations violations, in keeping with the 1781 recommendation and Connecticut
law.65
In sum, ATCA achieves its defensive purpose through its perceived ability to
placate foreign powers with the federal courts' more consistent and less biased
stance toward foreigners, when compared to state courts.66 Congress believed that
federal courts were more likely to give to alien claims what the non-citizen's home
country would regard as fair consideration. Federal courts would also be expected
to be more sensitive to any U.S. national interests implicated by alien claims.
67
It is important to note the joining together of crime and tort in the 1781
Congressional Resolution, the 1782 Connecticut law, and the 1789 Judiciary Act.
Evident in the 1781 resolution, for example, was an intention to expand the
nation's civil liability international law duties beyond the very limited scope set
down by Blackstone.6 8 Anne-Marie Burley argues the wider scope of redress
recommended in the Resolution "was an entirely logical addition, implicitly
recognizing that justice under the law of nations could require making the victim
whole as well as punishing the transgressor., 69 The Judiciary Act of 1789 carred
forward the concept of parallel civil and criminal sanctions for law of nations
violations, granting federal courts jurisdiction over common-law crimes
"cognizable under the authority of the United States" - which included crimes in
violation of international law - alongside federal jurisdiction and a cause of action
for alien tort claims. 70 Judiciary Act author Ellsworth appeared to suppose, quite
reasonably, that there might be a variety of possible offenses against international
H 36-37 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912)).
63. See Dodge II, supra note 32, at 692-93. Dodge noted that the Connecticut statute allows suits
by aliens for any tort, notjust for torts in violation of the law of nations. Id. at 693 n.32.
64. Id. at 695.
65. Id. at 695-96.
66. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782-83; see also Dodge 1, supra note 3, at 235 (writing that among
the factors motivating provision of the alien tort statute were "a desire for uniformity in the
interpretation of the law of nations, and fear that state courts would be hostile to alien claims."). As
matters turned out, due to gaps in Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, federal judicial uniformity was
not all it could have been. See Dodge I, supra note 3, at 235 n.101, William S. Dodge, Congressional
Control of Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: Why the Original Jurisdiction Clause Suggests an
"EssentialRole 100 YALE L.J. 1013, 1017 n.19 (1991).
67 Pryor, supra note 41, at 971.
68. Judge Blackstone saw law of nations violations pnmarily as crimes, but also wrote that civil
liability was available under the law of nations in the form of restitution against a transgressor for
violation of safe-conduct. See Dodge I, supra note 3, at 226 n.35 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 69-70 (1765)); see also Burley, supra note 28, at 477 n.74
(explaining that the "recommended authonzation of tort suits exceeds the scope of the duty outlined by
Blackstone, who refers only to criminal sanctions").
69. Burley, supra note 28, at 477.
70. See Dodge 1, supra note 3, at 231 (quoting Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, I Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789)).
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
law, some of which were best resolved by criminal sanctions, others by civil
damages to the injured, and some by a combination of criminal and civil
sanctions.
7
As with the "defensive" purpose, there is also sufficient evidence for an
"assertive" purpose for ATCA. That evidence, however, takes a more abstract
turn, starting with the Founders' fondness for Vattel and "Continental"
international law doctrine.72 That doctrine was aligned with U.S. commercial and
security interests and early leaders of the United States made it their own.73
Furthermore, U.S. leaders wanted to lift up Continental doctrine against rival
Anglo-French doctrine, or, more accurately, establish it against the Anglo-French
opposition to Continental law of nations doctrine becoming the widely accepted
international law 74 This provided an assertive purpose for ATCA, in the hope that
it would promote and solidify international acceptance of Continental international
law doctrine as the international law doctrine, by subjecting international tort
conflicts to a consistent and "disinterested" U.S. judicial treatment which also
happened to advance and establish Continental doctrine."
The specific doctrinal concern of early U.S. leaders, in an era of near constant
military conflict between France and Britain, was the degree to which international
law would favor belligerent or neutral rights in commerce.76 The Americans
advocated an understanding of the law of nations that strongly favored neutral
rights. 7  Vattel was the most prominent of the American "pantheon" of
international law jurists promoting that conception. 78 In fact, early post-Colonial
judicial decisions cited almost exclusively to five international law scholars from
71. Burley, supra note 28, at 477
72. "The Continent" generally describes the European nations other than the two mercantile
heavyweights, France and Great Britain.
73. Sylvester, supra note 2, at 66 ("To start, it must be understood that the American' theory of
the law of nations was an adaptation of the Continental philosophies on the law of nations.").
74. See Sylvester, supra note 2, at 43-44, 66.
75. See id. at 30-3 1.
76. It was "an age of the basest diplomatic intrigue, of hostilities too rarely assuaged in periods of
peace, and of the utmost ruthlessness in the conduct of hostilities. Edwin Dickinson, Changing
Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 241 (1932), quoted in Sylvester,
supra note 2, at 5.
77 See Sylvester, supra note 2, at 37, 64.
78. Dickinson, supra note 76, at 259 n. 132, quoted in Sylvester, supra note 2, at 67; See also Sean
D. Murphy, The U.S. Lawyer-Statesman At Times Of Crisis: A Look at Colonial America, 95 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 99, 105 (2001) ("[l~n the thirty years after ratification of the Constitution, U.S.
courts would turn to Vattel as their favorite authority on the theory of international law."); Jay, supra
note 35, at 823 ("In ascertaining principles of the law of nations, lawyers and judges of [the post-
colonial] era relied heavily on Continental treatise writers, Vattel being the most often consulted by
Americans."). As Sylvester explained:
Grotius, Bynkershoek, Wolff, Vattel, and Pufendorf formed the American pantheon of
writers on the law of nations. According to Edwin Dickinson, early American judicial
decisions implicating the law of nations cited almost exclusively to these Continental
writers, and they were quoted quite frequently for propositions about the law of nations:
in all, in the 1780s and 1790s, there were nine citations to Pufendorf, sixteen to Grotius,
twenty-five to Bynkershoek, and a staggering ninety-two to Vattel.
Sylvester, supra note 2 at 67. The Dickinson reference is to Dickinson, supra note 76, at 259 n. 132.
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three nations - the Netherlands, Austria, and Denmark - which, like the United
States, depended heavily on international trade for their economic prosperity were
militarily weak, and were generally neutrals in wars between the mercantile
powers. 79 "Not surprisingly, writes Douglas Sylvester, "their understandings of
the law of nations heavily favored neutral rights at the expense of belligerent
rights. In so doing, these writers envisioned an international society predicated on
peaceful relationships forged through trade. 80
The early leaders of the Republic were very much attracted to Vattel's vision
of an international relations based on natural law guaranteeing security and the
benefits of trade to all states large and small.8' Under Vattel's international law
standard, which he believed continental Europe already reflected, the concerted
power of the entire community of nations would overcome any country that dared
suppress the rights of another, both out of obligation and from realization of the
commercial and security benefits of the rule of the law of nations.
8 2
The new nation's leaders were idealistic enough to believe that successful
promotion of Continental international law might allow U.S. relations with the
world to stabilize into such a Vattelian system.83 Thus, in the Republic's early
years, the United States engaged in a "proactive foreign policy based not on simple
nationalistic self-interest, but rather, based on promotion, through advancement of
the Continental/American law of nations doctrine, of de-militarized, commerce-
driven international relations. 84 Specifically the promotion of Continental doctnne
derived from two central hopes of early American foreign policy- "first, that
international commerce should be predicated on a theory of neutral rights and free
trade, and second, that economic measures, not armed conflict, were the proper
response to belligerence. 85
These views conflicted with those of the dominant mercantile powers,
England and France. In fact, Edmund Genet, minister of France to the United
States in the early 1790s, belittled the international status of neutral rights as
"diplomatic subtleties" and "aphorisms of Vattel and others." 86
England more explicitly challenged what would later be the American
position on neutral rights when it announced, in 1756, that the commerce of neutral
79. See Sylvester, supra note 2, at 40-4 1.
80. See id. at 67.
81. See EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, at lxii (Joseph Chitty ed., 1863) (1758)
("A dwarf is as much man as a giant; small Republic is no less sovereign state than the most
powerful kingdom."), quoted in Jay, supra note 35, at 840.
82. See Sylvester, supra note 2, at 4 1.
83. For an example of such idealism, see the Judge Wilson quotation at the beginning of this
article.
84. Sylvester, supra note 2, at 41.
85. Id. at 43.
86. Sylvester, supra note 2, at 43 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris,
United States Minister to France (Aug. 16, 1793), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 371, 379
(quoting Letter from Edmund Genet to Thomas Jefferson (June 22, 1793)) (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,
1899)).
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nations with belligerent states in wartime would be restricted to peacetime levels.
8 7
Continental theory and its U.S. advocates advanced the much more liberal neutral
trading rights doctrine: that a neutral had an unrestricted right to trade with
belligerents during a war. As Thomas Jefferson argued:
[Wihen two nations go to war, those who chuse [sic] to live in peace retain their
natural right to pursue their [commerce], to carry the produce of their industry, for
exchange, to all nations, belligerent or neutral, as usual, to go and come freely
without injury or molestation, and in short, that the war among others shall be for
them as if it did not exist.
8 8
U.S. advocates of Continental law of nations theory also favored the "free
ships" doctrine, which precluded from seizure all goods found in a neutral vessel,
including belligerent goods.89 Under this understanding, if France, while at war
with Great Britain, were to stop an Amencan ship and find English goods on
board, those goods would not be condemned as prize.
9
0
In federal judicial decisions of the 1790s, neutral rights were occasionally a
topic of contention and judges did advance Continental law of nations doctrine. 9'
With international law within their control, Sylvester writes, "federal courts used
their decisions to support the needs of a commerce-based system. In order to do
this, the law of nations needed to strengthen commitments towards neutral trade-
at the expense of belligerent nghts. 92  Nonetheless, "it was only by rigorous
application, even in cases against the specific interests of Americans, that these
rights could hope to be vindicated in international relations. 9 3 ATCA's assertive
purpose of promoting Continental doctrine on neutral rights and free trade fit into
this overall strategy
Nonetheless, despite the statute's embodiment of the assertive and previously
described defensive objectives, courts rarely dealt with ATCA. In the 1790s, only
two cases and one U.S. Attorney General opinion are available for possible insight
into the statute's original intent. 94 In the first case, Moxon v. The Fanny,95 a 1793
87 See Sylvester, supra note 2, at 45.
88. Id. at 44 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney (Dec. 20, 1793), in 27
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 55 (Julian P Boyd ed., 1953)).
89. Sylvester, supra note 2, at 44 ("In the 1780s Congress codified [the free ships doctrine] into
American law, and at least once this enactment formed the rule of decision in a case.").
90. Id. at 44. Pnze is defined as the wartime capture of ships or cargo, by privateers and other
forces of belligerent nations dunng time of war, and is "therefore liable to being condemned or
appropriated as enemy property. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1218 (7th ed. 1999).
91. See Sylvester, supra note 2, at 31-36.
92. Id. at 64.
93. Id. at 35.
94. Dodge 1, supra note 3, at 251. However, there are likely other cases or Attorney General
opinions unrecorded or unpreserved. William Casto notes an early Attorney General opinion that does
not explicitly mention ATCA but does refer to an ambassador prosecuting "an indictment in distnct
court" this appears to rely on the statute because an ambassador could not prosecute cnminal suit.
Casto, supra note 2, at 504 n.208 (discussing I Op. Att'y Gen. 141 (1804)).
95. Moxon v. Fanny, 17 F Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793)
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district court denied federal court jurisdiction on political question grounds, 96 but
stated in dicta that ATCA jurisdiction would have been denied even without the
political question roadblock, because plaintiffs had sued for both restitution and for
damages.97  Therefore, they had not sued for a "tort only" as the statute
demanded.98
The second case, Bolchos v. Darrel," involved a French privateer's capture of
slaves mortgaged to a Spanish citizen, where the mortgagee was a British
citizen.' 0 0 In port, the mortgagee's agent seized the slaves.' 0' The privateer
brought suit for the proceeds of the sale.'0 2 On an initial matter, the court claimed
jurisdiction in the admiralty '03 It then added, on its jurisdictional right:
Besides, as the 9th section of the judiciary act gives this court concurrent
jurisdiction with the state courts and circuit court of the United States where an
alien sues for a tort, in violation of the law of nations, or a treaty of the United
States, I dismiss all doubt upon this point.'
°4
The proceeding indicated that ATCA grants more than jurisdiction in the
admiralty, and that the statute's grant is in fact the wide-ranging one indicated on
its face. 105  In any event, though the court stated it would have restored the
property to the neutral Spanish mortgagor under the law of nations, it ruled in
favor of the French privateer because of a treaty between the U.S. and France
stating that "the property of friends found on board the vessels of an enemy shall
be forfeited."' °6
In 1795, the same year as Bolchos, ATCA was suggested as a remedy for
victims of an attack on the British colony of Sierra Leone by a French fleet led by
an American slave trader.i °7  The British Ambassador officially protested, and
doing nothing was not a safe response. However, if the United States paid
96. Id.. at 946-47
97 Id. at 945.
98. Dodge 1, supra note 3, at 252. As Dodge stated, the interpretation of the court was that "only"
meant only one remedy for damages could be sought under ATCA, which meant the Moxon suit could
have been made acceptable to the court simply by deleting from it the restitution claim. Id. This is
contrary to another possible interpretation of "for a tort only" under which, if the events at issue give
rise to types of claims in addition to tort claims, the federal court must refuse jurisdiction. See Joseph
M. Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP L. REV. 445,
482 (1995) (stating that ATCA was directed at captures of prize in which "the legality of the capture
was not in issue, and the suit was 'only' for the reparation in damages of a wrong related to a capture");
see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377, 377-78 (2nd Cir. 1996) (rejecting Sweeney's restrictive
interpretation of ATCA); Dodge I, supra note 3, at 243-56 (answering Sweeney's argument).
99. Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F Cas. 810 (D. S.C. 1795).





105. This contrasts with Sweeney's restrictive claims regarding ATCA's applicability. See
Sweeney, supra note 98, at 482.
106. Id. at 811.
107 D'Amato, supra note 35, at 66.
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reparations directly to Great Britain surely France would have been angered. 1 8
"Fortunately the Founding Fathers had foreseen this very dilemma a half-dozen
years earlier when they enacted the Alien Tort Statute, writes modem
commentator Anthony D'Amato. Attorney General William Bradford issued an
official opinion directing the British to the statute, which offered a solution
especially felicitous for the United States since an ATCA suit by the British would
have necessitated litigating from the standpoint of the Continental/American
understanding of the law of nations.i09
Then for 185 years activity dropped off considerably, for reasons that are
uncertain. ' 1 One reason may have been that for most of those years the law of
nations was understood to concern, with rare exception, affairs between nations
and not between individuals and nations."' Also, the wider purposes of the statute
rapidly fell away, as the U.S. effort to establish a Continental doctrine of neutral
rights and free trade was overwhelmed by the need to accommodate the mercantile
powers, France and Great Britain.i 12
The discussion of purposes and objects now complete, several implications of
ATCA s original meaning and purpose appear relevant to the revival of the statute
as a vehicle for international human rights actions. First of all, ATCA served a
straightforward general purpose of advancing the national interest by putting a
federal stamp on the law of nations, this having both defensive and assertive
motivations. Second, and the historical context of the assertive objective
especially puts this on view, Congressional leaders saw the statute as part of an
effort to put the legal "voice" of the United States consistently behind one version
of international law during a time of international conflict over the "true" law of
108. Id.
109. Specifically, Bradford stated:
[Tihere can be no doubt that the company [the Sierra Leone company] or individuals
who have been injured by these acts of hostility have remedy by a civil suit in the
courts of the United States; jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts in all cases
where an alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of the
United States; such a suit may be maintained by evidence taken at a distance, on a
commission issued for that purpose.
D'Amato, supra note 35, at 66 (quoting I Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1795)). Similarly, 1907 opinion of
the Attorney General, regarding injuries caused by violation of a U.S. treaty covering the Rio Grande
U.S.-Mexican border, stated that ATCA provided both jurisdiction and cause of action for the private
Mexican citizens who wanted to sue. See 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250 (1907), discussed in Randall, supra
note 27, at 49-50.
110. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Rogue Regimes and the Individualization of International Law, 36
NEW ENG. L. REV. 815, 816 (2002).
1!l. Id. Although several exceptions have been widely accepted, the Westphalian formulation of
relations between nations held that "what sovereign governments did within their own borders was of
no concern to their neighbors. States were the subjects of international law; international law regulated
only political and economic relations between states, not within them. Id.
112. The "fragile consensus" in the United States for pursuit, through non-military measures, of an
international system based on neutral rights and free trade had been destroyed by 1809. Sylvester,
supra note 2, at 55. "Unfortunately for the new country, without sufficient economic or military power
to force adherence to neutral trading doctrines, this foreign policy was doomed to failure in the wake of
the great conflicts of the 1790s and 1800s. Id. at 44-45.
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nations doctnne. Therefore, the assertive purpose for the statute assumes the
malleability of international law, since that purpose was to establish more firmly or
to reform the law of nations advantageously for the United States. The nobler
language of the day stated that international law had recently improved with the
times, 113 and would conceivably develop further in the future.' 1 4  The law of
nations was understood as changeable, even though it was derived from and a
subclass of immutable natural law, because it was a reflection of human reason's
only gradual and imperfect progression in awareness of underlying natural law. 115
A third implication is that the apparent original understanding of the statute was
that it might be employed in a wide variety of alien tort claims. Congress
evidently meant what the statute's broad language says, and did not want ATCA
only to be applied to a specific subclass of torts, for instance those ancillary to the
capture of "pnze.'i16 Finally, and this awaits further exploration in the following
sub-section, ATCA was originally understood to provide plaintiffs with both a
general and specific cause of action.i 17 This last matter became quite controversial
early in the modem revival of ATCA as a vehicle for international human rights
actions. 118
B. The Filartiga Tradition: The Alien Tort Claims Act's Modern Revival
Until 1980, only twenty-one cases had invoked jurisdiction under ATCA, and
no one, human rights advocates included, had paid much attention to it. 119 In that
year, however, a victim of crimes against humanity in Paraguay successfully used
ATCA in a U.S. federal court. 12° Dr. Joel Filartiga, a Paraguayan physician who
had arrived in the United States in 1978, alleged that Americo Pefla-lrala was
responsible for the torture and killing of Filartiga's seventeen-year-old son.121 The
113. Jefferson stated in 1793 that the pnnciples of the law of nations "have been liberalized in latter
times by the refinement of manners and morals See Sylvester, supra note 2, at 59 (quoting Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney (May 7, 1793), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 243 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899)). Further, Jefferson would write in 1816:
[L]aws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As
that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new
truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances,
institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 42-43 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899), quoted in Sylvester, supra note 2, at 59.
114. The decision in Habana was guided in part by just such progress in the law of nations. The
question was whether fishing ships were protected by international law from capture dunng wartime.
Though 1798 English case had stated such protection was a rule only of international comity, the
Court held that "the period of hundred years which has since elapsed is amply sufficient to have
enabled what originally may have rested in custom or comity, courtesy or concession, to grow, by the
general assent of civilized nations, into a settled rule of international law. Habana, 175 U.S. at 694.
115. See 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42-43, quoted in Sylvester, supra note 112.
116. See Sweeney, supra note 98, at 482.
117 See Dodge 1, supra note 3, at 237-40.
118. See id. at 221,251.
119. See Randall, supra note 27, at 4-5 n.15.
120. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876.
121. Id. at 878.
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Filartigas initiated legal action in Paraguay but their attorney was arrested,
threatened with death by Pefila-Irala, and disbarred without just cause.122 In 1979
Pefla-Irala was discovered living in the United States and held for deportation.1
23
A federal court served a summons on him for wrongfully causing the death of
Filartiga's son and plaintiffs sought to have the deportation enjoined to ensure
Pefla-Irala's availability for trial. 124 The legal action was brought principally under
the jurisdiction of ATCA. 25 A lower court dismissed the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, and during the appeal Pefla-Irala was deported back to
Paraguay. 126
The lower court decision was reversed in favor of Filartiga by appellate judge
Irving R. Kaufman, who found ATCA applicable in its provision for federal court
jurisdiction.127 Judge Kaufman held that "deliberate torture perpetrated under color
of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of
human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties. Thus, whenever an
alleged torturer is found and served with process by an alien within our borders, §
1350 provides federal junsdiction."' 28  Overruling the lower court on another
matter, Judge Kaufman stated that courts "must interpret international law not as it
was in 1789 but as it has evolved and exists today among the nations of the world
today ,,029 On remand, Pefla-Irala took no part in the case, and the court awarded
punitive damages of $5 million each to Filartiga and his daughter. 130  The
judgment was never collected. 131
In the past two decades Filartiga has been used as a point of reference in over
one hundred cases and ATCA has been utilized in several dozen U.S. human rights
actions. 132 Nevertheless, it is still unclear how useful ATCA is or will be in
enforcing international human rights claims. A straightforward concern, for
example, continues to be the difficulty collecting damage awards. 33 In addition, it
is not yet clear how heavily federal courts will burden ATCA-based human rights
122. Id.
123. Id. at 878-79.
124. Id. at 879.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127 Id. at 878.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 881. See also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Judge
Kaufman's statement in Filartiga).
130. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 1049 (2d
ed. 2000).
131. Id.
132. See id., see also Beth Stephens, Taking Pride in International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 485, 485 (2001) (providing the numbers of ATCA cases).
133. See Charles Curlett, Introductory Remarks-Alien Tort Claims Act, international Law
Weekend Proceedings, ILSA J. INT'L & COMp L. 273, 274 (2000). "Although [ATCA litigation has]
generated two billion dollars in damage awards, none has been collected. Id., Shinn Sinnar, Book
Note, Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on the Development of Transnational Human Rights
Litigation, 38 STAN. J. INT'L L. 331, 332 (2002) (noting on the subject of ATCA law suits that while
"obtaining redress from perpetrators is often cited as an objective of transnational human nghts cases,
few claimants actually receive compensation even after favorable judgment").
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claims under a range of judicial doctrines prompted by litigation of international
matters. Judges have found international comity, forum non conveniens, sovereign
immunity and the act of state, color of law (or state action), and political question
doctrines relevant to consideration of ATCA claims. 1
34
C. Judge Bork v. The Alien Tort Claims Act
Despite the documentary and indirect evidence available regarding the
original purposes of ATCA, Judge Robert Bork, in a concurrence to the 1984 per
curiam Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic decision, contended that Congress in
1789 had been unaware of the changing nature of the law of nations.135 Therefore,
Judge Bork insisted that Congress intended ATCA to concern only acts that were
in violation of the law of nations in 1789 136 Judge Bork's position has not been
supported in the courts. 137 In line with the history presented in sub-section A, the
modern scholarly and judicial consensus is that the law of nations is changeable,
and that Congress understood this in 1789.13g
Judge Bork also asserted that the statute provided only a grant ofjunsdiction,
meaning that ATCA claimants would have to find a cause of action elsewhere for
any claim that had not been understood to have a cause of action attached in 1789
139 Dodge rejects this position as "patently antihistorical,"' 14 continuing directly-
The very notion of an express cause of action did not appear until 1848 - nearly
sixty years after Congress passed the Alien Tort Clause. In 1789, it was
understood that the common law provided the right to sue for a tort in violation of
the law of nations, just as it provided the right to sue for any other kind of tort.
14 1
In addition, as is nearly explicit in sub-section A, ATCA s original purpose
and intent were to grant foreigners the right to sue for tort claims in federal courts,
134. See generally John Haberstroh, In re World War 11 Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation and
Obstacles to International Human Rights Claims in U.S. Courts, 10 ASIAN L.J. 253 (2003) (discussing
ATCA in the context of Japanese forced labor litigation); Phillip I. Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights
Against Multinational Corporations under United States Law: Conceptual and Procedural Problems,
50 AM. J. COMP L. 493 (2002) (discussing claims against multinational corporations under ATCA).
However, an examination of these obstacles falls outside of the scope of this paper.
135. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d 774, 810-16 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 816. Dodge describes this position as "demonstrably incorrect. Dodge 1, supra note 3,
at 240-41.
137 See id.
138. Dodge refers to this as the prevailing view. Dodge 1, supra note 3, at 223; see also Kadic, 70
F.3d 232, 239.
139. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801 (Bork, J., concurring). ("[Ilt is essential that there be an
explicit grant of cause of action before a private plaintiff be allowed to enforce principles of
international law in a federal tribunal."). Judge Blackstone stated, in the late 18th Century, that "The
principal offences against the law of nations are of three kinds: 1. Violation of safe-conducts; 2.
Infringement of the rights of embassadors Isicl]; and, 3. Piracy. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 68, quoted in Dodge 1, supra note 3, at 226.
140. Dodge I, supra note 3, at 237.
141. Id. at 237-38.
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and early use of the statute actuated this understanding.142 The judicial consensus
is that a cause of action is implicit in ATCA. Doe v Unocal's Ninth Circuit has
agreed, finding that ATCA provided a cause of action.
43
In contrast to Bork's apparent understanding of the statute, ATCA is most
accurately understood as "merely" allowing an already existing substantive right of
action to be exercised in a new venue, the federal courts. 144 For example, Filartiga
read ATCA "not as granting new rights to aliens, but simply as opening the federal
courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized by international law.'
' 45
ATCA, after all, was not a replacement for, but only added to a common law right
of action already available in state courts. 146  The state courts today still have
concurrent jurisdiction with the federal circuit over tort claims advanced by non-
citizens and can also deal with torts in violation of international law 147 This right
under international law to make a tort claim in state courts arose in the colonial era,
not from state statutes but from the incorporation of the law of nations into state
law, through the inclusion of the law of nations in the American colonies' common
law. 148
In sum, Judge Bork's position is weak in scholarship, and the revival of
ATCA as an instrument advancing international human rights is solidly compatible
with the statute's original purposes and the Founders' understanding of the law of
nations. In this light, it would be a shame if an aggressively conservative Supreme
Court, if it were to review Unocal III, decided to demolish this human rights
weapon. The loss might be especially bitter since the entry point for Supreme
142. See Burley, supra note 28, at 463. See generally Dodge I, supra note 3; Anthony D'Amato,
What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers? Judge Bork Concept of the Law of Nations is Seriously Mistaken,
79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1985).
143. See Unoca 111, 2002 WL 31063976 at 8; Unocal If, I 10 F Supp. 2d at 1303.
144. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887 See also Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 780 n.5 (Edwards, J., concurring)
(referring to the passage from Filartiga cited in the text, Edwards stated, "I construe this phrase to mean
that aliens granted substantive rights under international law may assert them under § 1350. This
conclusion results in part from the noticeable absence of any discussion in Filartiga on the question
whether international law granted a right of action.").
145. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 780.
146. District court jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Clause was "concurrent with the courts of the
several States, or thecircuit courts, as the case may be Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, I Stat. 73, 77
(1789) (now § 1350), cited in Dodge 1, supra note 3, at 224 n. 100.
147. See D'Amato, supra note 35, at 65.
148. "[Tlhe law of nations is adopted in it's [sic] full extent by the common law, and is held
to be part of the law of the land. Dodge 1, supra note 3, at 232 (quoting, 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARY 67); Jay, supra note 35, at 824-25 (stating that American revolutionaries considered it a
"fundamental article of faith that the colonists were entitled to the protection of the common law
In the early years of the American Republic, federal judges, leading political figures, and commentators
commonly stated that the law of nations was part of the law of the United States."). Partly in answer to
the contention that ATCA establishes only federal jurisdiction and not cause of action, Dodge stated
that in early post-revolutionary America:
[V]iolations of the law of nations were widely recognized as common-law crimes
[and torts] were the civil counterparts of crimes The important point is that in 1789
neither crimes nor torts in violation of the law of nations required positive legislation to
be actionable; both were cognizable at common law.
Dodge 1, supra note 3, at 232.
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Court involvement may turn out to be an ostensibly mundane but so far intractable
task: working out a third-party liability standard to apply to Unocal's misbehavior.
IV DOE V. UNOCAL SOURCES THIRD-PARTY COMPLICITY
A. Three Decisions in Search of a Standard
Generally, the Doe v Unocal decisions have dealt with the third-party liability
standard by considering it a reverse "state action' or "color of law" issue.' 49 Under
this view, the liability of Unocal depends on whether its conduct meets some
standard for complicity with the state's first-party tortssO In an alien tort claim,
meeting such a standard triggers tort liability- it also triggers classification of
Unocal's "private-party" acts as state action, usually a necessary element of a
customary international law violation.151
Looked at as a whole, Doe v. Unocal is a muddle on how to find and establish
the liability (or complicity) standard. For example, as the following brief overview
illustrates, each of the three decisions, in its re-analysis of the complicity issue, has
incorporated new sources of law. The plaintiffs won an initial victory in Unocal I:
the 1997 decision relied on § 1983 "color of law" doctrine to develop a complicity
standard for Unocal's conduct. 52  Unocal 11 reversed the earlier decision in
2000 153 (in part, incidentally, because there was a heavier legal burden on the
plaintiffs154). Unocal H also employed § 1983 doctrine, but dismissed the action
because the private and public defendants did not share a common unlawful
goal.' 55  Innovatively, the decision enlisted relevant Nuremberg Tribunals
decisions to support its third-party liability standard. 156 Two years later, Unocal III
overruled Unocal 1 1 57 While it agreed with consulting Nuremberg tribunal
decisions, it rejected Unocal Irs readings of them.i58 Unocal Ill's innovation was
to give standard-setting weight to decisions by two recently formed ad hoc
international criminal tribunals, the International Cnminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 59
149. Unoca 11, 110 F Supp. 2d at 1305.
150. Id.
151. However, there are exceptions to the state action requirement. See Unoca 11, 110 F Supp. 2d
at 1305 (stating "the law of nations has historically been applied to private actors for the crimes of
piracy and slave trading, and for certain war crimes."); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-44 (removing the state
actor requirement from genocide and war crimes).
152. Unocal/, 963 F Supp. at 890-91.
153. Unocal 11, i10F Supp. 2dat 1312.
154. See Shaw, supra note 30, at 1372 (explaining that the Unocal I judge "dealt with the case
dunng Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, and he allowed the plaintiffs to proceed.
Later, however, [the Unocal H judge] considered the claim as part of the more stnngent standard for
summary judgment.").
155. Unocal ll, 110 F Supp. 2dat 1306-07.
156. Id. at 1309-10.
157 Unocal 111, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at 84.
158. Id. at 10.
159. Id. at 12-13.
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Finally, a February 2003 Ninth Circuit order set aside Unocal III for en banc
review, and again returned to the third-party liability issue, indicating it would
address the disagreement between the Unocal III majority and concurring opinions
over which standard to use.' 6°
As noted, the Doe v. Unocal decisions have focused on the state action
question, but one with a reversed causation of the usual state action analysis. In
this regard, both Unocal I and II used the joint action test, one of four federal
common law tests sanctioned by the Supreme Court for determining whether
private action is sufficiently connected with official acts to trigger private liability
for action "under color of law ,161 The joint action test asks whether private
parties and complicit state officials have acted "in concert" to effect a deprivation
of constitutional rights. 162  Courts find state action where there is a "substantial
degree of cooperative action" between state and private actors in the deprivation of
constitutional rights. 163
In Unocal I, plaintiffs alleged that Unocal and state officials were jointly
engaged in forced labor and other human rights violations in furtherance of the
pipeline project.16 The court agreed, and decided the allegations were sufficient to
support subject-matter jurisdiction under ATCA. 6  Notably however, during its
review of court decisions related to joint action, Unocal I commented that "some
courts have found that the joint action test requires that the state and private actors
'share a common, unconstitutional goal." '"66  It was this lack of a shared
unconstitutional goal between Unocal and the Myanmar military that would be
central to the Unocal II reversal of the earlier decision. 167
The Unocal I decision also found the Second Circuit's 1995 Kadic decision
instructive. 168 Kadic innovatively made use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "color of law"
jurisprudence in order to classify private party human rights violations in the
former Yugoslavia as state action. Color of law jurisprudence had first been
employed in the civil rights era to challenge, as state action, nominally private
deprivations of civil rights. 169  Kadic explained that color of law extends the
160. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716 (9th Cir.
Feb. 14, 2003) (en banc hearing order).
161. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1995) (identifying the four
tests as nexus, state compulsion, public function, and joint action).
162. Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1453 (10th Cir. 1995).
163. Id. at 1454.
164. Unocal l, 963 F Supp. at883.
165. Unocall, 963 F Supp. at891.
166. Id. (quoting Cunningham v. Southlake Ctr. for Mental Health, Inc., 924 F.2d 106, 107 (7th
Cir. 1991)).
167. See Unocal II, I l0 F Supp. 2d at 1306-10.
168. Unocal 1, 963 F Supp at 890.
169. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (finding a basis for relief under §
1983 when a police officer and employee of private firm "reached an understanding" to violate
plaintiff's constitutional rights); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 794 n.7 (1966) (stating "In cases
under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983, 'under color' of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the
'state action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment"). See also Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d
1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that the Supreme Court had made distinction between the color of
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liability associated with state action to any individual who "acts together with state
officials or with significant state aid."'170 For such an individual the § 1983
jurisprudence "is a relevant guide to whether a defendant has engaged in official
action for purposes of jurisdiction under [ATCA]."'' 7
Unocal I was cheered as a substantial victory for human rights abuse victims
because it recognized a "'knew or should have known' theory against a corporation
that 'looked the other way' and benefited from atrocious acts."' 172 Human rights
advocates' hopes were of course deflated by Unocal H.173 A critical difference
from Unocal I was Unocal Is more demanding interpretation of the joint action
test. 174 In order to classify their acts as state action, the court held that corporations
must do more than benefit from state wrongdoing. 75 Specifically, corporations
must conspire or participate with the state in the violations of international law and
exercise control over the actions of the state. 176 Working from the § 1983 case
law, the court stated:
In order for a private individual to be liable for a § 1983 violation when the state
actor commits the challenged conduct, the plaintiff must establish that the private
individual was the proximate cause of the violation. In order to establish
proximate cause, a plaintiff must prove that the private individuals exercised
control over the government official's decision to commit the section 1983
violation. 177
The Nuremberg Tribunal characterizations of joint action and complicity also
underpin the Unocal H understanding of the joint action test. 78 According to the
court, Nuremberg rested its guilty verdicts in several trials of industrialists who
had used Third Reich slave labor "not on the defendants' knowledge and
acceptance of benefits of the forced labor, but on their active participation in the
unlawful conduct."' 79  In fact, the tribunal acquitted defendants who had not
law and state action concepts).
170. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245.
171. Id.
172. John Christopher Anderson, Respecting Human Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike
Out, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP L. 463, 500 (2000).
173. See, e.g., Maria Ellinikos, American MNCs Continue to Profit from the Use of Forced and
Slave Labor Begging the Question: Should America Take Cue from Germany? 35 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 1, 12 ("As the Unocal case law reveals, all egal efforts to provide relief for the forced
laborers in Burma thus far remain fruitless.").
174. Unocal I1, 110 F Supp. 2d at 1305-06; Unocal 1, 963 F Supp. at 890 (citing Dennis v. Sparks,
449 U.S. 24,27 (1980)).
175. See Unocal 1I, 110 F Supp. 2d at 1305-06.
176. Id. at 1305-07
177. Id. at 1307 (citing King v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 1986)).
178. Unocal 1l, iOF Supp. 2dat 1309-10.
179. Id. at 1310. Unocal III rejected application of this standard:
The Distnct Court incorrectly borrowed the "active participation" standard for liability
from war crimes cases before Nuremberg Military Tribunals involving the role of
German industrialists in the Nazi forced labor program dunng the Second World War.
The Military Tribunals applied the "active participation" standard in these cases only to
overcome the defendants' "necessity defense. In the present case, Unocal did not
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
exercised initiative in acquiring forced labor.18 0 Examining Unocal's actions, the
Unocal II court agreed that the evidence suggested that the corporation knew
forced labor was being used and that it was benefiting from its use.'8 Guided by
Nuremberg, however, the court ruled that such a showing did not establish liability
under international law, since Unocal had not actively sought the use of forced
labor. 1
8 2
Commentators on Unocal 11 have criticized its use of the joint action test and
its "active participation" standard, citing several international tribunal decisions'
less stringent tests for classification of private party acts as state action.'8 3 Notably
undemanding was the standard in Prosecutor v. Tadic,84 where the Appeals
Chamber of the ICTY dealt, in a prosecution appeal of a trial court judgment, i85
with ascription of responsibility to a state for a private (paramilitary) group's acts
on its behalf'18 6 Tadic found that individual action could be under color of law
without substantial state involvement. 87  Specifically, "when a State entrusts a
private individual (or group of individuals) with the specific task of performing
lawful actions on its behalf, but then the individuals, in discharging that task,
breach an international obligation of the State, state action can be found without
substantial participation by the state in the non-state actors' international law
violations. 1S In such a case, "by analogy with the rules concerning State
responsibility for acts of State officials acting ultra vires, Tadic asserted that the
state becomes responsible for the private individuals' acts with the specific request
to act on the state's behalf. i89
However, what about the reverse9 Would private individuals, such as the Doe
invoke - and could not have invoked - the necessity defense.
Unoca 111, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 37 The Nuremberg tribunal, the court noted, defined the
necessity defense as follows: "Necessity is a defense when it is shown that the act charged was done to
avoid an evil both serious and irreparable; that there was no other adequate means of escape; and that
the remedy was not disproportionate to the evil. Id. at 37 n.21 (quoting United States v. Krupp, 9
Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10,
1436 (1950). The court also stated that a reasonable fact finder might find Unocal liable even if the
"active participation" standard were applied. Unocal II1, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 38 n.22.
180. Unocall1, 110 F Supp. 2d at 1310.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See Craig Forcese, ATCA's Achilles Heel, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 487, 508 (2001). See generally
Brad J. Kieserman, Comment, Profits and Principles: Promoting Multinational Corporate
Responsibility by Amending the Alien Tort Claims Act, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1999) (criticizing
the rejection by multinational corporations of responsibility "for the abusive conduct of their foreign
host governments.").
184. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, No. ICTY-94-I-A (July 15, 1999)
[hereinafter Tadic 1999]. Unocal III applied Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-I-T (May 7 1997)
(Opinion and Judgment) [hereinafter Tadic 1997] and several other ICTY cases in its analysis of Unocal
complicity. See Unocal 111, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 12.
185. Tadic 1997 supra note 184.
186. Tadic 1999, supra note 184, at 97
187 id.at 119.
188. Id.
189 Id. Ultra vires refers to actions "beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by law.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1525 (7th ed. 1999).
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v. Unocal defendants, become responsible for state acts if they had specifically
requested the state to act on their behalf? Only such reversed causation would
seem to make the Tadic scenario apply to Doe v. Unocal. However, the question
has in effect already been answered: Unocal I had reversed the third and first party
roles, finding the complicit private party liable, and under color of law, for the
state's first-party acts.190 In fact, one commentator has suggested ATCA decisions
are "evidently very comfortable" using state action doctrine to attach liability for
state acts to complicit private parties.i 91
Unocal III employed an updated version of the Tadic test. 192 Specifically the
court made use of another ICTY case, Prosecutor v. Furundzta,'93 importing most
of its aiding and abetting actus reus standard, which required "practical assistance,
encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration
of the crime."'194 Unocal III then returned to the 1997 Tadic trial chamber decision
to clarify when the accomplice's acts have the required "substantial effect on the
perpetration of the crime."' 95 The effect is substantial, the court stated, when "the
criminal act most probably would not have occurred in the same way [without]
someone act[ing] in the role that the [accomplice] in fact assumed."' 196
For the mens rea aiding and abetting standard, Unocal III again turned to
Furundztja, which held the requirement to be constructive (i.e., a reasonable
person's) or actual "knowledge that [the accomplice's] actions will assist the
perpetrator in the commission of the crime."' 97 Further, "it is not necessary for the
accomplice to share the mens rea of the perpetrator, in the sense of positive
intention to commit the crime."'' 98 Finally, the aider and abettor is not required to
know the precise crime the principal intends to commit. 99 Instead, if the
accomplice "is aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed,
and one of those crimes is in fact committed, he has intended to facilitate the
commission of that crime, and is guilty as an aider and abettor.' '200 Unocal III
came close to declaring its "Furundzya standard" the current criterion for aiding
and abetting liability under international law 201
190. Unocall, 963 F Supp. at 891.
19 i. See Forcese, supra note 183, at 498.
192. See Unocal 11, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 12-16.
193. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, ICTY-95-17/I-T (Dec. 10, 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999),
quoted in Unocal Ill, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 12.
194. Id. at 209.
195. Id.
196. Unocal 111, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 12, (quoting Tadic 1997 supra note 184, 688).





201. The concurrence accused the majonty of this. Unocal 111, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 30
(Reinhardt, J., concurring). The majority disagreed. Id. at 12. The majonty wntes that, "with respect
to practical assistance and encouragement, these [ICTY and ICTR] decisions accurately reflect the
current standard for aiding and abetting under international law as it pertains to the ATCA. Id. at 12-
13 (internal quotations omitted).
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Unocal III declared that applying the criminal tribunal test in a tort action is
not problematic, since the international criminal standard is similar enough to the
domestic tort law aiding and abetting standard. 0 2 It derived the latter from the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979): "For harm resulting to a third person from
the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he (b) knows that
the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or
encouragement to the other so to conduct himself. 20 3 Note, however, that the
standard adopted by Unocal III gives no weight to the last four words of the
preceding quotation, "so to conduct himself," if those words mean that a mens rea
aiding and abetting element is an intent to encourage or assist the first party's
specific breach of duty
In sum, Unocal III derived from Furundzya both its actus reus aiding and
abetting requirement - "practical assistance or encouragement which has a
substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime of, in the present case, forced
labor ' '2°4 - and its mens rea requirement - "actual or constructive (i.e., reasonable)
knowledge that the accomplice's actions will assist the perpetrator in the
commission of the crime. 20 5
As will be discussed in the following section, the Unocal III concurrence
disagreed with the majority's third-party aiding and abetting standard because it
rejected its sources of law. In brief, the concurrence would reject the standards
developed from "evolving standards -of international law, such as a nascent
criminal law doctrine recently adopted by an ad hoc international criminal
tribunal, 20 6 and instead would develop a liability rule from federal common law
principles.20 7 The principles of agency, joint venture, and reckless disregard are
well established in the federal common law, the concurrence states, "and disputed
questions of fact exist with respect to each. 20 8  Thus, like the majority, the
concurrence found the plaintiffs were entitled to go to trial.209
The concurrence is one indication that Unocal III has not finally settled the
third-party liability issue, especially regarding its sources of law, and the February
202. Id. at 13.
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1979) § 876, quoted in Unocal 111, 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19263, at 13.
204. Unocal II1, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 14. The concurrence criticized the court for
being inconsistent because it excluded the Furundzyja sub-element, "moral support, from its actus reus:
[B]y substituting international law standards for federal common law, rather than
following federal common law and incorporating those portions of international law that
attract sufficient legal support, the majority has lost whatever opportunity it had to pick
and choose the aspects of international law that it finds appealing. Having declared that
international law governs, and that the Yugoslav Tribunal's standard constitutes the
controlling international law, the majority cannot then escape the implications of being
bound by the law it has selected.
Id. at 30 n.9 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 15.
206. Id. at 26.
207 Id.
208. Id. at 30.
209. Id.
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2003 Ninth Circuit order for an en banc review is another.21 That order indicates
the en banc panel will closely consider the concurrence and majority liability
standard disagreement. 21  Beyond the en banc review, the Supreme Court may
await its chance to speak on the issue.
B. Unocal Il's Choice of Law Confusion
I Introduction
The Doe v. Unocal judges have experienced conflict of law difficulties, or at
least that is one way to explain the several incarnations of the liability standard
throughout the litigation. The conflicting analyses of the choice of law issue by
the Unocal 11I majority and concurrence may help to illustrate the problem. Both
look to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,212 as Ninth Circuit
precedent inssts. 21 3 The seven restatement factors are as follows:
(1) [T~he needs of the interstate and international systems[,] (2) the relevant
policies of the forum, (3) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue; (4) the
protection of justified expectations, (5) the basic policies underlying the particular
field of law, (6) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (7) ease in
the determination and application of the law to be applied.
214
The majority concluded that the above factors compel it to apply international
law generally, and specifically the third-party liability standards derived from the
Nuremberg, ICTY and ICTR international criminal tribunals. The majority
maintained its choice was favored by factors (1), (4), (5), (6), and (7) above, and
found factor (2) at worst neutral.2 5 Specifically, regarding factor (1), it stated that
the needs of the international system are best served by applying an international
standard for aiding and abetting.216 Regarding factor (2), the majority found the
forum has no settled standard to disturb, so the adoption of the international
tribunal-based standard will not upset existing forum policy 217 Factor (5),
advancing the underlying policy of the concerned field of law, also favored
international law 218 The underlying policy which the majority determined is "to
provide tort remedies for violations of international law, is best served by
international law.219 Finally, regarding factors (4), (6), and (7), the majority stated
210. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716 (9th Cir., Feb. 14, 2003).
211. See generally Koh, supra note 7 (discussing the June en banc hearing).
212. Unocal 111, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263.
213. See In re Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc., 277 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that "[flederal
choice of law rules follow the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.").
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 at 10 (1971).
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that the standard it adopted, "from an admittedly recent case, nonetheless reached
back at least to the Nuremberg tribunal and was similar to the standard set down in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.220
The concurrence decided instead for application of a third-party liability
standard grounded in federal common law principles. 21 It stated that factors (2),
(4), (5), (6), and (7) favor application of federal common law regarding third-party
liability, and found factors (1) and (3) neutral, if not also favoring federal common
law 222 Regarding factor (2), the concurrence stated the forum's relevant policy
was creation of a federal forum "where courts may fashion domestic common law
remedies" for torts in violation of customary international law 223 On the
protection of justified expectations, factor (4), the concurrence maintained those
expectations would be limited, since no Ninth Circuit direct precedent existed for
third-party ATCA liability 224 That said, the federal common law principles of
agency joint-venture liability and reckless disregard were well known and
regularly applied in many contexts, while the tribunal standard was new and the
nature of tribunals made their law unsettled.225  As for factor (5), the policy
underlying the field of law is to provide "an appropriate tort remedy" for
customary international law violations and "[t]he application of third-party liability
standards generally applicable to tort cases directly furthers the basic policy of
using tort law to redress international wrongs., 226 Regarding factor (6), the
concurrence predicted that future decisions' "certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result" would be enhanced by the wealth of precedent available in
federal common law and by independence from "the future decisions of some as-
yet unformed international tribunal established to deal with other unique regional
conflicts. '227 Finally, the concurrence concluded that the well-developed federal
common law is most compatible with factor (7), "ease in the determination and
application of the law to be applied., 228 The concurrence found the remaining
choice-of-law factors, (1) and (3), "neutral, at the least, and certainly not contrary
to the use of federal common law 229
2. Against the Concurrence's Federal Common Law Approach
Both the majority and concurrence analyses pointed out the central weakness
in the other side's choice of law The choice of law by the concurrence, for




223. Id. at 28 (Reinhardt, J., concurmng) (quoting Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (I lth
Cir. 1996)).
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variety municipal tort., 2 30 This resulted from treating the statute as "essentially a
jurisdictional grant only, and then looking to domestic tort law for the cause of
action.23' In other words, the concurrence, in part, determined whether there was
an ATCA cause of action from "the internal law of a nation as opposed to
international law. 232 Making such a determination from municipal law disserves
the emerging international human rights regime. For example, one scholar has
maintained, if judges worldwide are to build "an enduring jurisprudence of
international human rights law, it will be because those norms converge from
adjudications in multiple jurisdictions each reflecting the socio-political structures
of its constitution, while seeking to conform local practices to evolving
international standards. 233
Yet, the concurrence's interpretation is permitted by the wording of ATCA,
since that statute does not declare what law should determine matters ancillary to
the primary one of finding a tort in violation of international law This paper
simply argues that an alternative reading, based on common sense and an equally
accurate understanding of the purposes and objectives of the statute, should
override the concurrence's interpretation. In this regard, recall first that the
statute's general objective was to bring the law of nations under sway of the
federal judiciary In addition, note that ATCA refers to a jurisdictional grant alone
simply because a grant of a cause of action was assumed, under the widespread
late 18th Century understanding that a cause of action was already available
through the incorporation of natural law into federal and state common law.
Therefore, the law of nations marks out the character of the cause of action. From
this perspective, to find Unocal potentially liable with a third-party standard less
stringent than that of international law, as I believe the concurrence did, allows
ATCA to stray far from its focus, the violation of norms commanding the world's
"general assent. 234
Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals case quoted
earlier in this section, also exposes difficulties in the concurrence's position.235 In
an effort to establish a federal remedy that would "give effect to violations of
customary international law," 236 Abebe-Jira states, it would be incongruous to use
the same statute to provide remedies for violations of federal common law alone.
Rather, at the first opportunity, when the decision on a grant of jurisdiction is
made, customary international law and its substantive standards should control
regarding the alleged acts of all defendants, including those facing allegations of
complicity.
230. Unocal III, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at I I (quoting Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F Supp.
162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995) (internal quotations omitted)).
231. Id.
232. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 831 (7th ed. 1999).
233. M.O. Chibundu, Making Customary International Law through Municipal Adjudication: A
Structural Inquiry, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1069, 1148 (1999).
234. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 (quoting Habana, 175 U.S. at 694).
235. Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 848.
236. Id.
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As indicated earlier, the concurrence argued that federal common law should
be drawn from to establish a third-party liability standard, because that matter is
"ancillary" rather than substantive. 237 The concurrence correctly understood as
substantive the tort itself, and understood as ancillary that which does not create or
define the first party's acts.
However, another understanding is that "substantive law" is "the part of the
law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and the powers of the
parties," 238 not merely the first party From this perspective, the liability standard
for the third party is substantive law As even the concurrence agrees,
international law should interpret "the substantive component of the ATCA.,
239
As a matter of common sense, of course, the liability standard has been far more
than subordinate or ancillary- at every step of the litigation it has been singularly
critical in determining whether the case is dismissed or goes forward.240
In summary, while ATCA explicitly grants federal courts jurisdiction over
torts in violation of customary international law, the natural law that already had
"granted" the statute's cause of action was concerned only with violations of
international law, for example violations by third parties of rights and duties
derived from international law. The statute was not meant to allow federal
jurisdiction over parties in violation only of municipal law, and courts should bar
any wider application of the statute. 24' Therefore, courts should not apply a federal
common law standard to third party wrongs.
3. Against the Majority's International Tribunal Approach
The majority was right to reject the use of federal common law for
determining a liability rule and properly found the standard in international law.
However, the majority erred in where it looked for the international standard. The
concurrence justly derided the majority's use of a third-party liability rule only
recently generated by the ICTY 242
The standard set down by that tribunal was peculiarly broad, as seen in
several paragraphs of the 1997 Tadic decision, spelling out the Unocal 1Il
standard:
The Trial Chamber finds that aiding and abetting includes all acts of assistance by words
or acts that lend encouragement or support, as long as the requisite intent is present.
Under this theory, [if] presence can be shown or inferred, by circumstantial or other
evidence, to be knowing and to have direct and substantial effect on the commission of
237 Unoca 111, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 27 (Reinhardt, J., concumng) (stating that there
is no "reason to apply international law to the question of third-party liability simply because
international law applies to the substantive violation; as discussed above, federal common law is
properly invoked when the statute at issue leaves an ancillary question unanswered ").
238. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1161, (7th ed. 1999).
239. Unocal II1, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 27.
240. In Unocal I, HI and III, the liability issue decided whether the plaintiffs' case would go forward
or be dismissed. See supra Part IV.A-B.
241. See infra Part IV.C.
242. Unocal II1, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 24 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
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the illegal act, then it is sufficient on which to base a finding of participation and assign
the criminal culpability that accompanies it. Moreover, when an accused is present and
participates in the beating of one person and remains with the group when it moves on to
beat another person, his presence would have an encouraging effect, even if he does not
physically take part in this second beating, and he should be viewed as participating in
this second beating as well. However, actual physical presence when the crime is
committed is not necessary[, but] the acts of the accused must be direct and
substantial.
243
This standard was "legally suspect" even for Michael Scharf, a prominent
ICTY 'insider' and a Tadic judgment supporter.2" More evidence is needed in the
United States to find criminal liability for aiding and abetting.245  "For a
conviction, there must be proof that the defendant either physically assisted the
perpetrator in the commission of the crime, stood by with intent (known to the
perpetrator) to render aid if needed, or that he commanded, counseled, or otherwise
encouraged the perpetrator to commit the crime." 2  Moreover, absent
"contributing actual aid, criminal liability cannot lie unless the bystander's
approval is manifested by some word or act, such that it affects the mind of the
perpetrator., 247 The "encouragement" element of the Tadic standard, for example,
is reminiscent of the prosecution's proposed standard in what Scharf calls, "the
infamous Big Dan's rape trial, 248 later the subject of a popular movie, The
Accused. In that trial, the prosecutor's theory was that cheering bystanders had
contributed to the crime of rape. Defendants were acquitted of charges resting on
that theory 249
To develop an encouragement standard, the ICTY has made overly restrictive
surveys ofjudicial decisions to discover applicable international law, concentrating
almost exclusively on Nazi-era military tribunal cases. 250 In Tadic, for example,
Nazi-era war crimes and crimes against humanity decisions are the only cases
looked at in its examination of the aiding and abetting issue.251 Specifically, the
decision's "Required extent of participation" section first discusses the Nuremberg
243. Tadic 1997, supra note 184, at 689-91.
244. Michael P Scharf, Trial and Error- An Assessment of the First Judgment of the Yugolavia
War Crimes Tribunal, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & POL. 167, 200 (1998) ("In short, viewed through
American eyes, justice was done in [Tadic 1997], though it could have been done better."). Scharf is
co-author of a guide to the inner workings of the ICTY cited for guidance in Tadic 1997 supra note
184, at 536. Virginia Mors and Michael P Scharf, An Insider Guide to the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1995) [hereinafter Scharf, An Insider's Guide). Scharf has also
written an account of Tadic 1997 MICHAEL P SCHARF BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE
FIRST INTERNATIONAL WARCRIMEs TRIAL SINCE NUREMBURG (1997).
245. ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 724 (3d ed. 1982), cited in Scharf,
An Insider Guide, supra note 244, at 190.
246. Scharf, supra note 244, at 190.
247 Id. (citing PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 244, at 742).
248. Scharf, supra note 244, at 188. The decision is Commonwealth v. Viera, 519 N.E.2d 1320
(Mass. 1987). The case was later the subject of a well-known movie, The Accused (U1P/Paramount,
1988).
249. See Ruth Marcus, Other Defendants Acquitted; 2 More Convicted in Barroom Rape, WASH.
POST, Mar. 23, 1984, at Al, cited in Scharf, supra note 244, at 190.
250. Id.
25 1. Tadic 1997, supra note 184, at 682-87
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Tribunal's Dachau case, noting that its third element of required proof is that the
accused had to have "encouraged, aided and abetted, or participated" in enforcing
that notorious Nazi concentration camp's systematic deprivations and cruelties.
252
This is the last time in the sub-section that the court refers to the encouragement
notion. In the next paragraph, Tadic discusses another Nuremberg concentration
camp case, the Mauthausen case, which concerned the practice of mass
extermination in gas chambers.253  That court understandably employed a
remarkably broad extent of participation standard:
That any official, governmental, military or civil or any guard or civil
employee, in any way in control of or stationed at or engaged in the operation of
the Concentration Camp Mauthausen, or any or all of its by-camps in any manner
whatsoever, is guilty of a crime against the recognized laws, customs and
practices of civilized nations.
254
The next paragraph of the Tadic survey concerns an Auschwitz commander's
conviction as an accessory to the murder of 750 individuals, based on his
involvement in "procuring Zyklon B gas, constructing gas ovens, arranging for
trucks to transport inmates to the gas chambers, and alerting the camp bureaucracy
as to the imminent amval of transports., 25 5 The following paragraph cites another
World War 1I war crimes tribunal case, in which the British Military Court found
the defendants guilty because they "knew that they were going to the woods for the
purpose of killing the victims, and therefore the defendants engaged in a common
unlawful enterprise.256 Moreover, the defendant who "stayed in the car to prevent
strangers from disturbing the two who were engaged m killing the victims" did not
escape culpability 257 The next case involved the brutalization and killing of
downed WWII U.S. pilots by civilians while they were paraded through the streets
of a German town. 258 Guards who stood by during the lynching and the official
who ordered the parade were among the convicted.259 Finally, two more World
War 11 cases are cited, these before a French military tribunal. From Gustav
Becker Wilhelm Weber and 18 Others, 260 Ferrarese,261 and several other cases, the
Tadic court derives the accused-unfriendly principal that "not only does one not
have to be present but the connection between the act contributing to the
252. Id. at 1 682 (citing II UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS, 13 (London, 1949) [hereinafter LAW REPORTS])
253. Tadic 1997 supra note 184, at 683.
254. Id. (citing LAW REPORTS, supra note 252, at 15).
255. Tadic 1997 supra note 184, at 683 (2 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, WAR
CRIMES REPORTS 48 (London, 1948).
256. Tadic 1997 supra note 184, at 685 (citing Trial of Otto Sandrock and Three Others, British
Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals, held at the Court House, Almelo, Holland, on 24-26
Nov., 1945, Vol. I, Law Reports 35,43 (1947)).
257. Id.
258. Tadic 1997 supra note 184, at 687 (citing Case. no. 12-489, United States v. Kurt Goebellet
al., Report, Survey of the Trials of War Crimes Held at Dachau, Germany, 2-3 (Sept. 15, 1948)).
259. Tadic 1997 supra note 184, at 687.
260. Id. (citing Gustav Becker, Wilhelm Weber and 18 Others, Vol. V1i, LAW REPORTS 67 70).
26 1. Tadic 1997 supra note 184, at 687 (citing Ferrarese, Vol. Vii, LAW REPORTS 67, 81).
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commission and the act of commission itself can be geographically and temporally
distanced. 262
In the equivalent Furundzya sub-sections263 (putting aside their references to
ICTY and ICTR decisions) only the same or similar trials are examined, all from
the Nuremberg tribunals or other courts whose concerns were Nazi-era
atrocities. 2 " Once again, support is sparse for the notion that encouragement alone
can constitute the mens rea of aiding and abetting. Support is found in only two
cases: in Dachau and in The Synagogue Case, decided by the German Supreme
Court in occupied Germany 265 The Synagogue court held that the status of the
accused as a "longtime militant of the Nazi party, along with his general
knowledge of the perpetrators' criminal enterprise, were enough to establish the
crime's mens rea element, even though the defendant had not planned, ordered, or
taken part in the crime against humanity, the destruction of a synagogue. 26
The exclusive focus on the Nazis and their atrocities is troubling, because it
would naturally be expected to generate a mens rea standard of culpability
appropnate only for such perpetrators of unmatched evil.267 As noted above, for
example, the Nazi-focused military tribunals was not adverse to establishing catch-
all standards that ensured that nearly any German with any coercive authority at
the Mauthausen concentration camp would be found guilty of a crime against
humanity 268 Recall in this respect how Furundzya's mens rea complicity standard
was too broad for the Unocal III majority, which refused to incorporate "moral
support" into its own standard.269
The tribunals for Nazi-era offenses and by the ICTY and ICTR have devised
such exceptional standards because of a perceived duty to convict large numbers of
individuals culpable in widespread outbreaks of extraordinary evil. 270 Genocide is
262. Tadic 1997, supra note 184, at 687 (citing Vol. VII, LAW REPORTS 67, 70).
263. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, No. IT-95-17/l-T, 199-216, 217-26 (Judgment) (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber Dec. 10, 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999)
[hereinafter Furundzija].
264. Unocal II1 recognized this, although it also described Furundzyja as undertaking "an
exhaustive analysis of international case law" in pursuit of its actus reus aiding and abetting standard:
"The international case law it considered consisted chiefly of decisions by American and British
military courts and tribunals dealing with Nazi war crimes, as well as German courts in the British and
French occupied zones dealing with such crimes in the aftermath of the Second World War. Unocal
111, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 36 n.26. It is conceivable, of course, that all third-party liability
and aiding-and-abetting international case law has involved Nazi-era criminals.
265. Furundzia, supra note 263, at IM 205-09 (citing the case at Strafsenat. Urteil vom 10. August
1948 gegen K. und A. StS 18/48 (Entscheidungen, Vol. i, pp. 53 and 56)).
266. Furundzija, supra note 263, at 209.
267 The Nazi regime is "the epitome of absolute evil in Western culture Gerry J. Simpson,
Didactic and Dissident Histories in War Crimes Trials, 60 ALB. L. REV. 801, 811 (1997).
268. See Tadic 1997, supra note 184, at 683 (citing Vol. XI, Law Reports 13).
269. See note 204 and accompanying text.
270. See Scott T. Johnson, On the Road to Disaster- The Rights of the Accused and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 10 INT'L LEGAL PERSP 11I, 192 (1998)
("All of [the ICTY's] branches, including the judiciary, are slanted toward fulfilling the Security
Council mandate of achieving results: that means convictions not acquittals. As result, the ICTY in its
current incarnation cannot fairly adjudicate matters in a neutral and detached way."); see also Student
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the exemplar of such evil, and the creation of the ad hoc tribunals is commonly
understood as an attempt to put a stop to that atrocity 271 An innovative student
note in the 2001 Harvard Law Review, in fact, came right out and said what must
be on the mind of many a tribunal judge: that the disutility of acquitting a
genocidaire is a harm of an order of magnitude greater than the harm of freeing an
ordinary murderer.272 The writer then asked, "If the presumption of innocence
really reflects 'a rational world, should not the prosecutor's burden of persuasion
drop considerably in cases involving charges of genocide? ' 273 The ICTY may be
attempting to achieve that goal, in part, through the indirect means of standard-
274setting.
Note, Developments in the Law: Fair Trials and the Role of International Criminal Defense, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 1982, 1995 (2001) [hereinafter Student Note]:
There is little credible evidence of bias for or against any of the ethnic or national groups
prominent at the tribunals as defendants or victims. There is somewhat more evidence of
a bias against defendants generally, including as critics have noted, the "prosecutorial
zeal" demonstrated by judges in public remarks regarding the need for the tribunals to
succeed.
Id.. See also Larry A. Hammond, Testimony of Larry A. Hammond Before the House International
Relations Committee, Feb. 28, 2002, available at http://www.osbommaledon.com/press/artcles/
hammond_testimonyhouse of rep.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2004) (stating that the ICTY judges and
prosecutors are subject to "an always present pressure to gain convictions"). A former justice
department attorney, Hammond served on a 1993 ABA task force charged with recommending
procedural rules to the ICTY Id.
The contrast between ordinary crime and acts of extraordinary evil is considered in Miriam J.
Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice,
15 HARV HUM. RTS. J. 39 (2002). See also Michael Scharf & Valerie Epps, The International Trial of
the Century? A "Cross-Fire Exchange on the First Case Before the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal,
29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 635, 642 (1996) (comparing the Serb-run concentration camps to the Nazi-run
World War 1I concentration camps).
271. See, e.g., Symposium: Telford Taylor Panel: Critical Perspectives On The Nuremberg Trial,
12 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. RTS. 453, 458 (1995). Panelist Ruti Teitel described the ad hoc tribunals'
origins as "current attempts in Yugoslavia and in Rwanda to stop genocide. Id. Panelist Jonathan
Bush noted the "new international tribunals established to try genocide in Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia. Id. at 460.
272. Student Note, supra note 270, at 1992.
273. Id., see also Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties
and Prospects, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 111, 114 (2002) (describing that "[tihe extreme character of the
crimes alleged before international criminal courts makes the case for accountability stronger than in
domestic prosecutions.").
274. For comment on ICTY unfairness to the defense, see Matthew M. DeFrank, ICTY Provisional
Release: Current Practice, A Dissenting Voice, And the Case for Rule Change, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1429,
1457 (2002) ("A growing body of academic literature has criticized the Tribunal for denying its accused
procedural protections necessary for fair trials."); Vincent M. Creta, The Search for Justice in the
Former Yugoslavia and Beyond: Analyzing the Rights of the Accused Under the Statue and the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 20 HOUS. J.
INT'L L. 381, 390-417 (1998); Student Note, supra note 270, at 1994-96. See also Simon Jenkins, The
New Order that Splits the World, LONDON TIMES, Jan. 31, 2001, available at
http://www.casi.org.uk/discuss/2001/msgOO102.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2004) (describing the
tribunal as "absurdly partisan").
Regarding bias during the trial of Milosevic, see John Laughland, If This Man Is a War Criminal,
Where Is All the Evidence? MAIL ON SUNDAY (London) 54, Aug. 25, 2002, available at 2002 WL
23304850 (Presiding Judge Richard May "has distinguished himself throughout the trial by his
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Ultimately, then, war crime trials and their standards are for "the Hitlers, the
Goerings, the Pol Pots, the Milosevics, the Karadzics, and other architects of
genocide ,275 Perhaps these trials should not be for "ordinary murderers, as
their multitudes of purposes may take precedence over the dispensation of justice
for matters of less-than-extraordinary evil. 6  Perhaps this also helps to explain
belligerence towards Milosevic and in particular for his habit of interrupting Milosevic, even sometimes
switching off his microphone, whenever the former Yugoslav leader's cross-examination shows up
inconsistencies in a witness's evidence."). It is also useful to look at the transcripts of the ICTY trials.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54, Trial Transcript, 9012-45 (Aug. 28, 2002),
available at http://www.milosevic-tnal.org/tnal/2002-08-28.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2004) (describing
presiding Judge Richard May's obstructive and belligerent behavior toward Milosevic, and complete
permissiveness toward the witness, BBC reporter). Also note the lack of any response to Milosevic's
complaint about delivery of extensively revised witness testimony the night before the next witness's
testimony. Id. at 904445.
275. Davida E Kellogg, Jus Post Bellum: The Importance of War Crimes Trials, PARAMETERS,
Oct. 1, 2002, at 8799, available at 2002 WL 18222363. However, it is incongruous for Kellogg to
group Milosevic and Karadzic with Pol Pot and the Nazis; the evidence that those two are guilty of
genocide is sparse indeed. Nonetheless, the comment indicates that tribunals are set up in the wake of
perceptions of extraordinary evil. Regarding the absence of evidence against Milosevic, see Laughland,
infra note 283. The importance of Holocaust imagery in motivating the creation of the ICTY is
discussed in Freddric Mdgret, The Politics of International Criminal Justice, European Journal of
International Law, Feb. 09, 2003, available at http://ejil.org/joumalVVoll3/No5/brl-03.html. Megret
reviews seven books on the Balkan crisis, writing that all agree the decisive turn toward international
involvement came in the wake of 1992 media reports and images of Nazi-style concentration camps in
Bosnia. Regarding the Bosnia conflict, a senior BBC correspondent writes that "a climate was created
in which it was very hard to understand what was really going on, because everything came to be seen
through the filter of the Holocaust. JOHN SIMPSON, STRANGE PLACES, QUESTIONABLE PEOPLE 444-45
(1998).
276. For a practical view of the purposes of international criminal tribunals, see Antonio Cassese,
Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1, 1-6 (1998) (stating the principal aims
of tribunal justice are: I) distinguishing culpable perpetrators from others of the same ethnic or other
group, 2) dissipating calls for revenge by showing victims that perpetrators are being punished, 3)
fostering reconciliation by ensuring that perpetrators pay for the crimes, and 4) creating a reliable
record of past atrocities). Cassese is the former chief judge and President of the ICTY See Johnson,
supra note 270, at n.172.
Simpson, supra note 267 at 829, offers a theoretical discussion of war crimes tribunal purposes. One of
the functions described is legitimation:
[Tihere is a sense that war crimes trials, in revealing to us what war crimes are, also tell
us that other acts are not in this category. In this way, Nuremberg tells us that Nagasaki
was not a war crime and that the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1941 was not aggression.
Similarly, message of the [Klaus] Barbie trial is that torture in Algeria is not war
crime or that Vichy France was not as anti-Semitic as Nazi Germany.
Id. See also Joan Phillips, The Case Against War Crimes Tribunals, THE NATION, Feb. 1995, available
at http://www.balkan-archive.org.yu/politics/myth/articles/feb95.JoanPhillips.htm (last visited Mar.
10, 2004) (stating that "[tihe concept of war crimes appears to be an ideological construction of New
World order politics, used to legitimize the international pecking order by branding some as criminals
and casting others in the role ofjudges.").
The ICTY tribunal may be functioning in such a manner, in particular after NATO's air war on
Yugoslavia appeared to violate laws of war. See Amnesty International, NATO/Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia "Collateral Damage or Unlawftl Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by NATO
During Operation Allied Force (2000) available at web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/EUR700182000 (last
visited Mar. 10, 2004); Andreas Laursen, NATO, The War Over Kosovo, And the ICTY Investigation,
17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 765 (2002). The legitimation purpose may also have been present in the
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why their standards diverge from the practice in U.S. criminal courts, as Michael
Scharf has confirmed.27  Our federal courts, therefore, should draw back from and
reconsider applying ICTY and ICTR tribunal standards. Special rules for
conditions of absolute evil should not underpin generalized international law.
In addition to the general standard-setting problems of tribunals set up to deal
with outbreaks of extraordinary evil, the specific nature and purpose of the ICTY
and ICTR also generate legal dangers and difficulties.
27 8 First, each is ad hoc, 279
formed for a particular purpose whose fulfillment may warrant veering from the
course of simple justice. The United Nations Security Council established the
ICTY for example, in response to a finding of widespread and severe human
rights abuses during the bloody disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. 280  The
Security Council directly stated that an intended purpose, in addition to that of
dispensing justice, was to contribute to "the restoration and maintenance of
peace.' '2Si Other moral and political purposes may also have entered into the
genesis of the ICTY to deflect a sense that the West, in particular Germany's early recognition of
Slovenia and Croatia, had all but assured the anarchic, bloody break-up of Yugoslavia. See Misha
Glenny, Germany Fans the Flames of War NEW STATESMAN, Dec. 20, 1991, at 14. Further:
Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia will definitely mean war in Bosnia and probably in
Macedonia unless a substantial UN peace-keeping force is put in place before it happens.
At the moment, the chances of that happening appear slim The struggle in Bosnia
would be unspeakably bloody.
Id. At the time he wrote, Glenny was BBC's Central Europe correspondent. See also SUSAN L.
WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY- CHAOS AND DISILLUSION AFTER THE COLD WAR 147 (1995) (arguing
that the Western powers, by allowing the Yugoslav crisis to be defined along ethnic lines, inadvertently
"undermined or ignored the forces that opposed the radical nationalists and indirectly contributed to the
filfillment of the best dreams of the national extremists."). See generally Bette Denich, Unmaking
Multi-Ethnicity in Yugoslavia: Metamorphosis Observed, Anthropology of East Europe Review
Autumn, 1993, available at http://condor.depaul.edu/-rrotenbe/aeer/aeerl Il/denich.html (last visited
Mar. 10, 2004) (noting the long-term growth of inter-ethnic alienation and distrust also helped to cause
Yugoslavia's disintegration).
277 Scharf, supra note 244, at 178-96.
278. See Unocal III, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 27 (Reinhardt, J., concurring):
The [ICTY] was formed with the limited mandate of adjudicating allegations of human
rights abuses that took place in the Balkans in the last decade. Established by Security
Council Resolution 827 in May, 1993, it is a temporary body whose members are elected
for four-year terms by the members of the United Nations General Assembly. The
[ICTRI is a similarly-constituted body.
Id
279. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 41 (7th ed. 1999).
280. Tadic 1997 supra note 184, at 2. The ICTY was established pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 808, adopted February 22, 1993, and Secunty Council Resolution 827, adopted May 25,
1993. See U.N. Doc. S/RES/808(1993); U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). The finding regarding
widespread human rights abuses in Yugoslavia was established by an independent commission, formed
pursuant to an earlier UN Security Council resolution.
281. Tadic 1997 supra note 184, at 2. Another authoritative voice, UN Under-Secretary-General
for Legal Affairs, Carl August Fleischhauer, stated the ICTY had three main goals: "ending war crimes,
bringing the perpetrators to justice and breaking an endless cycle of ethnic violence and retribution.
See Scharf & Epps, supra note 270, at 660. The Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine
Albnght, stated the primary purpose of the tribunal should be to "establish the historical record before
the guilty can reinvent the truth. Id.
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formation of the tribunal,282 and there are ongoing concerns over its political
independence.283 This politicization is problematic, and should weaken confidence
in the impartiality of the "work product" of the ICTY including the legal standards
it established for itself. In the tribunals' place, international law in general - "the"
international law, so to speak - should draw its norms and standards from
permanent, democratically accountable legal regimes, in which the dispensation of
justice is the overarching and dominant purpose. 2u
282. See YvEs BEIGBEDER, JUDGING WAR CRIMINALS: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
171 (1999) (writing that establishment of the ICTY was "substitute for an effective, timely, military
intervention [during the Bosnian cnsis] by the UN Security Council."); Aleksa Djilas, The Politicized
Tribunal, IWPR TRIBUNAL UPDATE, July 25, 2001, available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/2001/0725icty.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2004)
(inferring from its indictments and other practices, that the tribunal's purposes include punishing
NATO's enemies and rewarding its friends); David Binder, The Ironic Justice of Kosovo, MSNBC
(US), March 17, 2000, available at http://www.geocities.conr/cpa~blacktown/20000319
balkamsnus.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2004) (Binder, a New York Times correspondent for the Balkans
since 1963, stated, that "[p]ortraying the Serbs as [the ongin of evil in the Balkans] is an unwritten
doctrine adopted by the State Department at the beginning of the Yugoslav conflicts and continued
today, doctrine endorsed and spread by the mainstream media, human rights groups and even some
religious communities.").
283. See, e.g, Jamie Shea, Press Conference Given by Jamie Shea, NATO Spokesperson, and
Major General Walter Jertz, SHAPE Spokesperson (May 16, 1999), available at http://
www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990516b.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2004). Shea, in response to question
regarding ICTY jurisdiction over NATO actions in Kosovo, stated:
I think we have to distinguish between the theoretical and the practical. I believe that
when [Chief Prosecutor] Justice Arbour starts her investigation [into the events in
Kosovo], she will because we will allow her to. It's not Milosevic that has allowed
Justice Arbour her visa to go to Kosovo to carry out her investigations. If her court, as
we want, is to be allowed access, it will be because of NATO.
Id., John Laughland, This Is Not Justice, THE GUARDIAN (UK), February 16, 2002, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4357313,00.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2004)
(stating that by refusing to investigate NATO attacks on Yugoslavia, "the strict circumscription of the
circumstances under which war may be waged (ius ad bellum) has now been replaced by an infinitely
malleable series of double-standards about how it may be waged (ius in bello): on Jamie Shea's own
admission in 1999, these standards are deployed in the service of the Hague's pay-masters, the Nato
states."). Similarly, others have noted that:
Although the Yugoslavia Tribunal is designed to be independent from the Security
Council, one cannot ignore the facts that the Security Council selected the Tribunal's
prosecutor and proposed a short list of judges from which the General Assembly chose.
Indeed, given that the battle for control of Bosnia was in large measure a religious war
between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs, it is astonishing that four of the eleven
judges elected by the General Assembly upon the nomination of the Council come from
states with predominantly Muslim populations.
Michael Scharf & Epps, supra note 270, at 645; Cogan, supra note 273, at 119 ("in model domestic
judicial systems, the right to prepare a defense, equality of arms, and judicial independence are
all more or less taken for granted. [Iln international criminal courts at present, such an assumption
would be unwarranted.").
284. Regarding democratic accountability, see Cogan, supra note 273, at 114. Cogan lamented the
absence in international tribunals "of strong community of 'watchdog' observers for fair trial
proceedings. Id. He concluded that "the realm of international criminal justice is distinguished from
domestic criminal justice not simply because accountability [for crimes of such an extreme nature] and
sovereignty [in pursuit of, for example, national security objectives] weigh heavier in this context, but
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The third-party liability standard might be where the ICTY is most tempted to
be partial. After all, the success or failure of the ad hoc tribunal has from the start
been widely seen to involve convicting certain national leaders with "command
responsibility" for human nghts violations in the former Yugoslavia.285 Therefore,
there has always been present a temptation to create a third-party liability standard
that is as helpful as possible to tribunal prosecutors. If the tribunal has given in to
that temptation, then its third-party liability standard is exceptionally likely to be
unique, and out of line both with "normal" international law and standards of
liability in the world's domestic legal systems.
The Tadic appeals chamber decision may be an example of an ICTY
predisposition regarding third-party liability matters. The trial chamber majority
had dismissed certain charges because Serbia had not exercised effective control
over the Bosnian Serb forces.286 In a sharp dissenting opinion, Judge Gabrielle
Kirk McDonald argued for a much lower threshold to find an individual a de facto
agent of a foreign government.287 ICTY ally Scharf agreed, urgently pointing out
the damage a high threshold might do to the future case against the ICTY's
ultimate quarry- "the ruling may effectively lift the responsibility for atrocities
committed during most of the three and a half year-long conflict [in Bosnia] from
Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic." 288  The Tadic appeals court reversed that
aspect of the trial chamber decision.28 9
In sum, it is deeply troubling, in light of the specialized nature of the ICTY
the indications of bias (in particular, for Doe v. Unocal, regarding command
responsibility matters), and the restricted "case law" upon which the tribunal
draws, to find that federal courts are "increasingly turning to the decisions by
international criminal tribunals for instructions regarding the standards of
international human rights law under our civil ATCA. 29 Moreover, the ICTY
third-party liability standard simply is not the "world standard, as common sense
would understand that phrase.
also because of the absence of an effective counterweight to check these interests. Id.
285. The frame of mind was evident in the run-up to the Tribunal's creation. Julia Preston, U.N.
Creates Tribunal to Try War Crimes in Yugoslav Warfare, WASH. POST, at 3, Feb. 23, 1993, available
at http://www-tech.mit.edu/Vi 13/N8/tribunal.08w.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2004). "Last fall,
Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger singled out a number of top Serb politicians and military
figures - including Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his powerful patron in neighboring
Serbia, President Slobodan Milosevic - as ultimately responsible for war crimes committed by their
underlings. Id. The following comment by prominent human rights lawyer on the Slobodan
Milosevic trial also indicated ICTY insiders' frame of mind: "the whole point of this trial is to show
that those who are primarily responsible, who set the ball rolling, can be reached, and not just the foot
soldiers who commit the atrocities and bury the bodies. Geoffrey Robertson, quoted in CNN Intl.,
Q&A Late Afternoon: Slobodan Milosevic Takes Offensive (February 15, 2002), available at 2002 WL
5129332. For Robertson's insider credentials, see Marlise Simons, Milosevic Trial Settles Into Slov
But Judicious Routine, N.Y TiMES, March 3, 2003, at 4 (reporting that Robertson had been selected "to
head the new special court for war crimes in Sierra Leone.").
286. Tadic 1997, supra note 184, at 605.
287 Id. at 607 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
288. Scharf, supra note 244, at 196.
289. Tadic 1999, supra note 184, 156-62.
290. Unocal 111, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 12.
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C. Instead, a Paquete Habana Approach
The Unocal III error is an inability to discover a third-party liability standard
which has grown, "by the general assent of nations, into a settled rule of
international law ,291 But how should a court go about discovering such rules for
matters, such as third-party complicity with a regime's internal human rights
violations, which only after Nuremberg became firmly categorized as "traditional"
international law" 292  How are U.S. courts to avoid imposing their own
"idiosyncratic legal rules" upon other countries, in a pretense of applying
international law92 93  On the other hand, federal courts also must resist being
compelled to adopt, from "an amorphous entity - i.e., the 'law of nations' -
standards of liability applicable in concrete situations. ' 294  Courts need to find
tangible sources of law - and not the ad hoc law formed to deal with extraordinary
evil - in order to determine the present-day international law.
In pursuit of the concrete, courts should look to the 1900 Supreme Court case,
The Paquete Habana.295 The case, which concerned a matter of traditional
international law, a belligerent's seizure of coastal fishing vessels as "prize,
demonstrated the modem, positivist method for determining customary
international law rules.296 The court stated that in order to ascertain and administer
customary international law,
[W]here there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who
by years of labor, research, and expenence have made themselves peculiarly well
acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by
judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concernimf what the law
ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
29
The decision presented a lengthy historical review, based on primary sources,
of actual state practices. 29s The review started with the early 15th Century and
proceeded up to the contemporary practice of the "civilized nations. ' 29  Next,
29 1. Habana, 175 U.S. at 694.
292. See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather
Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1982) (stating that pnor to Nuremberg individual citizens (and
their rights) were the concern of domestic law alone; "apart from a few anomalous cases [they] were
not subjects of rights and duties under international law"); Makau Mutua, From Nuremberg to the
Rwanda Tribunal: Justice or Retribution? 6 BUFF HUM. RTS. L. REV 77 82 (2000) (noting that
Nuremberg provided a foundation for the "international crimmalization of internal atrocities, despite
its subordination ofjustice to politics).
293. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
294. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781 (Edwards, J., concurring).
295. See generally Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (demanding determination of the customary international
law standard for the treatment of local fishing vessels by wamng parties).
296. Id. at 678-79.
297 Id. at 700.
298. Id. at 686-700.
299. The court understood the "civilized nations" to be the European powers and the United States,
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secondary sources were surveyed, allowing the court to peruse the opinions of
leading jurists, "witnesses of the sentiments and usages of civilized nations. ' 3°
The goal of the reviews of the primary and secondary sources was to determine
whether a legal rule had gathered the "general assent of civilized nations. That
requirement "is a stringent one, the Filartiga court would later write.30'
After the Nuremberg expansion of international law to internal matters
previously not subjects of international law, internal judicial practice must be given
prominence in deciding international standards, where, as will increasingly be the
case, it is the most representative state practice available. This would be less an
innovation than a change in the valuation of domestic law vis-a-vis the law of
international tribunals and courts. As Habana indicated, for example, courts have
long relied on nation states' domestic laws as one form of evidence for customary
international law norms. 30 2 In fact, the Habana case does so itself, citing domestic
laws regarding cross-border maritime matters.0 3 Filartiga provides another
example, finding it important that "torture is prohibited, either expressly or
implicitly, by the constitutions of over fifty-five nations, including the United
States. ' '~ For Doe v. Unocal, therefore, an approach in line with Habana might
examine the world's domestic legal systems for their treatment of third-party tort
liability and its near equivalents.30 5
Support for giving higher priority to the standards of domestic legal systems
is also found by looking again at standard materials on the sources of customary
international law. Fundamental in determining customary international law,
according to the Restatement on Foreign Relations Law, is the "general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation. 30 6
The Statute of the International Court of Justice (I0), "generally regarded as a
complete statement of the sources of international law, declares them to be the
following:
30 7
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
along with the recent addition of "the Empire of Japan the last state admitted into the rank of
civilized nations. Id. at 700. The court also implicitly brought Argentina into the civilized circle
through its references to the eminent Argentine jurist Calvo. Id. at 703.
300. Id. at 701.
301. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
302. See Habana, 175 U.S. at 689.
303. See id. (referring to French ordinance regarding capture of fishing vessels); idat 691 (citing
French legal order releasing English fishermen), and id at 694 (discussing a decision by an English
court). See also M. Erin Kelly, Customary International Law in United States Courts, 32 VILL. L. REV.
1089, 1122 (1987) (stating that "courts may look to the domestic laws of the United States and other
states as evidence of a norm").
304. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889 n.13.
305. The Unocal III concurrence took a very brief look at the standards of three "national legal
systems" and from this concluded that "[tihe status of joint liability as a general principle of law is
supported by the fact that it is fundamental to 'major legal systems."' Unocal I11, 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19263, at 30 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
306. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987).
307 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (5th ed. 1998).
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b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; [and]
d. judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists
of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of
law.
30 8
While the ICJ provision explicitly places judicial decisions in a subordinate
position to the practices and customs of nations, judicial decisions may be given
greater weight if they are helpful in determining the state practice. 309 "Case law,
ranked as subsidiary in subsection (d), nevertheless may reflect the meaning of an
ambiguous treaty provision as evidence of the subsequent practice of states. 310
Further guidance on whether conduct has attained the status of customary
international law is offered in the following description of characteristics that acts
"obligatory under or consistent with international law" are required to possess: "(1 )
'concordant practice' by a number of states relating to a particular situation; (2)
continuation of that practice over 'a considerable period of time'- (3) a conception
that the practice is required by or consistent with international law; and (4) general
acquiescence in that practice by other states.",31 The first two of these
requirements are better met, in a positivist conception of international law, by legal
rules and standards that are widely shared among the world's domestic legal
systems, rather than by the rules and standards of ad hoc international criminal
tribunals.
V CONCLUSION
ATCA represents, both originally and in the present day, a commitment by
the United States to bring aliens' customary international law concerns into the
federal courts.312 Our federal courts should carry forward our country's early vow
to be receptive to authentic "law of nations" alien tort claims, which today are
often international human rights lawsuits. However, the greatest advocates of
ATCA as a vehicle for such human rights claims may actually threaten the statute,
when they attempt to use ATCA to attack wrongs, such as the softer shades of
third-party complicity, which a world consensus has not decided are in violation of
customary international law If courts allow expansion of international law not
308. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 1055.
309. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987). An example of the
appropriate use of subsection (d) source is provided in David L. Nersessian, The Contours of
Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunals, 37 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 231, 238 (2002) ("Case law, ranked as subsidiary in subsection (d), nevertheless may reflect the
meaning of an ambiguous treaty provision as evidence of the subsequent practice of states.").
310. Nersessian, supra note 309, at 238.
311. Henry J. Steiner, et al., Transnational Legal Problems, 240 (4th ed. 1994) (citing Working
Paper by Manley 0. Hudson, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 26 U.N. Doe. A/CN 4/16 (1950).
312. Unoca 111, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 8.
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
based on consensus, and refuse it the guidance of actual, permanent legal regimes,
they are breaking with the positivist legal tradition. In this light, perhaps the
Unocal III judges were misguided by US. v. Smith, an 1820 Supreme Court
decision which stated that the law of nations "may be ascertained by consulting the
works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and
practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law "313
Smith does not give state practice greater weight than the learned writings of
academics and other jurists; in fact, the jurists are mentioned first.314  This is
classic natural law advice and should be looked on skeptically by those wary of the
"new" customary international law. 315
Doe v. Unocal should avoid the methodology of natural law and instead
discover the consensus practice within the world's legal systems regarding
domestic aiding and abetting tort violations. Gathering many legal systems' rules
together, one would likely find the most stnngent third-party liability standards
nearly universally create tort liability, while progressively more relaxed complicity
rules are less and less the object of consensus. Perhaps the more stringent
complicity standard of Unocal II would be found near universal in domestic
practice among nations, and the modified ICTY standard adopted by Unocal III far
from universal. In fact, while the ICTY standard is similar to some U.S. domestic
common law third-party tort liability standards, it is certainly not the consensus
even in the United States, as the Unocal H decision makes clear.3i 6 Thus, while it
was and is morally wrong for the Unocal Corporation to knowingly or
constructively be a party to an increase in the brutal human rights violations
perpetrated by the Burmese military, Unocal's complicity with human rights
violations would likely not reach a consensus customary international law. standard
derived from domestic legal systems' practice. In sum, although a Paquete
Habana approach might vanquish the Doe v. Unocal plaintiffs, ATCA itself would
remain alive as a vehicle for attacking violations of customary international human
rights law if those wrongs violate the laws and standards of the world's legal
313. Unocal 111, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at II (quoting Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 and
Untied States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820)) (emphasis added by the Unocal Ill
court).
314. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 154,
315. See supra note 12. Justice Story wrote in 1822 of the law of nations connection to natural law:
"Every doctrine, that may be fairly deduced by correct reasoning from the rights and duties of nations,
and the nature of moral obligation, may theoretically be said to exist in the law of nations. United
States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551), overruled on
other grounds, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825). See also Jay, supra note 35, at 822 n. I I (writing that at
the end of the Eighteenth Century "a consensus existed that the law of nations rested in large measure
on natural law. As Emmerich de Vattel contended, and Americans repeated, 'the law of Nations is
originally no other than the law of Nature applied to Nations."' Jay, supra note 35, at 822 n.I I (quoting
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, at Ivi (Joseph Chitty ed., 1863) (1758)). Moreover,
"[tihe law of nations has its foundation in the principles of natural law, applied to states; and in
voluntary institutions, arising from custom or convention. Jay, supra note 35, at 822 n. II (quoting
Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Virginia 16 (May 23, 1791) (A. Davis ed. 1791), in 2 THE
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 813 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967)).
3 i 6. See supra notes 134-52 and accompanying text.
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systems.
31 7
If Doe v. Unocal reaches the Supreme Court, however, conservative Supreme
Court justices would likely be more tempted by the "originalist" arguments of
Bork and Sweeney than by Habana. If the originalist view were to become
established law, international human rights actions under ATCA would come to an
end.31 8 That would not be the case if the court were to take the Habana approach,
which also contrasts with the originalist approach by being in accord with the
statute's literal meaning and original intent. All in all, Habana is a more attractive
option for the Court.
In any case, the legacy of Filartiga is under threat. It is threatened by the
originalists, of course, but the circumscribed sense of customary international law
of Filartiga is also endangered by the new customary international law, a
descendant of the visionary remarks by Judge Wilson quoted at the outset of this
paper.3 19 Therefore, federal judges should resist such self-inflation and return to
the grounded positivism of The Paquete Habana. Federal judges need to reassure
those of us who do not want to take wing and fly with Judge Wilson that we do in
fact "live in a more positivist age, and that modern-day courts really do "feel less
comfortable 'creating' international law ,,320
317 Notjust among those The Paquete Habana regarded as "civilized. Habana, 175 U.S. at 694.
318. Both Bork and Sweeney would exclude all ATCA-based human rights actions. See Tel-Oren,
726 F.2d at 813 (Bork, J., concurring); Sweeney, supra notes 98 and 105. See generally sub-section
III.C and accompanying footnotes.
319. THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 282 (R. McCloskey ed., 1967).
320. Dodge I, supra note 3, at 253-54 (commenting on Judge Story's quotation in The La Jeune
Eugenie, 26 F Cas. at 846, reproduced, supra note 315).
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In a period marked by the development of numerous treaties, conventions,
and statutes designed to regulate international business, the field of international
bankruptcy remains disturbingly resistant to reform. Most of the major initiatives
proposed in past decades have failed completely- others, though adopted, have had
only moderate impact. As a result, the bankruptcy of a multinational enterprise
typically triggers diverse and uncoordinated legal proceedings in various countries
connected to the affairs of that enterprise. For instance, this lack of coordination
imposes substantial costs both on the bankruptcy process itself, by multiplying
administrative expenses, and on international commerce generally, by preventing
lenders from predicting accurately the consequences of debtor insolvency The
need for a method of addressing international insolvencies that is fair, predictable,
and consistent therefore remains pronounced.
The movement to reform international bankruptcy law has been cast largely
as a struggle between two opposing camps: universality and territoriality For the
past few decades, universalists who argue that international bankruptcies should be
administered by a single forum, have been winning the battle. Universalists argue
that the centralized administration of cross-border bankruptcies will provide: (1)
equality of treatment for all creditors; (2) maximization of the value of the
bankruptcy estate; (3) expeditious and efficient administration of the estate; and (4)
predictability of outcome. Universalist principles have shaped the discourse as well
as the goals of the bankruptcy reform movement.
In the year 2000, however, the consensus that had long favored universality
seemed to be weakening. Territoriality, which favors the simultaneous
administration of multiple local bankruptcies, is gaining currency among
commentators. On the legislative front, the international bankruptcy provisions of
the proposed Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19991 while purporting to foster
universality, instead reveals only a partial commitment to the universality
approach. Finally, recent cases evidence the increasing tendency of courts to
abandon the battlefield altogether by handling cross-border bankruptcies in an
Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law, © 2003.
1. For current version, see Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 975,
108th Cong. (2003).
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extra-regulatory fashion.2
Many recent large bankruptcies, including Swissair, WorldCom, Enron, and
United Airlines, necessarily have multi-junsdictional problems. But smaller
enterprises also operate across international borders. What law to apply is
traditionally a conflict of laws problem. Nevertheless, as Professor Buxbaum and
others point out,3 cross-border insolvencies have not generally been analyzed in
terms of choice of law methodology
First, we need to identify the terminology used in this area of law Professor
Buxbaum mentioned "Universality" and "Territoriality A Although neither
describes the exact situation in the United States today, both are active elements in
efforts to describe courts' efforts to apply the limited legislative guidance.
"Universality maintains that a single forum should administer the bankruptcy of an
insolvent corporation. The bankruptcy proceeding would reach all assets of the
debtor, wherever located, and would distribute those assets to all creditors,
wherever located." 5 Generally, it is assumed that this distribution of assets and
determination of claims would be done according to the forum's own laws.
Territoriality, in contrast, is the familiar state law collection technique of
grabbing the local assets and distributing them to the local creditors according to
its own laws.6 The United States has a long history of trying to reconcile the needs
and interests of local creditors in and to local assets (the race to the court house)
and the desire for equitable distribution of an insolvent debtor's assets.7 Naturally,
if the debtor is not insolvent, a local creditor may be inconvenienced and taxed
with added costs by participating in a foreign proceeding, in theory, however, that
creditor will eventually be paid. It is where the assets are insufficient that equality
of distribution and other bankruptcy protective tools are needed-such is the
international conflict.
As noted, the United States has seldom been purely one or the other. Indeed,
the current regime under Bankruptcy Code section 304 has been characterized as
"modified universality ,,8 This characterization is accurate but a little odd. It would
appear that the United States is truer to Universality than any other nation.
In this piece I do not attempt to set out what choice of law principles should
govern cross-border insolvencies in the United States. Rather I attempt to trace
federal choice of law rules and show how those rules, such as they are, have had
limited use thus far in bankruptcy cases. In Part II I discuss choice of law rules
and identify what federal choice of law rules are in various contexts. In Part Il1 
2. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Rethinking International Insolvency: The Neglected Role of Choice-of-
Law Rules and Theory, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 23, 23-24 (2000) (footnotes omitted) (hereinafter
Buxbaum).
3. Id. at 25; see also Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies:
Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AMER. BANKR. L. J. 457, 462 (1991).
4. Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 24-27.
5. Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 26.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 27.
8. See I I U.S.C. § 304. See also Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 27
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discuss the trend, if it can be called a trend, in cases decided prior to the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1979 ("BRA herein). Part IV examines the structure
of the BRA dealing with cross-border issues and discusses selected cross-border
cases decided under the BRA showing the limited application of federal choice of
law analysis. In Part V I leave with a brief restatement of the problem facing
courts in cross-border insolvency cases rather than a solution, other than to suggest
that developed choice of law principles are designed to inform the choice and
should not be overlooked in deciding whether to apply United States bankruptcy
law.
II. WHOSE CHOICE OF LAW RULES?
A. Choice of Choice of Law Rules
For some time it has been settled that a federal court sitting in diversity
jurisdiction shall apply the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits.9 Klaxon
was based on Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompknso which relied in part on the Rules of
Decision Act." This Act provides that "[tihe laws of the several states shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in
cases where they apply ,,12 Thus the "laws of the several states" includes the forum
state's choice of law rules. i3 Does this apply in Bankruptcy9
The answer is curiously clouded. Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee
v. Green 4 is a starting point. In Vanston, the issue was whether interest on interest
should be paid in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. '5 If it was payable, the first
mortgage bondholders would be paid in full, but subordinate creditors would have
a reduced share. 16 The Court said:
What claims of creditors are valid and subsisting obligations against the bankrupt
at the time a petition in bankruptcy is filed, is a question which, in the absence of
overruling federal law, is to be determined by reference to state law.
Determination [of which state's law applies where, as here, other states have
significant contacts] requires the exercise of an informed judgment in the
balancing of all the interests of the states with the most significant contacts in
order best to accommodate the equities among the parties to the policies of those
states. 17
This quote was dicta, because the Court held that regardless of whether interest on
9. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
10. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
II. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
12. 28 U.S.C. §1652 (2000).
13. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,80 (1938).
14. Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
15. Id. at 158.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 161-162.
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
interest was allowable under any or all of the potentially interested states' laws, the
issue was determinable by reference to the policy of the Bankruptcy Act;' 8 that is,
there was "overruling federal law."' 9 Nevertheless, this case has been the point of
jumping off for much analysis. However, this analysis has not pointed in a clear
direct line.
It is to be noted that the Vanston Court, albeit in dicta, used a phrase to state
the essential choice of law relation that has similarly become basic in the
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Law ("Restatement of Conflicts"); they referred
to the "states with the most significant contacts, 2 ° whereas the core concept of the
Restatement of Conflicts is the "most significant relationship."'21 Because the latter,
in some version, appears in most states, and because the federal courts have
adopted the Restatement of Conflicts as the basis of federal common law choice of
law,22 it often happens that there is no essential difference in the choice of choice
of law- thus, the issue is left unresolved. This result was reached by the Fifth
Circuit in Woods Tucker Leasing Corporation v. Hutcheson-Ingram Development
Co.,23 where it held that Texas and Mississippi would apply the choice of law
provision of the Uniform Commercial Code, as would the federal court, in making
24its own choice to recognize a contractual choice of law provision.
The Second Circuit reached a finer judgment in In re Gaston & Snow.25 The
case was a bankruptcy adversary proceeding on an oral contract between a Chapter
11 law firm and its former clients.26 At issue was the applicable statute of
limitations. 27 The court, after noting the division in the courts of appeals, held that
because federal choice of law rules are a creature of federal common law, and that
because federal common law was only available where there was a significant
federal interest, that where state law was the underlying dispositive law, the
bankruptcy courts should apply the choice of law rules of the forum and not federal
law.28
Reaching a directly contrary view is In re Vortex Fishing Systems, Inc. 29 That
case also involved a statute of limitations which lay at the basis of a claim on
which a creditor predicated its standing as an involuntary bankruptcy petitioner.30
18. Green, 329 U.S. at 161.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 162.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6, cmit. c. (1971).
22. See, e.g., In re Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc., 262 F.3d 985, 994 (9th Cir. 2001).
23. Woods Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutchison-Ingram Dev. Co., 642 F.2d 744, 748-49 (5th Cir.
1981).
24. Id. at 753-54.
25. In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599 (2d. Cir. 2001).
26. Id. at 601-02.
27. Id. at 604.
28. Id. at 605-07" see also Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1013
(1953) (discussing that because Erie was partially based on the Rules of Decision Act, Erie also applied
in bankruptcy).
29. Vortex Fishing, 262 F.3d at 985.
30. Id. at 994-95.
VOL. 32:2
CHOICE OF LAW IN CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCIES
The case does not carefully discuss our issue but, following earlier circuit law,3 1
held that "[i]n a bankruptcy case, the court must apply federal choice of law
rules."32
Since most substantive rights in bankruptcy are based on state or non-
bankruptcy law, and since those state issues are respected in bankruptcy absent
federal bankruptcy statutes or strong, clear policies indicating otherwise,33 it would
seem that where state law prescribes the dispositive rule that Erie and the Rules of
Decision Act are controlling on the choice of law issue, then the forum's choice of
law rules would apply Otherwise, federal common law choice of law rules would
apply That is the position this article takes. I now turn to a brief discussion of
federal choice of law rules as applied when federal law is the dispositive rule. At
the end of the article I will briefly consider the choices made in some international
bankruptcy related state law issues.
B. Federal Choice of Law Brief History
The question addressed here is how to select between conflicting foreign and
federal bankruptcy law. In theory, the United States has the constitutional authority
to extend its legislation to the world. Thus, Bankruptcy Code section 541 expressly
provides that the estate created by filing a petition extends to all the described
property "wherever located and by whomever held. 34 There are, of course,
practical limits to this reach-the effect of American law on property located in
another country depends entirely on the willingness of the courts of that country to
recognize our claims or judgments.35
Partially in recognition of this practical limit, and partially as a matter of
conflict of laws policy, early on, the Supreme Court adopted the rule that:
[An act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if
any other possible construction remains, and consequently can never be construed
to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted
by the law of nations as understood in this country.36
Chief Justice Marshall's language implicitly admits that the law of nations does not
limit the powers of Congress as set out in the U.S. Constitution as a matter of law
cognizable before U.S. courts, but rather is a matter of construction in the face of
general language.
Justice Joseph Story, a founder of American conflicts law, expressed this
same idea with a little more force in The Apollon,37 where he said: "[tjhe laws of
no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories, except so far as regards its
3 i. In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 1995).
32. Vortex Fishing, 262 F.3d at 994.
33. Cf. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
34. 1i U.S.C. § 541 (2000).
35. See e.g., In re Int'l Admin. Serv., Inc., 211 B.R. 80 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
36. Alexander Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, i 18 (1804).
37 The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 370 (1824).
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own citizens. ' 8 Justice Story, in stating such, seemingly suggests that there were
real limits on a state's power under international law. The Marshall language has
prevailed.
In a case involving a Canadian insolvency, the Court held the American
creditors to the Canadian proceedings, saying: "[t]hat the laws of a country have no
extraterritorial force is an axiom of international jurisprudence, but things done in
one country under the authority of law may be of binding effect in another
country 0,39
The Charming Betsy case is generally looked at as a beginning since it at least
makes clear that courts are to use its guidance not as a limit on power where
Congress is clear, but as a rule of construction where Congress uses broad
boilerplate terms like "any" or "all.,
40
Perhaps the leading modern case is Lauritzen v. Larsen.4 1 Lauritzen was a
federal Jones Act 42 case, the facts of which center around a Danish seaman, who
signed on a Danish ship while the ship was in New York, and was later injured in
Cuba.43 He sought to assert his claim under the Jones Act, which facially allows
"any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
at his election, [to] maintain an action for damages "" While the Court noted
the reach of the actual language, it said: "[bly usage as old as the Nation, such
statutes have been construed to apply only to areas and transactions in which
American law would be considered operative under prevalent doctrines of
international law."45 But this holding does not bind U.S. law"
On the contrary, we are simply dealing with a problem of statutory construction
rather commonplace in a federal system by which courts often have to decide
whether 'any' or 'every' reaches to the limits of the enacting authority's usual
scope or is to be applied to foreign events or transactions.
46
The Court concluded that Congress could not have intended to apply the Jones Act
remedies to a foreign sailor aboard a foreign ship, injured in a foreign port.
47
Some question about the presumption against extraterritoriality as a basis of
statutory construction was raised in the close 5-4 decision in Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California.48 In that case, the Court, with two separate 5-4
majorities, applied the Sherman Act 4 9 to activities by English reinsurers in
38. Id.
39. Canadian Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 536 (1883).
40. Id.
41. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
42. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (2000).
43. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 573.
44. Id. at 573 n. 1.
45. Id. at 577.
46. Id. at 577-79.
47. Id. at 592-93.
48. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
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England.50 The majority on our issue simply held that since compliance with U.S.
law did not require the London reinsurers to violate English law, that is,
compliance would be legal in England, so there was no conflict of laws and U.S.
law could be applied.51 Justice Scalia, who wrote the dissent on this issue,52 used
the analysis followed here. The case does not really suggest there is any
qualification of this analysis, but the majority essentially ignored the real conflicts
issue presented: whether English law can be construed not to merely permit the
conduct prescribed by U.S. law, but to encourage the freedom of its insurance
companies to make such choices, at least while in England. This situation
classically calls for a conflicts analysis; Scalia does not offer a real conflict
analysis, but arguably his discussion is far superior to the simplistic analysis of the
majority.
Scalia, following the rules of statutory construction mentioned above, argued
that: (1) unless Congress indicates otherwise, federal legislation is only meant to
apply within the U.S. and (2) federal statutes should be construed, again where
possible, not to violate international law. 53 As a guide to these two canons of
construction, he mentioned that many lower courts in Antitrust cases had relied on
the doctrine of comity of nations and the rules outlined in the Restatement (Third)
Foreign Relations Law of the United States ("Restatement of Foreign
Relations").54
Comity is an older concept still viable in conflicts analysis, especially in
international cases. The classic statement associated with the concept of comity is
from Hilton v. Guyot,5 5 where the Court, in considering the enforceability of a
French judgment in federal courts, said:
'Comity, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of
mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and
to the nghts of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection
of its laws.
56
Obviously, the concept of comity is not a test or standard, but a guiding principle
of international cooperation. Moreover, it does not expressly, or to my mind
implicitly, give any guidance to a choice of law analysis. It addresses a style of
thinking which guides a court's attitude when offered the possibility that foreign
law should, by some choice of law principles, be applied. As vague as comity is, it
has continued to guide much of the thinking about foreign law in U.S. courts,
50. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 798-99.
5 1. Id. at 800.
52. Id. (Scalia also wrote for the majority on different issue).
53. Id. at 814-15.
54. See Suzanne Harrison, The Extraterritoriality of the Bankruptcy Code: Will the Borders
Contain the Code? 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 809 (1996).
55. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 122-23 (1895).
56. Id.
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including in bankruptcy proceedings, and plays a prominent role in determining
whether to grant relief in an ancillary proceeding.
57
Courts have found further guidance for the exercise of comity in the
provisions of the Restatement of Foreign Relations sections 402 and 403.5' Foreign
relations law in the Restatement includes "international law as it applies to the
United States., 59 As we have seen, this international law is not binding in the sense
that it overrides applicable federal statutes but serves as a canon of prudent
construction. Under section 402, a state has the jurisdiction to apply its law if it
chooses to do so, against:
(1) (a)conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its terrtory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its temtory that has or is intended
to have substantial effect within its territory; [and]
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as
within its territory.
60
But even where jurisdiction to prescribe is permitted under section 402, "a state
may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity
having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable. ' '6i Section 403(2) offers a nonexclusive list of relevant factors to be
applied where appropriate. These factors are:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e. the extent to
which the activity takes place within the temtory, or has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between
the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be
regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to
protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
57 1I U.S.C. § 304(c)(5).
58. RESTATMENT (THIRD) FOR. REL. §§ 402, 403 (1987).
59 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOR. REL. § I(a). (1987).
60. Id. at § 403.
61. Id. at §403(l)(1987).
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(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
62
As a non-exclusive list of factors, this list is necessarily consistent with the
alternative approach of many courts, which simply state that "[t]he federal
common law choice-of-law rule is to apply the law of the jurisdiction having the
greatest interest in the litigation. 63 Notice that the Restatement of Foreign
Relations factors do not directly focus on choice of law, but rather determine the
reasonableness of the extension of federal law to a transaction or person having
foreign connections. If the U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction would be unreasonable,
federal law should not be applied, but a court need not chose the application of the
other state's law; indeed, this determination of unreasonableness logically results
in dismissal of the action.
Thus, while the Restatement factors are often treated as principles for
implementing comity, they actually focus on different questions. Comity (whatever
it means) focuses on whether to apply or defer to the foreign law, while the
Restatement delineates when American federal law should be limited or not
applied. Neither actually focuses on how to make the decision. This role is also
played, albeit vaguely by the greatest interest, or closest connection, or most
significant contact standard. But the courts have not developed this degree of
coherence, for the most part, in international insolvency A little history might
help.
62. RESTATMENT (THIRD) FOR. REL. § 403(2) (1987).
63. In re Koreag, Controlle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992) (not choosing
between federal common law choice of law and the forum (N.Y.) choice of law since they were
essentially the same); In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 800, 816 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1994),
aff'd 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y 1995) and 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996) (on these important cases see
below).
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1II. PRE-1979 INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES 64
Charles Booth describes a movement in international insolvency law in the
United States that shifts from territoriality to universality, back to territoriality, and
again to universality, prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.65 The early
cases basically ignore all conflict of laws analysis, and concentrate on the question
of the status of claims under a foreign insolvency proceeding. 66 This status inquiry
includes recognition of a foreign representative of an estate (more modem cases)
67
and whether the claims of a foreign assignee in a bankruptcy commission can be
recognized.
The earliest federal case was Harrison v. Sterry.68 This case involved a British
partnership which also did business under a firm name in South Carolina.69 The
contesting parties were the United States; attaching American and British creditors;
an assignee for the benefit of creditors, assignees in bankruptcy under a British
commission; and an American commission.7" The issue was the equitable division
of property. 7 The Court merely set a scheme for distribution. In so doing, Chief
Justice Marshall stated:
As the bankrupt law of a foreign country is incapable of operating a legal transfer
of property in the United States, the remaining two thirds of the fund are liable to
the attaching creditors, according to the legal preference obtained by their
attachments [thus subordinating the claims of the British bankruptcy assignees].
72
But having adopted this clear territorialist view, the Court went on to state that any
surplus left after the United States and the attaching creditors were paid "ought to
be divided equally among all the creditors, so as to place them on an equal footing
with each other.' '73 In doing so, the British and American bankruptcy distributions
should be taken into consideration.74 While not a pure universality approach, the
notion of equality of creditors is part of the rationale for universality
Perhaps a clearer case of subordination of foreign creditors, versus refusal to
64. This brief section is largely based on Charles D. Booth, A History of the Transnational
Aspects of United States Bankruptcy Law Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, B. U. INT'L L. J.
1(1991).
65. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is codified in sections of I I U.S.C.
66. See text and cases in Part IV B below.
67 This issue is directly addressed as to ancillary proceedings in § 304 of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978. See below.
68. Harrison v. Sterry, 9 U.S. 289 (1809).
69. Id at 291-92.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 290.
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recognize, is In re Accounting of Waite.75 In Waite, the court recognized the claim
of a British trustee to property located in New York where no prejudice would be
done to local creditors by the transfer of the assets to England for administration.76
Judge Lowell recognized the developments as not involving conflict of laws
analysis:
We have no law of the situs giving preference to our creditors, but simply refuse
to interfere and aid the foreign trustee against the legal diligence of our creditors
who may have the good fortune to be able to attach or take in execution the effects
here before the trustee has removed them.
77
Thus, the notion of comity raised its head. It was not a choice of law problem-
which law should be applied-but a simple policy, which I have referred to as
subordination of the claims of the foreign trustee or estate representative, to the
claims of local U.S. creditors to assets located in the United States (a version of
territoriality).
A big step in the direction of the universality principle, which argues there
should be a single proceeding with equal treatment of the same class of creditors,
was taken in Canada Southern Railway Co. v. Gebhard.7 s In Gebhard, secured
bondholders of a Canadian railway company were subject to a Canadian scheme of
arrangement whereby the old bonds were to be exchanged for new bonds with a
longer maturity and lower interest rate.79 The scheme was approved by three-
quarters of the bondholders and the Canadian Parliament.8 Two dissenting New
York bondholders brought suit on their old bonds in the federal circuit court, which
held that the bondholders could recover on the old bonds.8' The Supreme Court
reversed.82 It reached several issues, but for our purposes it should be quoted for its
extensive endorsement of the essence of universality-
Unless all parties in interest, wherever they reside, can be bound by the
arrangement which it is sought to have legalized, the scheme may fail. All home
creditors can be bound. What is needed is to bind those who are abroad. Under
these circumstances the true spirit of international comity requires that schemes of
this character, legalized at home, should be recognized in other countries.
83
75. In re Accounting of Waite, 99 N.Y 433 (1885). The reader is reminded that during the
Nineteenth Century we had federal bankruptcy system for only about 17 years. Richard E. Coulson,
Consumer Abuse of Bankruptcy: An Evolving Philosophy of Debtor Qualification for Bankruptcy
Discharge, 62 AIb. L. Rev. 467, 471-477 (1998). During this period, most bankruptcies were state
based where inter-state bankruptcy issues were considered international, except where the federal Full
Faith and Credit Clause applied. Cf. John Lowell, Conflict of Laws as Applied to Assignments for
Creditors, I Harv. L. Rev. 259 260 (1888)).
76. In re Accounting of Waite, 99 N.Y 433,499-50 (1885).
77 Lowell, supra note 75, at 261.
78. Canada S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
79. Id. at 528-29.
80. Id. at 530.
81. Id. at 531.
82. Id. at 540.
83. Id. at 539.
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Implicitly this statement approved the application of Canadian law. Thus, like
many such cases involving the tension between territoriality and universality, the
choice of law is made by selecting a jurisdiction through the favorable application
of international comity Of course, international comity towards the law of a
similar common law nation is the easiest case. I will present that the similarity of
legal regimes has become a factor under Bankruptcy Code section 304.
The next case in this selective history is Hilton v. Guyot,i which has already
been mentioned in connection with its classic statement of comity.8 5 In Hilton, the
Court faced the question of the enforceability of a French judgment, by a French
liquidator, against two U.S. citizens on debts they owed to the liquidating firm. 6 In
addition to the statement of comity quoted above, the Court regressed to the
doctrine of territoriality when it said:
No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from
which its authority is derived. The extent to which the law of one nation, as put in
force within its territory by judicial decree, shall by allowed to operate within
the dominion of another nation, depends upon what our greatest jurists have been
content to call "the comity of nations."
8 7
Using their understanding of the comity of nations, the Court adopted a rule of
reciprocity, where the French judgment would not be enforceable in the United
States because a U.S. judgment would not be enforceable in France.88
Skipping ahead to just before the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197889 the
period described above and the intervening period were well characterized by
Booth when he wrote that "courts throughout the United States responded
inconsistently over the years to issues involving the recognition of foreign
insolvency proceedings and the claims of foreign representatives." 90 I would add
that they paid little attention to developing any coherent choice of law framework
for the solution in foreign insolvency matters. In the 1970s, there were a number of
big international cases which presaged many of the looming globalized
insolvencies, which we have and yet may see.
I will briefly mention two of these cases, only to illustrate the inadequacy of
the then existing Bankruptcy Act. The first of these cases was the insolvency of
84. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
85. See supra notes 55-59, and accompanying text.
86. Hilton, 159 U.S. at i14-21.
87. Id. at 163.
88. Most states do not require reciprocity concerning foreign judgments, and some authorities
think that federal courts must follow state law on this issue where the basis ofjurisdiction is diversity
including alienage. See Eugene F Scoles, et. al, Conflict of Laws at 1187ff (3d Ed. 2000). The
Restatement of Conflicts also does not require reciprocity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 98 and cmt. e. Many states accord foreign money judgments the essence of full faith and credit
via the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. Id. at cmt. e, and 13 Uniform Laws
Anno. Pt. 1i p. 43 ff.
89. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is codified in sections of I I U.S.C.
90. Booth, supra note 64, at 27.
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Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt K.G. a. A. ("Herstatt"). 91 Its story is fascinatingly told in an
American Bar Association article by Joseph D. Becker.92 It is a tale of weaknesses
and doubts that fortunately led to a settlement (as confusion often does) and
avoided difficult decisions. Herstatt was a large West German private bank.93 It
had incurred large currency exchange losses as a result of the inflation generated
by the 1973 oil embargo.94 On June 26, 1974, the West German authorities ordered
the closing and liquidation of the bank. 95 Herstatt did not conduct any banking
business in the United States, but held accounts for cleanng purposes in Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A.96 Chase froze the Herstatt account which had about $150
million, even though Chase's claims were only about $5 million.97 Attachments
against the Herstatt account with Chase began, and by mid-August, aggregated
about $200 million from American and foreign banks.98 Chase filed a federal
interpleader action interpleading the Herstatt account.99 Citibank, a nonattaching
creditor, then filed, on August 6, an involuntary bankruptcy petition designed to
wipe out the attachments as preferences.1°° Numerous legal issues were then
raised, including whether a foreign bank, which did not do banking business in the
United States, was excluded from coverage as an eligible debtor by the Bankruptcy
Act. 101 In such a case, the attachments could not be voidable preferences on the
assumption that U.S. preference law would apply, or whether it was an eligible
debtor, in which case the attachments were likely voidable. 10 2 On November 4,
1974, a bankruptcy judge heard this issue and others. 103 As Booth puts it, "[g]iven
the novelty and complexity of this issue, the inadequacy of the legal rules, as well
as the almost certain likelihood of appeal, the parties attempted to settle the matter
instead. ' ° 4 Settlement was shortly accomplished and the bankruptcy case was
dismissed. i 5
During the same period, an English bank called the Israel-British Bank
(London) Ltd. ("IBB"), had substantially identical problems.'0 6 On August 2, 1974,
it voluntarily commenced winding-up proceedings according to English law. 10 7 It
had bank accounts in U.S. banks, and attachments were levied against these
91. See Joesph D. Becker, International Insolvency: The Case of Herstatt, 62 A.B.A. J. 1290
(1976).
92. Id.





98. Id. at 1292.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1292-93.
101. Id..
102. See id. at 1291-93.
103. Id. at 1293
104. Booth, supra note 64, at 29.
105. Becker, supra note 91, at 1293-94.
106. Id.
107 Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 511 (2d Cir.
1976); see also Becker, supra note 91, at 1293.
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accounts.108 Attempting to avoid these attachments, IBB voluntarily filed a
bankruptcy petition on September 23, 1974.109 Addressing the issue as to whether a
foreign bank not doing banking business in the United States was an eligible
debtor under the Bankruptcy Act,' i the bankruptcy court refused to dismiss, and
was reversed by the district court; the district court was in turn reversed by the
Second Circuit."' While the Second Circuit decided the question about a foreign
bank being an eligible debtor," 2 it did not need to use any choice of law analysis
because the case simply concerned a federal bankruptcy issue.
This broad survey of the pre-1979 state of the law leaves one in agreement
with Judge Lowell who wrote in 1888:
[l]n the present state of commerce and of communication, it would be better in
nine cases out of ten that all settlements of insolvent debtors with their creditors
should be made in a single proceeding, and generally at a single place; better for
the creditors, who would thus share alike, and better for the debtor, because all his
creditors would be equally bound by his discharge. 113
Judge Lowell's statement does not reflect the even greater complexity of business
that exists today as compared to 1888, nor does it recognize the growing need for
reasonable, predictable rules of jurisdiction, recognition of foreign proceedings,
and choice of what law to apply to what issues. I will now briefly outline the
structural setting of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and some of its limited
choice of law implications, by looking at a few illustrative cases.
IV THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 19781 14
A. The Structure of Bankruptcy Code Section 304
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 ("BRA 1978") as amended, constitutes
the present Bankruptcy Code.' 15 In light of the history briefly mentioned above,
and other factors raised in the legislative history, the BRA 1978 made an approach
to what has come to be called "modified universality This concept means that
while the law leans towards the concept of a single plenary proceeding where all
creditors from all nations are treated somewhat equally (after all no system truly
treats all creditors equally-secured creditors, unsecured priority creditors, and
general unsecured creditors are not treated alike), the U.S. bankruptcy courts are
cautioned by the law to be careful in the recognition of foreign proceedings and to
108. Becker, supra note 91, at 1293.
109. Israel-British Bank, 536 F.2d at 511.
110. Id. at 511-12.
11. Id.
112. Id at 513.
113. Lowell, supra note 75, at 264.
114. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is codified in sections of I I U.S.C.
115. The present Code is codified in sections of I I U.S.C.
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give some protection to U.S. creditors.' 
1 6
Under the BRA 1978, as Arnold M. Quittner has noted, 1 7 a foreign debtor
has essentially four options for pursuing assets located in the United States."1
8
First, it may voluntarily begin a chapter 7 or chapter II proceeding, provided it is
an eligible debtor under Bankruptcy Code section 109(a), which usually requires
that the debtor has a place of business or property in the U.S." 9 Second, if the
foreign debtor is in a foreign insolvency proceeding outside the United States, 20 its
foreign representative 12 1 may file an involuntary proceeding under Bankruptcy
Code section 303(b)(4).122 Third, the foreign representative may also file an
ancillary proceeding subject to the conditions stated in Bankruptcy Code section
304.123 Finally under general standards of international comity, the foreign
representative or the foreign debtor may seek the assistance of U.S. state or federal
courts to claim its property and transfer it to another country 124 Indeed, in the
absence of creditors pursuing such property locally, the debtor could just see to the
transfer, while a foreign representative would seem to need judicial assistance.
Judicial assistance is likely to be expensive if the foreign debtor has property
located in more than one U.S. jurisdiction. 125
This section briefly outlines the variety of U.S. proceedings where foreign
claims concerning an international debtor's estate can face a U.S. court. I am going
to deal primarily with situations where there are either: (1) two plenary bankruptcy
proceedings pending, one abroad and one in the U.S., or (2) a plenary bankruptcy
proceeding pending abroad and an ancillary proceeding pending in the U.S.
Analytically there is no choice of law difference, except to the extent that the
Bankruptcy Code section 304 factors implicate choice of law considerations.
Bankruptcy Code section 304 applies to ancillary proceedings, 26 but its
factors have been applied more generally where two plenary proceedings are
116. Id.
117 Arnold M. Quittner, Introduction to and Overview of Cross-Border Insolvency Issues, p.2
(2003) (unpublished article on file with the author and the editors).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. A "foreign proceeding" is defined as a "proceeding, whether judicial or administrative and
whether or not under bankruptcy law, in a foreign country in which the debtor's domicile, residence,
principal place of business, or principal assets were located at the commencement of such proceeding,
for the purpose of liquidating an estate, adjusting debts by composition, extension, or discharge, or
effecting a reorganization. II U.S.C. § 101(23) (2000).
121. A "foreign representative" is defined as a "duly selected trustee, administrator, or other
representative of an estate in foreign proceeding. Id. at § 101(24).
122. II U.S.C. § 303(b)(4) (2000).
123. II U.S.C. § 304 (2000)
124. Quitnner supra note 117, at 29 ff.
125. In addition to Quittner id., see also Lynn P Harrison, Ill, Ancillary Proceedings Under the
United States Bankruptcy Code: A Primer in 2 23rd Annual Current Developments in Bankruptcy and
Reorganization p. 175, 185 (P.L.I. 2001). Cf. Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear de Mexico,
S.A., 44 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 1994) (where Court of Appeals ordered the District Court to consider
whether international comity called for deference to Mexican suspension proceedings).
126. I1 U.S.C. § 304(b) (2000).
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pending. For my purposes, section 304 is interesting for its choice of law
implications; it is about the only legislative guidance available showing where
Congress has chosen to articulate factors involved in a choice of whether to grant
relief. Thus, I will first outline the structure and factors of choice in section 304.
A "case ancillary to a foreign proceeding" is begun by a foreign
representative filing a petition. 127 Subsection (b) specifically authorizes the
bankruptcy court to enjoin "any action against (i) a debtor with respect to property
involved in such foreign proceeding or (ii) such property; or (B) the enforcement
of any judgment against the debtor with respect to such property, or any act, or the
commencement or continuation of any judicial proceeding to create or enforce a
lien against the property of such estate." 12S The territorial nature of this assistance
is clear, as it authonzes a stay against actions concerning "the property involved in
such foreign proceeding[s]" "such property, or "the property of such estate."' i29
The subsection goes on to authorize an order requiring the turnover "of the
property of such estate, or the proceeds of such property" to the foreign
representative. 30 Notice that the property is treated as property of an estate, but
this estate cannot be an estate created by federal bankruptcy law because that estate
under Bankruptcy Code section 541 (a) is only created by filing a petition under
sections 301, 302, or 303, not 304. 3i Also note that in an ancillary case, there is no
automatic stay* instead, it is only triggered by a petition under the same three
sections. 132 The subsection finally authorizes the court to "order other appropriate
relief."' 3 3 This provision clearly provides far reaching authority which, when
coupled with section 105(a), 34 allows the court to be most accommodating where
the factors to be considered under section 304(c) warrant.
Code section 304(c) says that "[in determining whether to grant relief under
subsection (b) the court shall be guided by what will best assure an economical
and expeditious administration of such estate" consistent with six factors listed
therein. 35 Notice again that the estate with which the court should concern itself
must be the foreign estate, because no domestic estate exists in an ancillary
proceeding. 136 The factors, not explicitly exclusive, in statutory order are:
(1) "just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such estate;"
(2) "protection of claims holders in the United States against prejudice and
inconvenience;"
(3) "prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property-"
127. II U.S.C. § 304(a) (2000).
128. Id. at § 304(b)(I)(emphasis added).
129. Id at § 304(b)(2).
130. Id. at § 362(a).
131. Id. at § 304(b)(3).
132. Id. at §362(a).
133. Id. at § 304(b)(3) and text at note 131.
134. "The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry
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(4) "distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with
the order prescribed by this title;"
(5) "comity" and
(6) "if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for
[an] individual." 137
It is noteworthy that comity merely appears as the fifth of six factors, which
are not arranged in any discernable order. It is as if comity was an afterthought, or
is merely one of several equal considerations. Some courts have so treated it, but
other courts have considered comity the paramount factor, with the other five
factors designated to carry it out.138 As I have demonstrated, comity is largely a
matter of political sensitivity in international relations with no particular structure.
Perhaps, in the future, it is sufficient if courts develop a federal common law of
comity, with content similar to developed choice of law principles.
The other factors, seen as attempting to guide the choice of relief to be
accorded, may be an advance. The problem is that it is unclear as to the goal of
factorial inquiry We are told that the court is to seek the economical and
expeditious administration of the foreign estate. This goal must be achieved
consistent with comity and the other factors. Is the court to apply foreign law or
domestic law9 How do you balance "just treatment of all holders" 139 of claims or
interests against the protection of U.S. claim holders against prejudice and
inconvenience? And, what does it mean to require distribution of the foreign estate
"substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by this title?"' 4  As
Professor Buxbaum has put it:
Unfortunately, section 304 does not incorporate a pnncipled choice-of-law
approach. There are two distinct areas in which the absence of a conflicts method
is apparent. First, Section 304 does not instruct courts to consider the interests,
relative or absolute, of the United States and any foreign jurisdiction in the
application of their respective laws to the bankruptcy proceeding. In other words,
a local proceeding initiated by a small local creditor when the debtor and all other
creditors are located in a single foreign junsdiction is not distinguished from a
local proceeding brought by a large group of U.S. creditors when the debtor has
major local operations and other substantial contacts with the United States.
14 1
Indeed, the 304 factors do not consider the foreign interests at all, except to the
extent they are considered via the single word "comity
My purpose is not, however, to review the courts struggle to apply the factors.
As is often the case with legislation, which does not fully address a problem, the
courts are occasionally very creative in dealing with these often complex
questions, but are also sometimes very parochial in a biased application of U.S.
law. I will now turn to a few selected cases to illustrate the law in action.
137 11 U.S.C. § 304(c).
138. See Harrison, supra note 125, at 10-13.
139. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(I).
140. Id. at § 304(c)(4).
141. Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 32.
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
B. Selected Cases
An early case under BRA 1978 was In re Toga Manufacturing Ltd.142 In a
back handed manner, this case essentially decided that Canadian bankruptcy law
would not be applied to a garnishment lien claimed in a fund then in the clerk's
office of a Michigan state court. 4 3 There is no conflicts analysis, little discussion
of Bankruptcy Code section 304 factors, and a rigid application of section
304(c)(4).14 Here, an American creditor had contracts with the debtor as an
exclusive sales representative for auto parts from three major automobile
manufacturers. 145 Alleging withheld commissions, the creditor sought arbitration
and eventually secured two arbitration awards. 146 Meanwhile, Toga's major
secured creditor took control of its business and assets and appointed a receiver.
147
The arbitration awards were confirmed by order of a Michigan state court, and
writs of garnishment were served on the three automobile manufacturers.i48 The
secured creditor intervened in the garnishment proceedings, claiming that the
funds, eventually ordered paid into the court, were subject to its prior perfected
security interest in Toga's accounts receivable. 149 The state court found the secured
party's security interest was superior to the garnishment liens, and directed the
funds be paid to the Canadian receiver. 150 The American creditor appealed and was
granted a stay 15 A few months later, an unsecured creditor filed an involuntary
bankruptcy petition in Canada. 152 The Canadian receiver was appointed trustee in
Canada, and brought an ancillary proceeding under section 304 in the Eastern
District of Michigan, seeking a stay and the turnover of the garnished funds.
53
Applying Canadian law, the court found the fund was property of the
Canadian bankruptcy estate. 154 It then addressed the question of what effect should
be given to claims based on Canadian law to property located in the United
States. 155 The court simply starts on the wrong foot.
Citing Harrison v. Sterry156 and Odgen v. Saunders,157 the court opined that
"[h]istorically, the bankruptcy laws of our country have been hostile toward claims
asserted by foreign trustees in bankruptcy against alleged property located in the
142. In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
143. Id. at 170-71.
144. See id
145. Id. at 165-66.





151. Id. at 166-67.
152. Id. at 166.
153. Id. at 166-67.
154. Id. at 167
155. Id. at 166.
156. Harrison v. Sterry, 9 U.S. 289 (1809).
157 Odgen v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827) (not dealing with an international insolvency but with
an interstate matter).
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United States." '  Not cited, and hence ignored, was Gebhard,159 which bound
domestic bondholders to a Canadian proceeding on the clear universalist attitude of
more recent law.16° Of course, the court was not without support in other uncited
cases. But, the court seemed to ignore the universalist factors in section 304. When
it turned to section 304 it listed the subsection (c) factors and discussed some of
them. 16' Although holding that the American creditor "would receive just treatment
of its claim against Toga in the Canadian courts,"'162 it did not discuss the balance
for which this factor calls. Section 304(c) does not merely call for just treatment of
the American creditor, 63 but for the "just treatment of all holders of claims
against such estate. ' 'i 64 This treatment is the universalist notion of a single
proceeding with equality of treatment of all creditors. The court's mistake appears
when it concludes that the American creditor will not receive distribution
"substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by this title." 165 It reaches
this conclusion because the American creditor, held by the Michigan state trial
court to be a subordinated secured creditor, would be considered unsecured under
Canadian law 266 Thus, the court construes section 304(c)(4) as requiring treatment
for an American creditor by the foreign law very similar to that accorded by U.S.
law. 167 I submit that is not what this subsection requires.
In the first place, if section 304(c)(4) requires substantially identical treatment
of individual creditors under both laws, there is never a role for conflict of laws.
This approach is the forum law approach, where the forum always applies its own
law. Secondly, the language of the rule requires the distribution of estate proceeds
be in accord "with the order prescribed by"2168 title 11 -not that each creditor be
treated in the same class that it would be under U.S. law. Whether a creditor is
secured or not depends upon the applicable law; applicable law is a choice of law
issue. For example, while in the United States most states follow the Uniform
Commercial Code on the attachment and perfection of consensual security interests
and its choice of law rules,' 69 the broader rule of the Restatement of Conflicts
provides that for chattels, the law of the state with the most significant relationship
applies, and that is generally, in the absence of an effective choice, the law of the
"location of the chattel at the time that the security interest attached." 70 The
"order" of distribution is a matter of bankruptcy law. I think, Toga reflects
158. Toga, 28 B.R. at 167.
159. Canada S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
160. Id.
161. Toga, 28 B.R. at 166.
162. Id.
163. It does call for the Amencan court to protect against "prejudice and inconvenience. I I U.S.C.
§ 304(c) (2000).
164. Id.
165. Toga, 28 B.R. at 169.
166. Id. at 168-69.
167. Id.
168. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4) (2000).
169. See id. § 9-301(1) (1998) (which generally adopts the law of the debtor's location to issues of
perfection and priority).
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 251 (1971).
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inattention to the issue actually presented, whether turning the money over to the
Canadian trustee would lead to the economical and expeditious administration
consistent with a distribution of proceeds, not substantially dissimilar to the order
provided in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.17 1 It does not call for every creditor to fall
within the distribution order that U.S. law provides.
Another case with a territorial bias is Interpool Ltd. v. Certain Freights of the
M/V Venture Star 172 This case has more of a choice of law aspect. KKL Kangaroo
Lines (KKL) was an Australian shipping company 173 Wah Kwong owned ship
leasing companies in Hong Kong, which leased ships to KKL. 174 Involuntary
liquidation proceedings were initiated by Wah Kwong in Australia. 175 At the time,
KKL had property in the United States, including certain freight monies and the
proceeds of a pending arbitration between KKL and Weyerhauser Company 176 A
Liquidator was appointed by the Australian courts. 177 In pre-liquidation
transactions, KKL assumed the business of another company and agreed to pay its
creditors. 178 The other company transferred the arbitration claim to KKL, and KKL
received a $6 million loan from a Wah Kwong subsidiary secured by an
assignment of the arbitration rights. 179 The relationship of the parties was complex
and the repayment terms unclear.180 The KKL's business deteriorated and it
subsequently ceased doing business.18 1 Wah Kwong went into receivership. 8 2 Two
agreements were entered into between various parties, including the KKL
Liquidator and certain Wah Kwong subsidiaries. 8 3 The agreements essentially
provided that the proceeds of the arbitration would be paid to the Liquidator, who
would then pay a Wah Kwong subsidiary the first $6 million, while the rest would
be held for the Australian bankruptcy. 18 4 These agreements were approved by the
Australian court apparently without notice to the U.S. creditors.
18 5
The Liquidator petitioned for ancillary proceedings under section 304 in the
District of New Jersey Bankruptcy Court.18 6 Then, various petitioning creditors
filed an involuntary chapter 7 petition in the Central District of Californma. 87 The
District Court for New Jersey entered an order which stayed all actions against the
171. The order provided in the Bankruptcy Code is: secured creditors, priority creditors, unsecured
creditors, and equity owners.
172. Interpool Ltd. v. Certain Freights of MN Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373, 374 (D.N.J. 1988).








181. Id. at 376.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 375.
185. Id. at 376.
186. Id. at 375.
187. InterpoolLtd., 102 B. R. at 375.
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debtor, withdrew to the District Court the reference of the 304 petition,
consolidated all actions in that court, and appointed a receiver to collect the
outstanding freights and pay them to the Court Registry.'88 Shortly thereafter, the
bankruptcy court in California transferred the chapter proceeding to the New
Jersey district court. 89 The reported decision involved the Liquidator's motion to
dismiss the chapter 7 proceeding.190
The court says that "[t]here is no requirement that Australian law and United
States law be identical."' 91 As I will show, it is hard not to agree with Charles
Booth. In discussing Interpool on this point Booth says, "[t]his assertion to the
contrary, the Interpool opinion, in effect, sets forth the requirement that for section
304 relief to be granted, the foreign law must be identical to the U.S. law."'
192
The court starts out reviewing Australian liquidation law and concludes that
"access to Australian courts relating to actions of the Liquidator is not
restricted."' 193 But, the court noted that briefs, affidavits, and testimony indicated
that creditors could not seek to set aside the Liquidator's agreements concerning
the arbitration proceeds. 194 The court then said that "[pirotection of United States
creditors is of utmost importance to this Court. Actions taken by a foreign court in
a foreign bankruptcy are to be given deference if, and only if there would be no
substantial violation of the law that would be applied in the United States."' 9 5
Looking at section 304, the court ordered the petition granted: "this Court
must be convinced that the foreign Court has or will abide by fundamental
standards of procedural fairness. 'i 96 Then, referring to the Federal Rules, of
Bankruptcy Procedure, the court noted that they required notice to creditors "prior
to the institutionalization of agreements between the trustee and any of the
creditors, and that the "trustee and creditors hold a series of meetings."' 197 The
court finally concluded:
Since, in this case, the creditors were not notified prior to the date the Court
ratified the agreement between the Liquidator and Wah Kwong, this Court
finds that the procedural protections available to creditors in the United States
were not iven to the United States creditors in Australia. This is a serious
omission.
Of perhaps more importance, the court found that the doctrine of equitable
188. Id.
189. Id. at375, fn. 3.
190. iI U.S.C. § 305(a)(2)(B) (2000).
191. Interpool Ltd., 102 B.R. at 378.
192. Charles D. Booth, Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: An Analysis and Critique of the
Inconsistent Approaches of United States Courts, 66 AMER. BANKR. L. J. 135, 204 (1992) (emphasis in
original).
193. Interpool Ltd., 102 B.R. at 378.
194. Id.
195. Id. (emphasis added).
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subordination was not available in Australia and might be implicated in the
Liquidator's agreement with Wah Kwong.' 99 Therefore, the court concluded that
"[b]oth the laws and the public policy of the United States will be violated if the
case is permitted to proceed under Australian law Foreign trustees will be able
to enter into any type of agreements as long as United States law, notions of due
process, and equitable treatment of creditors are followed in a similar fashion in
foreign jurisdictions.
' 200
Consequently, the court denied the section 304 petition and granted the
chapter 7 petition.20 Agam, there is a total failure to undertake anything but a
territorial analysis. There is no serious conflict analysis, nor is the statutory
injunction concerning economical and expeditious administration discussed. The
court fails to note the inherent conflict left where U.S. law claims the worldwide
assets of KKL are property of the U.S. bankruptcy estate in the chapter 7
proceeding. Indeed, the court mistakenly says that "[a]ll of the assets located in
the United States, including, but not limited to the proceeds of the [arbitration]
claims, shall be considered part of the bankrupt estate. ,202 Why the arbitration
claims are considered located within the U.S. is not mentioned, nor are conflict of
laws issues concerning the validity of the various foreign claims to the arbitration
proceeds. Booth points out a number of Australian protections for creditors which,
while different, would be weighed in any choice of law analysis considenng the
interests of the various states.20 3 Finally, there is no recognition that there remains
a choice of law question-whether Bankruptcy Code section 510 on equitable
subordination is the proper law to apply to a transaction between a foreign
liquidator, an alleged insider, a foreign debtor with property in the United States,
which was entered into abroad. It seems that while the district court reached a
decision, the rationale had little to do with principles capable of reaching a
predictable, fair, and economical result in an international insolvency.
The next case I survey demonstrates a far better use of section 304 and
includes a little choice of law analysis. In In re Culmer 204 Judge Lifland dealt with
a petition under section 304 by Bahamian liquidators of a Bahamian bank
("BAOL"). 20 5 BAOL's banking license was suspended in the Bahamas on July 16,
1982.206 On August 16, a stockholder's resolution called for the winding-up of the
firm, and a court-supervised liquidation was commenced in the Bahamas on that
day 207 On September 8, the section 304 petition for ancillary relief was filed.208 In
addition, the bankruptcy court issued two temporary restraining orders on that day
and on the 10th, which stayed actions against BAOL or its property in the United
199. Id..
200. ld. at 380.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Charles D. Booth, supra note 192, at 206-07
204. In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y 1982).
205. Id. at 622.
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States2" This property was in various forms, but centered on accounts in various
U.S. financial institutions.2"1 The U.S. creditors were largely claiming under ex
parte attachments or setoffs,
21' and some opposed granting the prayed for relief.
21 2
The relief requested was to stay the commencement or continuation of all actions
against BAOL's property in the United States, and require the turnover of all
property to the Bahamian proceedings.2' 3
The court discussed the progress of the Bahamian proceedings and found
them to be "inherently fair and regular., 21 4 The issues were largely discussed on
the implicit assumption that the choice was to defer to the Bahamian proceedings
and the assumed application of Bahamian law to all issues, or to dismiss the
section 304 proceeding and let the American courts apply American law 215 The
court does not really address this issue, which detracts from an otherwise fine
opinion.
The court seriously addressed the section 304(c) factors essentially treating
them as aspects of international comity 216 The court recognized the universalist
direction of section 304 by stating: "[ilt is this Court's opinion based upon the
wording and legislative history of section 304 that the central examination which it
must undertake in order to comply with Section 304(c) is whether the relief
petitioners seek will afford equality of distribution of the available assets. 2 t7 In
addressing comity, the court not only quoted the oft-quoted definition in Hilton v.
Guyot,2 18 but quoted New York cases, which state the exceptions to comity more
narrowly- "foreign-based rights should be enforced unless the judicial enforcement
of such a [right] would be the approval of a transaction which is inherently vicious,
wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense. 219
Applying this strong notion of comity, the court examined Bahamian
insolvency law and found it generally in accord with U.S. concepts, even though
the Bahamian notion of priority claimants is not the same as that in the United
States. 220 Thus, in some cases, American creditors would not be given the same






214. Id. at 627.
215. Id. at 627-29
216. Id. at 629 ("All of the factors listed in Section 304(c) have historically been considered within
a court's determination whether to afford comity to proceeding in a foreign nation ").
217. Id. at 628.
218. Hilton, 159U.S. at 164.
219. Culmer 25 B.R. at 629 (quoting from lnt'l Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 203 N.E.2d 210, 212
(N.Y 1964) as quoted in Comfeld v. Investors Overseas Serv., Ltd., 471 F.Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y
1979)). Interestingly, Golden was case dealing with a foreign gambling contract and the actual word
used by the New York court where Culmer shows "[right]" was "contract" which was changed to
"[right]" by the district court in Comfeld. Cornfeld, 471 F Supp. at 1259. It is possible that
international comity owes less respect to foreign law than to a foreign contract.
220. Culmer, 25 B.R. at 628-29.
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factor analysis under section 304(c) and concluded "that affording comity would
not violate American law or public policy Whether or not Bahamian law is
identical in application to American law, there is nothing inherently vicious,
wicked, immoral or shocking to the prevailing moral sense in the Bahamian laws
outlined above."22 '
Finally and most important to the themes of this article, the court briefly
addressed the reason that the Bahamian law should be applied to the instant
transactions.222 The court said:
Moreover, the Bahamas has by far the greatest interest in BAOL's liquidation
since neither the United States nor the State of New York has any governmental or
public interest in BAOL's liquidation. In contrast, only a handful of creditors
who have purported to obtain preferences in this district have opposed transferring
all of BAOL's assets for distribution in the Bahamian liquidation. This court is
thus not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign
attachment creditors over the policy favonng uniform administration in a foreign
court.
2 23
This analysis is not a detailed choice of law analysis, but it is an improvement
on the apparent dichotomy between deferring or dismissing. It adds measurably to
the section 304(c) factors, which call for weighing some of the relevant factors, but
ignores the weighing of the competing legal interests, which seek to choose the law
of the nation with the greater interest. Admittedly, choice of law analysis has not
reached anything approaching a litmus test; however, neither has most law. The
choice of law analysis would also suggest using the distinction between
jurisdiction, which section 304 primarily addresses, albeit with substantive
concerns, and applicable law. For instance, nothing in the law of nations requires
American courts to insist on leaving assets in the United States for administration
in order to get to consider the American notion of equitable subordination.224 Is the
lack of such a doctrine inherently vicious, wicked, immoral, or shocking? More
importantly might the Australian court in Interpool 225consider applying the
American doctrine in the case before it? This question is the type of choice of law
done daily in domestic and other international areas of law Why not international
insolvency 9 In fact, it is done in international insolvency cases by a properly
focused court, albeit not always with the clearest approach. To focus more directly
I now turn to a grand case.
In early 1996, before the Second Circuit's decision in In re Maxwell
Communication Corporation,226 but after the district court's affirmance227 of the
bankruptcy court's granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 228 Jay
221. Id. at 631.
222. Id. at 629.
223. Id. at 629.
224. See interpool Ltd. V Certain Freights of the MN Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373 (D.N.J. 1988).
225. Id.
226. In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 93 F.3d 788 (2d Cir. 1996).
227. In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y 1995) (Judge Scheindlin).
228. In re Maxwell Communication Corporation, 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1994) (Judge
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Lawrence Westbrook wrote: "[tihe Maxwell case as a whole is one of the most
important transnational insolvencies of modem times., '229 This judgment has not
needed to change with the passage of seven years-at least in reported cases. The
very interesting facts are well presented in the three opinions. I will only lightly
sketch the facts important to my use of the case for choice of law purposes. In so
doing, I follow the Second Circuit's factual presentation.
Robert Maxwell was a media magnate with his activities centered in England,
but with international holdings.230 His death led to the bankruptcy of the Maxwell
Communication Corporation plc, an English corporation ("Maxwell"). 231 While
most of Maxwell's debt was incurred in England, eighty percent of its assets were
located in the United States. 232 These assets included Macmillan, Inc. and other
entities. 233 On December 16, 1991, Maxwell filed a chapter I I petition. 234 The next
day, it petitioned the High Court of Justice in London for an administration order,
the closest equivalent in British law to Chapter II relief.235 With two large
multiparty proceedings pending in England and the United States,236 the two courts
did a remarkable thing-they cooperated m a sophisticated manner. Judge
Brozman appointed an examiner:
[The examiner was] to investigate the debtor's financial condition, to function as a
mediator among the various parties, and to 'act to harmonize, for the benefit of all
of [Maxwell's] creditors and stockholders and other parties in interest,
[Maxwell's] United States chapter 11 case and [Maxwell's] United Kingdom
administration case so as to maximize [the] prospects for rehabilitation and
reorganization.
' 23 7
More remarkably, the two courts approved a protocol between the Examiner and
the Administrators.238 In light of the protocol, Judge Brozman recognized the
Administrators as the corporate governance of the debtor-in-possession in the
United States, and the English judge granted the Examiner leave to appear in the
English proceedings. 239 The parties worked together to develop a plan for
reorganization and a scheme of arrangement (hereinafter, collectively referred to as
the "Plan") as interdependent documents which were filed for approval in both
countries. 240 The Plan treats all of the world-wide assets as a pool under the control
Brozman)
229. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communication, 64 FORDHAM L. REV
2531,2534 (1996); In re Maxwell Communications Corp.,93 F.3d 1036, 1041 (2d Cir. 1996).
230. In re Maxwell Communications Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1041 (2d Cir. 1996).





236. Id. at 1041-42.
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of Maxwell for distribution.24' It basically pays the secured creditors and holders of
priority claims in full.
242
Three banks, subjects of the instant preference actions, filed claims with the
Administrators. 243 One of these banks had sought an anti-litigation injunction in
England. 244 After receiving an ex parte order, the injunction was vacated by the
English court.245 In the U.S. case, the Administrators then commenced adversary
proceedings against the three banks for the recovery of allegedly preferential
transfers.2
As might be expected in large international transactions, the transfers were
complex. The three banks were: Barclays Bank plc, and National Westminster
Bank plc, both headquartered in London with branches in New York, and Societe
Generale, a French bank with headquarters in Paris and offices in London and New
York.247 Barclays and National Westminster had separately negotiated overdraft
facilities in London.248 When an extension on the overdraft became past due,
Barclays pressured Maxwell into making a $30 million payment from proceeds of
the sale of a Macmillan subsidiary. 249 These proceeds, on deposit in a Maxwell
account at the New York branch of National Westminster, were transferred to
Maxwell's dollar account with National Westminster in London, and from there, to
Barclays New York branch, and then credited to Maxwell's overdraft account in
London.250 Other similar transfers were also alleged.i
In National Westminster's case, Maxwell had sold another Macmillan
subsidiary for $145 million. 252 These dollars had been deposited with Citibank in
New York, from which they were transferred to a Maxwell account with Citibank
in London.253 Maxwell then purchased British pounds and used some of these to
deposit in an account it had at National Westminster's London branch. 25 4 The
deposit was then used to pay down the overdraft facility 255 Another similar set of
transfers were made to National Westminster.
256
Societe Generale had negotiated a loan in London with Maxwell. 25 7 Maxwell
made a payment of $10 million in pounds by transferring the pounds from another
241. id.
242. See E. Bruce Leonard, Breakthroughs in Court-to-court Communications in Cross-border
Cases, A.B.I. J. vol. 20 no. 7, 18 (Sept. 2001)( for more on the use of cooperation).
243. In re Maxwell Communications Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1043 (2d Cir. 1996).
244. Id at 1042-43.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1043.
247. Id. at 1040.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1040-41.
251. Id.
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account maintained in London to Societe's branch in London. 25 8 Although the
details of this transaction were unclear, the district court assumed these funds had
also come from the sale of one of the Macmillan subsidiaries.259
All of the actual transfers to the banks had been made within ninety days
preceding the chapter 11 filing.260 Despite the close cooperation and judicial
approval of the plan and scheme, neither court addressed the question of what law
would be applied in any avoidance actions. While there are many similarities
between U.S. and English preference rules, there was one large difference that
apparently would decide the instant actions.26' Under the English Insolvency Act
of 1986,262 preference avoidance requires that the debtor intends the transfers to
place the transferee in a better position.263 Of course, this subjective element is
absent from present U.S. preference law. A classic choice of law issue was
presented and so treated by Judge Brozman of the bankruptcy court through the
circuit court. They are to be commended.
What did they decide? They decided the English preference law was the
applicable law after seriously engaging in a proper choice of law analysis. 264 This
case was not an ancillary proceeding case, so the section 304 factors were not
directly applicable.265 Instead, the Second Circuit started with international comity,
citing the usual cases, but adding from Hilton:
[l]nternational law, including questions arising under what is usually
called private international law, or the conflict of laws, and concerning the rights
of persons within the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of acts,
private or public, done within the dominions of another nation, is part of our
law.
266
The court noted that comity does not limit sovereignty, but aids construction of the
law. 26 7 Essentially, in the absence of a clear congressional command, conflict of
laws rules guide the determination of what law to apply 268 As always, the conflict
of laws of the forum is determinative.
The court considered section 403 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations
discussed above. While these are textual rules limiting the state's jurisdiction to
prescribe, the Court said that the "factors enumerated in the Restatement
correspond to familiar choice-of-law principles, ' 269 and specifically referred by
parenthetical quotation from another Second Circuit case that the "rule is to apply
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See id. at 1040-41.
261. See id. at 1051.
262. Id. at 1043.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 104147
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1047, quoted in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
267. Id. at 1046-47
268. Id. at 1047
269. Id. at 1048.
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the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation."27 Thus,
they rapidly developed comity into consideration of the Restatement of Foreign
Relations and equated that in essence to the "greatest interest" rubric.
27'
The court then rejected a number of tenuous, but plausible, textual arguments
for the proposition that Congress had expressed itself.272 The court specifically
rejected the notion, implicit in many lower court cases-that "the Bankruptcy
Code always applies, comity notwithstanding, when a bankruptcy case has been
properly commenced, and that choice-of-law analysis is never appropriate in a
bankruptcy case.,, 2 7' The court rejected this notion because it could find no code-
based language supporting that broad proposition and rejected the interpretation
proffered by two older cases.274
It next considered the "false conflict" analysis suggested by the Supreme
Court in its narrow decision applying American anti-trust law to activities in
England, on the basis that the conduct prescribed by American anti-trust law was
not illegal in England in Hartford Fire Insurance,275 discussed above. It did so by
closely analyzing the scope and purposes of avoidance rules.276 Essentially, the
court properly recognized that the purpose of preference rules is to try to more
closely assure that the estate of an insolvent debtor is equitably distributed by
avoiding certain transactions shortly before bankruptcy, and sharing the avoided
transfers with creditors as a whole.277 As such, "a conflict between two avoidance
rules exists if it is impossible to distribute the debtor's assets in a manner
consistent with both rules., 278 Thus, it avoided the snare of "false conflicts" that
often confuses courts in ordinary cases, both where a conflict is not real, and where
it is real (if you look closely at related rules like distribution to creditors).
Finally the court undertook a careful weighing of interests in traditional
conflict of laws fashion. 2 79 It noted that the debtor, and most creditors, were
British.280 While the funds had a transient location briefly in the United States (if
today monies in deposit accounts are located anywhere other than via an artificial
legal rule 281 ), and may have been proceeds of sales of U.S. assets, these factors did
270. Id. Second quotation is from In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A. v. Refco F/X Assocs.,
961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992).
27 1. See Mathias Reimann, Savigny's Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the Close of
the Twentieth Century, 39 Va. J. Int'l L. 571 (1999) (for more on the globalization of the greatest
interest or most significant relation including contacts and policies at least in contract choice of law
cases).
272. In re Maxwell Communications Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1048 (2d Cir. 1996).
273. Id. at 1049.
274. See id. at 1048-49.
275. Id. at 1049-50.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1050.
279. Id. at 1051.
280. Id.
281. Cf. Rev. U.C.C. § 9-304 (local law of bank's jurisdiction governs perfection of security
interest in a deposit account).
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not particularly weigh in favor of applying U.S. avoidance law 282 The court
emphasized that not applying U.S. law was, in part, affected by the fact that these
assets had been sold as going concerns with no discemable effects on local
economies. 28 3 The court stated:
The principal policies underlying the Code's avoidance provisions are equal
distribution to creditors and preserving the value of the estate through the
discouragement of aggressive pre-petition tactics causing dismemberment of the
debtor. These policies are effectuated, although in a somewhat different way, by
the provisions' [§ 547] British counterpart.
2
8
The decisions (including those of the district and bankruptcy courts) are a
refreshing approach to the choice of law dilemma; they recognized that the
decision was properly analyzed based on choice of law principles, sought guidance
in the policies of the Code, and sought to follow the paltry prior guidance of the
Supreme Court. Jay Westbrook disagrees somewhat arguing for the application of
the home country's avoidance rules. Westbrook admits that, in Maxwell, the home
country was arguable and that a particularized application of choice of law analysis
might have been the only way out.28 5 I am not averse to a true universalist regime
where the proper forum would be selected by some rule, and that state's law
applied; however, I am more sympathetic to the notion that traditional choice of
law principles seek to allocate interests and policies as they best fit a particularized
case. Perhaps, the actual conflict is between principles of treating creditors alike,
and treating an individual creditor justly, a substantive accommodation will be
needed and found. I tend to believe, for now, that the common law choice of law
approach will better inform our eventual collective judgment.
Not discussed by the Second Circuit is whether New York or federal choice
of law rule should be applied. Maybe there was no salient difference, or maybe, as
seems the case, federal rules were assumed to apply 286 The bankruptcy court
applied federal common law.28 7 This issue was better considered by the Second
Circuit in the next case.
In Koreag, Controle Et Revision S.A. v. Refco FIXAssociates, Inc.,288 the court
faced the question of how to decide whether property located in the United States
is property of the foreign bankruptcy estate. 289 Koreag was the official liquidator of
Mebco Bank S.A., a Swiss bank.2 90 Refco was a New York commodity and
291currency corporation. Prior to Mebco being placed into liquidation by Swissauthorities on April 27 1989, Mebco and Refco engaged in extensive currency
282. See In re Maxwell Communications Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996).
283. id.
284. Id. at 1052.
285. Westbrook, supra note 229, at 2541.
286. In re Maxwell Communications Corp., 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
287. Id. at 1042-43
288. See In re Koreag, Controle et Revisone S.A., 961 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1992).
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transactions. 292 Typically, and especially in the instant dispute, the parties used an
account in the Swiss Bank-NY (the "Account") through which currency
transactions cleared. 3 Both Mebco and Refco were buyers and sellers of various
currencies. 29 4 In essence, the disputed fund (U.S. dollars) had been wire transferred
into the Account on the afternoon of April 28th, the day after Mebco was placed
into liquidation, Koreag appointed, and before Refco had notice of the Swiss
proceedings. 295 Mebco was then expected to transfer to Refco bank accounts
abroad foreign currencies of the same amount.29 Also, without notice of the
liquidation proceedings, Refco transferred foreign currencies to Mebco's European
accounts for which Mebco was to transfer dollars of an equal amount to the
Account. 297 "The net result of these aborted currency exchanges is that Refco
transferred approximately $6.9 million into the Account, and approximately $4.1
million worth of foreign currency to overseas Mebco accounts, for which Mebco
failed to make reciprocating transfers [the "Disputed Funds"]. 298 Upon learning of
the liquidation proceedings, Refco obtained an ex parte attachment of the Account
and moved for confirmation of the attachment. 29 9 Koreag then intervened, seeking
comity to the Swiss proceedings and the dismissal of the attachment
proceedings.3°0 The district judge suggested that a section 304 petition was the
better way to proceed, which Koreag promptly filed.30 i In its petition, it sought an
injunction against further efforts by Refco to reach the Account and an order to
turn the Account over to Koreag for administration in Switzerland. 30 2 The
bankruptcy court granted Koreag summary judgment and the district court
affirmed.30 3 The Second Circuit vacated and remanded.3 °"
On appeal, Refco argued that the Disputed Funds were not property of the
foreign estate, and that even if they were, the lower courts had improperly applied
the section 304(c) factors.
305
Section 304(b)(2) authorizes the bankruptcy court in an ancillary proceeding
to "order turnover of the property of such estate, or the proceeds of such property,
to such foreign representative. 30 6 The court resolved this question principally on
the ground that Collier's on Bankruptcy clearly read the statute to provide that
"[flor purposes of section 304, the estate of a foreign debtor is defined by the law
of the jurisdiction in which the foreign proceeding is pending, with other
292. Id.
293. Id. at 344-45.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 345.
296. Id. at 344-45.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 345.




303. Id at 346-47 (2d Cir. 1992).
304. Id. at 347.
305. Id.
306. II U.S.C. § 304(b)(2) (2000)(emphasis added).
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applicable law serving to define the estate s interest in particular property."30 7 The
court found this analogically supported by reference to domestic cases where the
actual interest of the debtor is defined by state law, even though section 541(a)
takes a broad approach to property of the estate30 8 Thus, the court determined that
a prerequisite to turnover under section 304(b)(2) is a determination by the U.S.
bankruptcy court that the property sought to be turned over is property of the
foreign debtor.3 9
Should Swiss or New York law apply9 The court noted that there was some
dispute in the cases as to what choice of law rules should apply-federal common
law or state law. 3i' Finding both applied an interest analysis, there was no need to
resolve the issue.31 1 Applying interest analysis, the court found that both New York
and Switzerland were interested in the dispute.3i 2 Refco was located in New York,
Refco performed in New York, the disputed funds were in New York, 3,3 and "New
York as a world financial center has a special concern with transactions such as
occurred here. ' 4 While Switzerland was interested in the administration of
Mebco's estate, its interest did not especially implicate the property issue at
stake.3 '5 Thus, New York law was to be applied in determining the competing
claims to the Disputed Funds.3i6
Refco asserted two claims: one for a constructive trust over the Disputed
Funds, and the other for the right to reclaim by a seller under former Uniform
Commercial Code (herein "UCC") section 2 -2 0 7 (2 ).37 The court found that a
plausible case for constructive trust had been made under New York law and
remanded with the "practical burden" on Koreag to show why a constructive trust
should not be imposed.3 18 Turning to the reclamation issue, the court rejected
Koreag's claim that Refco had to comply with Bankruptcy Code section 546(c)
because an ancillary proceeding under section 304 was not a full bankruptcy,
section 546 authorized the trustee or debtor-m-possession to proceed, and the
foreign representative was neither. 3'9 However, the court concluded the UCC did
not prevent the foreign currencies transfer from being property of Mebco's estate
and were therefore subject to turnover under section 304(b)(2).320 The court
307. Koreag, 961 F.2d at 348 (quoting 2 Collier on Bankruptcy 304.01, at 304-3 (15th Ed.
1992)(emphasis added).
308. Id. at 348-49.




313. Actually, this is unclear. The Disputed Funds included by definition of the court both the
dollars Refco transferred into the Account and the foreign currencies transferred into foreign bank
accounts of Mebco.




318. Id. at 352-55.
319. Id. at 356.
320. Id. at 356-57.
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
concluded:
If Refco prevails on the constructive trust issue upon remand, none of the
Disputed Funds will be subject to turnover. If Koreag prevails on that issue, only
the portion of the Disputed Funds involved in the [foreign currencies transfer] will
be subject to turnover. Under any view of the relative weight to be accorded the
pertinent § 304(c) factors, turnover would be a permissible exercise of discretion
as to those funds.
32 1
In my judgment, Koreag is a good example of conflicts analysis in an international
insolvency case. I cannot be as complimentary to the next decision, at least as to its
analysis.
The Tenth Circuit recently decided In re Grandote Country Club Company,
Ltd.322 Like so many international insolvencies, the facts are relatively complex. A
golf course located in Colorado was originally owned by a U.S. group known as
"Grandote Colorado, who failed to pay certain Colorado taxes in 1990. 323 A
member of the group sold the property to a person who then sold it subject to tax
liens to Grandote Country Club, Ltd. ("Grandote Japan"-the debtor in Japanese
bankruptcy proceedings) in February 1993.324 In May 1994, Grandote Japan
conveyed the property back to Grandote Colorado (the "Japan to Colorado
transfer").325 Another party purchased tax certificates, who then conveyed them to
still another, who then brought a successful forcible entry and detainer action
against the property 326 Grandote Japan declared bankruptcy in July 1994 and its
trustee filed a section 304 ancillary petition and received recognition sufficient to
bring the instant action, contending that the Japan to Colorado transfer was
avoidable under Japanese law and seeking to avoid the Tax Deeds under
Colorado's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.327 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 28
The Tenth Circuit, in a confusing opinion on this issue, perhaps reached a
correct result, by discussing section 304(c), and noting the goal of providing relief
in an ancillary proceeding is to "assure an economical and expeditious
administration. 329 It then turned to "two competing values prnciples of
comity, which favor application of Japanese law, [and] the interests of the locality
where the property is located, which favor application of United States/Colorado
law. ' 330 The court noted that the bankruptcy court in the section 304 proceeding
had found Japanese bankruptcy law consistent with the prnciple features of U.S.
321. Id. at 358-59.
322. In re Grandote Country Club Co., 252 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2001).
323. Id. at H 48.
324. Id.
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law.33' Citing Koreag, but hardly following it, the court drew on its statement that
"local law [should] determine whether the debtor has a valid ownership interest in
that property when the issue is properly posed by an adverse claimant. 332 It cites
Koreag, and Colorado law, for the proposition that the law of the state with the
greatest interest should be applied.333 It then concludes that "Colorado has the
greatest interest" because of the property's location, the tax proceedings, and the
execution of most of the documents.334 Nowhere does the court consider, or even
mention, the Japanese interest in recovering the debtor's property for the benefit of
creditors. It may be that seriously considering the Japanese interest would leave the
decision with Colorado law. But, it is not possible to determine which state has the
greatest interest without looking at the interests of both states and the competing
policies. Moreover, while it mentions it does not consider the federal policy
seeking to further the "economical and expeditious administration" of the debtor's
estate.335 The court, unlike the Second Circuit in Koreag, simply fails to engage the
applicable law. It then concludes that the tax deeds were not avoidable under the
Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
336
Another interesting decision is Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp., Ltd
v. Simon.337 This majority opinion in Simon is arguably a little confused, but it
reaches the right result and is not actually a choice of law case. The debtor Simon
was a Hong Kong resident and businessman when he personally guaranteed a
corporation's large debt, for which, he was the major shareholder.338 The debt was
guaranteed to the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corp., Ltd. ("HKSB") and was
part of a Hong Kong transaction.339 Hong Kong law was the law chosen in the
guarantee. 340 Greatly in debt, Simon moved to the United States and eventually
filed for personal chapter 7 341 The HKSB guarantee was listed in the schedules,
but HKSB did not file a proof of claim on that claim, but on a different one.342
HKSB is an international bank incorporated m Hong Kong, with offices in New
York and California.343 The bankruptcy court granted Simon a discharge and
issued an injunction in accord with the discharge injunction of Bankruptcy Code
section 524(a)(2). 34 4 Two weeks later, HKSB filed a complaint seeking a
declaratory judgment, that the discharge injunction did not reach its efforts to
pursue Simon personally abroad on his guarantee, or to claim against non-estate
331. Id.
332. Koreag, 961 F.2d at 349 (as quoted in Grandote Country Club, 252 F.3d at 115 1).
333. Grandote Country Club, 252 F.3d at 1 151.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 1150-51.
336. Id. at 1151-52.
337. In re Simon, 153 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1998).
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property abroad on the guarantee.345 The bankruptcy court held against HKSB, and
was affirmed by the district court.
346
The court had some difficulty in the first part of the opinion, to which there
was a dissent by Judge Hall. 347 The court first determined whether Congress had
acted clearly to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality 348 In an
extended discussion, it concluded that via section 541 (a) Congress had in fact
intended to assert the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction in rem over the property of
the debtor wherever it is located.349 The case law relied on is largely domestic, and
not international.3 5 °
Judge Hall reasoned that section 541(a)'s generality did not in fact reach
everywhere, and that the Supreme Court had adopted rules of construction to avoid
possible clashes with international law 3i More importantly, that was not the issue
in Simon. The court did not need to reach property in Hong Kong. It needed to bind
HKSB which had offices in California, had filed a proof of claim with the
bankruptcy court and over whom the bankruptcy court had personal jurisdiction.352
That is clearly enough to bind HKSB to the injunction. The majority finally turned
to this issue and concluded similarly 313 Before finishing, however, it considered
international comity 354
The discussion on comity is quite good, even though this case is not a case of
choice of law American law in final form and without appeal had enjoined
HKSB 5 The issue was whether this injunction, with extraterritorial effects,
violated the international comity between courts.356 This case was not an attempt to
enjoin a foreign court. Here the court cited, but did not discuss, the Restatement of
Foreign Relations section 403(l), 3 57 and instead followed Maxwell for the
proposition that this case did not deal with the question of deference to a foreign
proceeding, but was rather a case where the United States was unquestionably the
situs of a plenary bankruptcy proceeding, to which Hong Kong might need to
defer.5 The court stated:
The Bankruptcy Code does not codify either of the theories proffered by the
parties [territoriality or universalism]. Rather, the Code provides for a flexible
approach to international insolvencies dependent upon the circumstances of the
particular case. If any philosophy can be attributed to the structure of the Code it
345. Id.
346. Id. at 994-95.
347. Id. at 999.
348. Id. at 996
349. Id.
350. See id.
351. Id. at 999-1000.
352. Id. at 994.
353. Id. at 999.
354. Id. at 997-99.
355. Id. at 999.
356. Id. at 998.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 998-99.
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is that of deference to the country where the pnmary insolvency proceeding is
located, including the United States if the plenary proceeding is located here.
3V
While this quote can be presented as the question of what law to apply to the
question of discharge, U.S. law or foreign law (unlikely where the debtor is an
individual domiciled in the U.S.), it is better seen as a reflection of the fact that the
bankruptcy discharge actually operates as an injunction against a broad range of
enforcement activities.360 Thus, the discharge issue is predominantly one of
personal jurisdiction. The harder question in Simon would have been the
application of the discharge injunction to a non-resident of the United States, who
had no property in the United States, and who did not file a proof of claim. In such
a case, personal jurisdiction would be dubious and, in any event, extraterritorial
enforceability is practically impossible.
In the next case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not address
the choice of law issue and seemingly took a step back toward the territoriality
view of section 304 by emphasizing one of the subsections over the others, rather
than balancing the factors.36i The court also implicitly assumes, which may be
correct in context, that forum law will govern many of the legal issues.
362
In The Bank of New York v. Treco,363 the court faced a typically complex case
of an insolvent Bahamian bank.364 The bank, Mendien International Bank Limited
("MIBL"), controlled a number of banks primarily located in Africa.365 It had a
relationship with the Bank of New York and JCPL Leasing Corp, a subsidiary of
The Bank of New York Company, Inc. and affiliates ("BNY").36 MIBL pledged
its accounts with BNY in the June 1993 MIBL Pledge Agreement. 367 Later, MIBL
arranged an overdraft relation with BNY in the ultimate amount of $15.15
million. 368 This overdraft account was secured by funds deposited with BNY by a
MIBL subsidiary, Mendien BIAO Bank Tanzania ("Mendien Tanzania"), and
pursuant to an agreement (the "Meridien Tanzania Agreement"). 369 When MIBL
defaulted on the overdraft obligation, BNY liquidated the Mendien Tanzania
pledged account.370 This liquidation occurred in March 19 9 5 .37
1
In April 1995, the Central Bank of Tanzania appointed a manager to operate
Meridien Tanzania, who challenged the Meridien Tanzania Agreement and
demanded the return of the $15.15 million.372 On April 25, 1995, MIBL was placed
359. Id. at 998.
360. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2000).
361. See Inre Treco, 240 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2001).
362. Id.
363. Id. at 148.
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into involuntary liquidation in the Bahamas and Liquidators were appointed.373 In
June 1995, BNY filed an action in the Southern District of New York against
MIBL, Mendien Tanzania, and several other subsidiaries (the "District Court
Action"). 374 This action sought a declaratory judgment that BNY had the right to
retain the Meridien Tanzania liquidated account, or in the alternative, an order
allowing BNY to essentially setoff the $600,000 remaining in MIBL's BNY
accounts.375
In September 1995, the Bahamian Liquidators filed an ancillary proceeding
under section 304, seeking a stay of all actions against MIBL and the turnover of
all of MIBL's U.S. assets.376 The Bankruptcy Court issued a preliminary injunction
in March 1996, and the District Court action proceeded against the remaining
defendants.377 That action was settled, BNY agreed to pay $4 million to Meridien
Tanzania's assignee, and BNY was assigned all Mendien Tanzania's rights of
subrogation against the MIBL accounts.378
In the meantime, the Liquidators' right to the turnover of the $600,000,
BNY's claims against the $600,000 for its payment of the $4 million to Mendien
Tanzania's assignee, and BNY's subrogation rights acquired from Meridien
Tanzania, came to a head in the Liquidators' motion for partial summary
judgment.379 The bankruptcy court granted the Liquidators' motion on January 22,
1999 380 On appeal, this decision was affirmed by the district court on September
10, 1999 381
The Courts' decisions were reversed by the Second Circuit.382 Both Bahamian
and U.S. law recognized the status of a secured creditor.383 Under Bahamian law,
however, numerous administrative claims have priority over the claims of secured
creditors.384 On the facts of the case, the supremacy of administrative claims over
secured creditors was problematic for BNY Here, the Liquidators had recovered
approximately $10 million and incurred administrative expenses of almost $8
million, leaving $1 75 million in the estate. 385 The administrative claims were
routinely paid without notice to creditors.38 6 Thus, there was a substantial
likelihood that BNY would recover only a small portion of its $600,000 secured
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 152.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 152-53.
379. Id. at 153.
380. Id., see also In re Treco, 229 B.R. 280 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y 1999) (Judge Gamty) (the
bankruptcy court's opinion covers many issues not decided on appeal and is worthy of careful study).
381. In re Treco, 239 B.R. 36 (S.D.N.Y 1999).
382. See In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2001); In re Treco, 239 B.R. 36 (S.D.N.Y 1999).
383. See In re Treco, 240 F.3d at 152-53.
384. Id. at 155
385. Id. at 159.
386. Id.
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claim, if ultimately recognized as secured, in the Bahamian proceeding.38 7
The court recognized that section 304 "was a step toward the universality
approach.38 8 It described the approach as "a primary insolvency proceeding
instituted in the debtor's domiciliary country, [with] ancillary courts in other
jurisdictions [deferring] to the foreign proceeding and in effect [collaborating]
to facilitate the centralized liquidation of the debtor s estate according to the rules
of the debtor s home country. 3 8 9 But, the court also stated that "[s]ection 304 does
not implement pure universality 090 Rather, the court notes, the statute endorses
the five factors of analysis in section 304(c) noted above.39'
In dealing with the structure of section 304(c), the court noted that while
"comity is the ultimate consideration in determining whether to provide relief,"
that "comity does not automatically override the other specified factors. 392
Thus, section 304(c) "calls for a case-specific exercise of discretion in light of all
of the circumstances. '393 Unfortunately, this statement inherently means that no
precedent provides clear guidance for the future, unless the facts are very similar.
This statement also means that settlement, or the avoidance of litigation, is not
aided by reasonably clear case law For the Second Circuit, the structure of section
304(c) requires a court to "determine whether comity should be extended-to the
foreign proceeding in light of the other factors. '394 This quote of course adds
nothing to the language of the statute.
The court thus rejected the Liquidators' argument that the case called for a
straightforward comity analysis (whatever that would be!). In doing so, the court
in my mind amazingly said:
[wie think the proper question to ask is whether § 304(c)(4) [whether the foreign
distribution priority is 'substantially in accordance with the order' prescribed by
U.S. law], along with the other factors, requires the court to deny turnover in the
circumstances of this particular case, despite its goal of assunng an
economical and expeditious administration of foreign estates.'
39 5
This statement seems hard to square with the basic structure and language of
section 304(c). It seems to interpret this subsection to say that the goal in providing
relief, or turnover, of the economical and expeditious administration of the estate,
is limited by the five factors. Indeed, the case as a whole, with its fact specific
analysis, seems to raise the order of distribution in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to
the status of a trump in ancillary cases.
The Court concedes that "the first three factors present no bar to affording
387. Id. at 159.
388. Id. at 154.
389. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
390. Id. at 154.
391. Id. at 154-55, 158-60.
392. Id. at 156.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 157.
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comity to the proceedings in the Bahamas. 396 Again, notice the use of the factors,
not as a basis of analysis for the exercise of the discretion for which comity calls,
but as limits on the deference adopted as the general rule in international
insolvency cases. Thus, the Court, like the lower courts, was quite satisfied with
the procedures, non-discrimination, and prevention of preferences available in the
Bahamas. 97 While conceding that the priority rules need not be identical in both
countries in order for deference to attach, that is nevertheless the sole basis here for
refusing to defer. The court noted the high risk that the administrative costs would
eat up the estate and leave nothing for even a secured creditor.
398
The court assumed BNY's claims were secured for purposes of the section
304 analysis. 399 It now noted that that decision had not been made below and that
the case needed to be remanded for that determination. 4°° It also noted that because
a right to a setoff resulted in a secured claim under U.S. bankruptcy law,4°' the
lower court would also have to determine that issue apparently under U.S. law.40 2
Since the Bankruptcy Code does not create any setoff rights, 0 3 but only recognizes
those that exist under other law,4° the court should have left open the question of
whose law determined the right of any setoff. Moreover, it is not obvious that if a
setoff right exists, its status as secured must be determined by U.S. law. After all,
the status of a claim under the Bankruptcy Code is for the purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code, and not necessarily for the purposes of the economical and
expeditious administration of a foreign estate in an ancillary proceeding.40 5 The
court simply used section 304 as the exclusive statement of all factors to be
considered in ancillary cases. 406 That was not the approach in Maxwell,40 7 but then
Maxwell was a plenary chapter 11, and not an ancillary proceeding governed by
section 304.408
396. Id. at 158.
397. Id. at 158-61.
398. One reading of § 304(c)(4)'s reference to the order of distribution is that the class order must
be substantially the same not that an individual creditor would receive the same or substantially similar
distribution. Courts have not focused on this distinction but it seems necessarily implied. Otherwise, §
304(c)(4) collapses all foreign insolvency cases to cases where U.S. courts would defer only when the
foreign distribution to the U.S. creditor is both procedurally fair by U.S. standards, i.e. like U.S.
standards, and that creditor would receive substantially the same distribution. This is not much of a step
towards universality or comity.
399. See In re Treco, 240 F.3d at 161.
400. Id.
401. II U.S.C. §506(a) (2000).
402. See In re Treco, 240 F.3d at 161.
403. See I I U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
404. Id. at §553.
405. Cf. id. § 304(c).
406. In re Treco, 240 F.3d at 153-61.
407. In re Maxwell Communications Corp., 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
408. Id.
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CHOICE OF LAW IN CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCIES
V CHOICE OF LAW OR JURISDICTION SELECTION PRINCIPLES?
The Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency was adopted by the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") on May 30,
1997 409 The Model Act has been the basis of the proposed Title 15 of the United
States Code in various bankruptcy bills. 410 It basically calls for greater cooperation
in cross-border insolvencies, strengthens the express tools of the U.S. bankruptcy
courts, and adopts a number of procedures to make the process more predictable.4 '
It has little to do with choice of law issues. In this sense, I am critical, but not
surprised. Conflicts scholars for some time have noted the paucity of legislation for
domestic conflict of laws cases with little success.412 Statutory choice of law rules
are rare in the United States,4 13 although they are becoming more frequent and
more coherent in Europe.414 As the global economy grows and becomes ever more
constant in the lives of many businesses and their attorneys, the problems bnefly
mentioned in this article will become more regular, and the courts will be forced to
seek more coherent and predictable rules. The construction of these rules will
require the efforts of many.
Some versions of Universality call for the selection of a single forum for
insolvency proceedings. Implicitly and explicitly, the law would be that of the
forum, but this rule does not necessarily follow Applying a single state's law in a
conflicts setting would make matters somewhat less complex; however, it would
also merely force parties to do battle over the forum selection process. With so
much Territorialism in the world, this solution would not solve much. The
traditional conflicts of laws approach divides the work of issues into jurisdiction,
effect of foreign judgments, and choice of laws. 1 5 In the insolvency setting, I
believe that this scheme is in use, but only in the background because it is not
clearly acknowledged. An insolvency proceeding conceptually has four aspects:
(1) collection of the estate; (2) determination of claims against the estate; (3) some
system of priority of distribution of the limited assets; and (4) procedures for
handling these matters. The procedures have traditionally been those of the
forum.41 6 It would seem that there should be a single scheme for the distribution of
the limited assets of an insolvent estate hence, the strength of the universalist
appeal. The nature of the estate's interests in property, and the legitimacy and
409. See 36 Int'l Law Materials 1386 (1997) (for text of Model Act).
410. See 36 int'l Law Materials 1386 (1997); Current version is Title VIII, H.R. 975, 108"h Cong.
(2003).
41 i. 36 Int'l Law Materials 1386 (1997).
412. Roger C. Cramton, David P Currie, Herman Hill Kay, and Larry Kramer, CONFLICT OF
LAWS, 90 (5t' Ed. 1993) and Robert A. Leflar, 44 Tenn. L. Rev. 951, 951 (1977).
413. Cf. Revised U.C.C. § 9-301(2) adopting the location of colliteral for the perfection, effects of
perfection, and priorities for certain transactions.
414. Reiman, supra note 27 1.
415. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS p. XI-XXVII.
416. Id. at§ 122.
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value of creditor claims seem to be matters on which substantive law varies
throughout the world and, hence, calls for a choice of law analysis. As noted
above, the basic choice of law guidelines for (1) and (2) exist in state and federal
law Items (3) and (4) are at least somewhat covered by section 304.417
In this article I have tried to show that federal choice of law principles have
had limited impact in cross-border insolvency cases. Too many courts have
become embroiled in trying to work out the factorial elements of Bankruptcy Code
§ 304(c) in order to determine whether to grant the relief allowed in ancillary cases
by § 304(b), and the insoluble question whether § 304(c)(1), (2), (3), (4), and (6)
are independent of or examples of (5)(comity). In doing so the principle goal of
"an economical and expeditious administration of such estate" in § 304(c) is
diminished. As statutory law, of course, § 304 prevails where it is intended to do
so. But it is too much to assume from the text that § 304 is intended to be
complete and to exclude choice of law principles whose function is to decide what
law determines what issues.
In conclusion, I only can hope that focusing on the absence of and utility of
choice of law principles will inform future judicial and academic consideration of
cross-border issues.
417 I1 U.S.C. § 304(b)(3) (2000).
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Corruption is widely considered the single most severe impediment to
development and growth in developing countries.' Corruption in developing
countries is not simply a domestic problem, but often involves a variety of actors
within and outside of developing countries. Curbing cross-border, or transnational,
corruption through legal channels raises unique legal and administrative issues of
jurisdiction, investigative cooperation and conflict of laws that may not exist in
purely domestic anti-corruption efforts. These issues have led to numerous
multilateral efforts to control transnational corruption, including the OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, 2 the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, 3 and
the United Nations Convention against Corruption,4 all of which require countries
J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School, 2004; M.P.A. Candidate, John F Kennedy School of
Government, 2004. B.A., Northwestern University, 1999. Special thanks to Glenn T Ware for his
insight and comments throughout the entire writing process, Luis Moreno Ocampo and Philip B.
Heymann for providing a forum to develop my thoughts on anti-corruption, and my family for their
endless love and support.
1. Cheryl W Gray & Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption and Development, FINANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT, Mar. 1998, at 7. ("In recent survey of more than 150 high-ranking public officials
and key members of civil society from more than 60 developing countries, the respondents ranked
public sector corruption as the most severe impediment to development and growth in their countries.").
2. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-43 (1997), 37 I.L.M. I (1998), available at
http://oecd.org/dataoecd/41/242031210.pdf (last visited Feb, 8, 2004) [hereinafter OECD Convention].
3. Inter-American Convention against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-39
(1996), 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/Treaties/b-58.htm (last
visited Feb. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Inter-American Convention].
4. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/58/4 (2003), available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/Corruption_E.pdf (last
visited Feb. 16, 2004) [hereinafter U.N. Convention].
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to criminalize corrupt activity and urge cooperation between nations to investigate
and prosecute transnational corruption.5
In 1996, the World Bank 6 joined these multilateral efforts by publicly
announcing an institutional commitment to combat corruption within the World
Bank and within World Bank financed projects carried out by governments in the
developing world.7 Disbursing over $19 billion in loans per annum, the World
Bank is exposed to significant operational risk for corruption and fraud. For
example, Northwestern University political economist Jeffrey Winters estimates
that corruption diverted upwards of 30 percent of development funds lent to
Indonesia by the World Bank, totaling over $11 billion. 9 Several high-profile cases
involving multinational Western firms in World Bank financed projects confirm
the transnational nature of such corruption. In 2000, for example, the World Bank
suspended its support for a $100 million water project in Ghana awarded to a unit
of Enron Corporation, citing an unexplained $5 million payment by Enron.' 0
Additionally the World Bank raised objections to Enron projects in Nigeria, India
and Mozambique."
While a vast and developing literature attempts to define corruption and
address its causes and consequences, 12 the World Bank assigns its own meaning to
the terms "corruption" and "fraud" in its Procurement Guidelines and Consultant
Guidelines. The definitions set forth by the Bank in the Procurement Guidelines,
5. OECD Convention, supra note 2, at art. 9; Inter-American Convention, supra note 3, at art.
11(2); U.N. Convention, supra note 4, at art. I.
6. For the purposes of this article, "World Bank" or "Bank" solely denotes the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (1BRD), the largest organization under the World Bank Group
structure. See World Bank Group, About Us, Organization, Five Agenices, One Group, at
http://www.worldbank.org/ (last visited Feb, 16, 2004). The World Bank Group also includes the
International Finance Corporation, the International Development Association, the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency, and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. Id.
7 WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: PROGRESS AT THE WORLD
BANK SINCE 1997 1 (2000) [hereinafter PROGRESS SINCE 1997].
8. 1 WORLD BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 2002 8 (2002). Figure combines IBRD and IDA lending.
9 Jeffrey A. Winters, Criminal Debt, in REINVENTING THE WORLD BANK 101, 102 (Jonathan R.
Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters eds., 2002). See also Jane Perlez, Ahead of Re-election Run, Indonesia
President Is Chased by Corruption Complaints, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 26, 2003, at 8 ("The concerns about
corruption come with many news reports this week that 20 percent of World Bank and other foreign
loans are siphoned off every year by the Indonesians.").
10. Justice Eyeing Enron in Bribe Probe, CBS News, Aug. 5, 2002, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/08/20/national/printables519319.shtml (last visited, May 1,
2004).
Ii. John R. Wilke, Enron Criminal Probe Focuses On Alleged Corruption Abroad, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 5, 2002, at Al. See also Karen MacGregor, Acres Loses Appeal on Briber) Charge in Lesotho,
GLOBE AND MAIL, Aug. 18, 2003, at B3 (Acres International, Canadian multinational engineering
firm, lost an appeal of a conviction on bribery charges related to a World Bank financed water project).
12. See generally Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Corruption: A General Review with an Emphasis on the
Role of the World Bank, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 451, 453-59 (1997) (describing corruption from the
perspectives of economics, political science, law, sociology, public administration, and business);
David Kennedy, The International Anti-Corruption Campaign, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 455 (1999)
(proposing that current definitions of corruption may be over-inclusive).
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which are nearly identical to the Consultant Guidelines, are as follows:
(i) "corrupt practice" means the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any
thing of value to influence the action of a public official in the procurement
process or in contract execution; and
(ii) "fraudulent practice" means a misrepresentation of facts in order to influence a
procurement process or the execution of a contract to the detriment of the
Borrower, and includes collusive practices among bidders (prior to or after bid
submission) designed to establish bid prices at artificial, non-competitive levels
and to deprive the Borrower of the benefits of free and open competition.
13
While the definition of corrupt practice does not explicitly prohibit outside
parties from corruptly influencing World Bank staff,14 the World Bank Staff rules
provide that "[s]taff members shall not accept in connection with their appointment
or service with the Organizations any remuneration, nor any benefit, favor or gift
of significant value from any such governments or other entities or persons ,,05
The Staff Rules further state that "[n]either a staff member nor a member of his
immediate family shall accept a direct financial interest in any Bank Group
transaction ,,6 The rules also define staff misconduct to include the "[m]isuse
of Bank Group funds or other public funds for private gain in connection with
Bank activities or employment, or abuse of position in the Bank for financial
gain." 17
In accordance with these provisions, the World Bank Sanctions Committee
carries out sanctions for violations of the Procurement Guidelines, Consultant
Guidelines and Staff Rules.iS Allegations of corruption or fraud are first
investigated by the Department of Institutional Integrity (INT), 19 an allegedly
independent office within the World Bank that reports directly to the President of
the Bank.20 If INT believes there is reasonably sufficient evidence of fraud or
13. World Bank, Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits, § 1.15(a) (1999),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Procurement
Guidelines]. See also World Bank, Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants by World
Bank Borrowers, § 1.25(a) (1999), available at http://www.worldbank.org/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2004)
[hereinafter Consultant Guidelines].
14. It is also unclear whether the term "public official" in the World Bank's definition of corrupt
practice includes World Bank staff members.
15. World Bank, Staff Manual, Staff Rules, § 0.01, Pnnciple 3.1(b) (1999) [hereinafter Staff
Rules].
16. Id. at § 3.01,17.01.
17. Id. at § 8.01,13.01(d).
18. World Bank Group, Sanctions Committee Procedures, § i(a)(3) (2001), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Sanctions Committee Procedures].
19. Id. at § 3(a).
20. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WORLD BANK: MANAGEMENT CONTROLS STRONGER,
BUT CHALLENGES IN FIGHTING CORRUPTION REMAIN, GAO Doc. No. NSIAD-00-73, at 12 (2000)
(finding World Bank's Investigation Unit did not have the necessary independence from the Bank s
president. While reforms were subsequently undertaken by the World Bank to create a more
independent structure for investigations, it is unclear whether the GAO's conclusions have been
repudiated), available at http://www.gao.gov/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2004) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
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corruption, it can refer the matter to the Sanctions Committee for punitive
measures.
2 1
The World Bank Staff Rules provide that "termination of service shall be
mandatory where it is determined that misuse of Bank funds or other public
funds for private gain in connection with Bank activities or employment, or abuse
of position in the Bank for financial gain" has occurred.22 The Procurement and
Consultant Guidelines include provisions allowing the World Bank to retract an
award or contract if a bidder has engaged in corrupt or fraudulent practices in the
bidding or execution stages of the award or contract.23 The World Bank may also
declare a firm or individual ineligible, indefinitely or for a stated period of time, to
secure a Bank-financed contract. 24 Currently one hundred seventy-one firms and
individuals are debarred, either permanently or for specified periods of time, from
receiving World Bank-financed contracts.25 The Bank does not maintain a public
list of the names or the number of staff members who have been terminated for
26fraud and corruption.
Given its prominence in the world of development finance and its status as the
first development finance organization to implement a comprehensive anti-
corruption regime, the World Bank assumed a leadership position in the movement
to eliminate corruption from the field of international aid. Despite its successes,
however, significant legal and structural obstacles and uncertainties threaten the
effectiveness of the World Bank's anti-corruption efforts. This article analyzes a
number of these obstacles and uncertainties including the expansive due process
rights of employees and unclear procedural requirements imposed on the Bank
during criminal referrals, uncertainties surrounding the standard of proof in
internal corruption proceedings, the lack of a system of investigative cooperation
and cross-debarment and structural impediments arising out of the Bank's
operational model, governance structure, oversight capacity and staff incentives. In
the face of these obstacles and uncertainties, this article also offers
recommendations for the World Bank to improve its anti-corruption practices.
21. Sanctions Committee Procedures, supra note 18, at § 3(c).
22. Staff Rules, supra note 15, at § 8.01,1 4.01.
23. Procurement Guidelines, supra note 13, at §§ 1.15(b)-(c); Consultant Guidelines, supra note
13, at §§ 1.25(b)-(c).
24. Procurement Guidelines, supra note 13, at § I. i5(d); Consultant Guidelines, supra note 13, at
§ 1.25(d).
25. World Bank Group, Projects, Procurement, List of Debarred Firms, World Bank Listing of
Ineligible Firms: Fraud and Corruption, at http://www.worldbank.org/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
26. See World Bank Group, Preventing Corruption in World Bank Projects, at
http://wwwl .worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/preventing.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
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11. LEGAL OBSTACLES AND UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING CRIMINAL
REFERRALS OF ALLEGED CORRUPT ACTIVITY
A. Background to the Practice of Criminal Referrals at the World Bank
Criminal sanctions have traditionally been a part of the legal regime to
combat corruption in individual nations. 27 All of the major international
agreements against corruption require signatory governments to criminalize
corrupt activity 28 In the United States, criminal referral of corrupt activity to local
and federal prosecutors is an established tool for ensuring the integrity of those
institutions. 29 Following this bureaucratic norm, the World Bank began to refer
allegedly corrupt activity to national prosecutorial bodies.
In two 2002 cases, former World Bank employees pled guilty in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia to felony counts related to
corrupt activity they engaged in while employed at the World Bank.30 The U.S.
Department of Justice's prosecution of these two individuals was initiated via
criminal referrals from the World Bank's Legal Department.31 The cases also mark
the first two instances of employees of an international organization being
prosecuted under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In the first case, United States
v. Sengupta,32 the defendant, Gautam Sengupta, pled guilty to one count of
conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and to a second
count in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3.33 The
World Bank employed Mr. Sengupta as a Task Manager in Washington D.C. from
1993 to 2000."4 "Task Managers are responsible for individual development
projects and as one of their duties ensure that proper feasibility studies are
27 Philip M. Nichols The Myth of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational Intrusion, 33 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 627, 629 (2000) ("Bribery is universally condemned and is crimmalized by every country in
the world.").
28. See OECD Convention, supra note 2, at art. I Inter-American Convention, supra note 3, at
art. II; U.N. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 1.
29. See Thomas E. Holliday & Charles J. Stevens, Disclosure of Results of Internal Investigations
to the Government or Other Third Parties, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 279, 283-92
(Brad D. Brian & Barry F McNeil eds., 2003) (noting disclosure of criminal activity is required of
certain highly regulated industnes and for companies dealing in secunties while other companies may
disclose voluntarily).
30. See A.B.A., WHITE COLLAR CRIME 2003 506-49 (2003) (providing the Plea Agreement and
Statement of Facts for both cases and the Information for United States v. Basu).
31. Glenn T. Ware, Lecture at Harvard Law School (Apr. 11, 2003) (presentation on file with
author).
32. Both the Plea Agreement and Statement of Facts for United States v. Sengupta were filed in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on January 30, 2002. A.B.A., supra note
30, at 506. 519.
33. A.B.A., supra note 30, at 506.
34. Id. at 519.
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completed for each proposed project., 35 In his role as Task Manager, Mr. Sengupta
entered into a scheme whereby he caused the awarding of four contracts to a
Swedish consultant in exchange for kickback payments totaling $127,000.36 For
one of the contracts, Mr. Sengupta assisted the Swedish consultant in wiring
$50,000 to a Kenyan official overseeing the implementation of a World Bank
project, with knowledge that the payment was a kickback,37 in violation of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.38
In the second case, United States v. Basu,39 the defendant, Ramendra Basu,
pled guilty to identical counts of conspiring to commit wire fraud in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371 and to violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 78dd-
403. Mr. Basu served as an officer in the Consultant Trust Funds Office at World
Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C. from 1996 to 2000, except for
approximately three months in late 1997 4i As a Trust Funds officer, the
defendant's duties included recommending consultants to Task Managers and
approving Task Managers' requests for Consultant Trust Funds. 42 In this capacity,
Mr. Basu met with the Swedish consultant and Mr. Sengupta and agreed to
"facilitate the payment of bribes" from the former to the latter.
43
In September 1997 Mr. Basu left his job at the World Bank and joined the
staff of the Swedish consulting firm and also secured employment there for his
father, brother-in-law, and a close friend. 44 At that time, Mr. Basu agreed to
receive ten percent of the value of all contracts that he worked on for the Swedish
consultant.45 By January 1998, the Swedish consultant had been awarded three
contracts by the World Bank Task Manager, Mr. Sengupta.46 In December 1997
Mr. Basu returned to his position at the World Bank, though he continued to
perform work on World Bank contracts with the Swedish consultant and continued
to receive compensation for his services.47 Furthermore, Mr. Basu also played a
role in facilitating the corrupt payment of $50,000 to a Kenyan government
official, providing the bank account number of a Kenyan firm to whom the
35. Id.
36. Id. at 521-22.
37. Id.
38. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l-78ff (2000) (although the defendant was convicted of aiding in the
bribery of foreign official, the 1998 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act extend the
designation of foreign official to include officials of public international organizations. This amendment
extends the reach of the act to now include corrupt activity between corrupt actors and World Bank staff
regardless of whether a government official in a developing country is involved).
39. The Information for United States v. Basu was filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia on November 26, 2002. A.B.A., supra note 30, at 525. The Plea Agreement and
Statement of facts were filed on December 17 2002. Id. at 533, 545.
40. Id. at 533.
41. Id. at 525-26.
42. Id. at 545.
43. Id. at 546.
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Swedish consultant wired the illicit payment.
48
As of April 2004, both defendants are awaiting sentencing. In both cases, the
statutory maximum sentence is "a term of imprisonment up to five years, followed
by a term of supervised release of three years; a maximum fine of $250,000, and a
special assessment of $100.00 for each felony count -A9 The defendants also
were ordered to repay $127,000 to the World Bank as restitution to account for the
loss to the institution as a result of the corrupt payments involved in the case. °
Furthermore, the non-economic personal and reputation costs to each of the
defendants who, prior to his involvement in this scheme, held prominent positions
in the leading global development finance institution, are also notable.
Criminal referrals were also made in this case to Kenyan and Swedish
prosecutors. While the Kenyan prosecution is still ongoing, a court in Sweden, in
February 2004, sentenced two Swedish contractors to prison for 18 months and 12
months respectively for bribery 51
The plea agreements orchestrated by the Department of Justice (DOJ) include
a provision that should strengthen the World Bank's anti-corruption efforts. Both
agreements require the defendants to cooperate with the World Bank in the
investigation of any matter about which the defendants have knowledge.
Specifically, the provision states that
The defendant agrees to disclose completely and truthfully all information
regarding his activities and those of others in all matters about which he has
knowledge or hereafter acquires knowledge concerning any matter about which
the United States, The World Bank, or the Government[s] of Sweden [or Kenya]
may inquire. Defendant agrees to accompany agents of the United States, The
World Bank, or the Government[s] of Sweden [or Kenya] to any location in order
to accomplish that purpose Defendant agrees to answer all questions
completely and truthfully and must not withhold any information.
52
This provision gives the World Bank the opportunity to compel cooperation
from the defendants, subsequent to their termination from World Bank
employment. The provision is an especially valuable tool because the defendants
would otherwise no longer be required to cooperate with World Bank investigators
under the World Bank Staff Rules 53 and because the World Bank does not have the
power to compel cooperation otherwise. Given the possibility that the corruption
scheme in which Mr. Sengupta and Mr. Basu engaged might involve additional
World Bank employees, consultants or borrower country agents, this provision
allows the World Bank to continue their investigation with the assistance of the
48. Id. at 548.
49. Id. at 534.
50. Id. at 507.
51. Gus Selassie, Swedish Nationals Convicted of Bribery, Connection with World Bank-
Funded Project in Kenya, WORLD MARKETS RES. CENTRE DAILY ANALYSis, Feb. 6, 2004.
52. A.B.A., supra note 30, at 508, 534-35.
53. Staff Rules, supra note 15, at § 8.01, 5.04 (requiring staff members to cooperate in
investigations).
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defendants.
This provision is an unprecedented development in the landscape of
international organizations and their anti-corruption efforts. For the first time, an
international financial institution assisted national prosecutors of a Member
government and also helped coordinate prosecution efforts between Member
governments, without an express mutual legal assistance treaty that provides for
such cooperation. The World Bank's authority to do so presumably derives from
its own treaty obligations under its Articles of Agreement requiring it to "make
arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used only for the purposes
for which the loan was granted. 54 The deterrent and punitive value of effective
criminal prosecution helps to maintain the integrity of all World Bank loans.
Although it is unclear whether the DOJ would revoke its plea agreement with
the defendants if they refused to cooperate with the World Bank under this
provision, the threat of revocation may be potent enough to ensure the cooperation
of the defendants. The World Bank should, when possible, use this new legal
assistance provision in its anti-corruption efforts while also working with the DOJ
to ensure that they include and enforce the provision in future plea agreements
involving World Bank employees.
The use of criminal referrals is a positive development in the World Bank's
strategy to curb corruption in its projects. In addition to providing a legal
instrument to secure cooperation from corrupt actors after the termination of their
employment, criminal referrals provide an additional avenue by which to seek
punishment for corrupt behavior, providing further deterrence of such activity
B. C v. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 55 and Bank
Disclosure Policies - Roadblocks to Effective Criminal Referral
The World Bank is generally immune from judicial process in member State
courts for matters arising out of the employment relationship. 56 To protect the
employment rights of its staff, the World Bank has its own internal Administrative
Tribunal that hears and grants judgments in cases brought by employees for
violations of their employment contracts or terms of appointment, including staff
rules and related regulationsY.7 A recent decision by the Administrative Tribunal, C
v. IBRD, addresses for the first time the issue of criminal referrals by the World
Bank. The decision imposes serious limitations on criminal referrals that will
54. World Bank Group, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Articles of
Agreement, art. III § 5, available at http://www.worldbank.org/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2004) [hereinafter
IBRD Articles of Agreement].
55. C v. int'l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., Dec. No. 272 (World Bank Admin. Trib. 2002)
[hereinafter C v. IBRD].
56. See Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (analyzing World Bank Articles
of Agreement, International Organizations immunities Act, and customary international law).
57 World Bank, World Bank Administrative Tribunal, Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association
and International Finance Corporation, art. II (2001), available at
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/crn/wbt/wbtwebsite.nsf (last visited Mar. 22,2004).
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undoubtedly weaken the efficacy of such referrals as a punitive and deterrent tool
in the Bank's anti-corruption efforts.
In the case, the Applicant was referred to the DOJ in connection with
allegedly corrupt activity that had led to his termination from employment at the
World Bank. The Applicant contested the decisions of the World Bank, inter alia,
(1) "to refer the case to the DOJ for prosecution without notifying him;" (2) "to
deny him access to relevant documents and evidence necessary to his defense;"
and (3) "to withhold from him information in his personnel file while failing to
inform him of its transfer to third parties."58 The Tribunal held in his favor,
announcing that the Bank's Staff Rules and Policy on Disclosure of Information
require the World Bank to notify an employee of a criminal referral and to provide
him with copies of most of the documents referred to the DOJ. 59 The Tribunal
ordered the World Bank to pay the Applicant $150,000 in damages for its failure
both to notify him and to provide him with documents, in addition to damages for
other unrelated claims.
60
This section reviews this decision along with the applicable World Bank
administrative provisions and cites numerous flaws both in the Tribunal's
reasoning and in the World Bank's policies on disclosure. In order to fully benefit
from the deterrent and punitive value of criminal referrals, the Administrative
Tribunal should reverse itself and the World Bank should introduce new
regulations for disclosure in corruption-related criminal referrals to counter the
Tribunal's holding and to reform the current regulations.
I. Referral and Notification Requirements
As an international organization, the World Bank is not governed by the laws
of any nation and must rely on its administrative rules and Tribunal decisions to
define the rights of its employees. These rights are codified primarily in the World
Bank Staff Rules. Throughout C v. IBRD, the Tribunal cites World Bank Staff
Rule section 2.01, paragraph 5.01 as the source of law for the World Bank's right
to refer an employee to prosecutors and for that employee's right to be notified of
such a referral. Staff Rule section 2.01, paragraph 5.01 states:
The following staff records and personnel information may be released to persons
outside the Bank Group without the authorization of the staff member concerned:
(a) basic employment data such as name, employment status, employment dates,
job title and department; (b) compensation and pension information released to
member governments for tax purposes; (c) pension records made available to a
consulting actuary; (d) visa status of staff and dependents reported to
governmental authorities; (e) pension, benefits and salary records made available
to external auditors and accountants; (f) information necessary for processing
medical, workers' compensation and other insurance claims; (g) benefits
information necessary to coordinate exchange or joint benefits programs, and
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information necessary to coordinate benefit policies with other international
organizations; and (h) information on a staff member's salary, accrued separation
grant, accrued pension benefits, and designated pension and insurance
beneficiaries released consistent with a final court order or request from a judicial
or civil authority in cases of divorce or family maintenance to which a staff
member has not responded within 30 days of the Bank Group bringing the request
or order to the staff member's attention.
The Bank Group will not release other personnel information to outside parties,
including member governments and their representatives, without the staff
member knowledge, except in cases of emergency situations or upon advice from
the Legal Department of the Bank to release information for legal proceedings or
law enforcement efforts. In such cases, the staff member will be notified as soon as
reasonably possible of what information is released and to whom.
6 1
The Staff Rule explicitly allows the World Bank to refer personnel
information to third parties and requires the World Bank to notify an employee of
the release of a narrow category of personnel information for legal proceedings or
law enforcement efforts, "as soon as reasonably possible. 62 In C v. IBRD, the
Tribunal applies this provision for the first time to an actual case and, through
reasoning that is often incorrect and unclear, expands the World Bank's duty to
notify employees and creates significant uncertainty about the disclosure rules in
subsequent cases.
(a) Notification of the Referral to the Department of Justice
The Tribunal writes that "the disclosure requirement imposed upon the Bank
by this Staff Rule covers both the fact of a referral and the content of what is being
referred. 63 The Tribunal then disposes of the Applicant's claim, that the World
Bank referred him to the DOJ without notification, finding that it is "clear from the
record that the Applicant was aware of the fact of a referral being made to the
DOJ. This was not the result of specific notification to him but transpired from the
general context in which the Bank conducted its investigation and pursued its
cooperation with United States and Swedish authorities." 64
It is unclear whether the Tribunal is implying that a blanket right exists to be
notified of a referral to prosecutors. Under the Staff Rule, the duty to notify an
employee depends upon the type of information referred, attaching only when
"other personnel information," not specified in clauses (a) through (h) of the rule,
is referred. For example, if the World Bank refers only basic employment data
such as the name and employment status of an employee, under clause (a) of the
rule, notification to the employee of the referral would not be required.65
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Furthermore, the Tribunal's subjective standard for notice, relying on the
Applicant's awareness of the referral based on "the general context in which the
Bank conducted its investigation," 66 is unhelpful to the World Bank's legal
department when refemng future employees to prosecutors. The Tribunal
provides no guidance on what kind of "general context" would suffice not to
require notification in future cases. Given the remainder of the opinion, which
holds that notification is required for the disclosure of various types of
information,67 the World Bank will probably err on the side of caution and notify
the employee upon referral in future cases.
(b) Referral and Notification Requirements for Specific Documents
While Staff Rule section 2.01, paragraph 5.01 imposes a notification
requirement upon the World Bank when "other personnel information" is referred,
the Tribunal does not offer any definition of what constitutes personnel
information for the purposes of the rule. For example, the Tribunal holds that hotel
and travel information related to the Applicant's employment qualify as "other
personnel information, without any factual or legal basis for considering such
information personnel information. 68 The Tribunal also fails to define what is
meant by "as soon as reasonably possible. It may be persuasively argued that it is
unreasonable to inform an employee of the referral of information to criminal
prosecutors until a formal indictment has been filed, because the risk the employee
may destroy evidence, flee the jurisdiction or tamper with witnesses is such a
serious one. Without any definition of "personnel information" or what is
reasonable in terms of timing the notification, the World Bank's legal department
must perform significant guesswork to determine what it can refer and when it
must notify an employee of a referral.
While non-personnel information is not subject to Staff Rule section 2.01,
paragraph 5.01, the Tribunal broadens the applicability of the rule to include non-
personnel operational records. In considering the operational records referred in
the case, the Tribunal writes that it "is satisfied that nothing in them relates to the
accusations against the Applicant. It follows that such documents can be
released without notifying him thereof., 69 The Tribunal implies that a
notification requirement exists for non-personnel information if the Tribunal
determines that the information is related to accusations against the Applicant.
The test is a misguided expansion of the World Bank's notification requirements.
The Tribunal cannot know whether the referred information relates to accusations
against the Applicant simply because accusations have not been made by the DOJ.
The Tribunal's test expands the notification requirements and is grounded in
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Furthermore, the Tribunal announces disclosure and notification requirements
for non-personnel information that may be personal in nature. The Tribunal relies
on the World Bank's Policy on Disclosure of Information of March 1994, as
revised effective 2002, which establishes constraints on the disclosure of
information. 70 The relevant constraints, according to the Tribunal, include:
(i) documents and information provided to the Bank only "on the explicit or
implied understanding that they will not be disclosed outside the Bank, or that
they may not be disclosed without the consent of the source; or even,
occasionally, that access within the Bank will be limited" must be treated
accordingly by the Bank;
(ii) documents and records that are subject to the attorney-client privilege, or
whose disclosure might prejudice an investigation, shall not be made publicly
available, this constraint reflecting a general principle of privileged information
even though it was explicitly introduced only in 2002; and
(iii) appropriate safeguards must be maintained in order to protect the personal
privacy of staff members and the confidentiality of personal information about
them, all in accordance with the Principles of Staff Employment.
7 1
The Tribunal finds that the existence of an express or implied condition of
non-disclosure forbids the disclosure of certain non-personnel information to third
72parties. In this case, the Tribunal finds that the release of bank records and credit
card statements by private banks to World Bank investigators, with the consent of
the Applicant, "was not expressly conditioned" on non-disclosure by the Bank.73
The Tribunal also finds there was no implied understanding of non-disclosure
because (a) "the disclosed information was fully available to the Applicant himself,
as it originated in his own personal business"- (b) "his ability to defend himself
was not jeopardized by the disclosure"- and (c) "the DOJ could in any event have
subpoenaed the records in the ordinary process of discovery available in the United
States legal system. 74
The Tribunal's reasoning creates an unclear test for determining whether an
implied understanding of non-disclosure exists in future cases. The Tribunal does
not define what type of information could jeopardize an employee's ability to
defend himself. In reality, no type of referral by the World Bank jeopardizes an
Applicant's defense before the DOJ. Because the Applicant has not been indicted
for any crime, he has no defense to prepare. If he is indicted, federal criminal
procedure provides him adequate opportunity to respond to allegations and defend
himself. His rights include the right to discovery, which includes the right to
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preparation of his defense. 75 The Tribunal does not consider this line of reasoning
and instead creates an unclear test to determine the existence of an implied
condition of non-disclosure.
Finally, the Tribunal holds that the World Bank may refer its investigative file
to prosecutors, but must notify the Applicant of the referral.76 This report includes
"summaries of various interviews conducted in the context of the Bank's
investigations, including interviews with the Applicant and other persons (inside
and outside the Bank) implicated in the relevant events" and "other materials that
came out in the course of these interviews. 77 While the Tribunal admits that the
investigative report is "not related to 'personnel matters,"' it applies the
notification standard for "other personnel information" of Staff Rule section 2.01,
paragraph 5.01 78 The Tribunal offers no justification for applying this notification
standard to the investigative report. In the process, the Tribunal greatly expands
the notification requirement imposed on the World Bank.
In looking to the Staff Rules and the Policy on Disclosure of Information to
determine what may be referred to prosecutors, the Tribunal ignores the World
Bank Sanctions Committee Procedures, which include a provision allowing for the
disclosure of any information related to criminal activity The Procedures provide
that "[i]f the Director of the INT determines that laws of member countries may
have been violated by a Respondent, the Director may at any time make available
to the law enforcement or administrative authorities of the countries involved any
information relating to such a violation." 79 The Sanctions Committee Procedures
pertain in large part to the relationship between the World Bank and its employees,
as they discuss an employee's rights throughout sanctioning proceedings. 80 These
procedures are a legitimate source of law for the question of the World Bank's
right to refer documents to criminal prosecutors and should have been addressed
by the Tribunal and deemed dispositive in favor of the Bank on the issue of the
right to refer documents.8t Instead, the Tribunal's opinion failed to mention any of
these procedures.
75. FED. R. CRIM. P 16(a)(l)(C).
76. C v. IBRD, Decision No. 272, at 21.
77. Id. 16.
78. Id. l1.
79 Sanctions Committee Procedures, supra note 18, at § 16(a).
80. Id. at intro.(d).
81. Cf de Merode v. World Bank, Decision No. I (World Bank Admin. Trib.1981). In Merode,
the Tribunal held that, in addition to other sources of law, "elements of the legal relationship between
the Bank and its personnel are also to be found in the Personnel Manual, the Field Office Manual,
various administrative circulars and in certain notes and statements of the management. Id. 22. The
Tribunal cautioned, however, that "not all the provisions of these manuals, circulars, notes, and
statements are included in the conditions of employment. Some of them have the character of simple
statements of current policy or lay down certain practical or purely procedural methods of operation. It
is, therefore, necessary to decide in each case whether the provision constitutes one of the conditions of
employment. Id.
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(c) Referral and Notification Requirements after C v. IBRD
C. v. IRBD produces an intricate, and often ill-defined, web of considerations
for the World Bank's legal department regarding disclosure and notification related
to criminal referrals. The legal department must work without knowing whether
there is a blanket right to notify an employee of a criminal referral, regardless of
the type of information referred. The lack of a definition for both "personnel"
information and notice "as soon as reasonably possible" confounds the application
of Staff Rule section 2.01, paragraph 5.01. For non-personnel information that
falls outside of that rule, the World Bank must determine whether the Tribunal will
feel that the referred information relates to accusations against the employee,
despite the fact that the DOJ has not made any accusations. Furthermore, if the
referral includes non-personnel information that is personal, the World Bank must
determine whether an express or implied condition of non-disclosure exists and
whether the referral will jeopardize the employee's defense before the DOJ, again
without any accusations being made by the DOJ. The Tribunal must make all of
these considerations under the shadow of an expensive potential monetary
judgment.
The result of all of these considerations, in practical terms, is that the World
Bank will now notify employees of all documents referred to the DOJ and may
reconsider some referral decisions to avoid thorny questions, such as the existence
of implied conditions of non-disclosure. This result is detrimental to the World
Bank's overall anti-corruption strategy in two serious ways.
First, notification of referrals creates serious risks that the employee will
obstruct the criminal investigation. In its pleadings, the Bank raised concerns that
the Applicant "might attempt to destroy evidence, flee the jurisdiction, or harass
and intimidate witnesses" once he is notified or granted access to investigative
documents.8 2 The Tribunal casts aside these concerns by stating that, in this case,
the Applicant has cooperated with the World Bank and the DOJ, allaying any fears
of obstruction by the Applicant.83 The Tribunal's reasoning is based upon a naive
assumption. The Applicant is required to cooperate with World Bank investigators
under World Bank Staff Rules.84 His carrying out his duties as an employee does
not mean that he has refrained or will refrain from covering up his corrupt activity
once he is notified that he has been referred to the DOJ. In fact, referral for
criminal prosecution raises the possible harm an employee may face and may
provide a greater incentive to an employee to cover up his activities. The Tribunal
is simply in no position to know whether the Applicant has engaged or will engage
in such obstructive activities, simply because he may have cooperated in the past.
Second, the complex disclosure and notification requirements imposed under
C v. IBRD will probably result in the World Bank referring fewer documents to
national prosecutors. This development will impact the effectiveness of criminal
82. C v. IBRD, Decision No. 272, at 24.
83. Id.
84. Staff Rules, supra note 15, § 8.01, 5.04 ("Staff members are required to cooperate in the
investigation and failure or refusal to do so may constitute misconduct.").
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prosecutions, by both limiting the scope and pace of criminal investigations. The
result will be a reduction in the usefulness of criminal referrals as a punitive and
deterrent tool for corruption within the World Bank and a weakening of the overall
anti-corruption efforts of the World Bank.
2. Access to the Documents Referred
(a) Personnel Documents
The Tribunal also reads Staff Rule section 2.01, paragraph 5.01 to include a
right to view the contents of the personnel information referred to criminal
prosecutors.8 5 It reads the rule to require the World Bank to give the Applicant the
actual documents falling under this rule.86 The Tribunal provides no legal
reasoning for this conclusion. Instead, it is possible to interpret the rule narrowly as
requiring a notification of only what information has been released, which might
consist simply of a list of the documents referred, rather than copies of the
documents themselves. Unfortunately, the Tribunal does not ponder the nuances
of rule interpretation but rather decrees that the rule encompasses access to the
documents themselves.
(b) Non-Personnel Documents - The Investigative Report
The component of the Tribunal's holding that will be the most detnmental to
successful cnminal referrals is the finding that the Applicant should receive copies
of the World Bank investigative report referred to the DOJ. 7 The investigative
report includes summanes of interviews with the Applicant and witnesses,
investigator notes and other materials uncovered dunng the investigation."
The Tribunal finds that the Applicant's access to the referred investigative
report is "a matter that essentially is governed by pnnciples of due process and fair
treatment., 89 For the Tribunal, access to the investigative report is essential for the
Applicant's right to respond to allegations against him. The prncipal authority the
Tribunal cites is its previous decision, King v. International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development." The Tribunal writes:
The Tribunal set out detailed standards for the handling of misconduct under Staff
Rule 8.01 in King, Decision No. 131 [1993]. The Tribunal assigned particular
importance to the conduct of the investigation, to the right of the accused staff
85. C v. IBRD, Decision No. 272, at 7
86. Id.
87. Id. It is important to be clear that the Tribunal found the referral of the investigative report
permissible under the World Bank's Policy on Disclosure of Information. See Staff Rules, supra note
15, at § 2.01, 5.01. The Tribunal did not analyze the disclosure under World Bank Staff Rule section
2.01, paragraph 5.01, which applies to personnel information, assumedly because it did not consider the
documents to constitute personal information, although the Tribunal did not explicitly say so.
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member to respond, and to questions of due process. In respect of the right to
respond, the Tribunal specifically held that "the entitlement of the staff member to
respond presupposes an exact knowledge of the charge made against him and
extends to the right to give a properly considered answer to, or comment upon,
every aspect of the case made against him." 
91
The Tribunal was correct in finding that King established a "basic rule of due
process that an accused person should be confronted with a specific charge and be
given an opportunity to reply to It."' 9 2 The King decision, however, dealt solely
with an employee's due process rights in the context of allegations in internal
disciplinary proceeding.93 The Tribunal extends the due process protection in King
to an entirely different context-the relationship between an employee and his
national authorities in a prosecution against him.94 The Tribunal's extension of an
employee's due process rights to this context is flawed on numerous grounds.
Most importantly, the DOJ has not made any allegations against the
Applicant. Once allegations are made, in the form of a grand jury indictment or
information, the Applicant will have a chance to face his accuser, the United States
government, and undertake discovery of prosecution documents and respond to
any charges in a court of law without any "guesswork," a concern the Tribunal
cites explicitly 95 The Applicant's due process rights under the United States
Constitution are protected from the moment his file is referred to the DOJ and he
may petition the court with any procedural grievances he may have. Thus, his
ability to defend himself against any allegation by the DOJ has not been impaired
in any manner, a concern the Tribunal raises.
96
Furthermore, like any other individual under investigation by the DOJ, the
Applicant does not have a right to access the files and records in the possession of
prosecutors prior to the start of formal criminal proceedings. In the U.S, and
common law systems generally there simply is no right to know where you stand
in the eyes of prosecutors while they investigate you, a privilege to which the
Tribunal believes the Applicant is entitled.97 Even in internal World Bank
proceedings, under King, the employee does not have a right to information about
his case until a formal allegation is made.98 In civil law systems, a suspect's right
to access investigative documents similarly attaches only once the formal
investigative process has been launched by either the police or the public
prosecutor, though the defendant may have access to files earlier than in common
law systems. 99 Neither system compels a victim to turn over her documents or the
91. Id. (quoting King v. Int'l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., Decision No. 131, at9 35 (World
Bank Admin. Trib. 1993) [hereinafter King v. IBRD]).
92. King v. IBRD, Decision No. 13i, at 935.
93. King v. IBRD, Decision No. 131, at 9 29-82.
94. See C v. IBRD, Decision No. 272, at IM 3-35.
95. C v. IBRD, Decision No. 272, at 26.
96. Id. 932.
97. Id. 21.
98. King v. JBRD, Decision No. 13 i, at 1 33-37.
99. See Mario Chiavario, Private Parties: The Rights of the Defendant and the Victim, in
EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 541, 558 (Mireille Delmas-Marty and J.R. Spencer eds., 2002).
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content of her communication with the police to the defendant. In both systems,
the suspect's due process rights are only in relation to the national authority
investigating him, not to the victim who refers him.
The Tribunal's decision in C v IBRD creates an unprecedented right of access
to the DOJ investigation that is flawed on legal grounds under procedural rules of
both common law and civil law systems. Prior to the Tribunal case, the Applicant
was in no different position than any other individual under investigation by the
DOJ. The Tribunal's holding, however, puts him in a privileged position as
compared to all other individuals under the DOJ's jurisdiction. It alters the
relationship between him and his member government to the detriment of the latter
and is thus an illegitimate intrusion into the domestic legal process of a member
government.
The Tribunal also reasons that "[s]trict enforcement of due process will also
likely avoid accusations of a general nature unsupported by specific evidence that
could mislead the national authorities."'lo This concern is allayed by the fact that
government prosecutors are charged with the task of evaluating evidence for its
veracity and integrity when constructing a case. If the facts of an investigative file
contain speculative assertions, prosecutors can disregard such facts, or refrain from
pursuing the prosecution. If unsubstantiated facts are introduced during trial, the
criminal process allows the defense to produce contrary evidence and attack the
veracity of any testifying witness.
The Tribunal also errs in its rationale for granting access to the documents by
placing an inordinate degree of evidentiary weight to the investigative reports
referred to the DOJ by the World Bank. The Tribunal raises alarm that "none of
these documents bears the signature of the Applicant as evidence of his having
admitted or accepted its conclusions."' '" The Tribunal ignores well-established
rules of evidence in the U.S. denoting such summaries and notes as inadmissible
hearsay 102 At trial, the court would require the World Bank investigator to testify
about his interviews and would not allow the summaries themselves to be
introduced as evidence. The procedural protections of the U.S. legal system make
the Tribunal's protection unnecessary The result is only to impede the effective
criminal investigation of the alleged corrupt activity
The C v. IBRD holding is further flawed on the grounds of fundamental policy
considerations. Notification of criminal referral and access to referred documents
raises the risk that an employee will engage in activities to obstruct the criminal
investigation. As described earlier, the Tribunal is in no position to determine
whether such obstruction has occurred or will occur based solely on the
Applicant's prior cooperation, much of which was required by the World Bank's
Staff Rules.
Even assuming the Applicant has not engaged in obstructive activity he may
100. C v. IBRD, Decision No. 272, at 26.
101. d.j125.
102. FED. R. EviD. 801(c) (defining hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.").
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not know the full extent of the facts uncovered against him. With access to the
investigative file, the employee could read witness interviews and see documents,
which he may not have before known existed. His new knowledge could plausibly
change his disposition with respect to cooperating. The Tribunal cannot know the
risk of the Applicant destroying evidence, fleeing the jurisdiction or tampering
with witnesses until the Applicant views the documents that have been referred to
the DOJ. In this scenario, where an employee's level of cooperation could easily
change, a bright-line rule barring access to such documents would ensure that
employees who would want to obstruct the investigation would not have an
opportunity to do so.
The Tribunal continues and states that "[n]or could the documents concerned
be in any way destroyed or tampered with by the Applicant as they were already in
the hands of the Bank and, later, of the Department of Justice."1 0 3 The risk is not
that the Applicant will destroy the specific files that have already been referred;
rather, the risks are that other related evidence not yet subpoenaed will be
destroyed, or the Applicant will tamper with witnesses before they are deposed by
prosecutors or testify in the case. By ignoring the true risk involved in granting
employees access to the investigative report, the Tribunal's rationale for allowing
access to the documents is further flawed.
By saying that the facts of this case provide no specific risks, the Tribunal
creates an ambiguous rule for the World Bank to follow in subsequent cases.
Should the World Bank withhold its investigative report when it believes the
person is a flight risk and expose itself to additional adverse judgments by the
Tribunal if the Applicant does not flee? It is more likely that the Tribunal's
holding will result in the World Bank turning over the investigative report to all
subjects of referral in the future. This result is a disastrous policy as the real risks
outlined above, ignored by the Tribunal in C v. IBRD, may be present in future
cases and the effective subsequent prosecution of corruption may be seriously
compromised.
Finally the Tribunal states that it has "reservations with respect to
unnecessarily secretive procedures, which tend to result in unfair accusations and
investigations."' 4 Questioning the administrative procedures and judgments of
divisions within the World Bank is a core component of the mandate of the
Administrative Tribunal. The characterization of corruption investigations and
subsequent criminal referral as "unnecessarily secretive, however, reveals a
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of effective anti-corruption efforts
within organizations. Secrecy during an investigation and in the referral of
information to prosecutors is essential to ensure that a suspect does not obstruct the
investigation. There are sufficient due process guarantees already in place to
ensure that such secrecy does not impose an unfair result upon a World Bank
employee. Under King, the employee has a right to face his accuser in an internal
103. C v. IBRD, Decision No. 272, at 24.
104. Id. 26.
VOL. 32:2
THE WORLD BANK'S ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS
investigation.105 Under the laws of his national jurisdiction, the employee has a
right to face his national accuser in a court of law The Tribunal's reservations in
this regard are both redundant and misguided and result in an unprecedented
expansion of employee due process rights that guts the mechanism of criminal
referral as an anti-corruption tool at the World Bank.
3. Addressing the Legal Obstacles ofC v. IBRD and World Bank Rules
The explicit provisions of the Staff Rules and the Policy on Disclosure of
Information impose limits on referrals while contemplating some form of
employee notification. 1 6 The requirements specified in those provisions are
expanded and complicated in the Tribunal's holding in C v. IBRD. In order to
restore the World Bank's anti-corruption efforts, the procedures related to criminal
referrals should be reformed. A new Staff Rule ought to be implemented allowing
for the referral of any information, both personnel and non-personnel, to
prosecutorial bodies in cases involving employee corruption, without notification
and access.
Such a narrow provision would carve out a small area of full and unfettered
disclosure for special cases involving corruption. Criminal referrals are different
from disclosures to the general public and the due process and privacy rights of
employees referred to the DOJ are protected under U.S. laws. Any remaining
concerns about employee privacy should be outweighed by the World Bank's need
for effective anti-corruption efforts, for which secrecy is essential. While staff
opposition to such a new rule may be significant, the absence of such a provision
will aid corrupt employees, who break the laws of the nations in which they work,
in avoiding the most serious consequences for their actions.
III. STANDARD OF PROOF CONCERNS IN INTERNAL CORRUPTION INVESTIGATIONS
The official standard of proof needed to be met to impose sanctions is
evidence that is "reasonably sufficient to support a finding that the Respondent
engaged in a fraudulent or corrupt practice ,,107 The World Bank Tribunal has
never announced the precise meaning of the "reasonably sufficient" standard.
105. Id. 23; King v. IBRD, Decision No. 13 1, at 36.
106. See World Bank, The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information, June 2002, at § IV
89. In its discussion of the World Bank Policy on Disclosure, the Tribunal ignores one explicit
constraint. "The individual records and personal medical information of Executive Directors and their
Alternates and Advisors, of the President of the Bank, and of Bank staff, as well as proceedings of
internal appeal mechanisms and investigations, are not disclosed outside the Bank, except to the extent
permitted by the Staff Rules. Id. (emphasis added). While the Tribunal does not address whether the
files referred in this case would qualify as "proceedings" of investigations, it is plausible that they
could. Furthermore, the Tribunal ignores the Sanctions Committee Procedures which provide a blanket
right of referral, contrary to the Policy of Disclosure and the holding of the current case. Thus, there is a
need for an explicit Staff Rule provision allowing referral of all types of documents related to
corruption investigations without notification to bring clarity to the legal regime for referral and to
bolster the effectiveness of criminal referrals.
107 Sanctions Committee Procedures, supra note 18, at § 13.
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While no standard is without some uncertainty, the World Bank's standard,
standing alone, is devoid of any meaning without further definition of the clause
"reasonably sufficient to support. The World Bank standard, as it currently
stands, could require anything from evidence that establishes that the corrupt
activity was more likely than not to have occurred (the common preponderance of
the evidence standard) to evidence that establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that
the corrupt activity occurred. A recent case raises serious concerns about the
standard of proof applied in World Bank administrative proceedings involving
corruption and fraud.
In September 2002, the High Court of Lesotho convicted Acres International,
a prominent multinational engineering firm, of two criminal counts of corruption
related to bribes paid to a senior government official in Lesotho for contracts
related to an $8 billion water project, of which the World Bank contributed $150
million.10 8 Prior to the criminal conviction, the World Bank's Fraud and
Corruption Committee had conducted a two-year investigation into Acres and
found insufficient evidence to justify debarment.'0 9
This sequence of events, in which evidence against Acres clears the higher
hurdle of reasonable doubt in a criminal proceeding in Lesotho, while failing to
satisfy the presumably lower standard of proof in the World Bank, raises serious
concerns about the efficacy of the World Bank's sanctioning mechanism. Before
one discredits the World Bank's sanctioning mechanism, it is important to note
that the Lesotho court, being a national cnminal body, may have accessed evidence
unavailable to World Bank internal investigators, given the lack of subpoena
power of the World Bank.'"' Furthermore, the integrity of the criminal procedure
in Lesotho should be further studied to ensure that the conviction was free from
any political motivation or other impropriety. The World Bank, noting the
conviction in Lesotho, formally reopened its investigation of Acres in March
2004."'
Despite these factors, however, the Acres case reveals a need for clarification
of the "reasonably sufficient" standard in World Bank corruption proceedings. A
standard roughly equivalent to the common "preponderance of the evidence" or
"more likely than not" standard might be an appropriate approach. These
standards, which are widely used in legal systems around the world in non-
criminal matters, are regarded as balancing the interests of fairness to defendants
with the interest of judicial expediency. If the current "reasonably sufficient"
standard is higher than a preponderance of the evidence, lowering the standard
108. Michael Dynes, Net Closes on Western Corruption in Africa, TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 28, 2002,
at 16.
109. Catherine Porter, Oakville Engineering Company Braces for African Bribery Verdict,
TORONTO STAR, Sept. 12, 2002, at DO 1.
110. See id. Defense counsel for Acres argued that the evidence was identical to evidence presented
at the World Bank internal proceeding. Id. Such claim should of course be taken with grain of salt,
as it is clearly meant to imply that the defendant should be freed of all charges in the pending matter.
I l. David Pallister, World Bank Corruption Inquiry May Blacklist Firm, GUARDIAN, Mar. 16,
2004, at 18.
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could rid the Bank of corrupt agents, like Acres, in a more timely and effective
manner while ensuring the fundamental fairness of the sanctioning system.
The World Bank could also follow the example of some U.S. government
agencies that consider civil or criminal convictions against a contractor for certain
related or unrelated offenses, such as theft or tax evasion, as sufficient evidence as
a matter of law for debarment. 12 The World Bank could similarly regard
debarment from government contracting systems in member governments as
sufficient grounds to debar contractors from World Bank contracts. While these
contractors would not have committed any fraud against the World Bank, a pattern
of poor performance on prior contracts can be enough of a substantial risk to
World Bank contracts as to require debarment."i' Such an approach, however,
might yield a far greater number of debarments of firms and individuals from
Western countries that have more developed national government debarment
systems. Such a result might prove to be a substantial political impediment to
instituting such a system of debarment. The World Bank could impose shorter
periods of debarment in cases such as these to compensate for the lack of a full
investigation into firms. The Bank could also institute a system of suspensions, or
short term freezing of funding, pending full investigation. Suspensions usually
require a lower standard of proof, so that the initiation of criminal or civil
proceedings for certain offenses can trigger a suspension.' 14
A further development that could dramatically reduce the time spent on
investigations and more easily locate and eradicate corrupt activities is the
implementation of an illicit enrichment provision in the World Bank's Sanctions
Committee Procedures. Illicit enrichment provisions generally function by
allowing prosecutors to introduce evidence of a government official's unexplained
wealth or extravagant standard of living and to shift the burden to the person to
prove a legitimate source for that wealth or standard of living.' 5 A failure by the
government official "to provide an adequate explanation would mean that the
official must have traded on the governmental authority vested in him for personal
gain." 116
Illicit enrichment is most notably used in the successful anti-corruption efforts
of Hong Kong." 7 Furthermore, all major multilateral conventions call for signatory
112. See e.g., Steven A. Shaw, Suspension and Debarment: The First Line of Defense Against
Contractor Fraud and Abuse, REPORTER, Mar. 1999, at 4 (discussing suspension and debarment rules
in the United States Air Force).
113. Id. at 5 (writing that the U.S. Air Force has wide latitude to debar firms for a history of
unsatisfactory performance on private contracts, conduct that is neither criminal nor related to public
contracts. The author points out, however, that agencies have failed to take advantage of such broad
discretion).
114. See id. at 4.
115. Peter J. Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of International Corruption
Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L&COMP LAW 793, 813 (2001).
116. Id. at 814.
i 17 Section I 0(I) of the Hong Kong Prevention of Bribery Ordinance provides that:
(1) Any person who, being or having been prescribed officer, (a) maintains standard
of living above that which is commensurate with his present or past official emoluments;
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governments to establish illicit enrichment as a criminal offense."18 Illicit
enrichment is not a criminal offense in jurisdictions like the U.S. because it
conflicts with a defendant's constitutional right to refrain from testifying against
himself in a criminal matter."19 However, the notion of illicit enrichment and
burden-shifting to a defendant can be found m U.S. civil proceedings, including
civil asset forfeiture actions related to criminal activity 120 Evidence that a person is
living beyond his lifestyle can help build probable cause to support a civil
forfeiture action which, when established, shifts the burden to the accused to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the legitimate source of the asset in
question. 121
Illicit enrichment provisions recognize the importance of integrity among
public officials and understand both that unexplained wealth is a powerful
indicator of impropriety among civil servants and that evidence of corruption is
often hard to gather, a challenge that is even more acute in the case of the World
Bank, given its lack of subpoena power. 122 Establishing illicit enrichment, without
an adequate explanation by the official, as a sufficient ground to find against an
employee for breaching his duties to the World Bank could offer a faster and more
effective method of finding and expelling corrupt actors from the World Bank.
An illicit enrichment provision would not violate any established due process
rights of World Bank employees. Employees do not have a privilege against self-
incrimination in internal investigation proceedings. In fact, the World Bank staff is
subject to an express duty to cooperate in internal investigations. World Bank
Staff Rule section 8.01, paragraph 5.04, states that in internal investigations,
"[s]taff members are required to cooperate in the investigation and failure or
refusal to do so may constitute misconduct, which can serve as a ground for
termination under the Staff Rules. 23 The World Bank also expressly allows
or (b) is in control of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his present or
past official emoluments, shall, unless he gives a satisfactory explanation to the court as
to how he was able to maintain such standard of living or how such pecuniary
resources or property came under his control, be guilty of an offence.
Hong Kong Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, available at http://www.icac.org.hk/eng/prevt (last
visited Jan. 30, 2002).
118. See Inter-American Convention, supra note 3, at art. IX (mandating that signatories "[slubject
to its Constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system, each State Party that has not yet
done so shall take the necessary measures to establish under its laws as an offense a significant increase
in the assets of government official that he cannot reasonably explain in relation to his lawful earnings
dunng the performance of his functions. Among those States Parties that have established illicit
enrichment as an offense, such offense shall be considered an act of corruption for the purposes of this
Convention."). See also OECD Convention, supra note 2, at art. i, 2; U.N. Convention, supra note 4, at
art. 20.
119 U.S. CONST. amend. V
120. See United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1989).
12 1. See id. at 390 (holding where "a defendant's verifiable income cannot possibly account for the
level of wealth displayed and where there is strong evidence that the defendant is a drug trafficker, then
there is probable cause to believe that the wealth is either direct product of the illicit activity or that it
is traceable to the activity as proceeds.").
122. See supra note 110, and accompanying text.
123. Staff Rules, supra note 15, at §8.01, 5.04; see also id. § 0.01, Pnnciple 7. 1(b)(iv).
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internal investigators to "[c]all upon any staff member for the production of
documents believed to have probative value."'' 24 While the World Bank Tribunal
has not addressed whether staff members have a privilege against self-
incrimination during investigations, the express Staff Rules nowhere establish or
suggest such a privilege, but rather enunciate the opposite-a duty to cooperate.1
25
Given the lack of a self-incrimination privilege, the World Bank should proceed
with an illicit enrichment provision that considers unexplained wealth or
extravagant lifestyle, without adequate explanation, as sufficient to find staff
misconduct. A guarantee that financial records would not be disclosed to third
parties, other than criminal prosecutors in the case of corrupt activity, should be
made to protect the privacy of staff members.
The World Bank should also consider widespread financial disclosure
requirements for employees, covering all sources of income, to safeguard against
conflicts of interest. Currently, less than fifty senior World Bank officials are
subject to such disclosure. 126 Financial disclosure requirements for public officials
are seen as an essential component to ensunng the integrity of public
organizations. In the U.S., for example, detailed annual financial disclosures are
required of members of all three branches of government.127 Public officers of only
the highest grade are usually required to file, though given each grade has ten
steps, the total number of such officials across the federal government is
significant. 28 A wider base of individuals subject to such disclosure would
increase transparency and provide preliminary evidence under any illicit
enrichment provision once enacted. 1
29
IV INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION SHARING AND CROSS-DEBARMENT
Currently, the World Bank does not have investigative information sharing or
cross-debarment agreements with other multilateral or bilateral development
124. Id. §8.01, 15.04.
125. Providing employees with such a privilege would be contrary to the Staff Rules as well as
detrimental to effective fact-finding and resolution of internal corruption investigations. Given the
Tribunal's expansive view of employee due process, and the suspiciousness with which it views the
World Bank's investigations, the World Bank may want to include an explicit provision, such as a staff
rule, that enunciates the fact that employees do not have privilege against self-incrimination. Note that
the issue of whether statements made by employees in a World Bank administrative proceeding can
later be excluded in a subsequent prosecution in a national court has not been litigated.
126. Staff Rules, supra note 15, at § 3.01, 8.02 (noting only "[sitaff members at the level of vice
president or above" are subject to the requirement); see also World Bank Group, Senior Management,
at http://web.worldbank.org (last visited Feb. 6, 2004) (listing senior management positions).
127. See generally Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978).
128. See e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 2634.202 (2003) (defining public filer for the purposes of executive
branch disclosure requirements).
129. In summary, U.S. government disclosure rules measure the sources and value of income and
do not require the disclosure of a public official's net worth. Ethics in Government Act, at §§102, 202,
302. Net worth evidence would have greater evidentiary value for World Bank investigators, in the
event that an illicit enrichment provision is adopted. Any effort to implement such disclosure
requirement, or any further disclosure requirements for that matter, would face significant political
opposition from staff members.
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finance institutions. Transnational corruption often involves repeat players who
may practice in numerous developing countries and contract with different
development banks. Sharing investigative information with other development
finance institutions and instituting a system of cross-debarment can expedite the
World Bank's corruption investigations and ensure that corrupt firms and
individuals can not be debarred by one lender only to find another institution to
defraud.
Substantial obstacles against implementing investigative information sharing
and cross-debarment agreements with other institutions exist. The first is the lack
of uniformity between different organizations in the quality of investigations and
the standards of proof used. In April 2003, the Fourth Conference of Investigators
of International and Bilateral Institutions convened in Brussels to address this
concern. 130 Representatives from the World Bank and the United Nations presented
a number of Uniform Guidelines for investigations, which were endorsed by
representatives from international and bilateral institutions. 131 The guidelines
include ethical principles for investigators, detailed procedural rules for
investigating and administering inculpatory and exculpatory findings, policies on
the confidentiality and protection of witnesses and the due process rights of
subjects.13 2 The Uniform Guidelines, however, are only aspirational principles to
which institutions are not bound. A second obstacle is the risk of institutions
debarring firms for political purposes. A bilateral mstitution may debar foreign
firms more often than domestic firms or may target specific firms for political
purposes, under the rouse of a corruption investigation.
The World Bank could sidestep these limitations by creating investigation
information sharing and cross-debarment agreement only with institutions that
conform to the uniform guidelines. Any agreement could also require institutions
to open their respective investigation files for review by their partner institutions,
in order to ensure that institutions are meeting the ethical and procedural
requirements of the uniform guidelines. Furthermore, the World Bank could
require additional evidence in cases in which it suspects that political motivations
marred the referring institution's investigation, or it could exercise its discretion
and not debar the firm. Given these suitable responses, an investigative
information sharing and cross-debarment regime would be a viable approach for
the World Bank to undertake to increase the effectiveness of its anti-corruption
efforts.
130. See Press Release, European Anti-Fraud Office, The 4th Conference of International
Investigators held in Brussels on 3rd and 4th April 2003 (Apr. 4, 2003), available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/geninfo/info-en.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
131. Id.
132. Address before The 4th Conference of International Investigators (Apr. 2003) (on file with
author).
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V STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS TO EFFECTIVE ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS AT
THE WORLD BANK
The World Bank's operational model, governance structure, oversight
capacity, staff and contractor incentive structure, bureaucratic norms, political
motivations and the status of the internal investigate body all pose additional
obstacles to the control of corruption within the World Bank. This section
addresses the problems arising when structural attributes of the Bank impede
effective anti-corruption efforts or even create incentives contrary to the goal of
curbing corruption at the World Bank.
A. The World Bank s Operational Model
Under the World Bank Articles of Agreement, the World Bank is authorized
only to lend to governments and to third parties when the loan is guaranteed by the
government in which the party is located. 133 Governments in developing countries
are responsible for the execution of projects and are given a large degree of
discretion to carry out projects. 3 4  Government agencies charged with
implementing projects are responsible for procuring firms and contractors for
projects and managing and disbursing the loan funds.
35
Structurally, this operational model exposes the World Bank to significant
corruption risk. Developing country governments are plagued with weak
procurement systems, insufficient supervisory personnel for projects, inadequate
resources for investigating and prosecuting corruption and poor legal rules and
procedures to prevent, detect, and address corruption.136 For example, in a recently
approved $46 million World Bank urban revitalization loan to Brazil, 3 7 the World
Bank noted that the coordinating agency in charge of overseeing the entire project,
FIDEM, "has the minimum structure necessary to undertake a project of this type,
133. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 54, at art. Ill § 4, available at
http://www.web.worldbank,org/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2004) ("The Bank may guarantee, participate in, or
make loans to any member or any political sub-division thereof and any business, industrial, and
agricultural enterprise in the territories of member, subject to the following conditions: (i) When the
member in whose territories the project is located is not itself the borrower, the member or the central
bank or some comparable agency of the member which is acceptable to the Bank, fully guarantees the
repayment of the pnncipal and the payment of interest and other charges on the loan.").
134. While World Bank loan documents are not publicly disclosed, World Bank Project Appraisal
Documents offer detailed descriptions of World Bank financed projects. Generally, the borrower
government manages the majority of the project with assistance from a World Bank Task Manager and
World Bank consultants. Project Appraisal Documents and other documents can be accessed on-line at:
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/ navigationjsp? pcont--browdoc (last visited Feb. 6, 2004).
135. See e.g., WORLD BANK, PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT ON A PROPOSED LOAN IN THE
AMOUNT OF US$46.0 MILLION TO THE STATE OF PERNAMBUCO, BRAZIL WITH THE GUARANTEE OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL FOR THE RECIFE URBAN UPGRADING PROJECT, REP No. 23331-BR
(Apr. 2003) (listing specific government responsibilities related to a recently approved $46 million
World Bank urban revitalization loan to Brazil) [hereinafter PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT].
136. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 16.
137 World Bank, World Bank Approves $46 Million For Low-Income Urban Upgrading In
Northeast Brazil, Apr. 24, 2003.
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but that structure is generally weak, understaffed and not entirely prepared to
address the complexities involved in a large, inter-institutional and governmental
project of this size."' 38 Public procurement and financial systems in these countries
may also be inadequate to ensure the integrity of the transactions. The appraisal
document of the same urban revitalization loan to Brazil, for example, noted that
FIDEM's "[olverall procurement capacity is considered weak and the risk for the
project is considered high."'
139
In addition, the World Bank's institutional mission to eradicate poverty
140
involves it in lending to the poorest countries in the world, which also tend-to be
the most corrupt. 141 The World Bank is also often called upon to lend to countries
emerging from conflict situations where the institutional structures are often too
weak to ensure the integrity of the funds lent to them. 142 In these situations, in
which countries do not have adequate institutional "absorption capacity" to handle
aid, lending can actually provide an incentive for governments to create poor
governance structures so that aid money can be diverted for illegitimate uses.143
The World Bank is also a bank in the traditional sense of the word and its
success is measured by traditional measures of banking success such as the rate of
return of its projects, which depends on the number of loans it makes and its rate of
default. 144 These measures ensure that the World Bank retains its superb credit
rating, as the "IBRD raises almost all its money in the world's financial markets"
where "[w]ith a AAA credit rating, it issues bonds to raise money and then passes
on the low interest rates to its borrowers."' 145 The pressure to make loans, and
especially large loans, creates a "culture of loan approval," characterized by a
pattern of overly optimistic and misguided lending that leads to a deterioration in
138. PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT, supra note 136, at 35.
139. Id. at 37.
140. The World Bank's Mission Statement begins with "[olur dream is a world free of poverty"
and continues "[t]o fight poverty with passion and professionalism for lasting results. World Bank
Group, About Us, Mission Statement, at http://www.worldbank.org/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2004).
141. At the time of this writing, the World Bank has active projects in all of the ten most corrupt
countries according to the 2002 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. The
countries from least corrupt to most corrupt are: Moldova, Uganda, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Kenya,
Angola, Madagascar, Paraguay, Nigeria, and Bangladesh. 2002 Transparency International Corruption
Perceptions Index, available at http://www.transparency.org/pressreleasesarchive/
2002/dwld/cpi2002.presrelease.en.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
142. Glenn T Ware & Gregory P Noone, The Culture of Corruption in the Postconflict and
Developing World, in IMAGINE COEXISTENCE: RESTORING HUMANITY AFTER ETHNIC VIOLENT
CONFLICT 191, 194 (Antoma Chayes & Martha Minow eds., 2003). See also Paul Blustem, G-7 Agrees
That Iraq Needs Help With Debt; Important Roles Seen For IMF World Bank, WASH. POST, Apr. 13,
2003, at A37
143. See Glenn T. Ware & Gregory P Noone, supra note 142, at 197 (discussing examples of
corrupt governmental schemes that may occur in the developing country and post-conflict contexts).
144. See World Bank, About Us, What is the World Bank, at http://www.worldbank.org/ (last
visited Feb. 15, 2004). The World Bank explicitly disagrees with this observation and describes itself
as "[nlot bank, but rather a specialized agency. The World Bank is not 'bank' in the common sense.
It is one of the United Nations' specialized agencies, and is made up of 184 member countries. These
countries are jointly responsible for how the institution is financed and how its money is spent. Id.
145. Id.
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the quality of loans made and exposes them to corruption.
146
[P]ressure to lend encourages Bank operations staff to identify their interests with
those of their clients in the recipient government. Task managers, who typically
operate in one sector, develop working relationships with government officials in
the relevant ministries. These officials, who implement projects under the
supervision of the task manager, are also responsible-or are closely connected to
the people responsible-for the approval of the next proposed Bank project for the
sector. Given that the task manager wants the project and the government needs
the loan, it does not take long for an understanding to develop in which problems
associated with existing projects are overlooked in exchange for a smooth path for
... .- i47
new projects in the pipeline.
Furthermore, if "lending [declines], the Bank will shrink in size and become a less
central player in the international economy ,,148
The World Bank itself first described this phenomenon in an internal 1992
report known as the Wapenhans Report, named after the World Bank Vice
President who directed the study producing the report. 149 The report found that this
culture of loan approval could be characterized by overly optimistic project
appraisal ratings, poor identification of risk factors, and inconsistent and subjective
evaluation criteria across projects that had resulted in over one-third of completed
Bank projects qualifying as failures under the Bank's own evaluation criteria. 15
The Wapenhans Report pointed towards gross corruption, finding that
seventy-eight percent of the financial conditions in World Bank loans were not
adhered to, a statistic that the report considered "startlingly low. ' ' lSi In subsequent
years, numerous reports of widespread corruption in World Bank financed projects
have surfaced. In 1997 for example, Business Week alleged that over $100 million
of a $500 million World Bank loan to the Russian coal sector either could not be
accounted for or had been diverted.152 At the time of the story, the World Bank was
146. Bruce Rich, The World Bank Under James Wolfensohn, in REINVENTING THE WORLD BANK
26,43 (Jonathan R. Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters eds., 2002). See also HOWARD N. WHITE & A. GESKE
DIIKSTRA, PROGRAMME AID AND DEVELOPMENT- BEYOND CONDITIONALITY 489 (2003) ("aid agencies
exist to give away money, and there is an ample literature documenting that individual and agency
performance are assessed on the quantity of aid rather than its quality"). See also MICHELLE MILLER
ADAMS, THE WORLD BANK: NEW AGENDAS IN A CHANGING WORLD 5 (1999) ("Most staff members
believe the 'approval culture' is still in place"); PAUL J. NELSON, THE WORLD BANK AND NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE LIMITS OF APOLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 89 (1995) ("The
institutional tendency to define success in terms of money moved is in keeping with the tendency in
official development circles to assess the adequacy of the industrial world's aid efforts by reference to
the amounts of money or per centages of GNP devoted to the cause.")
147. Jonathan R. Pincus, State Simplification and Institution Building in Development Project, in
REINVENTING THE WORLD BANK, at 76,98 (Jonathan R. Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters eds., 2002).
148. ADAMS, supra note 146, at 18.
149. World Bank, Portfolio Management Task Force Report Findings (1992), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/htm/opr/pmi/maintxt5.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2004).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Carol Matlack, What Happened to the Coal Miners Dollars? At Least $100 Million from a
World Bank Loan is Lost, BUS. WK., Sept. 8, 1997, at 52.
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preparing a new $500 million loan for the Russian coal sector, and Business Week
observed that "World Bank officials seem surprisingly unperturbed by the
misspending. They contend offering loans to spur change is better than
micromanaging expenditures."'
153
While the risk of default should logically provide a counter-incentive to an
overzealous "culture of lending, the risk of default is nearly inexistent in the case
of World Bank loans. All World Bank loans are guaranteed by governments,
which reduces the risk of loss for the loan to nearly zero,154 as history shows that
developing countries governments rarely default on World Bank loans.' 55 The
reasons for this phenomenon vary by country, but include the high levels of
dependence upon development assistance common in some countries, the weight
private lenders place on a country's good standing with the World Bank, the lower
interest rates and longer repayment terms countries can get from the World Bank
vis-a-vis private lenders, and the lack of access to the international capital markets
of many countries due to a below investment grade credit rating. With the risk of
default minimized to nearly zero, any significant risk to World Bank lending
decisions is removed, and a "culture of loan approval" is free to thrive, exposing
World Bank funds to higher risks of corruption. 1
56
B. The World Bank s Governance Structure
The World Bank's governance structure may also contribute to the "culture of
loan approval" and the lack of critical attention given to projects. The World Bank
is owned by Member governments who provide paid-in and callable capital in
exchange for ownership shares in the Bank. i57 Member governments benefit from
153. Id.
154. Allan H. Meltzer, et. al, Report of the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission
(2000), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/meltzer.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004) ("the host
government guarantee, required by all Bank lending, eliminates any link between project failure and the
Bank's risk of loss"). In 1998, the U.S. Congress set up the International Financial Institutions Advisory
Commission, chaired by Allan Meltzer and including prominent economists, business people and
politicians, to review the usefulness of number of international financial institutions. Id. The
commission released the report in March 2000. Id.
155. See ADAMS, supra note 146, at 19 (noting that "[olver the years, a normative consensus has
formed among lending institutions and borrowing countries alike that treating the World Bank as a
preferred creditor is a central part of playing by the rules of international finance.").
156. One commentator cautions against viewing the World Bank as "simply money-pushing
institution. See Devesh Kapur, The Changing Anatomy of Governance at the World Bank, in
REINVENTING THE WORLD BANK, at 54, 71. Professor Kapur notes that the Bank's lending has leveled
off in the 1990s, except for limited bail out lending. Id. However, according to its annual report, the
IBRD increased its new lending by one billion dollars in fiscal year 2002. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
8, at 26. The flattening in the 1990s may be more attributable to a global economic downturn beginning
in 1999 rather than the absence of an overzealous "culture of lending. It is also possible that
allegations of widespread corruption and irresponsible lending have applied pressure upon the Bank to
reduce its lending. Professor Kapur also notes that any money-pushing by the World Bank is dwarfed
by private sector lending to developing countries and that more attention should be placed on the much
larger unregulated system of international capital flows rather than the relatively small scale activity of
the World Bank. Kapur, supra note 146 at 71.
157 IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 54, at art. II.
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the business and sales generated by Bank projects and place pressure on the Bank
staff to approve more and bigger loans. 158 For example, the U.S. share in
procurement and contracting volume combined from the World Bank is twenty-
one percent.159 Governments and creditors within member countries may also push
for new loans so that developing countries can continue to service their debt.
160
These interests provide little incentive to reign in new loans and projects. Member
governments also lack the incentive to criticize the activities of other Member
governments, lest they cast a light upon their own practices.
C. Lack of and Limits to Project Oversight for Corruption
In addition to an incentive structure that promotes overly optimistic lending,
the World Bank lacks the ability to oversee all of its projects to ensure the integrity
of project funds. The World Bank requires borrowers and project implementation
entities to provide the Bank with annual independently audited financial
statements. 16 1 An investigation into World Bank management by the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) in the year 2000 found that
[t]he Bank is required to approve the selection of the auditors. However, Bank
guidance on auditor selection acknowledges that it is often not possible to ensure
the independence of auditors, particularly government auditors that are used for
auditing Bank-financed projects in many countries. The Bank guidance states that
government auditors are frequently not professionally qualified accountants-
many are political appointees, and some are public service administrators.
Furthermore, the Bank has been concerned that government auditing institutions
sometimes are understaffed, underfinanced, and subject to political pressure.
16 2
In addition, audits are limited in their ability to reveal core issues of fraud and
corruption, in that business records upon which financial statements are based may
be fraudulent and left uninvestigated.
163
The scale of lending activity that the World Bank undertakes and its
geographical dispersion across the globe can create a trade-off between effective
oversight and efficiency Supervision missions to all project sites are implausible
due to cost and time constraints. The IBRD and IDA generate about 40,000
individual procurement contracts annually, of which 10,000 (60 percent of value)
undergo prior review by Bank staff.i64 The remaining 30,000 are subject to
158. Winters, supra note 9, at 122.
159 MICHAEL D.V DAVIES, THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: TOP
DOWN AND BOTTOM UP 355 (2002).
160. BERTIN MARTENS ET AL., THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF FOREIGN AID 4 (2002).
161. PROGRESS SINCE 1997, supra note 7, at 8.
162. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 16.
163. Winters, supra note 9, at 116 (citing a task manager who states, "The auditors themselves-
and I've talked to a number of them--they admit freely that all they do is look at the books. If the books
balance, they say 'we've looked at it according to international auditing standards, and we find that the
records are in order. But the records themselves could be fraudulent. Auditors will tell you it's not their
job.")
164. WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK
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selective "post-audit" review, 6 5 which is rarely camed out.166 Even in cases of
prior review, without a complaint about the procurement contract under review, it
is very difficult to find evidence of a kickback or bribe payment from the contract
itself. 167
The 2000 GAO report also found that loan appraisal documents remained
unduly optimistic. The report found that a
review of 12 projects approved after November 1998 confirmed that the Bank's
senior decision makers still have not adequately assessed the risks posed by
potential corruption and weak managerial capacity of borrowers Only 4 of the
12 projects we reviewed identified corruption or undue political interference as a
critical project risk (even as a low or negligible one), even though Bank reports
had indicated that corruption is a problem in all of the countries included in our
project sample.1
68
Review of a randomly selected recent loan appraisal document showed that
the Bank seems to have made minor progress in its review of corruption.'69 The
appraisal repeatedly noted the high levels of risk in procurement and financial
management as well as political risk. 70  Corruption risk was not specifically
addressed as a risk factor but was eluded to once in the appraisal, finding that an
external audit had been conducted on the main implementing agency and had
reported no misuse of the preliminary funds for the research and development of
the project.17i The Bank should consider creating a distinct component in loan
appraisal documents for corruption risk assessment, as they currently do for social
and environmental impact.172  Corruption risk should also be included in the
sensitivity analysis of the project's cost-benefit calculation, as it directly impacts
the financial outcomes of a project.
The clear inability to oversee all of its projects requires the World Bank to be
especially vigilant in its termination of corrupt employees and in its debarment of
firms. The World Bank's oversight regime has been compared to the self-
reporting tax regime of the Internal Revenue Service. 173 In such systems, probity
may only be achieved when the consequences of being caught for fraudulent
conduct are serious enough to outweigh the low probability of being caught.
174
Stronger and swifter sanctions in internal corruption proceedings, including
criminal convictions of corrupt actors, and a larger number of debarments and
terminations are necessary to achieve this outcome in World Bank projects. The
34 n.27 (1997).
165. Id.
166. Winters, supra note 9, at 119.
167. See id. at 119-20.
168. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 19-20.
169. See PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT, supra note 135.
170. Id.
171. PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT, supra note 135, at 96.
172. Id.
173. Winters, supra note 9, at 119.
174. See i. at 119-20.
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World Bank must also disseminate information of its successes in anti-corruption
proceedings more effectively to provide notice to governments and corrupt actors
that the penalties for corruption are severe and mounting. The recent criminal
convictions of two former World Bank employees, for example, were not publicly
disclosed by the World Bank, so any deterrent value that their convictions may
have had on other corrupt actors was lost.
D. Staff Incentives and Organizational Structure
The incentive system and the organizational structure under which World
Bank staff operates may often oppose the aims of effective corruption control.
Like any bank officer, staff members have an interest in generating new and larger
loans to further their professional prominence within the organization. 75 Due to
the difficulty in measuring the impact of loans, evaluation of staff within aid
agencies often concentrates more on the number of loans made.' 76 Staff members
also cultivate personal relationships with country representatives and may feel
pressure not to offend them or the Member government they represent.' 77 The
desire of country representatives to secure new loans combined with the staff
member's incentive to generate loans can sacrifice critical analysis of lending
decisions for corruption and other risks. 78 Rotation of staff can be used to break
personal connections and reduce corruption risk. The World Bank could consider
such a system, though it might involve a significant trade-off between anti-
corruption effectiveness and professional expertise, as regional or sector experts
are moved to new regions and sectors.
E. Sentiments Regarding Project Corruption and Development
Another obstacle to effective anti-corruption efforts is a norm voiced by some
staff members that a project with corruption is a lesser evil than no project at all.
179
By this logic, the people of a developing country are better served by a school
construction project with a fifty percent corruption rate, in which 500 out of the
required 1000 schools are built, than with no project that results in zero schools.
175. NELSON, supra note 146, at 90 ("Careers at the World Bank have long been built primarily by
designing projects that win Board approval. It is commonplace in insider discussions that staff advance
primarily by identifying, designing, negotiating and preparing projects that the Board will approve and
that further the investment program in country.").
176. ADAMS, supra note 146, at 5 ("In the development field where the criteria for success are so
long-term and uncertain, lending volume was one of the ways in which the Bank could be judged as
having an impact. As a result, the Bank's organizational culture puts premium on concluding loans,
especially large loans, and staff members have been evaluated and promoted on their success in doing
so"); see also MARTENS ET AL., supra note 160, at 4.
177 Marcus W Brauchli, Speak No Evil: Why the World Bank Failed to Anticipate Indonesia
Deep Crisis, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1998, at AI ("World Bank officials knew corruption in bank-funded
projects was common, but never commissioned any broad reports tracking how much money was lost to
it, in part, some bank officials say, because they feared having to confront the government."). See also
Rich, supra note 146, at 43 (citing World Bank internal report noting "fear of offending the client".)
178. Pincus, supra note 147.
179. Winters, supra note 9, at 120.
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
One senior World Bank official is quoted as saying, "[i]f you take the amount of
30 percent loss it means 70 cents [on the dollar] got used for development after
all." 180
While logically persuasive, this proposition has been attacked as
shortsighted and naively optimistic. A task manager is cited as retorting:
.[M]y experience has been-and it's the experience of a lot of other people
there [on the operations side of the Bank]-if they're busy stealing 30 percent,
they're not paying any real attention to the other 70, even assuming 30 percent is
all they're taking. What you're really doing is really ruining the whole
effectiveness of the investment itself If you let out a contract for $2 million,
and you get the few civil servants at the top sharing $600,000 or 30 percent, do
they care if the contractor puts in concrete that is just sand and water9 Do they
care if the contractor doesn't put reinforcing steel in the structures? They don't
care. So when Bank people say we're at least getting 70 cents of good
development on the dollar, no you don't. Because the contractor either has to
make back the money that he's kicked back, or he just figures, "hey it's open
season, I do what I want and no one is going to challenge me. And so you have
this feeding frenzy, and the end result is you get very little development.
18 1
Furthermore, the notion that projects with corruption can be a "second-best"
to clean projects ignores the long-term phenomena of escalating corruption. In an
escalating corruption scenario, corrupt government officials who safely divert half
of an initial contract are emboldened to divert larger shares of subsequent contracts
until the project is reduced to simply a transfer of funds to the corrupt official, with
no project component at all. 182
This norm of overlooking corruption may be most prevalent when a nation is
experiencing rapid growth or undergoing social and economic transformations of
which the World Bank approves. In the case of Indonesia, for example, World
Bank oversight was lacking because "the World Bank considered this sprawling
archipelago's rise from poverty its great triumph."'' 83 In early 1998, World Bank
President James Wolfensohn admitted that "[w]e were caught up in the enthusiasm
of Indonesia I am not alone in thinking that 12 months ago, Indonesia was on a
very good path. ' 184 The World Bank Indonesia country head spoke of "a trade-off
between, shall we say being pure and helping people We have to decide every
morning when we wake up, are we doing more good than harm?"' 18 5 But when that
same country head visited a dozen villages looking at schools built with World
Bank funding, "[a]ll were crumbling only months after their completion, the
evident result of massive corruption that resulted in use of substandard
180. Id. at III (citing an interview with Katherine Marshall and Julian Schweitzer at World Bank
Headquarters in Washington D.C. on April 10, 1999).
181. Id. at 120.
182. Id. at 11, 120.




THE WORLD BANK'S ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS
materials,"1 8 6 confirming the critique offered above that development usually does
not occur in such corrupt projects. 187
The incidence of this norm among World Bank staff members is difficult to
measure. While one can assume that most staff members are committed to the
goals of anti-corruption, one cannot simply assume that most staff members would
support wholly canceling many development projects because of corruption. Any
tolerance of corruption based on this notion of a "second-best" remains an obstacle
to effective corruption-fighting in the World Bank.
F Political Considerations in Lending
Political and foreign policy considerations often shape the lending decisions
of the World Bank and lead to an overlooking of corruption risk. Throughout its
history, the lending decisions of the World Bank have often followed the political
and foreign policy aims of its largest shareholder, the United States. These
external considerations explain the World Bank's decisions not to lend to Vietnam
in the 1970s and 1980s, not to lend to Iran in the 1980s and 1990s, and to reduce
lending to India and Pakistan after their nuclear tests in 199 8 .i
88 During the Cold
War, political allies of the U.S., including Indonesia, Turkey Mexico, Congo, and
the Philippines continually received World Bank funding despite widespread
corruption, repeated noncompliance with loan provisions, and political
instability i89 Most recently, the World Bank provided funding to reconstruction
efforts in Afghanistan and is now being looked upon for funding in the Iraqi
reconstruction effort, despite the lack of any reliable civil authorities in either
locale. 190 These reconstruction efforts are also current cornerstones in American
foreign policy efforts. The link between World Bank lending and political and
foreign policy objectives of leading shareholders will continue to pose a risk to the
integrity of World Bank loan funds.
All of these factors help explain why the World Bank has been reluctant to
make long-term commitments to cut off funding for countries in the face of
evidence of widespread corruption or of a generally corrupt business environment.
The case of Kenya provides an illustrative example. In 1997 the World Bank
suspended a $72 million dollar loan to Kenya, together with an IMF suspension of
$220 million in loans, in the face of endemic corruption. i9 Despite the clear
186. Id.
187. Winters, supra note 9, at 11I, 120.
188. Kapur, supra note 156, at 59-60.
189. Jonathan R. Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters, Reinventing the World Bank, in REINVENTING THE
WORLD BANK, at 1, 5-6 (citing Catherine Gwin, U.S. Relations with the World Bank, 1945-1992, in 2
THE WORLD BANK: ITS FIRST HALF CENTURY 195, 252-63 (Kapur et al. eds., 1997)).
190. World Bank, New World Bank Grants Worth US $90 Million Reach Out Across Afghanistan,
June 6, 2002, at http://web.worldbank.org/ World Bank, World Bank Supports International
Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq, Oct. 22, 2003, at http://web.worldbank.org/
191. Pamphil Kweyuh, Kenya-Economy: World Bank Stops US$71.6 Energy Project, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Aug. 13, 1997. See also Thomas Omestad, et al., Bye-bye to Bribes: The Industrial World
Takes Aim at Official Corruption, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP Dec. 22, 1997, at 39.
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failure of Daniel Arap Moi's administration to tackle corruption in Kenya-it
made a number of public and administrative gestures-the World Bank resumed
lending shortly thereafter, only to suspend loans again in December 2000.'192
Only a month after a new president, Mwai Kibaki, took office in December
2002 pledging to curb corruption, the World Bank announced it would again
resume lending as early as July 2003 if the government implemented measures
demanded by IMF donors. 193 The Kenyan government launched a serious public
effort to combat corruption, creating an anti-corruption commission and a new
Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, appomting the head of Transparency
International in Kenya to a senior governmental position overseeing public ethics
and integrity forcing the resignation of the notoriously corrupt former Chief
Justice, and requiring that all public officials disclose their wealth-with the
President being the first to do so.194
The World Bank, however, did not require an actual reduction in the level of
corruption nor did it conduct any assessments of changes in corruption levels or
risk since the inauguration of the Kibaki government. The outcome of the current
prosecution of the chief project director involved in the Kenyan road scandal that
led to the U.S. convictions of two World Bank employees last year is still
pending. 195 The Kibaki administration has not made any progress on World Bank
demands that other top officials and contractors involved in that scandal be
prosecuted and banned from future government tenders. 196 Kenyan Attorney
General Amos Wako even cautioned recently that "the culture of corruption is
deeply rooted and efforts to stop it might become entangled in political
wrangling."' 197 If the political will of the Kibaki government to fight corruption
withers or runs into any major obstacles, the World Bank could find itself
suspending lending for a third time.
The Kenyan government has also made promising developmental reforms in
its first one-hundred days, beyond its anti-corruption reforms, by introducing
universal free primary education, launching a scheme to restructure the financial
system to benefit the agricultural backbone of the Kenyan economy building up
strategic grain reserves to forestall food shortages, and passing a number of anti-
crime measures that have reduced the crime rate in half across the country 198 For
the World Bank, any risk of corruption seems to be outweighed by the need to
support the developmental goals of the administration. The Kenyan case reveals
that the notion of tolerating corruption risk when the broader development policies
or practices of the country are favorable to the World Bank is still present.
192. See Gus Selassie, World Bank to Resume Development Assistance to Kenya, WORLD
MARKETS RES. CENTRE DAILY ANALYSIS, Jan. 30, 2003.
193. Id.
194. U.S. Diplomat Highlights Kenya Actions Against Corruption and Terrorism, ALL AFR.,
Sept. 13, 2003; Kibaki, Cabinet Declare Wealth, ALL AFR., Sept. 30, 2003.
195. Kevin Kelley, Two Swedes Jailed over Bribes in Kenyan Deal, ALL AFR., Feb. 6, 2004.
196. Corruption Watch World Bank Kenya Counter Attacks, APR. ANALYSIS, May 8, 2002.
197. Press Releases and Documents, Voice of Amenca, Kenya/Corruption (July 24, 2003).
198. Yu Xinchao, Opportunities, Challenges Coexist in Reconstruction of Kenya, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, Apr. 14, 2003.
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G. Incentives for Firms and Contractors
Firms and contractors who are hired by the World Bank or by governments to
participate in World Bank financed projects can lack the proper incentives to report
corruption to the World Bank. The World Bank currently does not have a
provision that allows internal investigators to offer immunity to firms who assist in
corruption investigations. So, a firm that has paid bribes to a government official
in a World Bank financed project faces debarment if it comes forward with
allegations against the government official. If the firm has not engaged in
corrupt activity but is aware of corruption, it may still not come forward out of a
fear of losing future World Bank or government contracts. The creation of an
anonymous hotline to report corrupt activity may mitigate the risk to whistleblower
firms and contractors, but may not provide enough protection in the minds of some
contractors to overcome the fear of retaliation in the bidding process for future
projects.
H. The Status of the Internal Investigative Body
Another serious structural problem threatening the World Bank's anti-
corruption efforts is the precarious status of the internal investigative body within
the World Bank bureaucracy 199 In bureaucratic structures, internal investigations
bodies tend to be viewed with reservations if not outright distrust. The World
Bank Tribunal in C v. IBRD implied such a suspicion when it wrote that the
internal investigative body performed in an "unnecessarily secretive" manner that
violated the due process rights of employees. 20 0 The Tribunal has found due
process defects in a number of other investigations. 20 1 These cases affirm the fears
of some staff members that the work of the internal investigations department
oversteps its authority and illegitimately intrudes into their employment
relationship with the Bank. The fact that the Department of Institutional Integrity
is an independent body accountable only to the President of the Bank heightens the
distrust some within the Bank feel towards it.
The creation of an internal investigations body for the World Bank follows
from the World Bank's Articles of Agreement, which includes a provision stating,
"the Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are
used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted., 20 2 The World Bank has
199. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 12 (observing that the investigations Unit did not have the
necessary stature within the World Bank).
200. See C v. IBRD, Decision No. 272, at 26 (World Bank Admin. Trib. 2002).
201. See Koudogbo v. Int'l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., Decision No. 246, at 14, 43
(World Bank Admin. Trib. 2001). See also Dambita v. Int'l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev.,
Decision No. 243, at 9 26, 28 (World Bank Admin. Trib. 2001); Cisse v. Int'l Bank for Reconstruction
and Dev., Decision No. 242, at 37, 43 (World Bank Admin. Trib. 2001). It is important to note that
these decisions were decided when the internal investigative process was fragmented, prior to the
creation of unified Department of Institutional Integrity. This new structure allegedly increases the
Bank's system of checks and balances over the procedures of the internal investigations unit.
202. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 54, at art. Ill § 5.
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not formally established the Department of Institutional Integrity with an
Executive Board order, as the United Nations has done with its internal
investigations body through United Nations General Assembly resolution
48/218.203 Approving a World Bank Executive Board order would bolster the
organizational legitimacy of the investigations unit and would also establish the
office permanently, removing any threat to its continued operation.
1. Recommendations for Addressing Structural Obstacles
A number of recommendations have already been offered in this paper to
address some of the structural obstacles detailed above. These include issuing an
Executive Board order formally establishing the World Bank's internal anti-
corruption unit, providing the option of immunity from debarment to firms who
come forward with allegations of corruption, rotating project staff more frequently,
publicizing criminal referrals and other punitive measures against corrupt firms
and individuals more widely to bolster the deterrence value of such activities,
analyzing corruption risk as a distinct component in project appraisals and
including corruption risk in the sensitivity analysis of the cost-benefit calculations
of proposed projects.
Recommendations to address the serious challenges of the World Bank's
operational model and governance have also been widely offered in the public
domain. Some have recommended that the World Bank dramatically reduce its
level of lending "until the quality of administration and supervision in projects,
both on the Bank's part and on the borrower's side, is improved to a degree that
the resources are not squandered. 20 4
The Meltzer Commission Report draws a starker conclusion, calling for the
elimination of all lending to countries with investment grade credit ratings. 20 5 The
Commission recommends that loans to poor countries without access to capital
markets should still be made but for institutional reform and that developmental
aid should be aimed at public goods like health care and should be administered
through performance based grants rather than loans.2 6 The Meltzer Commission
included some prominent dissenting members who attacked the Commission's
recommendations as potentially threatening the fight against global poverty 207
They questioned the Commission s recommendation to limit the nonconcessional
lending of the IDA branch of the World Bank, which extends interest-free loans to
203. See G.A. Res. 48/218B, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 87th mig., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/218, at art.
11, 9 (1994).
204. Winters, supra note 9, at 122-23 (Winters finds task managers who agree with him, such as
one who concludes: "We're long way from turning the comer on the Bank s culture. There will not be
real progress until there's genuine slowing down of the lending program.")
205. Meltzer, supra note 154.
206. Id.
207. Id. (dissenting statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Director, Institute for International Economics;
Richard Huber, Former Chairman, President, and CEO, Aetna, Inc., Jerome Levinson, Former General
Counsel, Inter-American Development Bank; and Esteban Torres, U.S. House of Representatives,
1983-99).
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the poorest countries of the world.208 They also questioned the commitment of
Western governments to fund a grant-giving agency after the lending capital of the
World Bank is returned to Western governments per the Commission's
recommendations.209 Finally, they feared the impact on developing countries of
being forced to rely on international capital markets, which may be volatile.2 10
The World Bank had already undertaken one of the Meltzer Commission
proposals, by aggressively pursuing capacity-building in developing countries to
create the type of procurement, managerial and legal institutions necessary to
ensure the integrity of its funds. 211 The Overview of World Bank Activities in
Fiscal 2002 noted that "[p]ublic administration was by far the leading sector for
IBRD lending, receiving $3.6 billion, over 30 percent of the total. The significant
amount of lending in the public administration sector reflects the Bank's focus on
assisting its clients to improve development strategies, implement reform policies,
and build institutional capacities.' '2i2
The movement towards institutional reform should proceed with caution. In
the past, the use of economic aid as a tool for policy reforms has been mixed in its
success and is a controversial and contentious topic. 213 In addition, the World Bank
has espoused dramatically different patterns of thinking in the realm of
institutional development over the past thirty years that should cast doubt on its
knowledge base in governance reforms.214 Furthermore, there is no accepted
institutional formula for reducing corruption within countries and the tremendous
variation between countries requires customized and local political solutions.
215




211. PROGRESS SINCE 1997, supra note 7, at 44.
212. World Bank, Overview of World Bank Activities in Fiscal 2002, at
http://www.worldbank.org/annualreport/2002/Overview.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2004)
213. WHITE & DIJKSTRA, supra note 146, at 518 (for detailed analysis of the history and
controversies related to aid conditionality with case studies of conditionality programs). See also
WORLD BANK, ASSESSING AID 4 (1998) (The World Bank's own analysis of policy-based aid shows
"that donor financing with strong conditionality but without strong domestic leadership and political
support has generally failed to produce lasting change.").
214. See ADAMS, supra note 146, at 108 (describing the World Bank's view on state involvement
in economic development as swinging pendulum over the past four decades). See also WHITE &
DIJKSTRA, supra note 146, at 518.
215. See generally Mushtaq H. Khan, Corruption and Governance in Early Capitalism: World
Bank Strategies and Their Limitations, in REINVENTING THE WORLD BANK, supra note 146, at 164,
181-83 (proposing that the World Bank's anti-corruption prescriptions are founded on misguided
assumption that reducing the discretionary role of the State will promote growth. Instead, the historical
evidence attests to the fact that all developed nations have undergone a period during which State
intervention supported the interests of an emergent capitalist class at the expense of other classes. What
separates the underdeveloped from the developed is that in the latter, the State had the political capacity
to reign in the capitalist class to ensure that preferential disparate treatment did not become oriented
towards the capture of State resources. The key, then, is not to "nght-size" underdeveloped States with
reforms that reduce their discretion, but to allow discretion and preferential treatment while supporting
political reforms to ensure that political leadership can control the emergent capitalist class once it
begins to thrive.)
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developing countries about the power structures that foster and maintain corruption
and how to diffuse power so that citizens may more easily hold their governments
accountable for corruption.2 16 For this reason, any anti-corruption governance
reforms should be devised in collaboration with civil society and the population at
large in developing countries.
A reasonable compromise between the viewpoints in the current debate on
fundamental World Bank reform may be a viable avenue to follow The Bank has
not sufficiently addressed concerns about its culture of overly optimistic lending
decisions. A recent $46 million urban revitalization loan to Brazil attests to the
continuing culture of lending optimism at the World Bank.217 The loan appraisal
document identified an overall project risk rating of "substantial. 2 8 The appraisal
rated the risk associated with the project's implementing agency as "high, noting
"[w]eak management and technical capacity of the executing [agencies'
coordination of the project] (FIDEM and Municipalities), particularly in the areas
of procurement and financial management., 219 The loan appraisal did mention risk
mitigation strategies which included hiring numerous technical consultants to
assist the implementing agency and numerous World Bank supervisory visits."' In
spite of these measures, the World Bank should reconsider lending to projects with
"substantial" overall risk ratings in which the primary weaknesses is in the main
implementing agency Reducing lending to such risky projects might not
necessarily produce an overall reduction in World Bank lending, as funding for
safer projects and anti-corruption reform might be increased.
In the interim, as the World Bank addresses these larger institutional
questions, it should ensure that its own internal investigations unit is properly
financed and trained and has the proper legal framework within which to function.
This framework would include the reforms related to the recent C v. IBRD opinion
discussed above, the enactment of an illicit enrichment provision, a clear and
effective standard of proof, and the ability to share information with other agencies
and cross-debar. Increased public recognition of their efforts and an Executive
Board order formally recognizing their existence as a mandated institution under
the Bank's Articles of Agreement will also help to promote the stature of the
internal investigations unit while increasing the deterrent value of their work. The
internal investigative bodies should also provide training to national prosecutors in
developing countries to help prosecute corrupt firms and individuals the World
216. Some critics argue that the Bank's technical solutions to corruption overlook the power
arrangements in all corrupt client countries that allow certain actors in society to flout formal rules for
their personal benefit. Winters, supra note 9, at 113. The Bank itself admitted in its 1997 anti-
corruption Framework that, "[i]n some countries the primary reason for divergence [from formal rules]
may be political, a manifestation of the way power is exercised and retained. This limits what the Bank
can do to help outside the framework of its projects. PROGRESS SINCE 1997, supra note 7 at 13.
217 World Bank, World Bank Approves $46 Million for Low-Income Urban Upgrading in
Northeast Brazil, Apr. 24, 2003, at http://web.worldbank.org/.
218. The possible risk ratings were "high, "substantial, "modest, and "negligible or low.
PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT, supra note 135, at 50-51.
219. Id. at 51.
220. See generally id.
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Bank refers to them. Funding and training should also be provided to investigators
and prosecutors in developing countries to help build corruption cases related to
World Bank loans.
V CONCLUSION
In the face of a wealth of research on the debilitating effects of corruption in
developing countries and mounting evidence of endemic corruption in World Bank
projects, the World Bank announced an institutional commitment to curbing
corruption in its projects m 1996.221 Since then, the World Bank has launched a
multi-pronged strategy to attempt to ensure the integrity of the projects it finances
throughout the developing world. Nearly a decade later, the World Bank's anti-
corruption efforts are continuing to develop in concert with a growing international
effort to curb corruption. However, serious legal and structural uncertainties and
obstacles stand in the way of full effectiveness of the World Bank's efforts.
Expansive due process rights of employees in criminal referrals, an uncertain
standard of proof in internal corruption investigations, no system of investigative
cooperation and cross-debarment, and a series of fundamental structural
impediments pose significant threats to the success of the World Bank's anti-
corruption efforts. Substantive reforms ranging from a new Staff Rule ensuring
secrecy during criminal referrals to the formal calculation of corruption risk in loan
appraisal documents offer realistic ways to strengthen the anti-corruption efforts of
the World Bank. Unless these necessary internal legal and structural reforms are
undertaken, the integrity of all World Bank projects will be uncertain at best,
imperiling the future of the broader global development project itself.




THE TRIAL OF SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC:
THE DEMISE OF HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY
AND THE SPECTER OF VICTOR'S JUSTICE
Scott Grosscup
The conflict in Yugoslavia during the last decade has culminated in
unprecedented events in international law due to circumstances particular to the
region. The war exposed a number of the intense ethnic tensions between Bosnian,
Croatian, and Serb populations' that had lain dormant in the Balkan region for
many years under the rule of General Josip Broz Tito. 2 The fall of the Soviet
Empire in the late 1980's and early 1990's, and the rise of right to self-
determination principles in the region during the same period,3 brought instability
and war to Europe, the likes of which had not been seen since the end of World
War I1. The resulting ethnic hatred and political instability led an international
force to bring peace to the region 4 and has seen the first instance where the leader
of an independent state is on trial for crimes that occurred while he was in power.'
The events that began in Yugoslavia in the early 1990's are not over.
However, the majority of the violence that accompanied the rise and fall of
Slobodan Milosevic has subsided.6 The conflict involved numerous states and
international organizations.7 After ten years, United Nations troops are still
J.D. Candidate, 2004, University of Denver College of Law.
1. See generally JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD, RETURN TO DIVERSITY, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF EAST
CENTRAL EUROPE SINCE WORLD WAR 11 260-262 (Oxford University Press 1993).
2. See GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE 209 (Pnnceton University Press
2000) (estimating that Josp Broz Tito and his communist partisans executed between 20,000 and 40,000
of the opposition Ustasha fascists in Tito's rise to power, mostly through summary executions, for fear
that criminal trials would enrage ethnic tensions).
3. See generally ROTHSCHILD, supra note 1.
4. See Roger Cohen, Crisis in the Balkans, NY TIMES, June 15, 1999, at Al (quoting a United
Nations mediator,0 Carl Bildt, "An international military presence to guarantee peace in the Balkans
must be seen in the coming decades").
5. Sheema Khan, Comment, Welcome Ex-Dictators, Torturers and Tyrants: Comparative
Approaches to Handling Ex-Dictators and Past Human Rights Abuses, 37 GONZ. L. REV 167 194
(2002) (comparing state actions against ex-dictators involved in human rights violations and the role of
the International Criminal Court in bnnging ex-dictators to justice).
6. See generally U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Serbia and Montenegro, available
at http:l/www.state.gov/r/paei/bgn/5388.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
7 In addition to the United Nations and NATO forces, the Red Cross, Amnesty International and
numerous other organizations have provided assistance and aid to the redeveloping nations. See Bosnia
Help Organizations, available at http://www.cco.caltech.edu/-bosnialhelp/org.html (last visited Feb.
27, 2004) (listing of some of these agencies).
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deployed in the region,8 serving to keep the peace, and numerous non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) are on the ground, administering aide,
overseeing relocation programs, and ensuring safe transitions to democracy 9
The conflict in Yugoslavia has also forged new ground on how the
international community deals with a nation's internal conflicts.I° This includes
international intervention by a regional peacekeeping force" I and, in particular, the
first trial of a sitting head of state for state sanctioned criminal activities, and
violations of the evolving area of human rights law 12
This paper will examine the trial of Slobodan Milosevic, former President of
Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Part I discusses the events that led
to the arrest and charges against Milosevic. Part II explores why traditional
notions of sovereign immunity have not applied to his trial. Part III examines the
reasons why the international community has made an effort to prosecute the
former president. Lastly, Part IV looks at the impacts the trial will have on the
former Yugoslavian states,i3 and potential ramifications if the prosecution fails to
convict the former president.
PART I - TURMOIL IN THE BALKANS: THE RISE AND FALL OF MILOSEVIC
Prior to the eruption of war in 1991, Yugoslavia was the "Darling of the
West."' 14  Dunng this period, Yugoslavia received most-favored-nation status,
technology transfers, and cultural exchanges. 15 However, the Balkan states 16 have
complex ethmic and religious characteristics that have fueled conflict between the
8. See generally UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmibh/unmibh-body.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2002); see
also UNITED NATIONS INTERiM ADMINISTRATION MISSION IN Kosovo, available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2002).
9. A search of the Regional Environmental Center found 127 environmentally focused non-
governmental organizations operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 150 in Croatia and 160 in Yugoslavia.
Available at http://www.rec.org/REC/Databases/NGODirectory/NGOFind.html (last visited Nov. 22,
2002).
10. There is some debate as to whether the conflict in the former Yugoslavia constitutes an
international or an internal conflict. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), for purposes of jurisdiction, has decided that the war in Yugoslavia was of international
character.
II. See generally NATO Fact Sheet, NATO's role in Bosnia and Herzegovina, available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/role-bih.htm.
12. See, e.g., Richard B. Bilder, Kosovo and the "New Interventionism Promise or Peril? 9 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 153 (1999) (exploring the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo).
13. The former Yugoslavia was composed of six republics, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Serbia (with the once autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo), Montenegro, and
Macedonia.
14. JOHN FEFFER, SHOCK WAVES EASTERN EUROPE AFTER THE REVOLUTIONS 254 (South End
Press 1992).
15. Id.
16. The Balkans states are located between the Adriatic Sea to the west and the Black Sea on the
East, with Turkey and Greece to the South, and Slovakia and Ukraine to the North. SATELLITE WORLD
ATLAS 78-79 (Helicon Publishing 2001) (1999).
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Bosnian, Serb, and Croatian populations. 17  The assassination of Austrian
Archduke Ferdinand by a Bosnian Serb nationalist in 1914 was the spark that sent
the modem world into what was at that point the worst war in history "8 After
World War I, the Balkan states formed the state of Yugoslavia in 1929 '9 This
union of ethnic Serb, Croat, and Slovene populations was tenuous, and in 1934 a
member of the Croatian independence movement assassinated King Alexander of
Yugoslavia.2 Yugoslavia once again saw an invasion, but this time by the Axis
powers of Germany and Italy in World War 11.21 During the War, Croatian
collaborators worked to rid Croatia of Serbs, mimicking the Nazi concentration
camps and exterminating over 500,000 Serbs and displacing another million.22
Communist partisan forces, led by Josip Broz Tito and assisted by the Allied
powers, helped rid the territories of Axis occupation.23 From 1945 until Tito's
death in 1980, ethnic tensions and nationalistic movements were suppressed by the
state through relocating Serb minorities in the various republics outside of Serbia.24
Professor Michael Scharf notes, "Tito's death and the collapse of the Soviet
threat in the late 1980's unleashed the long-festering centrifugal forces that would
soon lead to Yugoslavia's disintegration. 25
The next section explores the recent history of the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), and events leading to the arrest and indictment of Slobodan
Milosevic as potential precedent necessary for the international community to
respond to conflict and serving as the base line for international law and the demise
of heads of state immunity
I History of the conflict
Slobodan Milosevic was born in Pozarevac, Serbia in 1941 to a communist
activist mother and absent father.26 Milosevic excelled at the University Law
School in the 1960's.27 After earning his law degree, Milosevic held several
Communist Party positions in city government and was appointed president of the
largest state-run bank in 1978.28 In 1986, Milosevic was appointed Communist
17. See MICHAEL P SCHARF & WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC ON TRIAL 14 (The
Continuum International Publishing Group, Inc. 2002) (citing commentators who date the beginnings of
the turmoil in the Balkans to 1389 when the Ottoman Turks defeated Serbian forces in the battle of
Kosovo Polje, starting several hundred years of occupation by the Ottoman Empire).
18. See id. at 15. The assassination occurred on the anniversary of the battle of Kosovo Polje
which occurred 525 years earlier.
19. Id. at 15-16.
20. Id. at 16.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 17.
24. Id. at 17
25. Id. at 18.
26. Id. at 5 (noting that both parents eventually committed suicide).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 8.
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Party leader after his friend and close ally, Ivan Stambolic, became President of
Serbia.29 That same year the Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences published a
memorandum that became the manifesto of the Serb nationalist movement and led
to Milosevic's rise to power.30 While Communist Party leader, Milosevic was sent
to Kosovo to quiet a Serb uprising against the Albanian majority "' Milosevic
spoke to a crowd of Kosovar Serbs and said:
No one has the right to beat our people! This is your land, these are your
homes, these are your fields, your gardens, and your memories Would you
shame your ancestors and disappoint your children? We will win this battle.
Yugoslavia does not exist without Kosovo Yugoslavia and Serbia will not give
32
it away.
Milosevic used these nationalistic emotions, suppressed by the Tito regime for
years, to become President of Serbia in 1989 just as anti-Serb nationalism rose in
the republics of Croatia and Slovenia.33
In June 1991, at the order of President Milosevic, the Yugoslav National
Army invaded Slovenia and Croatia under the guise of "protecting" Serbs living in
those republics from anti-Serb sentiments.34 In a brutal military campaign, the
Serbs quickly gained control over nearly one-third of the Republic of Croatia.35
United Nations investigators later found mass graves in numerous places including
outside the city of Vukovar, where Serb forces massacred over 200 Croatian
hospital patients.36
Citing the rising tide of war in the region, the United Nations Security
Council adopted Resolution 713 in September 1991, which imposed an embargo
on the sale of arms to areas within the territory of Yugoslavia and called for the
parties to abide by the ceasefire agreement they had signed just a few days earlier
in Igalo. 37 By February 1992, satisfied that the conditions had been met for the
deployment of peace-keeping operation to the region, the United Nations Security
Council adopted Resolution 743, establishing the United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR).38  Subsequently, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina voted
for independence from Yugoslavia on March 1, 1992, 39 which was recognized by
the European Community on April 6, 1992.40 Shortly after the dissolution of
29. Id. at 9.
30. Id. at 9-10.
31. Id. at 10.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 1I. The leaders of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, and Slovenia, Milan Kucan, sought to
dilute Serbian influence in Yugoslavia by creating a loose federation of states, leading to the dissolution
of Yugoslavia in 1991. Id. at 19.
34. Id. at 19-20.
35. Id. at 20.
36. Id.
37 S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 3009th mtg., U.N. Doc. SJRes/713 (1991).
38. S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 3055th mtg., U.N. Doc. SfRes/743 (1992).
39 SCHARF, supra note 18, at 22.
40. STEVE TERRETT, THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BADINTER ARBITRATION
VOL. 32:2
THE DEMISE OF HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY
Yugoslavia, Serb forces attacked Croatian and Bosnian Muslim populations in the
republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to unite Bosnian Serb populations with
greater Serbia.41 Although the official Yugoslav National Army (JNA) eventually
pulled out of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia continued to arm and direct Bosnian
Serbs in the self-declared "Republika Srpska, a Serb-dommated area of BiH, 42
over the next few years committing violations of international humanitarian law,43
numerous mass killings,44 and attacks on United Nations designated "safe areas. 45
The United Nations's inability to provide security for these areas led civilians to
call their "guests" by the derogatory name, "UNprotection Force, from the
acronym UNPROFOR, or United Nations Protection Force.46 One of the worst
massacres of the war occurred in eastern Bosnia in the town of Srebrenica after
Bosman-Serb troops overran United Nations peacekeeping forces and then
executed thousands of unarmed men and boys alongside trenches.
47
In 1995, after air strikes carried out by the United States with NATO support,
Slobodan Milosevic traveled to the United States and signed the Dayton Peace
Accord dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina into two "enities:" the Bosman-Serb
"Republika Srpska" and the Muslim-Croat Federation. 48 The accord also allowed
for greater deployment of United Nations Peacekeeping forces known as IFOR. '9
After several years of war, and up to 250,000 Muslim deaths and the displacement
COMMISSION: A CONTEXTUAL STUDY OF PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS IN THE POST COLD WAR WORLD 33
(Ashgate Publishing Co. 2000).
41. SCHARF, supra note 18, at 22. Bosnian Serb forces led by Radovan Karadzic seized control of
nearly seventy-percent of Bosnia leaving several enclaves under Bosnian control-Sarajevo, Mostar,
Bihac, Tusla, Srebrenia, and Gorazde.
42. NORMAN CIGAR & PAUL WILLIAMS, INDICTMENT AT THE HAGUE: THE MILOOviC REGIME
AND CRIMES OF THE BALKAN WAR 25 (New York University Press 2002); TERRET, supra note 41, at
33.
43. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 789 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at Part IV U.N. Doc S/1994/674 (1994), available at:
http://webmedia2.depaul.edu/ihrli/publications/yugoslavia.asp. See also Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic,
Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, IT-94-1-A (1999). Dusko Tadic was the first war criminal to be
tried by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Tadic was convicted of
individual criminal responsibility of willful killing; torture or inhuman treatment; willfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health; crimes against humanity and violations of customs of
war all in violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention. Tadic was present at the Omarska, Keraterm, and
Tmopolje camps in the Republic of Bosnia where he participated in "horrendous treatment" upon non-
Serb populations including the forced transfer of civilians to camps, beatings, and killings of those
civilians. Tadic was sentenced to twenty years in a German prison for violations of international
humanitarian law.
44. Id. at 61.
45. See SCHARF, supra note 18, at 26-27 United Nations forces were deployed to protect and
demilitarize the six "safe areas" with a force of 7,500.
46. See, e.g., Emma Daly, Croats Dismiss Fears Of New War Independent (London), Jan. 23,
1995, at 8.
47 YvEs BEIGBEDER, JUDGING WAR CRIMINALS 149 (St. Matin's Press, Inc., 1999) (describing
the July II, 1995 Serb attack on the U.N. safe haven of Srebremca, in which over 40,000 people,
mostly Bosnian Muslims, fled the area and anywhere from 4,000 to 10,000 men and boys were
systematically killed).
48. TERRET, supra note 4 1, at 96.
49. SCHARF, supra note 18, at 30-31.
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of over 2 million from Serb-controlled areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina,50 it
appeared that violence in the region had reached its maximum and peace was on
the horizon. 51
Ideas of self-determination permeated the region, however, and, in 1996, the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began attacking Serbian positions. 52  Serbian
forces then turned their energies away from Bosnia and Herzegovina and began
clearing ethnic Albanians from the territory of Kosovo through forced relocation
and killings of civilians.53 The ensuing exodus of the ethnic Kosovo Albanians
brought about another NATO bombing campaign,54 the withdrawal of Serb forces
from the region, and a new government in Serbia.55
The NATO led bombing campaign, economic crisis, international pressure,
and years of unrest evaporated Milosevic's grasp on power. In September 2000,
Vojislav Kostunica defeated Milosevic in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's
presidential elections.56 Milosevic did not recognize the results of the election
even though the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia and the Serbian Parliament
recognized Kostunica as the legitimate president.5 7 Milosevic finally submitted his
resignation on October 6, 2000, after Serb soldiers along with thousands of
protesters stormed government buildings ending his tenure as president.58  As a
result of the change in leadership, the United States lifted the oil embargo and
flight ban that had been imposed on the region since 1998.59 At the same time,
leaders with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced plans to readmit
Yugoslavia,60 which had lost membership in the international financial institution
in 1992.61 IMF membership enabled access to significant financial support for the
tattered country's redevelopment.
50. Id. at 35.
51. Raymond Bonner, Bosnian Civilians Hopes for Peace Are Modest, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 20,
1995, at A10.
52. 52.SCHARF, supra note 18, at 33.
53. Serb forces conducted killings of civilians as well as ethnic cleansing through rapes of
Albanian women with the intent of impregnating them with Serbian children. See generally Todd A
Salzman, Rape Camps as a means of Ethnic Cleansing: Religious, Cultural and Ethical Responses to
Rape Victims in the Former Yugoslavia, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 348, 363 (1998) (estimating anywhere from
20,000 to 70,000 survivors of rape from Serbian forces).
54. Id. at 34. NATO, using primarily the United States Air Force, bombed Serb forces from
March 24, 1999 through June 9, 1999.
55. Steven Erlanger, Showdown in Yugoslavia, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 7,2000, at Al.
56. SCHARF, supra note 18, at 36.
57. Erlanger, supra note 52.
58. SCHARF, supra note 18, at 36.
59. Lawrence L. Knutson, U.S. Lifts Yugoslavia Sanctions, AP ONLINE, Oct. 12, 2000, available
at 2000 WL 27905642 (citing commentators who have noted that these sanctions were not in place
dunng the war that dissolved the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1991 through
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2. Creation of the ICTY
The United Nations Security Council, pursuant to Article 39 of the United
Nations Charter,62 established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) on May 25, 1993.63 Resolution 827 creating the ICTY states
that the "situation [in Yugoslavia] continues to constitute a threat to international
peace and security" and that the "establishment of an international tribunal and the
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of
peace." 64 The ICTY was designed to help restore peace in the region by serving
internationally recognized views of justice, including the right to a fair trial. 65 The
ICTY is composed of sixteen permanent judges from different states, 66 seven of
whom serve in an appeals chamber where five judges sit on any individual
appeal.67 The ICTY Statute also creates the Office of the Prosecutor who is
responsible for investigating and prosecuting persons accountable for "violations
of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since January 1, 1991.,,68 The prosecutor is ultimately responsible for
determining whom to charge.69
The creation of the ICTY is not the first time that a special international
tribunal has been created by an international organization for prosecuting war
criminals. 70 However, its creation and potential success or failure does come at a
significant time in history when countries of the world are working to define the
scope and power of the International Criminal Court (ICC) created by the Rome
Statute in 1998.
In order to understand the ICTY it is important to first understand the court's
primary predecessor, the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal. Although not
62. U.N. CHARTER art. 39, states: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 4 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
63. Security Council Resolution on Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Law and Humanitarian law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 84th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/Res/827, 1993.
64. Id.
65. See id., see also AMENDED STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ART. 21, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000.htm.
66. See id at art. 12, para. I.
67. Id. at para. 3.
68. Id. at art. 16, paras. 1,3.
69. See id. at art. 18, paras. 1, 4.
70. See BASS, supra note 3, at 5 (documenting six times when states have dealt with issues of
international justice prior to the creation of the ICTY these include trials of the Bonapartists in 1815
after the 100 Days War; trials of German war criminals after World War I; prosecution of Turk
perpetrators of the Armenian genocide; the Nuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals; the trial of Japanese
war criminals in Tokyo; the current ex-Yugoslavia tribunal; and the trial for crimes that occurred in the
genocide in Rwanda).
71. See Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 44, at part IV
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the first international court, the Nuremberg Tribunal serves as a significant
example for how high-level politicians and senior military officers were put on
trial for their part in crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes against
peace.72 The Nuremberg Tribunal, however, only judged the participation of Nazi
officials during World War 11.73 As such, the tribunal has been labeled as a sort of
"victors' justice, where the nationality of the judges and prosecutors were the
same as those who won the war.74 In fact, the Nuremberg Tribunal was created
several months after the end of the war in Europe by an agreement of the United
States, French, British, and Soviet representatives and did not include input from
others in the international community 7 The fledgling United Nations, created in
June 1945 could have provided the opportunity for international input in
establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal,76 but it was bypassed by the victorious
nations. 77
The Nuremberg Tribunal also established general principles of criminal
responsibility for individual state actors during wartime activities for international
law 78 This principle was later adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
as Resolution 95 (1).79 This movement away from actions between states to
actions by states against individuals is a significant change in how the international
community is willing to prosecute individuals acting during times of war. Perhaps,
the world was appalled after learning about the acts of the Nazi's during the war
and sought some relief through what seemed to be a more humane and proper
treatment after all the bloodshed. Nonetheless, the Allied forces ran what some
have called "kangaroo courts" to prosecute those that had been vanquished 0
The Nuremberg Tribunal did not have the opportunity to try the major leaders
of the Nazi regime due to the fact that individuals such as Adolf Hitler, and several
72. BEIGBEDER, supra note 44, at 27.
73. Id. at 39 (stating that many modem scholars accept that activities undertaken by the Allied
forces, including fire-bombing of German cities and the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, would constitute war crimes defined as "wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages,
or devastation not justified by military necessity").
74. Id. at 39.
75. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, pmbl., 59 Stat. 1544,
82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284 (charter) [hereinafter Nuremberg Agreement and Tribunal] (in which the
governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of
America, the provisional government of the French Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics declared they were "acting in the interests of all the United Nations" in concluding their
agreement on how to prosecute German officials).
76. The United Nations Charter entered into force on October 24, 1945, while the International
Military Tribunal was signed and entered into force on August 8, 1945. See U.N. Charter, supra note
59; Nuremberg Agreement and Tribunal, supra note 72.
77. See Nuremberg Agreement and Tribunal, supra note 72.
78. U.N. Charter, supra note 59, at art. 6.
79. See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of
Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(i), U.N. GAOR, Ist Sess., U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946).
80. See generally Richard Falk, Telford Taylor And The Legacy Of Nuremberg, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 693 (1999).
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key office holders, Heinrick Himmler and Josef Goebels, were already dead.8'
However, key actors such as General Herman Goering, and Foreign Minister
Joachim von Ribbentrop, were tried and sentenced to death. 2 Recognizing that the
Tribunal was created by the victors, the chief prosecutor for the United States,
Robert E. Jackson, stated, "If these men are the first war leaders of a defeated
nation to be prosecuted in the name of the law, they are also the first to be given a
chance to plead for their lives in the name of the law. 8 3 Even though a court of
victor nations conducted the trials, which effectively preordained the outcome,
those charged had the opportunity to plead their defense before a court.84 For
example, several of the lower ranking officers were eventually found not guilty
and set free. 5 The Nuremberg Tribunal thus set the stage and the precedence for
trying war criminals.
8 6
Unlike Nuremberg, there were not yet any victors at the time of the creation
of the ICTY Modern media coverage broadcasted war images worldwide,
including the images of prisoner of war camps reminiscent of the German death
camps of World War 11.87 International public opinion called for something to be
done, and the United Nations responded with the creation of the ICTY in 1993.88
The ICTY created an alternative to the costly use of military force by major
powers. It allowed the United Nations to make up for its inability to stop the war
by creating a tribunal to punish the perpetrators of crimes that the United Nations
was unable to prevent. 89
Although there was not a "victor" in the Balkan conflict, the Nuremberg
precedent of "victors' justice" was the image that the ICTY has attempted to avoid
with marginal success.90 This desire for neutrality is buttressed by the unfortunate
reality that a criminal court's effectiveness is dependent on its ability to exercise
power over the criminal defendant. In order for a court to make an act by an
individual who is foreign to the court illegal, such as had been done with the
81. BEIGBEDER, supra note 44, at 35.
82. Id. at 35-36, 38.
83. Id. at 40-41.
84. See id. at 39
85. Id. at 38.
86. Ii at 39. Justice Robert Jackson, on leave from the United States Supreme Court has been
credited with perhaps "the worst cross examination in history" for his treatment of Hermann Goenng.
His performance was of little matter, as Goering's guilt was predetermined. See Scott W Johnson and
John H. Hinderaker, Guidelines for Cross-Examination: Lessons from the Cross-Examination of
Hermann Goering, 59 OCT. BENCH & B. MiNN. 22 (2002).
87 National magazines in the United States, such as Time and Newsweek, ran full stories with
horrifying images and international film crews like the BBC and CNN delivered the images as well of
emaciated men in the Omarska, Kerraterm, and Trnopolje camps.
88. Ivan Simonovic, The Role of the ICTY in the Development of International Criminal
Adjudication, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 440, 442 (1999).
89. Diplomatic attempts to stop the fighting between the former Yugoslav Republics continued to
fail until the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. From 1993 to 1995, the ICTY served as token action
by the international community towards an end to the conflict. BEIGBEDER, supra note 44, at 146-47
90. BASS, supra note 3, at 282. (quoting tribunal President Cassese, in reacting to the claims of
victors justice, as stating "this is truly international institution, it is an expression of the entire world
community, not the long arm of four powerful victors").
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Nuremberg Tribunal and now with Milosevic, the court must also have the power
to enforce its jurisdiction and to adjudicate the criminal matter.9 1 The ICTY is able
to exist and prosecute Milosevic because of NATO's subsequent bombardment and
occupation of areas of the former Yugoslavia and the willingness of the Serbian
leadership to turn him over to the ICTY
3. The arrest and indictment
Milosevic remained in Serbia for several months after his resignation in
October 2000, even though he was a fugitive in the eyes of the international
community 92 The prosecutor for the ICTY indicted Milosevic during the second
NATO bombing campaign alleging war crimes and crimes against humanity 93
The indictment was issued sixty days into the NATO bombing campaign against
Serbia, on May 22, 1999 94
In April 200 1, almost two years after his indictment by the ICTY Serbian
police arrested Milosevic. 95 Upon his arrest and confinement in a Serbian prison,
President George W Bush released $50 million in aide to the Serbian republic for
its capture and detention of Milosevc. 96 It was not clear what would have
happened to Milosevic in the Serbian prison. By not acting however, it appears
that NATO and other world powers were willing to let Milosevic remain in
Serbian custody In addition, the recently elected President Kostunica was
unwilling to turn Milosevic over to NATO powers.97 Then, seemingly overnight,
the United States and NATO changed gears, deciding that Milosevic should be
tried by the ICTY and conditioned an additional $1.28 billion in aid on the
surrender of Milosevic. 98
President Kostunica remained reluctant to turn over Milosevic to the ICTY 99
But in June 2001, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, a political rival, ordered
Serbian police to take Milosevic to an American airbase in Bosnia. 1° From there,
91. Alfred P Rubin, Pining Guilt on Pinochet, 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMp L. 371, 372 (2000)
(stating that "I know of no case in which war criminal or other supposed violator of "international
criminal law" from major power has ever been tried by a neutral tribunal").
92. Charles Trueheart, War Crimes Charge to be Announced Against Milosevic, WASH. POST,
May 27. 1999, at Al.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Not surprisingly, Milosevic was charged by the Serbian police with abuse of office and
embezzlement, not cnmes against humanity or genocide. Sam Cereste, The International Court of
Justice, the International Criminal Court, and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 17 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. Rts. 911,
913 (2001).
96. SCHARF, supra note 18, at 37
97. Id
98. Id. at 106. The requirement that Milosevic be turned over to the ICTY at The Hague served
almost as an overnight reversal of United States foreign policy. United States Senator Mitch
McConnell (R-KY) inserted an appropriations rider requiring that Milosevic be turned over to the
international court as pre-condition for receiving any additional funds. Id.
99. See Slobodan Milosevic Arrested, Charged with Corruption, UN WIRE, Apr. 2, 2001, at
http://www. unfoundation.org.
100. Marlise Simons and Carlotta Gall, The Handover of Milosevic, N.Y TiMES, June 29, 2001, at
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he was flown to The Hague, Netherlands, for trial by the ICTY for genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. 0'' The
charges stated that Milosevic had "planned, instigated, ordered, [or] committed"
crimes prohibited by statute in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.10 2 The newly elected
government in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia disagreed over the extradition,
which lead to the resignation of several members. However, two days after the
arrest of Milosevic, the Belgrade government was granted $1.28 billion in aid by
NATO allies, quieting much of the political unrest that had been brewing for the
new government. 103 The $1.28 billion put the world on notice regarding the
amount of money that would be necessary to bring the former leader to trial.
PART Il -WHY HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY DOES NOT APPLY TO MILOSEVIC
One might ask, "Why isn't Milosevic using the defense of bead of state
immunity to deny the ICTY from hearing his case?" A possible answer could be
that he has other defenses that go to show that he in fact did not make the orders to
carry out the killings by the Serb paramilitary forces in Croatia, Bosnia, or
Kosovo. 1i 4 Another answer, and one that Milosevic appears to follow by not
raising the issue of head of state immunity, 10 5 is that traditional notions of
sovereign immunity are disappearing in international law Current trends in
international law show that criminally defined acts that are committed by any
individual, whether they are done while serving as head of state, constitute crimes
that may be tried by an international court. It will be argued that such crimes are
no longer afforded immunity as political realities outweigh any immunity defense.
This next section examines the deterioration of immunity for heads of states in
international criminal law and the impact it has on Milosevic's trial.
I Absolute immunity
Traditional notions of sovereignty hold that internationally recognized nations
are not to have their domestic affairs compromised by foreign nations. 106 This
notion of sovereignty allows the political body of a state within a specific territory
to be the sole arbiter of what constitutes legitimate behavior within that state. i07
While states can invite influence, such as in the form of financial or military aid,
the ruling political entity remains the sole decision maker for the state leaving
Al.
101. Id.
102. See Indictment of the Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Slobodan Milosevic, IT-0 1-51 -I,
(1999).
103. SCHARF, supra note 18, at 37.
104. In fact a major issue facing the prosecution is the fact that Serb forces did not keep paper
trail of orders, and most if any orders from Milosevic were made orally.
105. SCHARF, supra note 18, at 105.
106. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 19 (Princeton University Press
1999). The term absolute sovereignty stems from the Treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648 creating
ideas of the modem state and allowing for actions within a state to be free from foreign scrutiny.
107. Id. at 20.
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foreign states unable to interfere with the inner workings of the sovereign state.' 0
This notion of sovereignty also applied to heads of state who held immunity
from civil or criminal prosecution at any point while serving as head of state or
after their tenure.'0 9 In Kahan v. Pakistan Federation,iiO the English court held
that a "foreign sovereign is entitled to immunity from civil proceedings in the
courts of any other country, unless, upon being sued, he actively elects to waive his
privilege and to submit to the jurisdiction." '' i While the action against the
Pakistan Federation was a civil claim for a breach of contract,' 12 the court stated,
"It is established beyond question that a mere agreement by a foreign sovereign
to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of this country is wholly ineffective if the
foreign sovereign chooses to resile from it."'' 1 3 The Pakistan Federation's
agreement allowed the English court to resolve contract disputes, 1 4 but Pakistan
later chose not to grant such jurisdiction when the matter came before the court.' i5
Because of the rule granting immunity to the sovereign of a state, the court
dismissed the complaint.i6 Kahan serves as an example of the application of
absolute immunity where no state has jurisdiction in adjudicating claims against
the sovereign state or its political head.
2. Restrictive immunity
The traditional notion of granting immunity to a head of state continued well
into the last decade of the twentieth century in United States courts as shown by
the case of the former president of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, whowas elected
in December 1990.117 An unsuccessful military coup was attempted against
President Aristide in January 1991, shortly after his election.iS However, in
September of the same year, Aristide fled Haiti after a second, and this time
successful, coup.ii 9 While in exile, a resident of New York filed suit against
President Aristide for killing her husband, Dr. Roger Lafontant, in federal district
court in New York. 120 The complaint alleged that President Aristide ordered the
execution of Dr. Lafontant shortly before Aristide was exiled because of the
108. Id. at21.
109. See Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, I Q.B. 149 (1893) (finding that foreign sovereign acting as
private individual and residing in England under an assumed name had sovereign immunity for
breach of contract even though he had concealed the fact that he was a sovereign).
110. Kahan v. Pakistan Fed'n, 2 K.B. 1003 (1951).
Ill. Id. at 1013 (emphasis added) (quoting Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, I Q.B. 149 (1983)).
12. See id. at 1003.
113. Id. at 1012.
114. Id. at 1016
115. Id. at 1010.
116. Id. at 1016.
117. See U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Haiti, Apr. 2002, available at
hftp://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1982.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2002).
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. Lafontant v. Anstide, 844 F Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y 1994).
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doctor's participation in the failed coup attempt in January 1991.121 Applying
common law notions of absolute immunity, the court dismissed the complaint.
22
The court said that a "head of state recognized by the United States government is
absolutely immune from personal jurisdiction in United States courts unless that
immunity has been waived by statute or by the foreign government recognized by
the United States."' 23 The court reasoned that President Aristide, although in exile
in the United States at the time of trial, 24 was recognized as the Head of State of
Haiti by the United States government.125  As such, the court did not have
jurisdiction regardless of whether Aristide committed a crime that was not in
furtherance of his official function as president.
26
This similar doctrine of absolute immunity was claimed by General Manuel
Antonio Noriega, but with a different result. 27 Noriega served as commander of
the Panamanian Defense Forces when Panama's President Eric Arturo Delvalle
asked for his resignation.' 28 Noriega refused, and Delvalle was voted out of
power. 29 The United States then invaded Panama with a significant military force
and Noriega surrendered to United States forces after several days of seeking
asylum with the Holy See. 30 The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Noreiga's claims of
head of state immunity stating, "the Executive Branch [President George H. Bush]
has manifested its clear sentiment that Noriega should be denied head of state
immunity ,131
By granting such deference to the executive branch of the federal government
m both instances, the United States' Executive is able to determine who should
receive immunity, disregarding the long held tenants of absolute immunity for
heads of state. Just by recognizing a nation and its leader as legitimate allows that
nation to be granted immunity for his or her actions while leader of that state.
Such a blanket grant of power to the executive branch of government may appear
overstated. However, the current trend in the doctrine of immunity allows
international public opinion (or the opinion in the powerful countries) to decide
121. Id. at 130.
122. Id. at 139.
123. Id. at 131-32.
124. President Anstide did not return to power until October 1994, after the United States led a
21,000 strong force to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 940. The Resolution
authorized member states to use all necessary means to restore the elected government to power. See
U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Haiti, Apr. 2002, supra note 114.
125. See Lafontant, 844 F Supp. at 121.
126. Id. at 130. If, for example, the ICTY had jurisdiction over Aristide, he could be charged under
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute, with crimes against humanity for acts conducted against civilian
populations in Haiti since his return. See Human Rights Watch, Haiti, the Human Rights Record of the
Haitian National Police (Jan. 1997) available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/
haiti/Haiti.htm#P62_1831 (last visited Nov. 13, 2002) (documenting several instances where the state
run police, the Haitian National Police, has conducted extra-judicial executions and acceptance by the
government of beatings and other abuses of civilian populations).
127 United States v. Nonega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11 th Cir. 1997).
128. Id. at 1209.
129. Id. at 1209-10.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1212.
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who should be granted immunity Had the crime by President Aristide been
different, or more importantly had it not been President Anstide, perhaps the court
would have come to a different result. United States courts see head of state
immunity not as "a matter of right but rather 'a matter of grace and comity"' where
immunity is granted to those friendly with the nation. 132
3. Deterioration of immunity protection for heads of state
The trial of Augusto Pinochet, the former leader of Chile, signaled a change
in how nations deal with head of state immunity for crimes defined in international
law i33 Pinochet ruled as President of Chile from 1973 to 1990 when he became a
Senator for Life pursuant to the Chilean Constitution, and served as Commander-
in-Chief for the army for another eight years. 34 Throughout his rule, over 3,000
political opponents were killed or "disappeared,"'1 35 some of whom were Spanish
nationals. 136 In 1998 Pinochet was visiting the United Kingdom for medical
treatment when he was arrested following his back surgery 137 The Spanish
government requested his extradition to Spain charging Pinochet with murder,
genocide, torture, and conspiracy to torture. 38 A divided panel of the House of
Lords ruled that the doctrine of head of state immunity did not apply to actions that
were inconsistent with international law "9 Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated that
Pinochet would not be entitled to immunity if he "organised and authorised torture
after 8 December 1988,140 [for] he was not acting in any capacity which gives rise
to immunity ratione materiae because such actions were contrary to international
law" to which Chile had agreed. 4 1 Because Pinochet's actions in ordering the
torture of certain individuals did not constitute an official function in his role as
head of state, the court decided to allow for his extradition to Spain to stand trial.'42
Although Pinochet has not yet stood trial before the court due to health reasons, the
decision of the House of Lords indicates a clear departure from the historical
132. See Ved P Nanda, Human Rights and Sovereign Immunity and Individual Immunities
(Sovereign Immunity, Act of State, Head of State Immunity and Diplomatic Immunity) - Some
Reflections, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP L. 467, 475 (1999).
133. See Charles Pierson, Pinochet and the End of lmmunity: England's House of Lords Holds that
Former Head of State is not Immune for Torture, 14 TEMP INT'L & COMp L.J. 263 (2000).
134. Id. at 264-65.
135. Id. at 265.
136. Id at 266.
137. Id. at 266-67
138. Mike Meier & John. R. Schmertz, House of Lords Rules that Crimes of Torture Allegedly
Committed During Pinochet Regime in Chile are Extraditable to Extent they Occurred After
Ratification of Torture Convention by Chile, Spain and United Kingdome in late 1988; Head of State
Immunity Held Inapplicable to Torture Charges as Jus Cogens Offenses, 5 INT'L L. UPDATE 41 (1999).
139. Id.
140. In 1998, the United Kingdom adopted the International Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, allowing for the prosecution of individuals
charged with torture.
141. Regina v. Bartle and the Comm of Police for the Metropolis & Others Er Parte Pinochet, 38
I.L.M. 581, 594 (1999).
142. Id. at 643.
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notions of head of state immunity. Even if the acts were official, they may still
violate international law
The dissenters took a narrower view of what activities constitute official
duties. 143 Lord Millet stated that just by agreeing to the Torture Convention, Chile
had not waived immunity for its former head of state. 144 Pinochet's acts were in
fact government acts: signing orders designed to be camed out by government
officials. Head of state functions, according to the dissenters, are not to be
determined by international law, as even an oppressive government is still a
government. 145
In times of conflict, immunity has not been granted to those who were beaten.
Rather, immunity is often used as a bargaining chip to bring about an end.
146
Immunity is used by powerful nations to encourage regime changes. 147  For
example, to encourage peaceful transitions of power, the United Nations has
helped negotiate amnesty for leaders of the apartheid regime in South Africa, the
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and leaders of the military regime in Haiti.
1 48
Furthermore, states (and the public opinion within those states) have become more
willing, as is evident with Milosevic, to try individual leaders in their executive
capacity due in part to an increasing significance and acceptance of international
human rights law 149 Much like the Nuremberg court, the desire to put leaders on
trial for their actions after the international community has decided to act plays an
important role m deciding who is tried and for what crimes.
Professor Stephen Krasner calls sovereignty an "organized hypocrisy" where
the sovereignty of nations is "frequently compromised through intervention in the
form of coercion or imposition by more powerful states, or through contracts or
conventions that have involved invitations for external actors to influence domestic
authority structures."' 50 Where a nation and its leaders are free to act within their
particular borders, traditional notions of sovereignty are only followed or agreed to
when major nations lack the will to intervene. Professor Krasner states that nations
143. Id. at 652.
144. Id. at 651 (Lord Millet).
145. See Charles Pierson, Pinochet and the End of Immunity: England' House of Lords Holds that
Former Head of State is not immune for Torture, 14 TEMP INT'L & COMP L.J. 263, 291 (2000).
146. Michael Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court, 32 CORNEL IN'TL. L.J. 507 514 (1999) (stating "When the international community encourages
or endorses amnesty for human rights abuses, it sends signal to other rogue regimes that they have
nothing to lose by instituting repressive measures. Such regimes can always bargain away their crimes
by agreeing to peace").
147. See generally Larry Rohter, Mission to Haiti, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 5, 1994 at Al.
148. SCHARF, supra note 18, at 48-9
149. JURGEN BROHMER, STATE IMMUNITY AND THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTs 221 (Kluwer
Law International 1997). Jurgen Brohmer argues that the growing jurisprudence of international
humanitarian law contradicts many of the notions of sovereign immunity. It is further argued that
notions of sovereign immunity should be further restncted when there are violations of human rights
through the adoption of a Convention on State Immunity that allows for adjudication of violations of
human rights in another state effectively allowing states to try leaders in foreign jurisdiction for
violations of humanitarian law.
150. KRASNER, supra note 103, at 125, 220.
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have intervened in certain target nations for state intolerance of minority
populations or religious factions when there was support within the intervening
nation for such intervention.1 5 1 United States foreign policy set by the Executive
Branch, specifically the State Department, not theoretical notions of state
sovereignty determined the outcomes of Noriega and Aristide. Both leaders
claimed to be the head of state for their respective nations, and for practical
purposes each was the acting head of state, but the label used by the State
Department allowed the courts to make their respective judgments. As applied to
Milosevic, only after images of forced relocations of ethnic Albanians from the
Republic of Kosovo and reports of killings and rapes did NATO breach
Yugoslavian sovereignty with a major bombing campaign (keeping its forces
mostly out of harm's way). Also at this point, the ICTY delivered its indictment of
Milosevic. 152
4. ICTY statute and immunity
The statute of the ICTY does not provide immunity protection for any persons
charged in the former Yugoslavia. 153 In so doing, the United Nations Security
Council decided that notions of absolute or even restrictive immunity would not
apply i54 The statute gives the tribunal the power to prosecute "a person who
planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided" in the commission of a
breach of the 1949 Geneva Convention, violation of the law of war, genocide, or
crime against humanity ,,155 The statute further states that, "the official position of
any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government shall not relieve
such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment."' 156 In enacting the
statute, the tribunal does away with the head of state immunity defense for actions
undertaken while serving in the capacity of head of state or other official
position. 157
Even though the statute allows for the prosecution of Milosevic in his role as
head of state, 58 such an activity was probably not necessary. The statute codifies
the demise of any notion of immunity for officials acting against the norms
established by the ICTY 159 New notions allowing for the prosecution of heads of
state for their participation, albeit from a removed leadership role of giving orders
or even just knowing that such acts are occumng, in war crimes and crimes against
humanity would have allowed for the prosecution of Milosevic in other criminal
courts. As one scholar stated, "If there is a conflict between the interests of the
151. Id. at 125-26.
152. The Milosevic indictment was delivered on November 22, 2001.
153. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (May 25, 1994) Res. 827 (as
amended May 13, 1998 by Res. 1166 & Nov. 30, 2000 by Res. 1329).
154. Id.
155. Id. at art. 7, para. I.
156. Id. at para. 2.
157. Id.
158. See id. at art. 7, para. 2.
159. Id. atpara. 1.
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state and the interest of the individual it can no longer be maintained that the
interests of the state must always and per se prevail."'160 Gross violations of human
rights may cause nations to intervene and violate sovereignty for the stated purpose
of ending such violations, as in the Balkan states, and be approved by international
law.
5. Extradition of Milosevic
Milosevic, on his flight to The Hague with his United States captors and
officials from the ICTY claimed he was being kidnapped. 161 The ICTY rejected
this argument of kidnapping in violation of international law on the basis that a
formal extradition treaty existed between the court and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.162 The ICTY is unable to enter Yugoslavia and capture any of the
indicted individuals and is dependent upon international cooperation for capturing
war criminals like Milosevic. 63 Without a police force, it is reliant upon other
nations to enforce its junsdiction over any of the "fugitives" that It seeks. 164
The Milosevic arrest is not the first instance of international kidnapping
sanctioned by the courts. One of the most well known abductions was the
abduction of former Nazi leader Adolf Eichmann by an Israeli Special Forces unit
while he was in Argentina after World War 11.165 Although Israel was forced to
pay reparations to Argentina for violations of its sovereignty 166 the actual
kidnapping was allowed. 67 Eichmann faced trial by the Israeli court and was
eventually convicted and put to death for his participation in killing of millions of
Jews dunng World War 11.168 This was also the case with the arrest of Panamanian
General Noriega who was carted off to a United States court after soldiers invaded
Panama. 169 Following the United States Supreme Court's ruling in United States v.
Alvarez-Machan, 170 the court adjudicating the claims against Nonega said that in
order to prevail on an extradition treaty claim, Noriega had to show that the United
160. BROHMER, supra note 146.
161. SCHARF, supra note 18, at 106.
162. Id.
163. See Judge Gabnelle Kirk McDonald, Address to the United Nations General Assembly (Nov.
8, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p445-e.
164. Id.
165. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM (Penguin Books 1994) (1963).
166. See U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 867th mtg., at 1-2, S/P V 867 (1960). For history of the
diplomatic efforts between Argentina and Israel, see Mathew Lippman, Genocide: The Trial of Adolf
Eichmann and the Quest for Global Justice, 8 BUFF HUM. RTS. L. REv. 45, 54-64 (2002).
167. Id.
168. in addition to the issues regarding Eichmann's extradition from Argentina, Eichmann's
appearance created an obvious fiction in Israeli law where the accused is deemed innocent until proven
guilty. In explaining why Israel had violated Argentine law, Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion said, "it
was Eichmann who organized the mass murder, on a gigantic and unprecedented scale. See ARENDT,
supra note 166.
169 United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1210 (1 Ith Cir. 1997).
170. United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (holding that the abduction of a
criminal defendant from nation with whom United States has extradition treaty is not in violation of
treaty and may be tried in district court for criminal law violations).
2004
DENY J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
States had agreed not to seize him.' 7
Professor Sheri Burr poses the question of whether kidnapped individuals
accused of human rights violations possess a legal right to be brought before an
international court. 72 Her answer is no, claiming that such actions are not morally
or legally justified and makes citizens of states feel less secure.7 3 Furthermore,
she argues that the kidnapping of alleged offenders erases thei rights to fair trials
and benefits the powerful states that have the means to conduct a successful
kidnapping. 74 Although these concerns may be valid, so long as the nation is
allowed reparations for the violation of its territorial integrity, and there is a desire
by the international community to see that the individual is brought before a
tribunal, the international community appears willing to allow for the kidnapping
of officials and others. 75  While the ICTY has decided that it does have
jurisdiction over individuals who are brought to stand trial before it against their
will, 176 the question remains how other courts, such as the ICC, will be able to
assert jurisdiction over an individual brought before it.
PART III -RATIONALIZING MILOSEVIC's TRIAL
The indictment of Milosevic was handed down in May 1999 sixty days after
the NATO bombing campaign began, eight years after the conflict in Yugoslavia
started, four years after Milosevic signed the Dayton Peace Accords, and well
after the arrival of thousands of United Nations peacekeeping troops. It came at a
time when support in NATO nations for activities in the former Yugoslavia was
declining. 177 The bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, and the use of
cluster bombs and depleted uranium munitions on military and civilian targets,
strengthened political opposition in NATO countries. 178  It appears that the
Milosevic indictment was delivered at such a time to show that an end of the
conflict, and therefore foreign involvement, was in sight and there was a goal of
arresting and bringing to justice international war criminals.
1. Non-cooperation of Yugoslav republics
Since the creation of the ICTY the main problem that the tribunal has faced
has been its inability to arrest and put on trial the leaders in the former Yugoslavia
responsible for the atrocities. With the exception of Milosevic, the other major
171. Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1213.
172. Sherr L. Burr, From Nortega to Pinochet: is there an International Moral and Legal Right to
Kidnap Individuals Accused of Gross Human Rights Violations, 29 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 101
(2001).
173. Id. at 14.
174. Id at 112.
175. See Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. at 655.
176. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, IT-94-I-A (1997) (stating
"The Statute grants competence to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the terrtory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991").
177 SCHARF,supra note 18, at 102.
178. Id.
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Bosnian-Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic have been charged with
war crimes but remain at-large.' 79 As of March 2004, the ICTY has issued over
110 indictments with ninety-one individuals in proceedings before the tribunal.' 80
Twenty indicted individuals however, remain at large.1'1 Without any enforcement
power at its disposal, the ICTY has relied upon "dumb luck" for finding and
arresting those before the tribunals. 182 The current governments of the nations
making up the former Yugoslavia have been reluctant to turn over war criminals to
the Tribunal, putting into question the court's effectiveness. 8 3 The United States
has made some efforts to pressure the nations of the former Yugoslavia into
cooperating with the ICTY 184 In May 2002, a freeze on financial assistance was
lifted and roughly $40 million in aid and $300 million in frozen assets were handed
over after Yugoslav officials agreed to respond to document requests.
185
Former ICTY President Claude Jorda recently complained, "The Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia is not co-operating m tracking down, arresting and
transferring to The Hague certain of the accused. ' 'is6 While arrest warrants have
been issued and evidence for other indictments requested, these requests have been
summarily ignored. 187 The refusal to cooperate extends beyond Serbia. For
example, Croatia has refused to turn over General Janko Bobetko, indicted for
killing over 100 Serbs in a 1993 military campaign, with the official position that
the massacre was part of a legitimate military operation. 188 However, since some
leaders in Serbia saw fit to allow United States troops to take Milosevic to The
Hague rather than see him tried in Serbian courts, the ICTY has its first "big
catch. Therefore, the inability of the ICTY to function without international
assistance is a major weakness of the court.
2. Factors causing international intervention
NATO's intervention into the Balkan region poses several questions as to the




182. See, e.g., SCHARF, supra note 18, at 250-51 (describing an arrest that took place in January of
1996 when Bosnian Serb General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic took a wrong turn in
the city of Sarajevo and ran into the Bosnian police who promptly arrested them even though neither
had been indicted by the ICTY The two were transferred to a Bosnian jail where French soldiers took
them away to a United States airbase and then to The Hague. Upon their arrival, prosecutors scrambled
and General Djukic received an indictment and Colonel Krsmanovic was eventually set free).
183. BEIGBEDER, supra note 44, at 161-2.
184. Bruce Zagaris, Yugoslav Tribunal Flourishing, 18 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 310 (2002)
185. Id.
186. Hague Tribunal Calls for UN Pressure on Belgrade, REUTERS NEWS, Oct. 23, 2002.
187. Id.
188. Britain Demands Croatia Accept Indictment of War Criminal, AP NEWSWIRES, Oct. 15, 2002.
189. For example, the Russian Federation proposed a United Nations Security Council resolution to
require NATO to cease bombing and declare the act as unlawful but was vetoed by the NATO states.
See Security Council Rejects Demand for Cessation of Use of Force against Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, UN press Release SC/6659 (Mar. 26, 1999).
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charter asks members to "refrain" from the "threat of force or use of force" in
conducting their international relations.' 90 The Article was violated by NATO's
threat and ultimate use of air strikes against Yugoslavia.' 9' However, since the end
of the Cold War, there has been a shift in international law that allows for the
justification of intervention on "humanitarian" terms; internal conflicts involving
human rights violations or other crimes against humanity pose a threat to
international peace and security and thereby provide the authority to intervene.
92
In addition to sending peacekeeping troops to the Balkans, the United Nations has
attempted such humanitanan intervention in Somalia, Rwanda, and in East
Timor. 93  In Somalia, however, United Nations, and United States, casualties
quickly turned the stomach of nations sending peacekeeping forces.194 The United
Nations' failure in Somalia to stop warring factions led to its reluctance to
intervene in Rwanda 195 and then later to deploy troops in Bosnia'96 but to keep
them out of harm's way. But, the prospects of providing humanitarian assistance
to the Kosovars, after the international community witnessed the ramifications of
earlier failures including efforts m Bosnia, allowed NATO to act albeit without
Security Council authorization.1
97
Professor Gary Bass argues that there are limits for when a liberal, or
democratic, state will act. 198 The idealism that can cause a state to act against the
"face of foreign wickedness" can also cause a turning away and abandonment of
the pursuit ofjustice.199 According to Professor Bass, there are a number of factors
that cause a liberal state to pursue war criminals through an international criminal
190. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
191. See Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, Kosovo: A Thin Red
Line, 10 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1999), also available at http://www.ejil.org/joumai/Voli0/Nol/abi-
2.html#Heading2.
192. See Louis Henkin, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo and the Law of "Humanitarian
Intervention, 93 A.J.I.L. 824, 825 (1999) (arguing that unless the military action is sanctioned by the
Security Council, unilateral or even collective action such as the NATO bombing of Serbia after its
invasion of Kosovo, is unlawful); see also Ved P Nanda, Human Rights and Sovereign and Individual
Immunities (Sovereign Immunity, Act of State, Head of State Immunity and Diplomatic Immunity) -
Some Reflections, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP L. 467 (1999) (arguing that a human rights exception ought
to be added to the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act "to allow the law to catch up with
the monumental progress of international human rights law").
193. See Background Note, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Jan. 15, 2004, available at
http://www.un.org/peace/bnote0O0i.pdf.
194. See e.g., Editorial, The United Nations at 50, N.Y TIMES, June 26, 1995, at AI4.
195. Secretary General Kofi Annan said, "Confronted by gross violations of human rights in
Rwanda and elsewhere, the failure to intervene was driven more by the reluctance of Member States to
pay the human and other costs of intervention, and by doubts that the use of force would be successful,
than by concerns about sovereignty. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 4th plen. Mtg., at I, U.N. Doc. A/54 PV 4 (1999).
196. Id.
197. See Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, Kosovo: A Thin Red Line, 10
EUR. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1999) (stating "we would be well advised to regard the Kosovo Crisis as a
singular case in which NATO decided to act without Security Council authorization out of
overwhelming humanitarian necessity, but from which no general conclusion out to be drawn).
198. See generally BASS, supra note 3.
199. Id. at 5.
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court. 20° These factors are a sense of legal norms, desire to protect the intervening
nation's soldiers over the lives of foreigners, an appearance that there has been war
against the liberal states, public opinion is such that the outrage is able to influence
the democratic process, and there is pressure by non-state actors such as non-
governmental organizations. 2 1 In applying these factors, it makes sense why the
United Nations chose to establish a tribunal rather than use ground forces to stop
the war in the region. The United States and the international community did not
want to intervene forcefully but were willing to make the effort to provide a court
where those responsible for the carnage would be brought to justice. The United
States' reluctance to intervene during the height of the conflict in the early 1990's
was evident when President Bill Clinton in May 1993, refused again to send troops
to the region saying "we don't want our people in there, basically in a shooting
gallery. 2 °2 It was not until the downing of an American pilot and the capture of
three American soldiers in 1999 did support for more action grow in the United
States and NATO intensified its air bombings.0 3
There are numerous places where an international tribunal such as the ICTY
could be applied but the international community has decided not to take action
against the heads of state even after they have left their positions and are either
living or have lived abroad. Some of these suspected criminals include: Pol Pot,
leader of the Khmer Rouge and head of state during the killing fields in
Cambodia;204 Idi lmm, former ruler of Uganda, who lives in exile and is suspected
of over 300,000 politically motivated killings; 20 5 Mengistu Haile Mariam, former
Ethiopian dictator, also in exile, and allegedly responsible for up to I million
Ethiopian deaths; 206 Jean Claude Duvalier, former Haitian President, who along
with his father are estimated to have ordered the deaths of between twenty and
thirty thousand Haitian civilians;20 7 and former Indonesian General Suharto who
may be responsible for thousands of civilian deaths when he came to power in the
mid 1960's, and later when Indonesian forces invaded East Timor in 1975.20s
Where the United Nations has decided to intervene there have been results.2°9
Former Prime minister of Rwanda, Jean Kambanda, was sentenced to life in prison
200. Id.
201. Id. at 29-35.
202. Quoted in id. at 214.
203. See George Jahn, Captured US Soldiers To Be Tried, ASSOCIATED PRESS Apr. 1, 1999.
204. No state was willing to put Pol Pot on trial for his actions as leader and died prior to the
establishment of tribunal similar to the ICTY All but two of the prominent Khemr Rouge figures
remain free. See Mary Margaret Penrose, It's Good to be the King!: Prosecuting Heads of State and
Former Heads of State Under International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 193, n. 9-10 (2000).
205. Id. at note i1.
206. Id. at note 12.
207. See Human Rights Watch, Haiti, Thirst for Justice, a Decade of Impunity in Haiti, 1996,
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Haiti.htm (crediting the Duvaliers with driving hundreds
of thousands of Hatians into exile, fleeing official torture and murder).
208. Suharto Crimes Against Humanity, INSIDE INDONESIA DIGEST 60, May 22, 1998, available
at http://www.nsideindonesia.org/digest/dig6O.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2004) (arguing for an
international criminal tribunal similar to the ICTY for crimes committed by the Suharto regime).
209. Id.
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for crimes against humanity and genocide against the civilian Tutsi population in
Rwanda. 2 1' Kambanda was turned over to the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda after Kenyan authorities arrested him.21' This dynamic, where certain
individuals are prosecuted, or even indicted, is representative of a system of
international law that is "constrained on one end by voluntary compliance of
consenting sovereign states and on the other by the political deadlock of the
moment.",212 Only after the international community achieves a political will and
states which are harboring suspected criminals opt to participate are those who
caused the atrocities put to trial. It took a significant NATO bombing campaign, a
regime change, and the arrest and subsequent middle of the night extradition, for
Milosevic to come to trial.213
While the world continues to sit idle as other atrocities continue, the desire of
the ICTY to avoid appearances of "victors' justice" is doomed. Without the
consistent application of international law to all individuals, the stigma and
precedent of the Nuremberg court will remain. "In the last analysis, the two
international war crimes tribunals in The Hague and Arusha stand largely as
testaments to the failure of America and the West. Had the West managed to
summon the political will to stop the slaughters in Rwanda and Bosnia, there
would have been no need for these two fragile experiments in international
justice. 2t 4 Professor Bass sees the experience of the war crime tribunals as having
potential to work.2 15 But with the exception of Nuremberg, they have not worked
as well as possible.216 The ICTY began with a lengthy trial of an insignificant
player, Dusko Tadic, not the way that would have given the tribunal the legitimacy
or recognition that it needed.2i7 Now with the potential that Milosevic may
continue his lengthy trial to his death, or even to victory as some have questioned,
the lack of success of the ICTY to prosecute the high-ranking officials of the
Balkan conflict may spell the practical demise of a functioning and operational
International Criminal Court.
210. See The Prosecutor v. Jena Kambanda, Judgment and Sentence of Sept. 4, 1998, ICTR 97-23-
S, available at http://www.ictr.org, (last visited Nov. 17, 2002).
211. Id.
212. See Penrose, supra note 201.
213. BASS, supra note 3 at 240 (stating that at the end of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995,
seventy-percent of the American public did not want to see troops in Bosnia: one poll conducted by the
White House stated that the last thing that American troops should be used for was arresting war
criminals)., See Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in International
Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 321, 340 (1999) (arguing that courts such as the ICTY should
not precede the end of a conflict without first establishing a mechanism to ensure enforcement); See
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22, Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo., Trial Chamber,
Sentencing Judgment (May 29, 1996), available at http://www.un.org/icty/judgement.htm; see also
Article 24 of the Statute of the ICTY (stating that "the penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be
limited to imprisonment").
214. BASS, supra note 3, at 283.
215. Id. at310.
216. Id.
217 Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings, at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm.
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PART IV - THE LEGACY OF THE TRIAL
The trial of Slobodan Milosevic brings many "firsts" to international criminal
trials. In addition to the first trial of a head of state for war crimes, the trial has
brought wartime adversaries into the opposing sides of a courtroom, with one head
of state testifying against another. 2t 8  The trial of Milosevic, and others at The
Hague, will have lasting impacts in the region and the world, especially with the
creation of the ICC, as Milosevic's trial is certain to be a "harbinger of [the] future
when there will be more trials like this.,,
219
I Impact in the former Yugoslavia
The international community hopes that the Milosevic trial and the ICTY will
help create some healing in the former Yugoslavia. 220  This in part has already
happened with the uneventful reelection attempt of Vojislav Kostunica as President
of the Republic of Yugoslavia.22' Milosevic's trial also has played an important
role m increasing the tribunal's effectiveness and credibility 222 Furthermore, the
trial may help educate the people of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo,
Serbia, and the world as to what happened so that such acts do not occur in the
future. However, reliance upon the tribunal to prosecute war cnminals by the
governments of the Balkan states has not served to develop local war crimes
prosecutions in the regions of the former Yugoslavia.223
In order for the ICTY to meet its goals, the international community should
take a sincere interest in the ICTY's operations. The yearly budget of the ICTY
has increased from $276,000 in 1993 to over $223,000,000 for 2002-2003 and a
staff of 1238 from eighty-four countries.224 Yet, with the increase in staff and
resources, the ICTY continues to face critical resource shortages. 225  It also
struggles with logistical problems such as providing a place where convicted war
criminals are to be imprisoned; making it reliant upon United Nations member
states to house convicted criminals.226 The ICTY also does not have any
218. Marlise Simons, Croat Leader Says Milosevic Made "Rivers of Blood N.Y TIMES, Oct. 2,
2002, at A7 (describing the testimony of Croatian President Stjepan Mesic against Milosevic, and
appearing as the first head of state to appear as witness at the ICTY).
219. Id. (quoting Richard Dicker).
220. Id.
221. See Misha Savic, President Kostunica Carries on Legal Battle over Failed Elections, AP
NEWSWiREs, Dec. 14, 2002 (reporting that some argue that there is a lack of interest in that not enough
people are voting to satisfy the constitutional requirements).
222. See David Tolbert, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:
Unforeseen Successes and Foreseeable Shortcomings, 26 FLETCHER F WORLD AFF 7 (2002) (arguing
that the increase in credibility comes after NATO troops allowed indicted individuals, such as Mladic
and Karadzic, to pass through checkpoints without arrest).
223. Id. at 15 (citing the failure of the ICTY to have a significant impact on the region's justice
system as a major failure of the ICTY "tamish[ing] the successes that the tribunal has seen").
224. Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings, available at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm (last
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enforcement mechanisms to make sure that those who are indicted are brought to
trial.227 As it is, the ICTY is dependent upon NATO and the United Nations to
bring the indicted individuals to tral.228 Without a police force and a jail, the basic
necessities of a criminal justice system,229 it promises to continue to be an uphill
battle of legitimacy for the ICTY
The ICTY was created in the midst of fighting in Yugoslavia.23 ° Cries for an
end to the conflict from those who became refugees, lost loved ones, or had their
homes destroyed found little comfort when the international community sent
resources to the establishment of a court in The Hague to try those who were at the
time in the act of causing harm. 3' It will be hard for those who were forced to flee
their homeland from the fighting and destruction to not be skeptical of promises of
justice. Unlike the Nuremberg Trials, where the sentence of death was possible,
the ICTY statute limits punishment to imprisonment. 232  Concerns over the
legitimacy of the death penalty aside, the inability to impose such a penalty may
also cause greater skepticism that "justice" will be done when those who have lost
all that they have seek vengeance rather than "justice. 233
2. Impact on the establishment of the ICC
In an attempt to do away with ad hoc criminal tribunals, the United Nations
General Assembly convened the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plempotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Court, which created the
Rome Statute of the ICC.234 Nations within the international community have been
trying for some time to establish such a court235 before the statute came into effect
on July 1, 2002.236 The ICC was created to prosecute those responsible for
international crimes. 23 7 United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated, "In





231. See Penrose, supra note 210.
232. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, supra note 2 10.
233. Id.
234. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Overview, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/general/ overview.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2002).
235. Id. (discussing the history dating back fifty years from when the United Nations first
recognized the need to establish an international criminal court).
236. The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plempotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court adopted the statute creating the ICC on July 17, 1998, in Rome, Italy.
There are currently 139 signatories to the treaty, and eighty-four who have ratified it. Although the
United States signed the treaty in 2000, in May of 2002, the United States withdrew from the treaty.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Ratification Status, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterXVlII/ treatyl0.asp (last visited
Nov. 19, 2002).
237 Rome Statute of the international Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9
(1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) (hereinafter Rome Statute).
238. Id.
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goal of the ICC to help end conflict, to act when other criminal justice institutions
are unwilling, and deter future war criminals 239 is dependent upon being able to
exercise jurisdiction over the "wrong-doers.
The ICC will have jurisdiction over "the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole" including the crime of genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.240 Just like the ICTY
the ICC does not recognize head of state immunity 241 The statute states, "official
capacity as a Head of State. shall in no case exempt a person from criminal
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for
reduction of sentence. 242
Many see the ICTY as a trial run for how the ICC will proceed.243 Some
commentators claim that the ICC does not solve the problems that are inherent in
international criminal justice.2 " Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald in her address to
the United Nations said, "Mr. President, the international community is in the
initial stages of establishing the ICC. Make no mistake about it: if the international
community does not ensure that the orders of the Court are enforced, it is bound to
go the way of the League of Nations. 245 Without an international police force to
enforce violations of international criminal law, the effect of the ICC would be to
serve as an international reprimand for criminal acts. Indictments, such as those
delivered by the ICTY against the Bosmans Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic,
would go unheeded unless there is some incentive for the country to turn over the
individual or unless it has no choice.
The ICC foresees a world where nation states will assist in the
implementation and enforcement of international law 246 Enforcement mechanisms
of the ICC are similar to the ICTY with both placing a "general obligation to
24cooperate" upon states in the prosecution and investigation, '7 and leaving states to
"continue to pursue their own self-interests at the cost of enforcing international
law., 248 The court can only work effectively with participation at all times by all
239. Id.
240. Id. at art. 5, see. I.
241. Id. at art. 27, sec. 2.
242. Id. at art. 27, sec. I.
243. See David Tolbert, The Evolving Architecture of International Law, 26 FLETCHER F WORLD
AFF 7, 8 (2002) (stating, "The ICTY has grown into an effective court, which has painstakingly
administered trials that are widely perceived as fair. In the process, the tribunal's judges have developed
an important body of international law and criminal procedure that will serve as critical guideposts for
the ICC as well as other prosecutions for serious violations of international humanitarian law.").
244. See William Miller, Comment, Slobodan Milosevic Prosecution by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Harbinger of Things to Come for International
Criminal Justice, 22 LOY L.A. INT'L & COMP L. REV. 553 (2000) (citing the potential major problems
with the ICC are issues of state sovereignty and cooperation of states as well as overcoming political
obstacles).
245. See Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Address to the United Nations General Assembly (Nov.
8, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p445-e.
246. See Penrose, supra note 210, at 352.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 356. Professor Penrose continues, "International criminal law cannot depend on the
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involved. However, as seen with Milosevic, states are willing to satisfy their self-
interests and provide a court to resolve disputes or try criminals when it satisfies
those interests.
3. What if Milosevic wins?
Milosevic, who is a trained lawyer, has so far put on a good show. The
question then, is what happens if the prosecution is unable to tie him to making the
orders to conduct the mass executions and other crimes that he is charged with
committing and, as a result, he wins. Of course, it is not clear what will happen;
presumably if he wins, he would return to Serbia and face whatever trial may be
conducted for abuse of power. If convicted, he would likely serve the rest of his
life in a European prison.249 But the end result to Milosevic, who may not even be
able to finish the trial based upon his failing health, is perhaps insignificant
compared to the precedent that his trial will establish in trying heads of state before
the ICC.
If Milosevic wins, then the international community may be less likely in the
future to seek out war criminals and bring them before a tribunal. It would appear
easier and a less lengthy process to attempt to kill the leaders either by
assassination or bombing then go through the long drawn out process of a trial with
the potential of not convicting the leader.250 If Milosevic loses, then nations will
have a precedent regarding the level of resources required to convict such an
individual. States may also require bribes and/or bounties in order to turn over
suspected criminals, as has been the case with the ICTY 251
Cases that will go to the ICC are those where the local courts would not
charge an actor for his participation in a crime against humanity, war crime, or
crime of genocide.25 2 Therefore, it is unlikely for an individual who is not
convicted by the ICC to be tried in his or her home country afterwards. If the
country has little incentive to turn over the individual in the first place, then it
would also have little incentive to cooperate with the ICC and produce the
acquiescence of powerful nations. Otherwise, international tribunals return to the setting of "victors'
justice, which begs the question whether international criminal law is capable ofequitable distribution.
Without salient enforcement, international criminal law provides only the enticing mirage of justice.
Id. at 364.
249. See Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 150, at art. 27 As of March 11, 2004, ten
nations have signed agreements with the United Nations to enforce sentences delivered by the ICTY
These include Italy, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Austria, France, Spain, Denmark, Germany, and the
United Kingdom. Press Release, United Nations, The United Kingdom The 10th State to Sign an
Agreement on the Enforcement of Sentences With the ICTY, (Mar. II, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2004/p830-e.htm.
250. The United States war with Iraq provides an example of where numerous attempts to kill the
leader of Iraq, Sadam Hussein, failed only to later find him and take him prisoner. The United States
has assured people that his trial will be "fair and transparent, however, it does not appear that an
impartial tribunal will sit in judgment of the former dictator. See Neil Lewis, Bush Leaves Unclear
Role of Iraqis in Any Trial, N.Y TiMES, Dec. 15, 2003, at A18.
251, See discussion in Part 1 (3) of this paper.
252. Rome Statute, art. 5, sec. I.
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documents and required materials for a conviction.
CONCLUSION
The ICTY's attempts at steering clear of claims of "victor's justice" are
commendable, however, the reality of the Tribunal makes it impossible to enforce
its statute without having some nation, or group of nations, hand over the indicted
criminals. 253 States will only take the nsk of arresting international criminals if
they know they have the evidence to convict. Attempts at impaneling an impartial
jury will not overcome the intense pressure to convict. Without each nation ceding
jurisdiction to the ICC, it will be lost to the claims of victor's justice from those
nations who expect the most from the court's ability to prosecute wrong-doers,
those nations that are not strong enough to be the "victors.
253. See Penrose, supra note 233.
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THE KOSOVO CAMPAIGN: EXPLORING THE PROBLEMS OF INTERVENTION
IN INTRASTATE WARS.
REVIEW BY Jot-IN D. BECKER*
LEGAL AND ETHICAL LESSONS OF NATO'S KOSOVO CAMPAIGN, Anduu
E.Wall, (Ed.), International Law Studies, Volume 78, U.S. Naval War
College, Newport, Rhode Island, 2002.
Kosovo stands as a symbol for many things in the world of international
security affairs. First, it stands for intrastate war in a multi-ethnic society Second,
it stands for the role of collective action by regional organizations in intrastate
wars. And lastly, Kosovo stands for the problems of fighting in interstate wars by
regional organizations. Accordingly, many recent texts have looked to Kosovo as
a case study for modem war. Popular works like Waging Modern Wars by
General Wesley Clark and War in a Time of Peace by David Halberstam are
reflective here. More scholarly works are following in kind, including Legal and
Ethical Lessons of NA TO's Kosovo Campaign, edited by Anduu Wall.
Wall's text contains the proceedings from a scholarly colloquium entitled
Legal and Ethical Lessons of NATO's Kosovo Campaign hosted by the Naval War
College on August 8-10, 2001. The colloquium looked at the international and
legal lessons to be learned from NATO's Kosovo conflict from the standpoint of
jus ad bello concerns. In other words, consideration was given to issues relating to
the conduct of hostilities, rather than the jus ad bellum questions regarding the
legal justification of NATO's initiation of the air operation in Kosovo. A variety of
scholars and practitioners participated in the colloquium including representatives
from the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, the Center for
National Security Law at the University of Virginia School of Law, Duke
University of Law School, and the United States Naval War College, as well as all
the branches of the U.S. military and military allies from NATO to Israel and even
Sweden and Switzerland.
The opening remarks by Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, then-President of
the Naval War College, are insightful in two regards. First, unlike many post-
conflict conferences, Cebrowski notes this one is not focused on lessons learned,
rather it is on lessons to be examined. The distinction is important in that only the
future will show if the lessons have in fact been learned. Additionally, and
John D. Becker is third-year law student at the University of Denver where he is also a Ph.D.
candidate at the Graduate School of International Studies. A retired Army officer, he has served on the
faculties of the U.S. Military Academy and the U.S. Air Force Academy, Mr. Becker also serves as an
adjunct faculty member at the University of Phoenix and for the MBA program at Regis University.
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probably more importantly, Cebrowski talks about the linkage information age and
modem warfare. This nexus was first seen in the Gulf War and is now more in
evidence in campaigns like Kosovo and Iraq war.
The information age has been characterized by three trends-networking,
greater globalization and economic interdependence, and technology assimilation.
Each of those trends, in turn, has enormous implications for societies and their
militaries throughout the world. These changes have been analogized as
significant as the change from the agricultural age to the machine or mechanical
age.
Network-centric warfare most notable enables a shift from attrition-based
warfare to a much faster effects-based warfighting style, characterized by
operating inside an opponents decision loop by speed of command as well as by a
change to the warfare's context or ecosystem. In theory, at least, the result may
well be decisional paralysis.
It is forth noting here that network-centric warfare is the generational
successor to what was called maneuver warfare in post-Cold war defense analysis.
This movement, initially articulated by a group of young Turks in the Army and
Marines in the late 1980's and early 1990's, challenged traditional military
doctrine and standards and opened up the fields to extended discussion both within
and outside the military profession. This author was exposed to this group of
reformers and their ideas during an assignment to West Point at that time.
The approach itself is premised on achieving three objectives: first, the force
achieves information superiority, having a dramatically better awareness of the
battlespace; second, forces acting with speed, precision, and the ability to reach out
long distances with their weapons achieve the massing of effects versus the
massing of forces themselves; and third, the results that follow are the rapid
reduction of the enemy's options and the shock of rapid and closely coupled
effects in his forces. This disrupts the enemy' strategy and, hopefully, forecloses
the options available to him.
Underlying this ability is an alteration in the dynamics of command and
control. The key to this possibility is the ability to provide information access to
those forces that need it most at the time they need it most. Traditional military
notions of top-down command and control are replaced by new bottom-up
executions and organizational structures. With that change, a number of
challenges result form this new type of warfare and the text looks at three major
ones.
They are found within the area of jus in bello and include: i) targeting, 2)
collateral damage, and 3) coalition operations. In fact, the text is broken into three
parts reflecting these areas, framed by an introduction, by keynote speakers and a
conclusion, looking to the road ahead.
Among the more interesting insights provided are those by conference
speakers, the Honorable James R. Baker and Air Force Lieutenant General
Michael Short. Baker, now a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces, served as Special Assistant to the President and Legal Adviser to
the National Security Council during the Kosovo campaign. Short, now retired
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from active duty, served as the Commander of Allied Forces Southern Forces, and
commanded NATO's Kosovo air campaign.
Baker argues that lawyers have a legitimate role in military operations,
including in the vetting process of targets, targeting sets, and targeting in general.
Lawyers, however, not always readily accepted in the military targeting team, for a
variety of reasons including concerns about secrecy, delay, lawyer creep
(analogous of mission creep, where one legal question becomes ten legal questions
and which requires not one lawyer to answer but twenty lawyers to answer those
legal questions).
Baker also forecasts three areas of tension between doctrine, policy and the
law of armed conflict. The first of these, between Proportionality, Necessity and
"Going Downtown, is the tension between the legal constraints ofjus in bello and
the military importance of striking hard at the start of a campaign to surprise and
shock the enemy and thus, rapidly end the campaign. This was most recently seen
in the Iraq War with the "Shock and Awe" campaign that kicked off the war. The
second area is seen in dual-use targets, those targets which have both military and
civilian objects, and accordingly the tension is found between effects-based
targeting and the law of armed conflict. The attacking of convoys and bridges in
Kosovo fell into this category. The third area is in the tension between the
protection of noncombatants and the traditional understanding of military
objectives. Specifically, this is expressed in the question of legally killing military
(and political) leaders? This too was seen in the Iraq War with the decision to
launch a missile attack against Saddam Hussein, based on intelligence reports
which put him in a suburb of Baghdad. He concludes with the message that
lawyers remain integral to the conduct of military campaign, particularly at the
national command level, that the law of armed conflict is hard law, and that the
application of the law armed conflict is a moral imperative.
General Short's remarks follows along the same topics Baker raises but his
answers differ since his perspective is that of military commander-a professional
soldier. And Short is clear about what he thinks here. Targeting is a shared
responsibility but only in that the President and the National Command Authority
should only be concerned with approving targeting sets---command and control
nodes or power grids, for example. Individual targets that are not to be targeted
should be put on a no-strike list. Once that is done, the commander and his forces
should be allowed to get on with their mission and achieve the effects as rapidly as
rapidly and with as little loss of life and as little destruction of property as possible.
The general also notes that anyone who understands anything about modern
warfare knows that responsible commanders always take every possible step to
limit collateral damage. But the job of a commander, and his staff of advisers, is to
balance concern for collateral damage and concern for loss of life on the one hand
with the risk you are asking your pilots to take. Citing an example from the
Kosovo campaign, the bombing of a bridge outside of Nis, he notes that some Serb
civilians were killed in an attack on the bridge. Milosevic quickly lined up the
dead and brought down the international press from Belgrade to show off the dead.
This had a CNN-effect on the Clinton administration and our NATO allies,
resulting in unconscionable restrictions on bombing that target: only at night
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between 10 p.m. and 3 a.m. and no bombing on weekends. The lesson taken away
here ought to be that bombing, under any circumstances, is a difficult mission and
putting unreasonable restrictions on that mission may limit civilian deaths but it
also increases risks to friendly pilots, who are a valuable and limited resource. It
may also encourage the enemy to take advantage of those imposed limitations and
continue their campaigns of terror.
Finally Short acknowledges that while the United States should never
undertake a military campaign alone-a lesson somewhat lost on the Bush
Administration in the recent Iraq War-he also notes the difficulties involved in
coalition warfare and military operations. Unlike the Persian Gulf War, where the
norm was simply if your nation wanted to join the coalition of the willing, then you
had to follow the coalitions' rules, it was different in the Kosovo campaign. Since
NATO was an established regional organization that was fighting the war, albeit
under U.N. Security Council resolutions, the decision-making process was set and
accordingly, different. Each and every nation had to approve and agree on targets
and target sets, to the point where a small nation member could effectively veto
targets that a larger nation member might approve and want to strike. Likewise,
some nations had much more restrictive guidance and other nations did not. The
result was a complex targeting process, where specific state's military aircraft
could be used on some missions and not others, where approval of bombing
missions might be scratched in the air if approval was not granted in time, and
where some restrictions applied sometimes and not other times, depending on
where the combatants were in the timeline of the war (in other words, restrictions
were less severe in the early days of the war than later in war, when they were
much more demanding and controlling).
General Short concludes by noting that lawyers, particularly military lawyers,
have an obligation to keep the commander within the bounds of the law, while
conducting a military campaign. But, the job of the military lawyer is not to keep
the commander from doing his job; rather it is to make it possible for the
commander to do his job, without breaking the law, without blowing up things that
shouldn't be blown up, without killing people who should not be killed, and
without committing war crimes. And most importantly tell the commander the
truth, even when he or she doesn't want to hear it.
Moving into the core of the book, Parts 1II, IV and V dealing with Targeting,
Collateral Damage, and Coalition Operations respectively, a number of voices are
heard. There is little agreement on all the issues but much insight to found. For
example, Scott Silliman, a Duke University Law professor, notes while the precise
linkage between jus ad bellum concerns and jus in bello concerns is not completely
resolved, there is an important connection here. Whether one takes the 1950's
view that the good guys, because they are good guys fighting a good war, don't
have to follow jus in bello rules (which ultimately is problematic) or the more
nuisanced view, that since self-defense is the only basis for lawful conflict, then
the conflict must be measured by both jus in bello rules and if it complies with
necessity and proportionality requirements of self-defense, the link between the
two concepts is an overarching concern.
Christopher Greenwood, Ivan Shearer, George Walker, and John Norton
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Moore, to name but a few of the commentators here, discuss other issues like
whether members of the armed forces of a party to an international conflict who
find themselves in the power of the enemy are prisoners of war or not; whether it
matters, in terms of legitimacy and the applicability of laws, if interventions are
U.N.-based or regional-organizationally based; and whether the law of armed
conflict always apply, regardless of the type of conflict or the parties to the
conflict?
So it is clear that this text provides a broad and thorough consideration of the
legal and ethical concerns of fighting modern war, specifically as viewed through
the lens of the Kosovo campaign. It also suggests that the Kosovo experience can
be most fruitfully used for scholars and practitioners. As Joel Rosenthal notes
introducing the concluding section, we need to be able to see the choices clearly
and be able to articulate the principles upon we make our decisions.
We also need to consider several inclusive legal and ethical issues stemming
from rapid geopolitical and technological changes. These include recognizing that
the law needs to keep up with those changes to be relevant, we need to carefully
consider if we want to change that law from one focused on armed conflict to one
focused on international human rights, and whether we can or even should try to
learn lessons from history. These considerations will, hopefully, shed some light
on the road ahead.
In sum, Legal and Ethical Lessons of NATO's Kosovo Campaign provides a
nice summary of the difficulties found in waging modern warfare, including
humanitarian interventions in intrastate wars, where jus ad bello concerns have
become a dominant concern. It also helps us understand the difficult and complex
nature of fighting war within the constraints of an established coalition and
regional organization like NATO. One common criticism of U.S. action in the
post-9-11 world has been its reliance on unilateral action. The problems and
difficulties in fighting the Kosovo campaign suggest the other option-multilateral
action-is not always the easy alternative to fighting wars.
Additional Comment:
Immediately after this review was prepared-March, 2004-fighting once
again broke out in the Balkans. Erupting in the divided city of Mitrovica, clashes
between Albanians and Serbs across Kosovo resulted in a handful of deaths and
hundreds of injuries including U.N. peacekeepers. The U.N., according to reports
by the New York Times, has lost control of several city centers throughout Kosovo.
NATO responded by sending an additional 1,000 reinforcements to the already
18,000 troops in Kosovo.
Coming almost five years after the NATO intervention, the most recent
clashes show at least two things. First, ethnic divisions in multi-ethnic states
remain will remain for years and years, no matter the kind or type of interventions.
Given that these divisions are often grounded in history and culture that extends
for many generations pnor to the present day it is sheer lunacy to assume that a
few years of monitoring and controlling outward violence will change those
divisions. Changing a culture-be it in an organization or a state-requires both
strong leadership and long-term commitment, by the party desiring it. Second, the
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relationship between the U.N. and regional organizations remains problematic in
dealing with these kinds of conflicts. In past conflicts, there has not been the
luxury of having regional forces available for almost immediate action. Somalia,
Rwanda, and Haiti all come to mind as places where no regional organization was
in place to work in conjunction with the U.N. In Kosovo, the U.N. is able to rely
upon NATO to immediately deal with the problem of renewed conflict. But that
reliance is not based upon communication and cooperative arrangements between
the U.N. and the regional organization NATO. Rather, the regional organization
deals with conflict as it sees fit. This is not the spirit or the intent of Articles 39-42
of the U.N. Charter, much less with Article 2(4), which is often considered the
heart of the Charter.
Any long-term success in Kosovo is contingent upon recognition of these two
factors and incorporation of them in the planning and executions of the operations
for peace making and peace enforcement.
